AMERICA AMONG 
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AMERICA 
AMONG THE NATIONS 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

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AMERICA 
AMONG THE NATIONS 



BY 

H. H. POWERS 

Author of "The Things Men Fight For" 



Npw Ifnrk 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1917 

All rights reserved 



CoPT»icirr, 1917, 
Bt n II. IHIWERS. 

Set up mnd elcctrotyped. PublUbed December, 1917 



BwwKk h South Co., Nonrood, Mmi., U.S.A. 



©CIA481 1G» 
DEC 27 1917 



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TO MY WIFE 

MY ABLEST AND MY KINDEST CRITIC 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

This book is in some sense a sequel to the work 
published last year, The Things Men Fight For. In 
that work was considered the problem of war as re- 
lated to modern nations, and more particularly to the 
nations then engaged in the great conflict. The 
United States was mentioned but briefly at the close. 

Since that book appeared the United States has en- 
tered the war, thus completely abandoning its tradi- 
tional policy and necessitating a psychological recon- 
struction such as no nation has ever undergone in like 
time. The war is to the old-world nations the logi- 
cal outcome of a familiar situation. They have but 
to adjust their thought to new magnitudes and new 
methods. To us the change is revolutionary. We 
were outsiders before, critical, indifferent, and un- 
sympathetic. Of a sudden we became members of 
the European family and must get the family point 
of view. The task is diflScult. 

I would like to help in this task if I can. I am en- 
couraged in the attempt by the Insistence of friends 
and by the reception which the earlier work has met, 
both at home and abroad. Particularly gratifying is 
the long and sympathetic article by the late Earl of 
Cromer {Yale Review, January, 19 17), perhaps the 
last of his many publications, in which, despite certain 
misunderstandings and a few pardonable manifesta- 



AITHOR'S PREFACE 

tions of British susceptibility, I was honoured with his 
general and emphatic approval. So important is any 
word from this most distin^iished of British admini- 
strators that I have ventured to give brief considera- 
tion to his article in the Appendix. 

As the historic facts referred to are for the most 
part commonplaces of popular knowledge, I have 
thought it unnecessary and undesirable to encumber 
the book with footnotes. Those who care to go into 
these questions of historic detail with more thorough- 
ness, will find them admirably presented in Johnson's 
America s Forc'uju Rrlatiotis (The Century Co., 
19 16) a work of singular clearness in its statement of 
facts, though proffering little bv way of interpreta- 
tion, especially in the later chapters. 



CONTENTS 



Introduction 



PART ONE 

CHAPTER AMERICA AT HOME 

I The First Americans 

II The Logic of Isolation . 

III The Great Expansion 

IV The Struggle for the Pacific 
V Despoiling the Latin 

VI The Break with Tradition 

VII The Great Inadvertence 

VIII Afterthought and Empire . 

IX The Aftermath of Panama 

X The Unfinished Task . 

XI Pan-Americanism .... 

XII The Dependence of the Tropics 



PAGE 

15 

27 

40 

56 

70 

83 

97 

108 

122 

141 

158 

175 



PART TW^O 

AMERICA AMONG THE WORLD POWERS 

XIII The Greater Powers 197 

XIV The Mongolian Menace 211 

XV Greater Japan 223 



CONTENTS 

oiArrta PACE 

XVI The rsFtAHEo Powers 240 

.\\ II T»iE Backgiiol'nd of Europe .... 259 

XVIII (!tJiMAS-Y. THE Stor.m Centre .... 274 

XIX The Stcmlm Area 292 

XX The Gre-atest Kmpire 311 

XXI T"- <'-\t P'ellouship ^24 

•XAH \ 343 

Appendu 363 



AMERICA 
AMONG THE NATIONS 



INTRODUCTION 

When of old the pilgrim to Delphi went to inquire 
of the oracle concerning the things of the future, he 
was confronted at the entrance to the sacred precinct 
by the admonition, " Know thyself." To the Amer- 
ican people, as they turn, in this momentous hour, to 
inquire what Destiny has in store for them, this injunc- 
tion is peculiarly fitting. Perhaps no great people 
ever reached so advanced a stage of development un- 
der the influence of such complacent prepossessions. 
Isolated, during the earlier stages of our development, 
from the fierce rivalries of Europe and confronted in 
our own domain with no opposition worthy of the 
name, we have reached our present sprawling growth 
without any real experience of race competition, and 
with the consequent comfortable conviction that we are 
a peaceable and reasonable people, strangers to the 
fierce hate and the wicked concupiscence of unregen- 
erate Europe. With everything that we need lying 
before us and to be had for the taking, we are shocked 
at those who would get what they need by fighting. 
Opulent In lands and mines and harbours, the Impulse 

1 



2 i\ I K< )i)i criox 

to encroach upon a neighbour's territories seems to us 
peculiarly reprehensible. 

Our theory of international morality is thus as easy 
as it is simple. Nations should live content within 
their boundaries. Normal and legitimate relations 
between nations are relations of friendship. To 
maintain such relations is perfectly easy, given only 
the most elemental good will. I bat nations can live 
peaceably without encroachment or sinister designs on 
one another's territorv needs no other proof than the 
fact that we do so. With ilue modesty and absolute 
sincerity we offer ourseKes as a pattern to a jarring 
and misguided world. 

I hat the world, despite our example and demon- 
stration, continues to be misguided and ijuarrelsome," 
is a tact which naturally calls for exjilanation. The 
explanation lies ready to hanil. We are a democracy, 
a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people. ( )ther nations are ruled by kings, or have 
but recently escaped trom tluir malign control. 
Autocracy with its resulting slavery, and dynastic am- 
bition, arch enemy of j^eace. of these we know noth- 
ing, wbile l'!urope is still the \ictim of their baneful 
sway or tbe heir of their blighting tradition. The co- 
incidence turnishes an ex[ilanation altogether congenial 
to our habits of thought, .\utocracy is the cause of 
war and democracy its cure. Our task as friends of 
humanity is to liestroy autocracy anil " make the world 
safe for democracy." It is true that in our moments 
of self criticism, when no comparison with other peo- 
ples is involved, we are wont to (]uestion the realir\' 
of this government by and for the people, and arc 



INTRODUCTION 3 

disposed to assign to untitled potentates among us all 
the baneful power which we decry in the rule of kings. 
Equally, when occasion suits, we are fond of assert- 
ing that kings are but fi-gureheads quite unable to with- 
stand the force of popular opinion. But such slight 
inconsistency as these minor diversions involve, is sel- 
dom allowed to disturb our confidence in the major 
propositions. " For the human mind is hospitable 
and will entertain conflicting views and opinions with 
grave impartiality." 

Even less are we influenced by the fact that other 
nations do not wholly share our view either of our- 
selves or of our institutions. Our Latin American 
neighbours, though sharing our preference for democ- 
racy and modeling their governments as closely as 
possible on our own, persist in regarding us with 
mingled suspicion and fear. Neither our protestations 
of friendship, nor our democracy, nor our history as 
they read it, reassures them. They are not convinced 
that peaceableness and content are our inherent char- 
acteristics or that other nations are safe from our ag- 
gression. The nations of Europe can hardly be said 
to judge our claims more favourably. So far from 
being convinced that we are considerate and unag- 
gressive, they attribute to us rather unusual preten- 
sions, and have been known to characterize our claims 
as " international impertinence." The fact that we 
are at peace at a given moment, is no proof to them 
that we are peaceable. The most belligerent nation 
in the world can honestly claim to have kept the peace 
longer than we ever did. Nor does the world credit 
us with magnanimity as a victor. We are conscious 



4 INTRODLXTIOX 

of special and justifying reasons tor our spoliations. 
The world remembers only the spoliations, and re- 
mains unct)nvinced that we are pledged to maintain 
the world's peace. By way of compliment quite as 
much as by way of reproach, they refuse to credit the 
naive simplicity which wc seem to atlect. The friendly 
greet our C(jmplacent pose with a smile, the cynical 
with a sneer, but both with incredulit)', refusing to 
recognize in us a ditterent type of humanity, or in 
our institutions a ditterent political principle from 
those with which they are familiar. Just as the en- 
gineer sees in the half tilled but tilling tank no diftcrent 
hydraulic principle from that in the tank, that is tilled 
and running o\ er, so they see in the uncrowded popu- 
lation of our halt tilled land men of like passions with 
themsehes, and men who are certain, when similarly 
circumstanced, to assert themselves in like manner. 

Nor do the nations of F.urope concede to us that 
pre-eminence among the exponents of democracy which 
we are wont to assume. A majority of them ha\e 
long been fully committed to the democratic principle, 
and some have devised means of registering the popu- 
lar will more promptly and accurately than we can do. 
Kings have disappeared or have become docile instru- 
ments of democracy. I\ven where kings still reign, 
democracy is potent ami iiionarchs are circumspect. 
It is a very limiteil autocracy that survives in luirope 
totlay. And e<)ually, it is a very imperfect democ- 
racy to which we have now attained. Other nations 
may be pardoncvl. therefore, if they refuse to recog- 
nize our democracy as having talismanic virtue, the 
more so as they are unable to discover in us those pe- 



INTRODUCTION 5 

culiar virtues which we had invoked democracy to 
explain. 

If our self analysis leaves something to be desired, 
it is at least as satisfactory as our estimate of other 
nations. Having never known the needs which con- 
strain the older nations to unwelcome action, we see 
that action only in its unlovely outer aspects, and pro- 
nounce it unnecessary and perverse. " If the people 
have no bread, why don't they buy cakes? " was the re- 
proachful query of the unstarved queen. With that 
promptitude of opinion which is our national char- 
acteristic, we unhesitatingly assign the most unplausi- 
ble reasons for foreign action and propose the most 
unpractical remedies for foreign ills. Our cocksure- 
ness is neither ingratiating to them nor enlightening 
to us. It is not too much to say that the prevalent 
American opinion of every foreign country is not only 
false but uncomphmentary, a veritable caricature of 
the reality. 

As America assumes her new position among the 
nations, or more exactly, as she suddenly becomes 
aware of her actual position and realizes that she must 
work in intimate co-operation with nations which she 
has been wont to disparage and which have seemed 
to disparage her in turn, the importance of a juster 
estimate becomes apparent. These doubtful ameni- 
ties do not contribute to mutual helpfulness and effi- 
cient co-operation. Yet that co-operation is a neces- 
sity of the moment and probably of the entire future. 
It is true that we do not intend our present alliance 
with nations from which we have hitherto held aloof, 
to be permanent, but a year ago we did not intend to 



6 INTRODLLTION 

enter even a temporary alliance. Intentions count for 
little in the face of unexpected situations. There is 
no telling how lon^ this alliance will last or how com- 
prehensive it may become. 1 here will be less of 
shock and less of inconsistency in staying in, than there 
was in going in. And even if the alliance is but 
temporary, it constitutes a precedent which is almost 
sure to be followed by this or other combinations as 
future exigencies may require. All signs point to an 
increased co-operation among nations. National iso- 
lation is past and national independence is passing. 
Confronted by combinations and unable to avoid col- 
lision, there is much reason to apprehend that we shall 
adopt a policy of co-operation and strive for more or 
less permanent friendships with those with whom we 
tind that we can make common cause. This will in- 
volve difficulties ami dangers, abandonment of our 
traditional policy, and all that. It may be more a sub- 
ject ot regret than of congratulation. But our opin- 
ion in the matter counts for little. It is not a matter 
of our choosing. Science and invention have de- 
stroyed the barriers between nations, and whether we 
like it or no, we must come to terms. Whether the 
nations grou}> themselves in rival camps in one of 
which we find our place, or try to maintain a more 
difficult equipoise as imlividuals, matters little. 
Closer relations have become inevitable, and these re- 
lations can not be satisfactorily based on mutual dis- 
paragement and misunderstanding. 

In the following stuilies two principles have been 
borne constantly in mind. lirst, nations reveal their 
character by what they do rather than by what they 



INTRODUCTION 7 

say. With them as with individuals, there is often 
a wide divergence between practice and profession, 
each individual deviation, of course, having its spe- 
cial explanation and excuse, but entering none the less 
into the permanent structure of character as into the 
record by which posterity will judge that character. 
Professions which contradict this record count for 
very little. They may and ordinarily do represent 
ideals which react upon conduct, but in that case they 
find recognition in the record of conduct. To the 
practical man it matters not what a man thinks he 
stands for. The question is simply, what does he do 
when put to the test? And what he has done, espe- 
cially what he has done repeatedly, he is likely to do 
again. That, at least, is the only safe guess. So 
with nations. Every nation has certain political 
principles which it reiterates until they become shib- 
boleths. It has an astonishing power, too, to take 
these shibboleths seriously as reflecting its real con- 
victions and character. " Equality before the law," 
" consent of the governed," " non-intervention in the 
affairs of other nations," " the Monroe Doctrine," we 
can point proudly to an unvarying profession of these 
principles throughout our history, and can easily per- 
suade ourselves that this credo has represented our 
true position. The writer has no intention of proving 
or refuting this dogma. He would rather, if possible, 
forget these time honoured formulas and arrive at an 
independent estimate of national character from the 
homely facts of our national history. Equally, he 
would if possible discard the time honoured preposses- 
sions and epithets which have too long done duty with 



8 INTRODUCTION 

u> a> estimates of foreign nations, and arrive at a 
juster conclusion based on their action. 

In short, this is a modest attempt at a historic in- 
terpretation of our national character and our rela- 
tion to other nations. Not that the writer professes 
to adduce new testimony or to unearth facts hitherto 
unknown. With all deference for those who are en- 
gaged in this important task of historical research, the 
writer ventures to doubt whether their labours will 
seriously modify the data for historical judgments. 
Doubtless many minor obscurities remain to be cleared 
up, but the main facts of history for the period with 
which this study deals, are known. Those which are 
here cited are commonplaces of popular knowledge. 
But knowledge is one thing and interpretation another. 
Interpretation can never keep pace with knowledge. 
The facts of our first hundred years as a nation are 
known, but their meaning is scarcely appreciated and 
is being progrcssix ely revealed by the things that come 
after. Interpretations require continual revision. It 
is to this task that the author ventures his slight con- 
tribution. 

I he second point to be emphasized is the basic 
principle that nations act from self-interest. A like 
assumption regarding individuals underlies the science 
of economics, and without it no such science is possi- 
ble. This does not mean that nations never do the 
generous thing, — generosity often furthers self-in- 
terest, especially if spontaneous and sincere, — but it 
means that nations know their own needs better than 
others know ur can know them, and that they are 
necessarily charged primarily with the duty of pro- 



INTRODUCTION 9 

viding for those needs. This would seem to be even 
more true of nations than of individuals, for nations 
have much less of that kind of acquaintance of one 
another which makes sympathy and consideration 
possible. With a horizon of national consciousness 
extending but little beyond their own boundaries and 
a struggle to provide the necessaries of national 
existence, usually of a nature to tax their powers, any- 
thing like deference or actual concession becomes ex- 
ceedingly difficult, and must be the rare exception. It 
is a popular fallacy that friction between nations is 
due to injured sensibilities, and the frequent allusion 
to the vague entity known as " national honour " lends 
colour to this belief. The writer has repeatedly been 
asked, on returning from visits to Japan: " How do 
the Japanese feel toward Americans?" Were it 
possible to answer this question, it would hardly be 
worth while to do so. If there is ever trouble be- 
tween Japan and America, it will not be because 
Japan's feelings have been hurt, but because her in- 
terests are endangered. No doubt in a strained situ- 
ation where conflict of interests has brought nations 
to the breaking point, an affront may serve as a pre- 
cipitating cause. It did so in the present war, as in 
the Franco-German War of 1870, The value of an 
affront in such connections is such as to make it eagerly 
sought by the would-be aggressor. But to attribute 
the war to the affront is like attributing the rifle shot 
to the trigger, — true in a way, but in a way that ob- 
scures the real forces at work. The precipitating 
cause of the present war was the murder of the arch- 
duke; the real cause was the conflict of interests be- 



lo INTRODUCTION 

tween the Central Powers and their eastern and 
western neighbours. 

It is the danger of all such inquiries as the present 
that they should stop short with proximate causes. 
These causes are infinitely varied and defy all classi- 
fication. Interpretation in terms of these surface ac- 
cidents never gets us anywhere or gives us a true basis 
for ameliorative action. For instance, the Kaiser 
signed the order for mobilization and so precipitated 
this war. To remedy the world calamity, send the 
Kaiser to St, Helena. Japan is reported to be in a 
menacing mood because we have wounded her pride. 
To remove the menace, study courtesy toward Japan. 
Wars are precipitated by secret diplomacy, therefore 
abolish secret diplomacy. There is often a modicum 
of truth in such suggestions, but it is never the signifi- 
cant truth. The Kaiser would not and could not have 
signed the order for mobilization if the nation had 
not previously become convinced that its vital interests 
were at stake. There would have been no discourtesy 
toward Japan and no sensitiveness on her part if in- 
terests had not been in conflict. No secret diplomacy 
ever causes war if there are not serious issues which 
refuse peaceable adjustment. 

In contrast with the precipitating causes, these 
deeper interests of national life have a singular uni- 
formity. It goes without saying that they may be 
misconceived and unwisely defended, but they are the 
stern reality underlying all relations between nations. 
When a nation conceives its interests to be vitally af- 
fectctl, it will, if possible, take action to protect them. 

Tlic problem ot interpreting international relations 



INTRODUCTION 1 1 

and of forecasting their development reduces there- 
fore to a few simple — but difficult — inquiries. 
What are the vital interests of the nations involved? 
What is their capacity to perceive those interests? 
What is their habitual method of protecting or as- 
serting those interests? 

For the answer to such inquiries history is our only 
reliable guide. We must judge the future by the past. 
The future will not be quite like the past, and we 
shall necessarily err somewhat in our forecast. But 
if we can get beneath the accidents of the past and 
discover its essence, our error will not be fatal. In 
its essence there is a continuity in national character, 
as in human nature generally, which offers an adequate 
basis for prophecy and for constructive endeavour. 

Finally, the writer wishes strongly to insist that this 
is an inquiry, not a propaganda. If the conclusions 
reached are somewhat positive and startling, the wish 
has none the less nowhere been father to the thought. 
The writer is neither an optimist nor a pessimist. In 
some mild sense of the word he may perhaps be de- 
scribed as a fatalist, by which is meant merely that 
history seems to him less a matter of voluntary choices 
and more a matter of cosmic forces than is commonly 
assumed. The great decisions of nations have seem- 
ingly been unconscious. Men are free to choose 
among the alternatives which present themselves, but 
they have little power to determine what those alter- 
natives shall be. Their choices, even within the limits 
allowed, have a significant uniformity. There is 
nothing depressing in these facts. We need a very 
stable and dependable world about us if choice is to 



12 INTRODUCTION 

have any significance. If choice could determine the 
greatest things, who knows what some other man's 
choice might do? 

Be this as it may, one who sees in history princi- 
pally a record of cosmic forces and of subconscious 
human decisions, has little temptation to be a Petcr- 
the-Hermit. Poor Peter! How much he thought 
he was accomplishing! How little he realized that 
he was but a bubble borne along on the surface of 
a resistless cosmic current! 

This book is written with a paramount conscious- 
ness of this current. Upon it ride the frail craft 
which bear the destinies of men. It bears us, we 
know not whither. We have no reason to believe 
that it threatens us with destruction. We may fairly 
hope that it is more spacious and more placid as it 
nears the great sea. Nor are we helpless or deprived 
of a worthy task. The navigator's task is still a 
man's task, though he does not make the river or 
determine its current. 



PART ONE 
AMERICA AT HOME 



CHAPTER I 

THE FIRST AMERICANS 

The history of the American people as such be- 
gins with the founding of the EngUsh colonies of 
North America. There were other colonies and 
earlier colonies of Europeans planted within the 
limits of the United States, and these colonies have 
not been without important influence on the history 
and character of the American people. But these 
earlier colonies have not themselves survived, and 
their chief contribution to American character was 
the hardihood engendered in their political exter- 
mination. As individuals they of course survived, 
and their descendants are easily recognized in the 
Spanish families of our southwestern states, the 
French of Louisiana, and in the Dutch aristocracy of 
Manhattan. But their numbers being insignificant 
and their political independence early extinguished, 
they have necessarily merged In the larger body of 
English speaking population, and have accepted or 
are accepting its civilization. It Is therefore with the 
English colonies that we have to deal. The strug- 
gles with earlier and later rivals, like the struggles 
with the Indians, are merely incidents In the history 
of the English colonies. They were very important 
Incidents, however, and must receive due attention 
at the proper moment In any Inventory of American 
achievement and character. 

IS 



1 6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

It is a truism of history that the success of the 
Enghsh colonies was due in large measure to the 
stern natural selection by which the colonists were 
recruited. With slight exceptions the colonies were 
the result of dissensions in the homeland and the 
colonists the most irreconcilable of the dissenting 
minority. A dissenting minority is almost of neces- 
sity more assertive and belligerent than the opposing 
majority. The majority may contain individuals 
quite as assertive as any, but its average can hardly 
be so. The imitative and quiescent temperament in- 
stinctively seeks countenance in traditional and major- 
ity opinion. Dissent from accepted opinion, there- 
fore, while seldom characterized by reasonableness 
and equity, is a pretty sure guaranty of independence 
and aggressiveness. That it was so in the English 
dissensions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
no one familiar with the history of that time will 
doubt. 

It was from this picked stock that a second and 
much severer test culled those stern spirits which 
were to form the nucleus of the American common- 
wealths. The hardships of those early settlements 
were tremendous, and though but imperfectly antici- 
pated, they were still such as to deter all but the 
sternest and most aggressive. If dissent had not 
completely eliminated the adherent of conventional 
and concessive temper, colonization almost certainly 
did so, especially at first. It was a Gideon's band 
that planted the Anglo-Saxon standard on these 
shores. 

The character of the early colonist, as seen In the 



THE FIRST AMERICANS 17 

juster perspective of history, with all the trivial de- 
tails of personality eliminated and the generic fea- 
tures brought out into bold relief, quite confirms this 
a priori conclusion. The portrait reveals a stubborn- 
ness of conviction and a relentlessness of purpose 
which seem unbeautiful to a softer and more tolerant 
age. Whatever his weaknesses, sentimentality and 
forbearance were not among them. He seems fear- 
fully opinionated, the more so since his estimate of 
moral values has not stood the test of time, but he 
had the courage of his convictions and a vigour In 
their defence which we can not but admire, even when 
we do not emulate. 

It will be recognized, of course, that we are sketch- 
ing primarily the portrait of the New England 
Puritan, and it may be objected that he was but one 
of many and widely divergent types among the early 
settlers of America. But apart from the fact of his 
undoubted primacy In this early delegation, he was 
more representative than is usually recognized. 
These pioneers were catholic and protestant, conform- 
ist and non-conformist, pacifist and militarist, but they 
were one and all confronted by the same necessities 
and selected by the same tests. The single exception 
of government aid to Virginia was not continued, and 
the English colonies were saved from the demoraliz- 
ing government patronage which ruined the colonies of 
France. Even the Quaker seems to have adapted 
himself to the stern necessities of this fighting time, 
and while avoiding war in the conventional form which 
he had foresworn, appears pretty uniformly In an 
attitude of belligerent assertion. 



1 8 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

This ancestral stock, though constantly diluted by 
the indiscriminate admixture of later years and soft- 
ened by the lesser exactions of an easier time, has left 
an enduring impression upon American character. 
Heredity accounts for much, while the long continu- 
ance of frontier conditions has done not a little to 
counteract relaxing tendencies. Above all there has 
been a legacy of intellectual and spiritual ideals which 
has perpetuated the Puritan type in the face of an in- 
undation of alien thought and sentiment. Aliens have 
been dealt with piecemeal, and constrained, one by 
one, to forswear their old allegiance, until they find 
themselves, even when in majority, committed to the 
ideals of a dwindling minority. The passing of 
Puritan New England is sometimes deplored. The 
wonder is that it did not pass sooner and more com- 
pletely. New England is still Puritan in a substantial 
degree, and with it, our nation as a whole, the off- 
spring and heir of New England. 

This Initial character of the American people was 
accentuated and maintained by the situation in which 
they found themselves and the tasks which confronted 
them. The mere task of exploration and the subdu- 
ing of nature was one calling for enterprise and hardi- 
hood in the highest degree. Even yet, after three 
hundred years of occupation, the work of the pioneer 
is not finished, and It is in the memory of men now liv- 
ing that he has achieved his greatest triumphs. Con- 
tinued stimulus and uninterrupted selection ha\-e thus 
tended to maintain original characteristics. 

In this struggle the Indian has played an important 
part. Always a feeble antagonist, he from the out- 



THE FIRST AMERICANS 19 

set forfeited his claim to compassion by his own In- 
evitable savagery. The Indian could be annoying 
from the first, even dangerous, but to become civilized 
and useful required time and an amount of coddling 
and forbearance which the colonist could hardly af- 
ford. The inevitable relation was one of conflict, 
conflict which might have been different In its inci- 
dents, but hardly in its essence. And if the conflict 
was unavoidable, Its outcome was even more prede- 
termined. Even without conflict it Is probable that 
the Indian must have disappeared before the white 
man. No possible considerateness of treatment could 
have compensated for the inherent disparity between 
the two races. As It was, no such considerateness 
was shown. White superiority asserted Itself rather 
ruthlessly, impatient of obstruction by a conspicuously 
inferior race, and the Indian suffered the inevitable 
consequence of his inferiority. Nor did the later 
grudging recognition of obligation on the part of the 
more efiicient race, with Its perfunctory and demor- 
ahzlng tutelage, greatly help the situation or modify 
the outcome. 

Whether the world has lost by the disappearance 
of the Indian is not the question. We are concerned 
only to note his influence upon American character. 
The struggle was little calculated to develop military 
science on our part, but It was even less calculated to 
make us pacifists or to encourage theories of human 
brotherhood. Such theories may be accepted as of 
universal application, but as an actual working pro- 
gram, they are apt to fare badly when we are dealing 
with savages. Considerations of practical utility are 



20 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

equally at a disadvantage in this case. The savage 
seems to be a cumberer of the ground. The matter- 
of-fact competitor for his place in the sun is little af- 
fected by ideal considerations. You can make a man 
of him in time, no doubt, but not half so easily as you 
can displace him with a better man already made. 
Such considerations as these, — felt rather than rea- 
soned, — make the competition between civilized and 
savage races, especially in regions suited to either, a 
very ruthless one, and deepen the instinct of race as- 
sertion and race aggression. They have done so in 
the American people. 

But far more important than the conflict with the 
Indians was the conflict between the English and the 
earlier colonists to whom reference has already been 
made. This struggle was, of course, only the reflec- 
tion of the age-long conflict between the parent peo- 
ples in Europe. Those who see in war only a strug- 
gle for trade or the pressure of congested population 
will find it difl^cult to account for many things in these 
conflicts. At a time when France and England had 
to seek each other in America across almost impassa- 
ble barriers of unoccupied territory, when seemingly 
from sheer lonesomeness, they should have welcomed 
each other, they compassed land and sea to destroy 
each other, anticipating friction which if realized, 
could be realized only after centuries of development. 
In this struggle they sank a capital which no profits 
from the trade they foresaw could ever repay. The 
struggle seems to have been instinctive rather than 
calculated, the spontaneous manifestation of race com- 
petition. 



THE FIRST AMERICANS 21 

This fundamental antagonism was sharpened by 
certain differences of lesser import which performed 
the important service of furnishing the pretexts of 
which our unreasoning instincts always have need. 
Spaniard and Frenchman, Frenchman and Briton, in- 
stinctively grudged each other a place in the vast ter- 
ritory which they were so long unable to fill, but 
neither quite knew why. It was therefore with pe- 
culiar satisfaction that they recognized, each in other» 
the exponent of a sinful heresy, and in themselves the 
chosen instrument of God, for its extermination. 
This situation has its counterpart in the experience of 
every nation and of every individual when account 
must be given to an importunate reason for action in 
deference to an inscrutable instinct. 

When the great competition began, England and 
France were in revolt against the intellectual bondage 
of Roman Catholicism, while Spain was intensely 
loyal. Geographical situation first brought Spain and 
France into conflict, the earliest French settlements 
like the British having been founded by dissenters. 
The ruthlessness of the resulting struggle has few par- 
allels in ancient or modern warfare. It was no war 
of subjugation but a war of extermination deliberate 
and complete. The actors seem to have viewed their 
work with complacency, and if they ever felt remorse, 
the fact is not recorded. 

When later French and English came into conflict, 
reaction had triumphed in France, CoHgny and the 
Protestant cause had perished at St. Bartholomew's, 
and with them their ill starred colonial schemes. 
Colonies fostered by state aid, under the supervision 



22 AMERICA AiMONG THE NATIONS 

of the church, and soon under the direction of the 
Jesuits, suppHed abundant and mutual justification for 
a relentless war against the tenacious heresies of 
colonies even more heretical than the heretical land 
from which they came. Other differences added as- 
perity to the conflict. 

The struggle which followed lasted for a century, 
and left no generation without experience of warfare. 
If less pitiless than the earlier struggle between Span- 
ish and French, it was still a war of savage ferocity. 
Conquest, to be sure, was followed by subjugation 
rather than by extermination, but such incidents as the 
exile of the Acadians by the English and the employ- 
ment of Indians by the French, with its accompani- 
ments of massacre, torture, and cannibalism, have 
given to the memory of this war a peculiar horror. 
The final issue was settled in 1759 between Mont- 
calm and Wolfe on the plain of Quebec, and in the 
great competition of civilizations, the vast potential 
weight of America was thrown into the scale of 
Britain. 

But what concerns us is the reaction of these events 
upon the character of the American people. From 
the first settlement of the English in America to the 
final British triumph at Quebec, — a period of a hun- 
dred and fifty years, — the colonists may be said to 
have lived in an armed camp. They had gone armed 
to church as a protection against the treacherous 
native. They had participated in innumerable cam- 
paigns, often puny and inefficient, but not the less 
bitter and positive in their reaction. They had fought 
an unsparing foe and had learned to be unsparing. 



THE FIRST AMERICANS 23 

The colonists had no need of land. They could have 
given a province to every household. When at last 
the continent was assured to them, they were scarcely 
sufficient to police its eastern border. Nor does it 
appear that the vision of a countless posterity 
prompted them to so colossal a provision. To the 
alien, unless heretical, they accorded the heartiest wel- 
come, as to a fellow soldier in the fight against nature. 
That the land should ever be insufficient both for 
themselves and for him was unthinkable. 

Nor do these colonies seem ever to have contem- 
plated, like the Spanish and French, the enforcement 
of uniform religious beliefs. Many of them had 
intense convictions and were exceedingly jealous of 
their right to be religious in their own way, — even 
jealous of all dissenting opinion within their midst. 
But the notion of forcing other colonies to their own 
opinion does not seem to have been entertained. Re- 
ligious liberty in the modern sense of tolerance for 
all opinions was certainly not their ideal, but as be- 
tween their several isolated settlements they exhibited 
passive tolerance at least. Whatever may be true of 
the French, the English did not fight these wars in 
the interest of religious propaganda. 

Nor yet for trade, though the traders of the two 
peoples, penetrating the remote wilds in quest of furs, 
were in continual clash and were the advance guards 
of settlement and of the pernicious Indian alliance. 
But the obligation of a nation to protect its citizens 
beyond its boundaries was not recognized then as it 
is now, and it is difficult to believe that the colonies 
would ever have consented to vast expenditure of 



24 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIOxNS 

blood and treasure, and would have risked their very 
existence in perpetual wars in the interests of traders' 
profits. The recent much heralded discovery that 
war does not pay, could hardly find better illustration 
than in such an outlay for such an end. 

For what then, if not for land or faith or trade? 
There is but one possible answer, and that, perhaps, 
a new riddle to explain the old. It was an age-long 
struggle for supremacy, for dominion. The indi- 
vidual was provided for in either event. Under the 
one flag as under the other he could sow and reap 
and gather into barns. Under either allegiance he 
could trade and get gain. If his individual Interests 
were menaced, it was primarily because of his al- 
legiance. With this stone of stumbling removed, his 
path was clear. But far from purchasing individual 
well being by the surrender of allegiance, he was will- 
ing to maintain his allegiance at the expense of indi- 
vidual well being. The Englishman wanted the new 
world to be British; the Frenchman wanted it to be 
French. Neither knew, nor yet greatly cared to 
know. why. It was enough that his own was familiar 
and the other strange, enough that he had inherited 
fealty to the one and not to the other. Perfectly ir- 
rational, do you say, this blind loyalty to an unproved 
good? Yes, no doubt; as irrational as the love of 
life. Who ever yet proved that life was worth liv- 
ing? What healthy man ever tried? This is all 
merely a way of saying that we are dealing with in- 
stinct, not with reason, and it is not to reason but to 
instinct that nature has committed the guardianship of 
our vital interests. 



THE FIRST AMERICANS 25 

This struggle of civilizations of course did not 
originate on our continent. It grew up in Europe un- 
der very different conditions and was transferred to 
our shores as a part of the colonist's heritage. It 
might have been expected that under the very different 
conditions here prevailing, it would lose its bitterness 
and perhaps disappear. Europe was land hungry, 
America land-surfeited. Changed conditions might 
reasonably be reflected in a changed attitude. But 
there was no change of attitude. Hostility' between 
the two civilizations continued unrelenting, and the 
empty land found no room for the two. This un- 
compromising assertion of race instinct under condi- 
tions that afforded It none of its usual pretexts is 
peculiarly illuminating as to the nature of the force 
with which we have to deal. 

This blind instinct of race assertion we have no 
occasion either to challenge or to defend. There are 
pros and cons in plent}% but we are studying history 
just now, and are concerned to know the American 
people rather than to correct them. The broad fact 
is that throughout the colonial period they were ab- 
sorbed in a ceaseless struggle for race ascendancy. 
Harassed rather than endangered by the Indian, they 
were never allowed to forget him or let him alone. 
The tolerance that they might have shown him was 
made impossible by his alliance with an implacable 
rival. With this riv^al in turn they were compelled 
to wage a relentless and far more desperate warfare 
until victory at last compelled submission. How dif- 
ferent would have been the history and the schooling 
of the American people if, like Spain in South Amer- 



26 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ica, their occupation had met no challenge from foe- 
men worthy of their steel. It was a Spartan disci- 
pline that the colonists underwent in the century that 
closed with Britain's triumph before the walls of 
Quebec. 

But this was not all, nor yet the most important. 
Throughout the long conflict the colonist was never 
wholly unconscious that he was playing a minor 
role in a vast drama which had the world for its stage 
and the most powerful nations of the world for its 
actors. During a period of a hundred and thirt}' 
years ending with the Battle of Waterloo, England 
and France fought seven great wars, the aggregate 
covering a total of sixty-seven years, or more than 
half of the entire period. The prize of victory was 
nothing less than the privilege of leading the world 
that was, and of peopling the world that was to be. 
All that men care most for was involved in the issue, 
their race, their speech, their institutions, and their 
ideals. In all these wars except the last the English 
colonies were actively engaged. They won for their 
race the leadership of the nations, and for themselves 
the right to become the American people. 



CHAPTER II 

THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 

It would be strange if a people so sired, so selected, 
and so schooled as were the American people, had not 
developed characteristics consonant with their origin 
and their experiences. They had been compelled to 
fight for everything, and they had developed the 
fighting temper. Their antagonists had been too un- 
intelligent or too implacable to make compromise pos- 
sible, and they had become uncompromising. They 
had prospered in war, and were the easier persuaded 
to resort to it. They had known its sacrifices, but 
never its humiliations, and therefore did not feel its 
chief deterrents. On the other hand there was much 
in these early experiences to mislead them, for war 
as they knew it was not the war of organized and dis- 
ciplined Europe, and they quite overestimated their 
ability to deal with a serious antagonist. Aggressive, 
over-confident, undisciplined, and incautious we should 
expect them to be, and such we find them. The 
events of the years immediately following the great 
colonial triumph might have been predicted. 

Unfortunately for Britain, her political evolution 
had not kept pace with her territorial expansion. 
This was inevitable. A great deal of undeserved 
acrimony has been expended upon the British policy 



28 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

of this period, and especially upon the misguided 
monarch who had the misfortune to be conspicuously 
associated with it. It is all so very plain now, what 
ought to have been done. The great principles are 
so obvious, — " no government without consent of the 
governed," " no taxation without representation," 
and the like, — so very obvious, except (as always) 
in contemporary applications. It is barely possible, 
too, that a supreme genius in place of George III 
might have perceived these principles and persuaded 
his people to recognize them in their dealings with the 
colonies. It would have been a supreme achievement, 
however, one for which history scarcely furnishes a 
precedent, for It is not usually the dominant partner 
who first discovers the rights and needs of the weaker 
party. It can not be too strongly insisted that the re- 
lation which the colonies sought to establish with the 
mother country was one for which history furnishes 
no counterpart. Much has happened since to prove 
their contention to be reasonable and wise, but it did 
not and could not seem so then, especially to the more 
responsible party. This point is so vital to all our 
subsequent discussion that we may well make a little 
effort to see how the world looked to an Englishman 
of the eighteenth century. 

The problem of empire, the management of com- 
plex states. Is a very old one. When the king of 
Egypt relinquished the time honoured privilege of 
plundering the Syrians against the payment of an an- 
nual tribute, he laid the foundations of empire. He 
seems to have done nothing, however, to help his 
tributaries, unless by protecting them from other 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 29 

marauders. He taught them no arts and sent them 
no administrators. He left them to their own rulers 
and their own devices, so long as the required tribute 
was paid. The conquered territory was like a hunt- 
ing preserve in which the proprietor had learned to 
hunt discreetly, giving the hunted the benefit of a 
closed season. Its justification, like the justification 
of all things historic, lies in the fact that it was a way 
station on the road from worse to better things. 

The Roman Empire marks a great advance upon 
the empires of this primitive type. Rome still sub- 
dued peoples and exacted tribute, but she created the 
wealth that she took and much more. She made 
roads, bridges, and harbours, protected life and prop- 
erty, administered justice, and defined the relation be- 
tween man and man. The hunting preserve now be- 
came a cultivated estate whose proprietor reaped 
harvests of his own sowing Instead of depending on 
the scanty yield of nature. If material well-being 
counts for anything, Rome has put the world very 
much in her debt. 

This system was such an Immense advance over 
anything that the world had previously known, and 
its success was so Imposing that the world has some- 
times forgotten Its limitations. Yet Rome failed, and 
failed because she was unable to meet the require- 
ments which her very success created. The system 
worked admirably for a conquered and alien people 
who were not Roman and who might plausibly be 
placed in tutelage. But as these countries gradually 
became Roman in culture, intelligence, and feeling, 
their status as protected inferiors became both less ac- 



30 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ceptable and less appropriate. Yet there was no ade- 
quate means for their participation in the direction of 
affairs. The whole empire was governed essentially 
by the citizens of the imperial city. Citizenship, to be 
sure, became more widely distributed, but as the 
Roman could exercise political functions only by com- 
ing to the Cit>^ of Rome, citizenship of non-residents 
counted for little outside of personal prestige and 
protection. 

As the Republic expanded to vast proportions with 
corresponding increase of tribute, it became too much 
for any city to manage, while at the same time the 
pampered city became hopelessly demoralized and in- 
capable of exercising its functions. The provinces, on 
the other hand, were still sound, and their competency 
had steadily increased. But there was no way of 
calling them to the aid of the state. Rome had de- 
veloped arteries by which she sent her creative author- 
ity out to the uttermost parts of her dominion. But 
she had no veins through which she could bring back 
the life current to the wasted centre. With the break- 
down of the municipal control, she could think of noth- 
ing better than to reinforce it with a military despotism 
which was based on the same defective principle and 
had only the merit of being temporarily more efficient. 

Yet it is tantalizing to note how near Rome came 
to taking the next great step and solving the problem. 
When Julius Ca?sar appointed Gauls and other bar- 
barians to seats in the Roman Senate, he recognized 
in essence the great principle of representative govern- 
ment, and Rome seemed near to adding the crowning 
glory to her achievement by devising an adequate 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 31 

means for creating and maintaining the authority back 
of her administration. But the reception which these 
rustics met at the hands of those born to the toga ef- 
fectually deterred them from exercising their new pre- 
rogative, and as the poHcy did not command the sym- 
pathy of Augustus, the experiment passed with its 
originator, and the principle which it involved re- 
mained unnoticed. Probably it was incapable of ap- 
plication at that time. So military autocracy had its 
day, while authority maintained a precarious existence 
by the initiative of genius and the momentum of 
heredity. 

And now the world hibernated for a thousand years 
and waited for Britain. Outside this single little area 
the world recognized the traditional method of con- 
stituting authority which had received the sanction of 
imperial Rome, autocracy founded by chance and per- 
petuated by birth, the whole under the awful sanction 
of divine right. Britain recognized the same author- 
ity and was hardly conscious of standing for a dif- 
ferent principle. But Britain had found the talisman 
that Caesar had sought. She had her Parliament, her 
institution for " parley " between people and king. 
It was crude and weak as yet, still fighting for its 
doubtful prerogative, but it involved the precious 
principle of representation. Through delegates the 
people spoke with the king concerning the matters that 
were of concern to them, without the necessity of com- 
ing to the capital city. Slowly and painfully the Eng- 
lish schooled themselves in the difficult task of cre- 
ating, renewing, and supervising the authority to 
which they subjected themselves. 



32 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

It is impossible to exaggerate the difficulties that 
attended this task, continued, as it was, without the 
guidance of precedent and against the determined op- 
position of the monarch. Success would have been 
impossible in any but a small and well defined area 
with a fairly homogeneous people whose interests were 
so uniform that all could understand them. Race 
differences, natural barriers, or diverse interests would 
have wrecked it in its earlier stages, may conceivably 
wreck it even yet. 

It was while this struggle was in progress that the 
colonies were founded. Indeed they were in part an 
incident of the struggle, for it was the malcontents 
who saw no hope that their views could be made to 
prevail and who were unwilling to accept the necessary 
compromises, who were most prominent In the move- 
ment. It is doubtful if any one thought much about 
the political problems that were involved. They were 
still Englishmen and went with the consent of the king 
and under his protection, but they went to get away 
from the conditions prevailing under the English gov- 
ernment, and England knew and recognized with them 
that this action put them beyond the pale. How it 
would work out probably no one knew or felt it 
necessary to know. They could wait and see. 

But the all important fact for us to note is that 
whether they wanted to be a part of England or not, 
it was now physically impossible to be so. Practical 
administration must have things handy and accessible, 
while they were many weeks away. It implies 
familiarity with conditions, and this was something 
that no English minister could claim. To refer mat- 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 33 

ters to London always involved long delay and usually 
resulted in perfunctory and unpractical decisions. 
Meanwhile the colonists were not savages, but Eng- 
lishmen quite as competent as those at home and in- 
finitely better informed regarding local conditions. It 
was inevitable that such men should have their own 
way in most matters, and that although England might 
send them governors and go through the forms of 
administering the colonies from London, no governor 
would get along with them who did not respect their 
judgment and their wishes. As England was rarely 
concerned in the matter, no sensible governor would 
invite trouble by opposing their will, or bother his 
superiors by referring matters needlessly to them. 
The inevitable modus zivendi was from the first some- 
thing like this. The colonies allowed the king to 
rule in theory, and he allowed them to rule in fact. 
To challenge either half of this arrangement was to 
insure trouble. 

By a similar unwritten arrangement the colonists 
were subject to taxation, but paid no taxes. Being 
British subjects and under the king's protection, his 
right to demand tribute was as old as monarchy itself, 
a right not invalidated by the growing power of Par- 
liament. But at a time when Britain's rivals were 
supporting their colonies by grants from the royal 
treasury, regarding them somewhat as expeditionary 
forces, it was clever financiering on Britain's part to 
get her colonists to pay their own expenses. To tax 
them for the privilege of waging an arduous frontier 
campaign for the mother country would have been 
preposterous. No doubt the time would come when 



34 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

their lot would be that of normal citizenship, and nor- 
mal duties would be recognized. Until then taxation 
must be postponed. But the longer it was postponed, 
the more difficult it became to establish It. The days 
of hardship were long continued, and as poverty 
slowly gave way to modest affluence, colonial needs 
absorbed the local revenues. Quite naturally, the 
colonies came to regard this arrangement as reason- 
able and just. They looked out for their own end 
as the home folks did for theirs. Their burdens were 
as heavy and their work as well done. They shared 
In the common defence. When England fought 
France, they fought New France, and served at their 
own charges. They asked no help, and no help 
should be asked of them. If this was not ideally 
equitable. It was as near it as men are likely to get. 
All this was felt rather than asserted by the colonists, 
and England acquiesced by silence rather than by di- 
rect avowal. The right to tax was neither asserted 
nor withdrawn. It was merely held In abeyance until 
it was eliminated by atrophy. 

Representation in Parliament was the third matter 
of vital concern to a Briton. In the case of the colon- 
ists, this right, like so many others, went by default. 
As the home government was chiefly occupied with 
home affairs, It Interested the colonists but little, and 
they would have felt It a burden rather than a privi- 
lege to participate in its management. Representa- 
tion in Parliament in the early days, when the colonies 
were but insignificant communities of malcontents who 
had shaken off the dust of their feet against the British 
government, was of course unthinkable. When later 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 35 

these conditions changed and representation might 
have seemed more appropriate, the colonists were 
canny enough to reahze that if they helped govern 
England, England would help govern them. Repre- 
sentation thus wore the aspect, not of a privilege, but 
of an insidious menace. Meanwhile the colonists had 
developed little parliaments of their own and were 
jealous of their prerogatives. They were the weaker 
party, and their prerogatives, in theory, rested only on 
English suffrance. The less said about the matter 
the better. So they waived their right to representa- 
tion in the great council of Englishmen. 

To summarize the situation. In theory, the colonists 
were Englishmen, entitled to all the privileges and 
subject to all the duties of British subjects. But just 
because they went so far away that they could not 
conveniently communicate with England or act under 
the detailed direction of her government, they had 
developed a substation or advanced base of govern- 
ment direction, and to this they reported for duty or 
applied for privilege, until all working relations with 
the central station were forgotten and died of disuse. 
Yet while they had been growing self-sufficient and 
American, they were still Englishmen and had not the 
slightest idea of being anything else. It is a puzzling 
relation, and one that the world had hardly known be- 
fore, and was therefore unable to define clearly. Or- 
ganic connection between homeland and colonies, 
though nominally Intact, had quite ceased to function. 
Yet there was a conscious union of a very real char- 
acter, something quite different from the mere friendli- 
ness existing between two independent states. Try to 



36 AMJkICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

concrete it In the form of taxes and parliamentary 
control, and resistance was at once manifest, but leave 
it alone, and it remained, an iinpressi\"e reality, in- 
tangible but potent. 

The saying of Bismarck, that the art of the states- 
man is the proper evaluation of the imponderables, 
was never better illustrated than here. The unity in 
question was built of imponderables, of things that can 
not be weighed or translated into material terms. A 
proper evaluation of the imponderables would have 
discerned in this unity an infmitciv precious thing. 
L'nfortunately the faculty here required is the gift of 
a few rare spirits, among whom can not be included 
the English monarch and his advisers of this period. 
The king inherited a struggle the necessarv issue of 
which he was unwilling to accept. The authority of 
the people, as expressed through its responsible Parlia- 
ment, had steadily encroached uj^on the irresponsible 
authority of the monarch, who now engaged in a des- 
perate struggle to save and if possible to strengthen 
his prerogative. The main issue was between Parlia- 
ment and himself, an issue in which the colonies were 
not directly concerned, save that it gave them a pow- 
erful ally. But if the king's authority had weakened 
as regards Parliament, it had also weakened as re- 
gards the colonies, and that for a difterent reason. 
Parliament ditl not represent the colonies, and it was 
an open question whether it could claim authority over 
them. It might plausibly be contended that their re- 
lation was to the king alone. Vet their avowed al- 
legiance hail been shadowT in the extreme. If royalty 
was to recover its prerogative, this normal allegiance 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 37 

must be translated Into fact. The rights and duties of 
British subjects must become real through experience. 
To the minds of these men, as to certain in our day, 
only material relations were real relations. The im- 
ponderables were too unsubstantial. 

It is but fair to add that Parliament, though at 
feud with the king and therefore the logical ally of 
the colonies, was neither able nor willing directly to 
espouse their cause. Not only was Parliament at the 
time in artificial subserviency to the king, but it had 
its own feud with the colonies, claiming, like the king, 
an authority over them which they were nowise 
minded to recognize. Parliament as a whole was 
hardly more expert than the king and his ministers In 
the evaluation of imponderables. But there were a 
few who recognized the fatuity of the king's effort to 
control Parliament and of his attempt to assert In the 
colonies an authority which w^as both alien and out- 
worn. These few proved to be the true representa- 
tives of the English people. 

We know the outcome, and yet we perhaps do not 
always recognize Its significance, for we too are not 
always able to appraise the Imponderables. The all- 
Important fact Is that at the outset the colonists were 
Englishmen, owing an allegiance to Britain which was 
a tremendous reality, albeit Imponderable. The king 
and his ministers, endowed with no diviner's sense for 
the things of the spirit, felt that this structure of the 
Imponderables was unsubstantial and untrustworthy, 
and sought to transmute It Into a more material sub- 
stance. In so doing, they wrecked the mystic fabric 
of British allegiance and British unity. When they 



38 AMI RICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

began, the colonies were British. \Mien they ended, 
they were American. The change was not outward 
and pohtical merely. There had been a regrouping 
of the imponderables. 

It must not be concluded, however, that this was 
due to the character of George III. Had there been 
no struggle with Parliament and no ettort to recover a 
vanished prerogative, the issue would have arisen in 
another way. The situation was one which had never 
arisen before, and one which the most intelligent of 
peoples could hardly be expected to appreciate. 
Never before had two countries been really one in 
their inmost consciousness and yet completely inde- 
pendent in all their political activities. History was 
witness that real bonds between nations had always 
been material bonds. Assuming, as everybody did, 
that unity was to be maintained, it seemed a patriotic 
ilutv to supply the material bonds which alone could 
guarantee its continuance. So they reasoned, so any- 
body would ha\e reasoned in their place. 1 heir rea- 
soning was natural and in the light ot past experience, 
conclusive. It was a mistake that simply had to be 
made. It chanced to be a king who made it. It 
might just as easily have been a Parliament, and a 
\erv reasonable Parliament at that. King and min- 
isters and personalities were accidents in the case. 
The essence of the situation was British unity existing 
umler conditions of extreme geographical separation. 
The new thing which these brought into the world was 
not at once to be recognized bv those schooled in a less 
intangible order of things. The reign of the impon- 
derables was not yet. 



THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION 39 

The temptation Is Irresistible to turn for a moment 
to this same struggle In our own day. A nation has 
arisen which holds a quarter of the earth In fief, and 
which yet seems to be no nation, for Its parts are 
themselves nations, jealous of their liberty and brook- 
ing no Interference, yet feehng themselves one, bound 
together by the Imponderables. And there Is an- 
other nation that puts Its trust in more material things, 
sceptical of bonds that can not be seen with the eye 
and handled with the hand, a nation that has de- 
clared through the mouth of Its prophet that a nation 
united by other bonds Is " a sham," that you have but 
to touch It and It will fall to pieces. And they have 
given heed unto their prophet and have touched, and 
the world waits the outcome. Was that other 
prophet right, or was he wrong, when he said that the 
art of the statesman was to appraise the imponder- 
ables? 



CHAPTER III 

Tin: GREAT EXPANSION 

The nation which was thus started on its inde- 
pendent career, with those characteristics in its peo- 
ple which resulted ine\itably from a long frontier ex- 
perience, was dowered with a domain of uncertain ex- 
tent, but vastly in excess of present or even prospective 
needs. Its settlements formed a chain of fairly de- 
veloped communities along the Atlantic seaboard, with 
a narrow fringe extending westward into that illimita- 
ble domain in which as yet they could not even post 
their sentinels. Remorseless as had been their war 
of extermination against the French, there was noth- 
ing they needed so much as population to fill the aching 
void from which the French had been expelled. The 
motive which has seemingly impelled men to migration 
and conquest in all ages of the world, the need of room 
for a growing population, was one that the Americans 
had never known. 7 he crying need was always for 
population to (ill the empty spaces and do the yeo- 
man's work and, save where religious prejudice inter- 
fered, immigrants seem always to have been wel- 
comed. The pet)pling of the whole western territory 
might have been foreseen, and the expulsion of the 
French and other movements of appropriation thus 
justitied, the usual motive working merely by antici- 

40 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 41 

pation. But there is much evidence that it was not 
foreseen and that the American people long regarded 
themselves as an Atlantic coast people, backed by a 
great interior which would never be filled by the 
growth of their own population. Many decades after 
we became a nation, there were intelligent Americans 
and even distinguished American statesmen who re- 
garded the idea of filling up the land from ocean to 
ocean by the natural growth of the American people 
as wholly chimerical. 

It is important to get clearly in mind this prevail- 
ing feeling of our people, as the psychological back- 
ground of this first century of our national history. 
If they sought new territories, it was because they 
wanted them, not because they needed them. It is 
easy for us to see that real need was only a question of 
time, but they did not live in any consciousness of such 
a time. We also can see that there were urgent 
strategic reasons for our territorial expansion, but it 
is all but certain that they wrought their work un- 
guided by any such ideal. The seer may have under- 
stood the craving, but the people merely felt it. They 
lived in a constant consciousness of territorial suffi- 
ciency, but sufficiency brought no satiety. 

The first century of American history is a record of 
unparalleled territorial expansion. This expansion 
began almost from the first moment of our independ- 
ent life. It has been noted that the nation began es- 
sentially as a chain of coast settlements with a slight 
and uncertain western fringe. The Atlantic coast 
was the only certain thing about its boundaries. Even 
that was uncertain at either end. 



42 AxMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

The first problem was started by the treaty of peace 
with Britain. It will be remembered that this treaty 
had a certain clandestine character. We had pledged 
ourselves not to make peace with Britain except in 
conjunction with France, our ally. When the sur- 
render of Cornwallis made peace possible, France 
began to manoeuvre for a peace that should make 
the colonies in a sense dependent upon her. As this 
design became apparent the American envoys were In- 
dignant and evaded the spirit of the agreement while 
observing its letter. They negotiated a treaty with 
Britain, settling all details, and then laid it before the 
French minister for his adhesion and approval. He 
was intensely indignant at being thus excluded from 
the negotiations where alone he could have hoped to 
accomplish his purpose, but as the complete agreement 
left him no plausible pretext for objecting in a relation 
where France had steadily professed disinterestedness, 
he assented with bad grace. 

The clandestine character of the treaty went 
further, however, and included a provision of a more 
questionable character, in the shape of a secret clause 
which was not included in the text of the treaty and 
was never revealed to the French minister at all. 
England, it must be remembered, was then at war, not 
only with the Colonies, but also with France and Spain. 
Both I'^ngland ami Spain had widely scattered posses- 
sions, and it was pretty certain that when the time for 
peace came, there would be exchanges. Gibraltar was 
the chief object <if contention, but it was certain that 
England would not surrenilcr this on any account. 
The only question was, liow much would it be neces- 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 43 

sary or wise to concede elsewhere in order to reconcile 
Spain to the loss of the famous fortress. Florida was 
most likely to be the price of peace with Spain. It was 
a Spanish settlement anyway, and England had but re- 
cently acquired it by exchange in order to round out 
her colonial boundaries. Now that the colonies were 
lost, its value was much lessened, and if " swaps " 
were called for, Florida was likely to go. 

The boundaries of Spanish Florida had been much 
as at present except that the western projection ex- 
tended to the present eastern boundary of the State of 
Louisiana or almost to the Mississippi River. But 
when England acquired it, she found it convenient to 
extend it clear to the Mississippi, adding that tip of 
Louisiana which she had acquired about the same time. 
She also extended it considerably to the north, adding 
a broad strip of territory which belonged to none 
of her colonies and which she could most easily ad- 
minister in this way. 

Now that she faced the possibility of yielding Flor- 
ida, this question of boundary was important. Hence 
this secret clause above referred to, which specified 
that if Florida remained British, the northern boun- 
dary was to be the parallel of thirty-two degrees and 
thirty minutes, but if Florida became Spanish, the 
northern boundary was to be the parallel of thirty- 
one degrees as at present. Florida was to extend 
westward to the Mississippi In either case, for as 
Spain, who, by the previous acquisition of Louisiana, 
controlled the other side of the Mississippi, desired 
above everything to control its mouth, this was the 
thing that chiefly made Florida valuable to her. The 



44 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

result was a broad zone of debatable territory, the 
" Yazoo Lands," about the size of the State of Penn- 
sylvania. By this treaty Britain said in effect to her 
late rebellious colonies: "If 1 keep Florida. I want 
these lands, but if Spain is to have Florida, I would 
rather they would be vours." 

The significance of this attitude on the part of 
Britain, an attitude manifested In many other connec- 
tions, will be considered later. At present we are con- 
cerned to note the American attitude toward terri- 
torial expansion. Little is recorded on the subject, 
for the reason that that attitude is taken for granted. 
From the first it was one of stout insistence. The 
lands were neither strategic nor needed, nor were they 
closely akin in population. To secure them would 
not give the country a natural frontier. Spain, having 
acquired Florida in the settlement, of course, found 
out about the secret clause and Insisted that Florida, 
which liad been ceded to her. could not be one thing 
to one claimant and another thing to another. Flor- 
ida was Florida, and if the northern boundarv was 
thirty-two degrees and thirty minutes for Britain, it 
was thirty-two degrees and thirty minutes for Spain, a 
very plausible contention. It all availed not. Amer- 
ica insisted, and at last in 1795, under a virtual threat 
of war which Spain was in no condition to face, Spain 
yielded, and the line was drawn at thirty-one degrees. 
Technically this may perhaps be classified as a defen- 
sive act rather than conquest and annexation. We 
merely insisted on our " rights '' under the treaty with 
Britain, waiving the question whether Britain had any 
right to grant us such rights. The important thing to 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 45 

note is that Spain denied our right and yielded to a 
threat of force. This is conquest in essence, for con- 
quest is usually based on some alleged right, and this 
right is enforced by coercion. The American " for- 
ward policy " was thus inaugurated at the very birth 
of the Republic, and it scored its first considerable 
victory when our constitution was six years old. 

This advance was necessarily followed by others. 
Slight as was the general appreciation of strategic 
problems, anybody could see that existing boundaries 
were no stopping place. Florida, extending clear 
across to the Mississippi, completely cut off the coun- 
try from the Gulf of Mexico and closed our southern 
access to the West Indies with which, at that time, we 
maintained an extensive commerce. The very nar- 
rowness of this artificial barrier was an incitement to 
break it down. More important still to all the in- 
terior territories was the navigation of the Mississippi. 
We had extorted from Spain by force the privilege of 
navigating the river to its mouth, but her people re- 
sented the concession and made it as uncomfortable 
for us as possible. The control of the river, there- 
fore, even more than access to the Gulf, engaged the 
attention of the Americans and their government. 
This was made possible by an extraordinary turn of 
events in Europe. Napoleon, just risen to power, re- 
acquired Louisiana from Spain in exchange for cer- 
tain rather specious promises of a dynastic character 
which he never fulfilled. The transfer, long con- 
cealed, was divined by the Americans as the result of 
renewed obstructions to the navigation of the Missis- 
sippi. It is noteworthy that there was an instant and 



46 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

widespread clamour tor war with Napoleon who was 
already at the zenith of his fame. The President, 
however, sent a commission to buy, if possible, the city 
of New Orleans and some portion of Florida to secure 
control of the Mississippi, the purchase price not to 
exceed $2,000,000. As Napoleon was confronted 
just then with a war with England who controlled the 
seas and would almost certainly seize the territory, he 
offered to sell the whole, and the commissioners has- 
tened to buy for eight times the sum allowed them. 
To go home without Florida which they had been sent 
to purchase, and with a territory which had not been 
asked and which the American imagination had not yet 
come to desire, and above all with an expenditure eight 
times the authorized amount, implied some confidence 
in American imperialist sentiment. 1 hat confidence 
was justified by the prompt ratification of the treatv. 
It is worth while to note that Jeflerson fullv believed 
that he was violating the Constitution in the purchase, 
a fact the more significant when we recall that Jeffer- 
son and his party were inclined to construe that docu- 
ment in the most conser\-ative sense. Evidentiv all 
parties to the transaction " had their nerve with 
them." Spain protested that IVance had not acquired 
title and that she had pletiged herself not to dispose 
of the territory to any other power, both perfectly 
valid objections, but we ignored them as matters that 
did not concern us. The reluctance against purchas- 
ing stolen goods, we did not feel, as indeed nations 
never do. It is to be noted that Britain did not pro- 
test, although this sale of her bo<nv at the moment 
when she \\as about to seize it, might ha\"e been open 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 47 

to objection. She seems not to have regretted the 
strengthening of America. 

This acquisition, the largest ever made in all our 
history, was accomplished at the ripe age of fifteen 
years. It extended our territory westward to the 
Rocky Mountains, a very vague boundary, but one little 
liable to cause actual disputes throughout the greater 
part of its length. Unfortunately it gave no northern 
or southern boundary, thus insuring later difficulty 
with Britain in Canada and with Spain in Mexico, dif- 
ficulties to be settled as might be ex^Dected, in the one 
case by agreement and in the other case by war. It 
is a great pity that the southern boundary was not de- 
fined at once, but American statesmen seem to have 
been incapable at that time of appreciating the need 
of definiteness in the vast unpeopled West. There 
was a little difference of opinion between Spain and 
France as to the boundary between Louisiana and 
Mexico, a difference amounting approximately to the 
present State of Texas, but as no one at the time had 
the slightest interest in Texas, and all attention was 
focused on the control of the Mississippi, it did not 
seem worth while to undertake a negotiation with a 
nation that was feeling aggrieved in order to secure a 
definite line through an immeasurable wilderness. 
Our acquisitions had not only outrun our needs, but 
had completely outrun our imagination, a much more 
important consideration, for men seldom care to de- 
limit carefully that which has not been taken posses- 
sion of by their fond fancy. 

Spain undoubtedly felt aggrieved, and with reason 
as regards France. Naturally we acquired her resent- 



48 AMI-RIGA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ment along with her possessions. This was respon- 
sible in part for the somewhat dubious plan of cam- 
paign by which we now sought to complete our original 
program. For if we were indifferent to Texas, we 
were keenly alive to the desirabilit>' of controlling 
Florida, particularly West Florida, for all along the 
dominant consideration was the Mississippi. We now 
controlled all of the western bank and all of the east- 
ern bank north of latitude thirty-one. We wanted 
the rest. 

Our first move was to challenge the validit}^ of 
Spain's title. The title was doubtful as indeed most of 
these early titles were, but it would have seemed suf- 
ficient if it had been ours. Spain, of course, stoutly 
defended the title, but being unable to defend the ter- 
ritory, America had the better of the argument. She 
got a foothold in the very year of the Louisiana pur- 
chase, then negotiated vainly, threatened war, and 
finally took forcible possession of the western portion 
of West Florida in iSio. By this time Alabama and 
Mississippi were filling up and wanted access to the 
Gulf. In default of other means, or perhaps in pref- 
erence to other means, the balance of West Florida 
was seized in 1813. The extreme preoccupation of 
Europe with the Napoleonic struggle made possible 
this unceremonious procedure. Spain, of course, pro- 
tested frantically, and even Britain lodged formal 
protest, but all to no purpose. 

There remained East Florida, the Florida of our 
own day. 1 Icr case was radically different from that 
of West Florida. She did not control the Mississippi, 
nor was she necessary to gi\e any other state or terri- 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 49 

tory access to the sea. But failing these reasons, 
there were others. Broader conceptions of strategy 
now began to prevail. Florida, almost touching 
Cuba, completely dominated our commerce between 
the Atlantic and the Gulf. Spain was little to be 
feared, but her possessions might be alienated to 
France or Britain. That was a thought to give us 
pause, and it led Jefferson to state the essence of the 
Monroe Doctrine twenty years before the date of 
Monroe's famous message. To make matters worse, 
Florida became a refuge for outlaws, filibusters, and 
hostile Indians, who harried the border much as Mex- 
ican adventurers are doing today. The man who for- 
mulated our extremest doctrines about liberty and the 
consent of the governed, as well as his associates, had 
none of the scruples which their present day disciples 
profess in their name. They openly declared that 
Florida would become American as soon as Spain be- 
came involved in another war; they invaded Florida 
again and again to chastise outlaws and destroy hostile 
posts, and finally finding that Spain could not or would 
not maintain order in Florida, they virtually took pos- 
session of the territory and then forced Spain to cede 
Florida for $5,000,000, all of which was to be paid 
to American citizens in satisfaction of claims against 
Spain. 

There can be no possible doubt about the desirabil- 
ity of this annexation, but equally, there can be no 
question about its spirit. The temper of the country 
was one of unqualified aggression. Jefferson's state- 
ment that as soon as Spain became engaged in another 
war, Florida would become ours, is significant. 



50 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

There Is no suggestion of a moral impediment. 
Florida was necessary to complete our natural fron- 
tier, in itself a strong incentive to aggression. If it 
had been objected that Spain had rights in Florida 
(no such objection seems to have been urged) the 
answer would probably ha\e been that incompetency 
invalidates all such claims, a doctrine instinctively ac- 
cepted by energetic peoples and ever a cardinal prin- 
ciple of American policy. Most readers will remem- 
ber with what force it was urged against Spain in our 
war for the liberation of Cuba. 

The acquisition of Florida marked the beginning of 
another policy which has been rather peculiarly Amer- 
ican, the disguise of seizure under the form of pur- 
chase. Seizure has traditionally been the privilege 
of conquest, and money payments, if any, have been 
an added perquisite. Indeed it is the curious tradi- 
tion of this our world that indemnity is due only from 
nations that have allowed their territory to be in- 
vaded, and who are thus condemned to bear the cost 
of the invasion. I he L nited States has chosen to 
construe its seizures as purchases, paying for them a 
moderate sum, the more willingly when, as in the 
present instance, tiic money could be kept at home to 
pay uncollectible debts due to American citizens. 
The method has the advantage of sahing wounds 
which otherwise might fester. It is available, how- 
ever, only in cases where the purchaser is in a posi- 
tion to set the price unaided by the seller. 

The acquisition of Morida was at once followed by 
an agitation tor the acquisition ot Cuba. The 
strategic argument was identical and even more 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 51 

urgent, for a hostile base in Cuba could be as injurious 
as one in Florida, and harder to get rid of. The com- 
punctions later felt about the suitableness of the Cuban 
population for the duties of American citizenship, 
seem not to have troubled the ardent doctrinaires of 
the time. The annexation of Cuba as a state in the 
American union was freely urged, Jefferson in partic- 
ular having championed the idea to the end of his life. 
But in this case Britain interposed her powerful ob- 
jection, and though this raised American apprehen- 
sion of British designs and led to further develop- 
ment of the policy soon to be embodied in the Monroe 
Doctrine, the project of American annexation was 
dropped, and the great problem of Cuban develop- 
ment postponed for nearly a century. 

The southeastern corner of our continent was now 
properly rounded out, and with the necessary post- 
ponement of plans for overseas development, our 
restless energies turned to the northeast corner where 
a bit of rounding out needed to be done. The treaty 
of 1783 in which England recognized the independ- 
ence of the Colonies, had made an honest attempt to 
fix definite boundaries between them and British pos- 
sessions to the north, but neither party knew enough 
of the country to do so. Some of the mistakes were 
merely ludicrous, as when it was specified that the 
boundary In the west should be a hne running due 
west from the northwest corner of the Lake of the 
Woods to the Mississippi River. Inasmuch as the 
Mississippi rises considerably to the south of this 
point, such a line would never touch it even if carried 
round the world. But where intention was plain and 



52 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

no conflict of interests was involved, rectification was 
easy. 

In the extreme northeast there was a more 
dangerous ambiguity. The attempt had been made 
to establish natural boundaries by following rivers 
and watersheds, a perfectly proper method but dan- 
gerous unless detailed by a survey. No such survey 
was made or was possible at the time, and neither the 
river " source " nor the " highlands " designated in 
the treaty were so easily identified as had been ex- 
pected. In brief, there was a debatable territory of 
something over twelve thousand square miles or about 
the area of Massachusetts and Connecticut, which was 
claimed by both the State of Maine and New Bruns- 
wick. This proved a difficult question to settle, 
and one which peculiarly illustrated the American 
temper. Maine and New Brunswick, the territories 
immediately concerned, each claimed everything in 
sight and were absolutely deaf to all proposals of con- 
ciliation or compromise. The Federal government 
was hardly less so. After the failure of early at- 
tempts at negotiation, resort was had to arbitration, 
and the king of the Netherlands was chosen as ar- 
biter. He gave about two thirds to Maine and one 
third to New Brunswick. Our minister in Holland 
protested against the award without referring it to 
Washington. Washington sustained him. however, 
and the award was ignorcil, (Hir gcncrnment thus es- 
tablishing an uncn\iablc and well nigh unique record 
in the history of arbitration. Then began prepara- 
tions for war, not only by the L'nitcd States, but 
ridiculously enough, by the State of Maine on her 



THE GREAT EXPANSION 53 

own account. Troops were raised and money voted, 
and if Maine and New Brunswick had been left to 
themselves, war would undoubtedly have resulted. 
Fortunately, one of the bumptious claimants had a 
sober backer, and the dogs of war were held in leash 
until Webster and Lord Ashburton (uncle of the late 
Lord Cromer) arranged a compromise. This di- 
vided the territory in much the same proportion as 
the earlier arbitration award had done, and the treaty 
was violently denounced by extremists on both sides, 
but was finally ratified In 1842. 

With the close of this long-standing controversy, all 
boundary problems in the east were settled. To the 
south we had settled all questions by wholesale an- 
nexation. Beyond lay the sea and the islands which 
were reserved for a later chapter in our history. To 
the north we had reached an amicable agreement with 
a stalwart people who knew how to stand their ground, 
but Insisted upon being friendly. From the Atlantic 
through to the Rocky Mountains the northern bound- 
ary was determined past all hope or need of chang- 
ing. Meanwhile our domain had been Immeasurably 
extended in the west by the addition of the great 
plains which stretched on and on till their margin 
faded In the silent mountains or the Illimitable wastes 
of the great desert, where desire died and the wan- 
derer stopped and dominion had no need to extend. 

As we look back over this first period of American 
history, we are not profoundly impressed with the 
moderation and reasonableness of American demands, 
or with the tact and considerateness of American pro- 
cedure. We want the earth, and we say so quite 



54 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

frankly. Not that wc ha\c tar reaching designs of 
world empire; — far from it. Such unholy ambitions 
have ahvays been abhorrent to us. We merely want 
the next thing beyond. We are like the young woman 
who had no sympathy with the craze to be rich. All 
she wanted was to have money enough so when she 
saw something she wanted, she could buy it. Wc 
have worked out an imperial destiny from instinctive 
impulse rather than from deliberate purpose. 

Our method of procedure is equally characteristic, 
— to ask for what we want, — for all of it, — and 
stand our ground. Recognizing that possession is 
nine points in law, we have shown a strong inclina- 
tion to make appropriation our lirst step in the pro- 
ceedings, whether we contemplated purchase or con- 
quest. We have also appreciated the value of a 
threat of war at the proper moment. 

With decadent Spain this procedure was falrlv suit- 
able. She was hopelessly incompetent to manage her 
colonies and helpless to defend them against our ag- 
gression. Her protests against our appropriation of 
her territories only afforded us an opportunity to give 
her a piece of our mind. Spain cuts a sorry figure 
through it all, and we can not be sorry that she was 
dispossessed, but there are times when one can not 
help feeling a bit oi sympathv for Castillan sensi- 
bilities. 

With Britain the American pnK'cdure was less suc- 
cessful. She was not decadent, and knew both how 
to defend and iunv to value the possessions which we 
challenged. New Brunswick was not to be won like 
Florida. The marvel is that American aggressive- 



7ffi. ^PJ..\7 i.XPANyON 55 

ne^s did not lead to more ■^eriou^ con^cjuence^. The 
record i<i one of unfailing conciliation and conce^^ion 
on Britain^ part, bxit never one of weak surrender. 
The significance of this attitude will be apparent later. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 

The building of our territory on the east was now 
done, and on the whole, well done. Starting with 
the Atlantic coast line as our one definite boundary, 
we had carried our frontier to the tip of Florida, and 
thence on round the Gulf to the Mississippi and be- 
yond. So much at least was necessary to our safety. 
It would have been a calamity if our southern bound- 
ary had remained at parallel thirty-one as established 
In the treaty of independence. The end of this coast 
line, to be sure, was arbitrary, and considering the 
character of the neighbour In that quarter, It might 
have been surmised that It was but tentative. It re- 
mained in fact unfinished business to come up soon for 
the strenuous consideration of the nation. 

At the other end, our long frontier had been car- 
ried sately rouiui the corner and extendctl through the 
great lakes and along lesser lakes and rivers to the 
accepteil northwestern corner, the Lake of the Woods. 
I'rom the northwestern corner of this lake some brave 
guess work carried our frontier to the Mississippi 
which had been chosen as our western boundary. 
Guesswork It had to be, for no one had ever explored 
the region. I he guesses were \'ery unluckv and might 
later have proved embarrassing, had not the acquisi- 
tion of Louisiana, long before settlement reached this 

56 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 57 

point, moved our western boundary to the Rocky 
Mountains and made connection with the Mississippi 
quite unnecessary.- We have now to follow this 
northern line on to the western ocean. 

The original treaty specified that the line should 
run from the northwest corner of the Lake of the 
Woods due west to the Mississippi. When the 
Louisiana purchase moved the western frontier to the 
Rocky Mountains, the natural thing was to extend 
this line to the mountains, and this was agreed upon 
without much difficulty, thus obviating the embarrass- 
ment of the later discovery that such a hne did not 
touch the Mississippi at all. Unfortunately no one 
seems to have known just where the starting point — 
the northwestern corner of the Lake of the Woods — 
was situated and since definiteness was desired, an- 
other guess was made and parallel forty-nine was 
adopted. This again proved to be an imperfect 
guess, and the line refused to make connections with 
the northwest corner of the lake. The adjustment 
ultimately agreed upon gave to Minnesota a curious 
little piece of detached territory which remains as a 
monument to the ignorance of those who drew the 
line between the two peoples. 

Ignorance but no ill-will. There is no other bound- 
ary in the world so arbitrary as this. Nature had 
seemingly anticipated no such horizontal division of 
the continent, and had arranged her mountains and 
rivers the wrong way. The original plan to find a 
natural boundary had to be abandoned, though both 
sides realized the danger of an arbitrary line. Yet 
no boundary in the world is more settled or more serv- 



58 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

iceablc than this. It contains no strategic traps, no 
ambiguities. Its acceptance conceals no mental reser- 
vations. By a supreme triumph of friendliness it was 
early agreed that the line should not be emphasized 
by fortirications. The unreasoning have argued from 
this the needlessness of carefully drawn strategic 
frontiers; the discerning see in it the essential unity 
of two kindred peoples. 

As we follow in imagination the march of the 
American people along this westward line to the sum- 
mit of the great divide, it now seems plain to us that 
destiny beckoned them farther, that this was no stop- 
ping place, and that nature's limit must be the great 
western ocean. But the United States had in fact 
reached limits more natural than any reached since or 
likely to be reached in any period of subsequent ex- 
pansion. The Rocky Mountains are a watershed, one 
of the greatest in the world. They do not culminate 
in a narrow line of serrated peaks like the Pyrenees, 
and a delimitation would necessarily be arbitrary, but 
the sterility of the soil on cither side of the line al- 
lows plenty of margin to arbitrariness and makes de- 
limitation easy. It we wanted a natural stopping 
place, this was the place to stop. 

But the -American people have not been looking for 
stopping places. I'or them all stopping places have 
been starting places, and that forthwith. The new 
boundary was no exception. I",\cn before the Louisi- 
ana purchase was consummated. Jefferson, whose 
wh()le interest In the purchase seems to have centred 
in the control ot the Mississippi and whose original 
plan contcmplateii onh the purchase of West Florida, 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 59 

sent out the Lewis and Clark expedition to explore 
the headwaters of the Missouri, ostensibly in the in- 
terest of trade with the Indians. This expedition 
penetrated to the Pacific coast by way of the Columbia 
River. It is impossible to say whether the thought 
of territorial expansion actuated this expedition, but 
it can hardly be doubted that the expedition con- 
tributed to that end, adding one more to the shadowy 
claims which America was able later to advance as an 
offset to like claims on the part of her rivals. 

This region of vague extent known as Oregon, 
where our mountain boundary, sweeping far to the 
northwest, came nearest to the Pacific, was the vor- 
tex of international rivalry. Nowhere In the world 
were the claims of the great powers so pretentious or 
so preposterously conflicting as here. It was here 
that the great nations of Europe put out their longest 
tentacles and reached farthest into the shadowy un- 
known. 

Russia, In the period when the nations of Western 
Europe had been colonizing America, had pushed her 
way across Asia and gained a foothold in America at 
the northwestern corner. From this point she 
claimed the coast south Indefinitely. She had even 
established a garrison as far south as Bodega Bay, a 
few miles north of San Francisco. Spain was In un- 
disputed possession of South America and of the Pa- 
cific Coast of Mexico. She claimed everything to the 
north Indefinitely. England had established herself 
in Eastern Canada and, claiming the hinterland west- 
ward to the sea, she struck the line midway and 
claimed both ways Indefinitely. The whole territory 



6o AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

in question was therefore covered with chiims three 
layers deep before we appeared on the scene. These 
claims were based on accidents of exploration and dis- 
covery, fur trader's stations and the like, all of them 
trifling in comparison with the magnificent domain at 
issue, a territory, it must be remembered, extending 
from California to Russian America, wherever the 
latter might be. The American claim was hardly 
better than the others, but in one respect her case was 
stronger. She was nearer and better able to occupy 
the land, an advantage that counted in the end. 

It is not clear that America at any time during this 
early period, formally adopted the policy of extension 
to the Pacific coast. It seems rather, that as one 
question after another came up bearing on the case, 
she " played safe," keeping the way open, with the 
result that, despite the reluctance of such statesmen as 
Webster, even to the last, she found herself com- 
mitted to the policy and became a candidate for all 
honours. 

A controversy with Russia opened the competition. 
In 1808 and again in 18 10, that country proposed 
commercial arrangements with the United States 
which were rejected on the ground that we did not 
know the limits of Russian territory and therefore 
could not tell to what ports the proposed commer- 
cial arrangements would apply. Then Russia sug- 
gested that a generous territory be tentatively al- 
lowed to Russian trade, exact boundaries to be agreed 
upon later. .Again the United States refused, doubt- 
less realizing that tentative arrangements were likely 
to become permanent. Finally, compelled to be more 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 6i 

definite, Russia modestly stated that she claimed only- 
down to the Columbia River. This claim, which 
would have given to Russia the State of Washington 
and everything to the north of it, our government re- 
fused to discuss, and when later, the Czar attempted 
to assert a modified but preposterous claim by imperial 
edict, we retorted by denying that Russia had any 
right whatever to territory in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. These mutual extravagances paved the way 
to a compromise agreement in 1824. It was recalled 
that the Czar in 1799 had established latitude fifty- 
five as the southern limit for his trading company, and 
it was argued with force that this was the limit of his 
rule. Finally the Russians asked for a slight change 
to fifty-four forty, the southern end of Prince of 
Wales Island, a perfectly reasonable request, the 
granting of which settled the matter. In this valiant 
fight we crowded back our later southern border In 
the firm conviction that It was to be our northern 
boundary and that we were thus widening rather than 
narrowing our ultimate domain. 

When In 18 10 we refused Russia's commercial pro- 
posals on the ground that we did not know where the 
line was, one of our arguments was that we should get 
into trouble with Spain who claimed all this coast up 
to the Russian line. This was a half way recogni- 
tion of Spain's claim which was much the weakest of 
all. This turned out to be good policy (though It 
can hardly have been foreseen) for when in 1821 we 
secured Florida by treaty, we induced Spain to throw 
in Oregon as a trifle for good measure. The acquisi- 
tion of this claim cleared the field of the two end 



62 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

claimants and left us with a single rival. It also de- 
fined the boundaries of the territory at issue. Oregon 
extended from latitude forty-two to latitude fifty-four 
forty, and from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains. 
That is, it included the whole of Oregon and Wash- 
ington and Western Canada up to our southern 
Alaskan border. 

The two residual claimants now advanced upon 
Oregon from the east, along that parallel of forty- 
nine already agreed upon. The prolongation of this 
line to the coast, as later agreed upon, cutting Oregon 
not far from the middle, seems the obviously reason- 
able settlement of such a controversy. But it did not 
at all seem so to the men of that time. In the long 
controversy of more than thirty years which ensued, 
the claims of each were urged in all possible ways, and 
the most varied proposals were made, but at no time 
did either party show definite historic reason for the 
line proposed. Above all, both parties seem to have 
assumed from the first that they must settle the mat- 
ter amicably and must be patient until they could 
do so. 

Strangely enough, the first proposal made, — that 
of the Americans in iSiS, — was almost exactly the 
one accepted twenty-eight years later, the extension 
of the line of forty-nine to the coast. Britain refused, 
and proposed the Columbia River which would have 
given her nearly the whole of the State of Washington. 
No agreement being possible, both agreed that the ter- 
ritory should be open to the settlers of both for ten 
years, an agreement later renewed for ten years 
more. This ultimately became the deciding factor 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 63 

for reasons already mentioned, but this was not an- 
ticipated at the time. 

Soon after came the extravagant Russian decree 
already referred to. It is significant that America 
and Britain, though they had but just finished their 
second war, at once combined against Russia. Amer- 
ica ultimately succeeded in driving Russia back to fifty- 
four forty, a victory which of course inured to the 
benefit of Britain, as America soon realized, for she 
at once proposed the line of fifty-one as a boundary. 
This was two degrees higher than before, but that was 
offset by the fact that we had crowded Russia back. 
England demurred, and proposed the line of fifty-one 
running west from the Rocky Mountains until it 
struck the Columbia River. Thence the river was to 
be the boundary. This would work out much as be- 
fore, giving Britain most of Washington. The next 
time the matter came up Britain proposed forty-nine 
and the river and America proposed forty-nine clear 
through, both proposals, it will be noticed, less favour- 
able to America than the preceding. 

Gradually it became apparent that the line of forty- 
nine, which did well enough for the interior, was 
painfully unsatisfactory In Oregon. It crossed the 
Columbia River which both parties Insisted upon hav- 
ing, and it clipped off the southern end of Vancouver 
Island with far more loss to the one side than gain 
to the other. Hence the next proposal was to take 
forty-nine as the basis but to give Britain the tip of 
Vancouver and America the territory between forty- 
nine and the upper Columbia. This American pro- 
posal Britain rejected, and America In turn rejected 



64 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Britain's counter proposal. As the ten years' truce 
agreed upon in 1818 was about to expire, a second 
truce was agreed upon for a like period. 

During the course of these negotiations both parties 
at times took extreme ground. Britain, replying to an 
unacceptable clause in Monroe's famous message, de- 
clared that she had a right to " colonize " down to 
the California line. At another time, America de- 
clared that Britain had no right whatever on the Pa- 
cific coast. It does not appear that Britain ever in- 
tended seriously to annex the whole of Oregon, de- 
spite her assertion, but the American contention that 
we were entitled to the whole region up to fifty- four 
forty, though perhaps little more than rhetorical at 
the first, gradually became a passionate national con- 
viction which led us to the brink of war. This was 
due to the appearance, toward the end of the second 
truce, of a new factor, the American settler. 

By the terms of this truce the territory was to be 
open to settlers of both powers on equal terms. For 
many years only trappers and fur traders took ad- 
vantage of this privilege, and of these the British, 
backed by the powerful Hudson's Bay Company, had 
the decided advantage. But just before the expira- 
tion of the second truce a remarkable missionary, 
Marcus Whitman, who with others had gone to Ore- 
gon in response to a unique Indian appeal, returned 
aflame with enthusiasm for the winning of Oregon. 
The result was not onlv a stream of settlers who re- 
turned under the leadership of Whitman, but an im- 
mense awakening of interest in the territory on the 
part of the American people. 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 6s 

It is wholly characteristic of the American people 
that once they were conscious of the existence and 
value of Oregon, their attitude was one of uncom- 
promising aggression. They refused to listen to a 
division of the territory, and the demand for its an- 
nexation entire became a campaign slogan in the presi- 
dential election of 1844 under the fine alliterative form 
of " fifty-four forty or fight." Polk, the exponent of 
this uncompromising policy, was triumphantly elected 
and it looked as if England must yield her claim or 
fight for it. 

England was genuinely alarmed. She was in- 
tensely averse to farther trouble with America, yet 
she felt it necessary that Canada should have an out- 
let to the Pacific. Could this outlet have been se- 
cured in any other way, it is probable that she would 
have yielded to American insistence. She did indeed 
do her best to force Russia farther back and get an 
outlet north of fifty-four forty, — tried even to narrow 
up the Russian strip so as to give her the heads of 
some of the inlets, precisely as Canada tried it many 
years later. But her reason for all this effort was 
precisely Russia's reason for opposing her, for Russia 
did not want Britain In the Pacific, and so she guarded 
the " Panhandle " jealously, hoping that America 
would make good her claim and come up to fifty-four 
forty. 

Rebuffed by Russia, Britain returned to the strug- 
gle with America increasingly determined to get her 
share. Unfortunately, the affair coincided with other 
causes of irritation against Britain, and feehng in 
Congress and in the country ran very high. Some of 



66 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

the speeches made at the time now sound foolish and 
unreasonable, but they were very characteristic of 
American feeling at the time, perhaps at other times 
when similar crises have confronted our people. 

Nothing can be more striking than the British ef- 
forts at this time to effect a peaceable settlement with- 
out sacrificing what seemed to Britain a vital interest. 
Proposal after proposal was made, only to be rejected. 
Arbitration was urged in several different forms, but 
the Americans would not hear of it. When it is re- 
membered that American claims based on discovery 
and exploration did not extend north of the Columbia 
River, while British explorers had both come earlier 
and gone farther, the Americans can hardly be accused 
of lack of enterprise. 

It is difficult to tell what the outcome might have 
been if circumstances had not created a diversion that 
proved favourable to Britain. Texas had been ad- 
mitted to the Union and war with Mexico had become 
inevitable. War with Britain was therefore less 
practicable than before. Meanwhile, Polk having 
been elected president on the platform of fifty-four 
forty or fight, that slogan, in accordance with a fairly 
established precedent, was regarded as having served 
its purpose and as being no longer necessary. More 
important than any of these, however, was the fact 
that the nation was now rent asunder by the great 
controversy that was to paralyse its efforts for a 
generation and make it impossible for it to present a 
solid front on questions of this kind. The lines were 
now sharply drawn between the slaverv and anti- 
slavery parties, and all questions of territorial ex- 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 67 

panslon were now debated in the light of this issue. 
Since it was accepted that slavery could not flourish 
In northern latitudes, the expansion of our country to 
the northwest was looked upon as strengthening the 
anti-slavery party, while extension to the southwest 
strengthened its rivals. Both parties were Intensely 
Imperialist, but mutual jealousy now Insured strong 
opposition to all expansionist schemes. 

Under these conditions Britain renewed her pro- 
posals, and after repeated failures, a settlement was 
finally effected In 1846, after nearly forty years of 
controversy. The previously adopted parallel of 
forty-nine was extended, as originally proposed, 
through to the coast. It was not carried across the 
Island of Vancouver, however, but sto.pped at the 
shore of the great sound whose waters formed the ob- 
vious division for the rest of the way. 

Strangely enough, even this did not end the con- 
troversy. In the sound were a number of Islands 
which either country might plausibly claim. Over 
them the controversy raged for another twenty years. 
The story Is Interesting merely as showing once more 
the American characteristics. An American soldier 
Is said to have overheard a British marine remark that 
the British flag was to be raised on one of these Islands 
the next day. The soldier reported It to his colonel, 
afterwards General Robert E. Lee, who sent over a 
small detachment and raised the American flag that 
same night. The British, on their arrival ordered 
the American flag lowered, which was refused. The 
controversy was referred to the respective govern- 
ments, who in turn, after years of fruitless negoti- 



68 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ation, referred it to the arbitration ot the German 
Emperor by whom, after the most exhaustive study 
by experts, it was decided in our favour in 1872. As 
this award, unlike that of the New Brunswick arbi- 
tration of I 83 I, gave us all of our claim instead of 
a part, it was accepted, and the controversy which had 
continued for sixty-four years, was at last closed. 

The purpose of these pages, it will be remembered, 
is not to trace the growth of the American domain, 
but to ascertain the temperamental attitude of the 
American people tow^ard militancy and imperialism. 
Nor is it intended to criticize or to defend this atti- 
tude. The traits of character so strikingly manifested 
in connection with these transactions, will be ap- 
proved or condemned by the reader in accordance with 
his local prejudices or philosophical bias, but no state- 
ment here made can legitimately be construed in 
favour of either contention. The sole purpose is to 
ascertain. 
/ Modesty, moderation, and content with existing 
boundaries, in the sense in which Americans have 
sometimes enjoined them upon other nations, have 
not thus far revealed themselves as American traits. 
It would be unwarranted to attribute to Americans in 
this period of national expansion, a defmite policv of 
deliberate and unlimited expansion. They have had 
no such policy, indeed, no consistent and persistent 
policy whatever, and they have consistently and sin- 
cerely condemned such a policy on the part of others. 
But they have hail, like other peoples, what the out- 
siilc world quite naturally construes as such a policy, 
a permanent instinct of self assertion which acts auto- 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC 69 

matically in all situations. They don't want the earth, 
— far from it. But whenever circumstances have di- 
rected their attention toward some concrete portion 
of it, it has looked good to them, and they have cast 
about successfully for reasons why they should possess 
it. They have wanted it, and if possible, have taken 
it, from impulse, and then have justified the taking by 
arguments developed later. Best of all, they have 
justified it by their own large power to organize, de- 
velop, and bless. The need of room, so often and 
plausibly cited by other peoples in justification of their 
aggressions, is a need that they have never known. 
The needs and the convenience of neighbour nations 
they have never regarded. American imperialism 
has been of the most unmistakable and undisguised 
variety, and never more so than in the campaign of 
" fifty-four forty or fight." 



CHAPTER V 

DESPOILING THE LATIN 

We must now move round to the southwestern 
corner of our country where it will be remembered 
that the Louisiana purchase had left our boundar)^ in- 
determinate. The boundary had never been defined, 
and the treaty of cession made no attempt to define it. 
The American commissioners were so eager to grasp 
the huge prize offered, that they seemed not to have 
asked about the boundary until the purchase was as- 
sured. When they did ask, they received from the 
two French ministers characteristic and seemingly dis- 
interested replies. One said the boundaries were 
vague, and that it was well they should be. The 
other advised them to make the most out of their bar- 
gain. The instinct of the professional diplomat who 
saw an opportunity in vagueness, could hardlv be 
better illustrated. 

The Americans, however, whether through inepti- 
tude or scruple, did not profit by their opportunity. 
They thought of trying to stretch their title over West 
Florida, at that time their chief solicitude, but failed 
to do so, and later acquired that territory' independ- 
ently by the simple process of seizing it. The western 
boundary did not trouble them mcrelv for the reason 
that they did not know it and had not learned to think 
that far. It was recognized that the boundary here 

70 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 71 

was a river, but whether the Sabine or the Rio Grande 
was not clear. The present state of Texas hes be- 
tween these two rivers. 

When they got round to it, the effort was of course 
made to secure this territory. It was planned to in- 
clude it in the Florida treaty in 1821, a proposal so 
universally popular that it was opposed and defeated 
in the cabinet by a cabal hostile to the Secretary of 
State lest it bring him undue prestige. Mexico now 
became Independent, and we had a much more diffi- 
cult party to deal with than Spain. 

When in 1827 Mexico organized the territory into 
a state with a constitution prohibiting slavery, the 
southern states became aroused. To have the great 
southland take sides against slavery looked bad for 
them and might have serious consequences. From 
this time on they were persistent champions of Texan 
annexation. But for precisely similar reasons the 
northern states were opposed to it. The result was 
a protracted struggle in which American Imperialism 
was for a time completely overshadowed by the bitter 
struggle over slavery which was to have such a tragic 
conclusion. 

Proposals for the purchase of all or part of Texas 
were made In 1825, soon after the recognition of 
Mexican independence, and were repeated in varying 
form throughout the period of controversy. To all 
such proposals Mexico turned a deaf ear. She was 
hardly less helpless than Spain, but she made it clear 
from the first that she had no Intention of parting with 
any portion of her territory unless forced to do so. 
Very soon, however, the factor which had proved de- 



72 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

cisive in the case of Oregon, intervened to decide the 
fate of Texas, The restlessness which had carried 
American settlers to the Mississippi soon carried them 
beyond it, and they began to cross into Texas. A 
movement was early organized to colonize Texas 
systematically with Americans, who should then de- 
clare Texas independent and ask admission to the 
United States. This movement, unnoticed at first, 
excited the most strenuous opposition, both in Mexico 
and in the anti-slaver}^ states, for the settlers made 
no secret of their intention to reverse the policy of 
Texas in the matter of slavery. But Mexico had no 
power to stop it and the United States had no right 
to stop it. So settlement continued, until in 1836 
Texas declared herself independent. War with Mex- 
ico followed as a matter of course, but Mexico, dis- 
tracted by revolution, though she might harass, could 
not conquer her seceding state. Texas was duly or- 
ganized as an independent state, slavery was recog- 
nized, and admission to the United States was at once 
sought. 

But if the anti-slavery party could not interfere with 
the first part of the program, they had their say about 
the second. Annexation was successfully resisted for 
nearly ten years, until at last Britain and France be- 
gan to interest themselves in Texas. The exact nature 
of this interest Is open to question, and rumour un- 
doubtedly exaggerated Its Importance, but it alarmed 
the United States and elated Texas inordinately. 
There can be no doubt that these countries strove 
earnestly to prevent the annexation of Texas to the 
United States, even arranging a treaty by which 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 73 

Mexico was to recognize the independence of Texas 
in return for a pledge on the part of the latter never 
to become a part of the United States. Their mo- 
tives, or at least those of Great Britain, are not far 
to seek. It must be remembered that this was just the 
moment when we were pushing what Britain regarded 
as excessive claims to Oregon under threat of war, 
and the slogan of fifty-four forty or fight was re- 
sounding through the land. Every proposal looking 
to the joint navigation of the Columbia River and 
even to any access whatever to the Pacific had been 
rejected. There can be no question that Britain re- 
garded this contention of ours as profoundly un- 
reasonable, and it would be strange if she had not felt 
disposed to even the score. 

But Britain was accused of having another motive, 
one that the United States resented much more pro- 
foundly, but which we may perhaps now regard dif- 
ferently. She had some time before abolished slav- 
ery in all her dominions and was recognized as the 
uncompromising foe of the " Institution." Nothing 
so Incensed the southern states as Britain's alleged 
purpose to Induce Texas to abolish slavery, a purpose 
undoubtedly consonant with British opinion If not ac- 
tually entertained by the British government. Per- 
haps both these reasons weighed more or less with 
the French people and government as well, for France 
had even more conspicuously if not more resolutely 
committed herself to the cause of human freedom. 
Doubtless both countries, too, were moved by the 
jealousy which nations naturally feel of upstart and 
incontinent powers. 



74 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Whatever their motives, the intervention of Britain 
and P^rance had the effect of greatly strengthening the 
annexation sentiment in the United States. The ex- 
treme bitterness of the anti-slavery agitation still in- 
sured powerful opposition to the annexation of what 
was sure to be a slavery state, but the opposition was 
in the minority and in 1846, after ten years of im- 
perfect independence, Texas became a state in the 
American union. A single year therefore marked the 
extension of our northern boundary to the Pacific and 
of our southern boundary to the Rio Grande. 

Mexico had long before warned the United States 
that the annexation of Texas would mean war, and she 
kept her word. The United States very properly 
prepared by sending troops to the Mexican border 
where a, petty attack by Mexicans gave the much de- 
sired occasion, and a two years war followed in which 
Mexico was necessarily defeated and her capital oc- 
cupied. Perhaps no successful war was ever the ob- 
ject of such bitter criticism on the part of the winning 
nation. It was denounced in the most unmeasured 
terms as a war of criminal aggression against a weak 
people and in the interest of an infamous institution. 
This judgment, enshrined in our literature by the 
genius of Lowell, has become a tradition with our 
people, and the frank avowal of its iniquity has be- 
come a popular form of innocuous national penance. 
Ihis conventional verdict may well be challenged. Its 
acceptance is of course due to the connection of the 
war with slavery, later so completely discredited. 
Slavery is a very black chapter in our history and our 
awakened national conscience follows with just aver- 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 75 

slon its influence in our national affairs. But there is 
another side to this whole transaction which has been 
unduly neglected. The war with Mexico resulted 
from our annexation of Texas. Now Texas is the 
only annexation that we have ever made on the Amer- 
ican continent with the expressed consent of its inhabi- 
tants. With their consent and much more than their 
consent, for they had been suppliants for admission 
for ten years. We did not ask the consent of the in- 
habitants when we annexed Louisiana or Florida or 
northern Maine or Oregon, and only in the last case 
is it reasonably certain that such consent would have 
been given. But when in Texas an elected conven- 
tion passed on the question of annexation every dele- 
gate but one voted for it, Texas therefore had the 
best possible claim to membership in the Union, a bet- 
ter claim than North Carolina or Rhode Island, states 
that had yielded but a tardy and grudging consent to 
the Constitution. It is a pity that Texas came in as 
a slave state, but this was inevitable, and with slavery 
a recognized institution in the United States, those 
who fought slavery by opposing annexation were 
neither consistent nor wise. The annexation of Texas 
is probably the most irreproachable episode in our 
long record of imperialism. 

It Is to be noted also that this victory of the pro- 
slavery party was so much less than they had hoped 
that it may well be counted a defeat. The intention 
had been not only to annex Texas, but to cut up its 
vast territory, — a territory as large as the German 
Empire, — Into a number of states, thus adding a con- 
siderable number of senators to the pro-slavery ranks 



76 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

and maintaining the ascendancy of that party in this 
citadel of its power. In the struggle for annexation 
they won, but the plan of division failed. Of nearly 
a million square miles of territory acquired from 
Mexico, only Texas took their side, and that only as 
a single state. The gain to our national domain was 
enormous, but the gain to the cause of slavery was 
slight. 

For the war which followed, Mexico may fairly be 
held responsible. She not only threatened it in ad- 
vance and technically committed the Hrst overt act, but 
it may fairly be said that all reasonable effort was 
made to secure a peaceable settlement. 

The war having resulted in defeat for Mexico, the 
usual forfeit was exacted. Mexico was compelled to 
cede to the United States all the territory north of the 
Rio Grande and the Gila River, including most of the 
present state of Arizona, parts of New Mexico, Col- 
orado, Wyoming, and Idaho, the states of Utah and 
Nevada, and above all the imperial state of California, 
still prosy and Spanish, but tlestined a brief year later 
to disclose riches such as Cra'sus never dreamed. 
The whole territory had but the scantiest Mexican 
population, and had already begun to attract Amer- 
ican settlers whose reports had aroused the interest 
of the American people. That is tantamount to say- 
ing that we had begun to desire the land. Etiorts had 
been made to purchase the whole territor}' along with 
Texas at an earlier date, but without success. Seiz- 
ure was the inevitable if unbeautlful alternative. 
^ ct there is nothing especially heinous in this acquisi- 
tion, as sucli things go. .Mexico luui no idc:i what she 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 77 

was losing, but equally, we had no idea what we were 
getting. It is true that no account was taken of the 
wishes of the inhabitants, but they were few and had 
httle right to determine the future of a region which 
under any arrangement, was certain to be peopled by 
others than their posterity. Mexico lost a posses- 
sion of immense potential value, but she had no con- 
ception of that value and very little power ever to 
profit by it. Of present hardship there was little. In 
one important respect the hardship of defeat was sig- 
nally lessened. In accordance with a practice already 
noted as characteristically American, the victor paid 
the war indemnity. For the territory thus ceded, the 
United States paid Mexico fifteen millions of dol- 
lars besides assuming private claims against the Mexi- 
can government amounting to three and a quarter 
millions more. It was altogether a very mild case of 
vae victis. 

The Mexican war is an odious memory, for its 
backers were the champions of slavery, and it bulked 
large in their schemes for the extension of that dis- 
credited institution. Had these schemes been the true 
cause of the war, as is sometimes unwarrantably as- 
sumed, that would be its suflicient condemnation. 
But it is diflicult to believe that under any circum- 
stances Texas would have remained contentedly out- 
side the United States, or that seeking admission she 
could have been permanently refused. Nor is there 
anything in the subsequent history of Mexico to war- 
rant the belief that she would ever have acquiesced 
in the union without war. Even if war had been 
averted in this connection, the same issue must have 



78 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

arisen later in connection whh California, already 
filling up with an American population and soon to be 
Hooded with the gold seekers of forty-nine. If there 
had been no slavery question, the war would have 
come, and uncomplicated by slavery It would have had 
the almost unanimous approval of the American peo- 
ple. Subsequent developments which, it must be re- 
membered, were in part foreseen, have tended to 
justify that approval. 

Extensive as was the territory transferred to the 
United States, it is well to recall that it represented the 
moderate rather than the extreme demands of the 
public at that time. The entire country had been con- 
quered and an American army occupied its capital. 
Its Spanish population, though more considerable than 
that of Florida or California, was not unassimilable. 
Its capacity for self-government was far from demon- 
strated. What wonder that a strong party In the 
Union favoured complete annexation? Indeed, every 
member of the cabinet except one, and many Senators 
and Congressmen favoured this policy. It is more 
than likely that such a proposal would have been re- 
ceived with favour by Congress. But President Polk, 
despite the jingo platform upon which he had been 
elected, was moderate in this case as In that of Ore- 
gon. He resolutely resisted the extreme counsels 
of his own cabinet and took from Mexico only terri- 
tory that was unlikely ever to be Mexican and was al- 
ready Inclpicntly American. The fact that it was 
taken in the Interest of slavery, Is a damning but ir- 
relevant fact. Jutlgetl on its merits and apart from 
this unhappy coincidence, the settlement \\as modera- 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 79 

tion itself as compared with the program of fifty-four 
forty or fight. 

But the rounding out of our continent was not yet 
complete. There followed an insignificant and peace- 
able transaction which seems never to have attracted 
much attention and which has since been well nigh 
forgotten, but one which, for several reasons, Ameri- 
cans must contemplate with doubtful satisfaction. 
The boundary as fixed by treaty followed the Rio 
Grande and Gila rivers, the short stretch between 
them being covered by an arbitrary line. This in- 
volved some uncertainty, as the country was not yet 
surveyed, but on the whole it was an exceptionally 
satisfactory boundary. Yet the Americans did not 
find it so. The project for a trans-continental rail- 
road was broached at this time, and this route, later 
followed by the Southern Pacific, seemed the most 
feasible one. Unfortunately, however, the feasible 
location was on the southern or Mexican side of the 
Gila. Thereupon the Americans claimed this as be- 
longing to them. This could be done only by draw- 
ing the arbitrary connecting line, not from the head 
waters of the Gila to the nearest point on the Rio 
Grande, but between points far down the two rivers. 
This made a very long arbitrary line and a very short 
river frontier and was anything but a plausible inter- 
pretation of the treaty. But we wanted the territory, 
and a way had to be found. Our claim having been 
asserted, Mexico forestalled us by taking armed pos- 
session. War again became imminent. As there 
were other matters of importance between the two 
countries, — heavy claims of Mexico on account of 



8o AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Indian raids which \vc had promised to prevent, — 
Mr. Gadsden was sent to Mexico to negotiate another 
treat)\ This was done, and a treaty laid before Con- 
gress which ceded a large territory to the United 
States in return for which United States was to pay 
Mexico fifteen millions of dollars and satisfy the 
claims of Mexican citizens to the extent of five mil- 
lions more. This treaty Congress refused to ratify, 
and a new one had to be made which ceded much less 
territory, waived all Mexican claims, and called for 
a payment of but ten millions. As this sum was but 
a fraction of the damages claimed by Mexico, to say 
nothing of the territory ceded, and as the treaty fur- 
ther released the United States from its recent con- 
tract pledge to restrain the Indians, its terms were 
not unnaturally regarded by the Mexicans as leonine, 
and their president was compelled to Hee the country 
as result of the transaction. Congress was thrifty. 

Never did thriftiness so overreach itself. The 
changes forced by Congress for no presentable reason 
except trifling economv, at a time when there was 
virtually no public debt and a large surplus in the 
treasury, resulted in a sacrifice to the United States 
which was little less than a calamity, and the repair- 
ing of which is now an urgent and unsolved problem. 

The southern boundary of New Mexico follows the 
parallel of thirty-two to the Rio Grande, then drops 
down the river to El Paso (the Pass) some fifteen 
miles below the parallel, then runs west again for a 
hundred miles, and again jogs thirty miles to the south 
where it resumes its final westerly ilirection. These 
jogs to the south carry the line more than a hundred 



DESPOILING THE LATIN 8i 

miles south of the Gila and effectually clear the moun- 
tain barriers east of Tucson which were an obstacle to 
railroad building. Once past these barriers, however, 
the railroad could safely turn to the northwest, as 
it now does, and enter California at the southeastern 
corner some hundred miles from the Gulf of Cali- 
fornia. 

Gadsden's original plan seems to have been to carry 
this southern boundary Hne due west to the Gulf. 
The Senate, in insisting upon modifications to the 
treaty, seems to have had chiefly in mind the Mexican 
claims and the necessity of avoiding them. In the 
short space of five years the pledge to protect Mexico 
from the Indians had laid this country hable to the 
extent of fifteen to thirty miUions. To satisfy this 
claim and secure release from this pledge was the all 
important thing. The only farther object was to se- 
cure a railroad right of way from El Paso to Cali- 
fornia. Gadsden's proposal accomplished only the last 
of these objects. The Senate therefore cast about to 
find some harmless concessions which could be made as 
showy offsets for the very substantial benefits which 
they were to ask of Mexico. The decision was easy. 
West of Tucson the railroad would turn north, while 
Gadsden's boundary kept on due west thus enclosing a 
vast area of perfectly unnecessary and perfectly worth- 
less territory. Moreover the only land connection 
between Mexico and her province of Lower Cah- 
fornia was through this territory. Such a concession 
ought to look large to Mexican eyes. So the diagonal 
was drawn as it is today, from meridian 1 1 1 to a 
point near the California corner, and Mexico waived 



82 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

her claims and released us from our pledge and re- 
duced her price by live millions. It was clever bar- 
gaining with a weak and corrupt government. 

But he laughs best who laughs last, and the laugh is 
decidedly on us. The mouth of the Colorado River 
is wholly Mexican, and commercial and irrigation 
schemes are subject to her veto. Above all, the con- 
trol of the Gulf of California looms large in all con- 
siderations of national defence. Here is a body of 
water at our very borders whose strategic possibilities 
are hardly second to any other, the title to which we 
have v^oluntarily relinquished to a nation that is neither 
able nor altogether disposed to prevent its being used 
against us. Access to the Gulf at a single coast point 
would give us complete defensive control. That ac- 
cess was offered and rejected at a time when both 
parties were blind to its value. It is now desired and 
withheld by parties who are both thoroughly awake. 

For once we did not take when we might have 
taken. We refrained from no altruistic sentiment or 
conscientious scruple. We bargained sharply with 
ignorance and cupidity, and were the victims of our 
own ignorance and cupidity in return. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 

The history of the United States during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, is a record of frank 
and consistent imperialism. There are the usual af- 
fectations and protestations of higher purpose which 
are inseparable from the struggle for existence on the 
part of peoples and individuals whose social organiza- 
tion schools them to the law of deference, but these 
normal concessions to the social instinct are not ex- 
cessive and never degenerate into fawning hypocrisy. 
Lacking the plausible excuses of the crowded older 
nations, we have been rather constrained toward can- 
dour, and our instinctive imperialism which we share 
with all normal peoples, has been comparatively frank 
and avowed. 

All this has been easier because of our situation. 
We began on the edge of a great empty continent 
which was lying fallow. To subdue it to human serv- 
ice was obviously beneficent. There was no other 
power on this continent which could for a moment con- 
test our claim. To us, at least. It seemed reasonable 
that European powers should keep out of America, 
since America was content to keep out of Europe. It 
was therefore our very manifest destiny to appropri- 
ate the central part of North America and bring it 

83 



84 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

under cultivation as rapidly as possible. To the 
American people, consequently, imperialism had 
nothing of its traditional predatory character. It 
was a struggle of " cosmos against chaos " in which 
the question was not, how much do we need, but how 
much can we manage. It would have meant a perver- 
sion of all wholesome instincts and an apathy most ig- 
noble, if the American people had not pushed its con- 
trol as rapidly as possible across to the Pacific. 

How far considerations of strategy entered into 
American calculations it is difficult to determine. The 
strategy argument was of course urged, and in certain 
cases like Florida, which thrust itself far out into the 
pathway of our well developed commerce with the 
West Indies, it was no doubt seriously considered and 
influential. But it is probable that even here Ameri- 
cans were more concerned over Indian raids into 
Georgia than over foreign menace to our West India 
trade. On the New Brunswick border it is doubtful 
whether considerations of defence had any influence. 
Webster's defence of the treaty on the ground that it 
gave the mountains to New Brunswick and the good 
land to Maine, does not sound like an argument of 
the General Staft'. Finally, in the Gadsden purchase, 
we have seen our Senate completely oblivious of 
strategic considerations which are now recognized as 
of the highest importance. 

This early period is in fact a very unmilitary period. 
Political expansion is always a concomitant of settle- 
ment, and it is the settler rather than the soldier who 
appraises the lands to be acquired. Maine is ap- 
peased by the fact that she gets good land, and Gads- 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 85 

den's purchase is rejected because the land secured is 
worthless. The strategic result is in fact anything 
but ideal. Aside from the fact that our territory is 
utterly at the mercy of Britain, not only via Canada, 
but through her naval bases in the Caribbean, — a 
danger which we justly regard as purely theoretical, — 
our relation to Mexico, a state whose persistent jeal- 
ousy constantly inclines her to serve as a base for our 
enemies, is one that no strategist can contemplate with 
satisfaction. Such strategical advantage as our terri- 
tory acquired during this period was largely acci- 
dental. Our notion of metes and bounds was alto- 
gether naive. From our starting point on the shores 
of the broad Atlantic the untilled lands stretched in 
unbroken continuity to the broad Pacific, our clearly 
appointed limit. Never was manifest destiny quite so 
manifest. A Webster might scoff at the arid lands 
beyond the mountains, but to the sense of the common 
people the problem was simple and plain. So we 
moved on to the Pacific, never doubting that there we 
should catch up with our fleeting horizon. 

Owing to these peculiarities of our situation and to 
certain influences derived from our experience, our 
imperialism during this early period had developed 
conservative features which it Is important that we 
should note. All the territory that we had appro- 
priated had been continuous and compactly arranged. 
This rounding out of our territory was In itself a pow- 
erful argument In favour of annexation. Who can 
doubt that the mere looks of the map appealed 
strongly to the American imagination as a reason for 
the annexation of Florida, California and Oregon? 



86 AiMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But concurrently there grew up a feeling against the 
annexation of detached territory. Jefferson and his 
contemporaries seem to have felt no hesitation about 
annexing Cuba. They justly felt that the sea with 
its easy pathway united us to Cuba much more than 
it separated us from it, and that Cuba was in effect 
much closer to the colonies than Kentucky whose de- 
fection Washington feared on account of the dividing 
barrier of the Blue Ridge. But as we continued our 
progress by land, and as railroads removed land bar- 
riers, while the sea continued to be the symbol of po- 
litical separation, the annexation of overseas terri- 
tories seemed less natural. 

Far more important, however, was the influence of 
our federal development. It was inevitable that the 
territories acquired in our westward advance, as they 
filled up with population drawn from the older states, 
should in turn become states. The term, " terri- 
tory," therefore acquired a special meaning, as an 
area administered by the federal government pending 
preparation for statehood. F.\en the boundaries of 
the future state were usually determined in advance. 
" Territories " were, therefore, mcrclv unripe states, 
and Americans knew no other status for territory un- 
der the control of their government. So strong was 
this tradition that when later the ijuestion of perma- 
nent depenilencies of the L nited States was discussed, 
it was naively objected that we had no governmental 
machinery suitable for governing dependencies. The 
fact that we had been governing dependencies all along 
and doing it (]uite as successfully as we did anvthing 
else, — doing it much after the fashion of our British 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 87 

cousins, by the way, — all this quite escaped our ob- 
jector's notice, simply because he had thought of our 
territories, not as dependencies, but as states in the 
making. He was quite sure that we had no place in 
our system for dependencies. There is no doubt that 
he reflected the almost universal American feeling. 
Territories must become states, and annexations could 
only be made with this expectation. 

Meanwhile a great deal had happened to lessen our 
naive faith in the capacity of all peoples for democ- 
racy. Jefferson, we have seen, favoured the admis- 
sion of Cuba as a state. He seems never to have 
questioned the fitness of its people for participation in 
the responsibilities of popular government. But the 
slavery controversy, with its race to add slave states 
and free states, had raised the issue of fitness, and 
ultimately discredited all communities of slavery ante- 
cedents. Populations akin to those known in slavery 
naturally lost credit, while the experience of alleged 
republics in Latin America was far from reassur- 
ing- 

It is plain, therefore, that as American imperial- 
ism, toward the middle of the century, completed its 
first and most obvious task, it was confronted by very 
positive barriers, physical and psychological, in its 
farther progress. It was faced on the east and the 
west by the largest seas in the world, on the north by 
a nation that it could not affront and on the south by 
a nation that it could not fear. There was a strong 
conviction that a nation's territories should be con- 
tinuous, that its people should be homogeneous, that 
its government should be democratic, that it should 



88 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

be based on the consent of the governed, that all 
should participate in its responsibilities, and that all 
its territorial units should have a uniform status. 
Farther territorial expansion could hardly meet these 
conditions. If the Americans were to follow further 
the star of empire, they must sacrifice their much her- 
alded political principles and the most distinctive char- 
acteristics of their nation. Nothing could better 
illustrate the dependence of political convictions on 
environment and their subordination to the deeper 
instincts of race assertion, than the ease with which 
America made this momentous transition. 

The outstanding fact in this transition was the civil 
war. This inexorable struggle not only made serious 
inroads upon our political philosophy, but it gave us 
the consciousness of military power and directed our 
attention to military considerations. An increased in- 
terest in strategic problems is at once apparent. 

The most important episode in this connection re- 
sulting from the civil war, was the intervention of 
France in the affairs of Mexico and her withdrawal 
when peace enabled us to enter an effectual protest. 
This was merely a new assertion of an old doctrine, 
albeit one of the most extreme phases of American 
imperialism. I litherto the doctrine had not been 
seriously challenged and neither we nor others knew 
what our attitude would be if put to the test. Per- 
haps even yet the issue would be doubtful, if it were 
sprung upon us when we were unprepared. As it 
was, France chose the one moment in our histor}' when 
we were fullv able to assert our will. But the prob- 
lem of the Monroe Doctrine belongs not to the nine- 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 89 

teenth century, but to the twentieth, and must be re- 
served for later discussion. 

The conspicuous event of the time was the purchase 
of Alaska from Russia for the sum of $7,200,000. It 
is the more conspicuous because it was not preceded 
by any events which made the purchase a logical 
necessity. Viewed in the broad perspective of his- 
tory, it stands as a more or less isolated and gratuitous 
transaction. There was no public demand for it, 
and the general attitude toward it seems to have been 
one of good-natured indifference. No immediate 
danger was averted and no immediate advantage 
gained. Yet when, after one or two earlier sugges- 
tions, the transfer was finally seriously proposed, the 
treaty was drawn up and signed the same night and 
was ratified almost without opposition. Yet this ter- 
ritory was detached and the most sanguine could not 
expect it to become a state. Its population was not 
American and was guiltless of any consent to the trans- 
fer. It is amazing to see the easy way in which 
American traditions went by the board in this epoch- 
making annexation. So mystifying is the whole af- 
fair that quite a mythology has grown up as to the 
motives that actuated the parties to it. The simpler 
reasons are the more plausible. Russia was tired of 
it. She had meant it as the beginning of a great 
American empire, and Britain had headed her off. 
It promised nothing now, and was expensive. Be- 
sides, the next war with Britain (which was then a 
foregone conclusion) would see it annexed to the 
British Empire without compensation. Russia was 
selling what she did not want and could not keep. 



90 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

On the other hand, Scwarei, one of the most fearless 
expansionists we ever knew, wanted to get Russia out 
of the Western Hemisphere and hoped to see Alaska 
linked to the United States later by the annexation of 
Canada, a scheme to which he was frankly committed. 
As a part of the scheme of a united North America 
the acquisition of Alaska is consistent and intelligible. 
As an isolated fact it would not have seemed so to 
the knowledge and the reasoning of that time. All 
intimations that he divined Alaska's wealth, and all 
complacent references to the hundreds of millions that 
have been taken from her mines, are beside the mark. 
He did not know her wealth, and if he had, he would 
not have forgotten, as his admirers have done, that it 
costs something to get those hundreds of millions out. 
Seward's scheme of a united North America through 
the union of Canada with the United States has not 
been realized, and the idea is now nowhere enter- 
tained. But at the time it was nowise an unreasonable 
plan. It coincided with a very low ebb of imperial 
enthusiasm in the British Empire, and the opinion was 
widely held that the self governing dependencies of 
Britain, like the " territories " of the United States, 
were merely serving a probation which was to end in 
complete independence. The statement was made, 
even in official circles, that whenever Canada wished 
to sever her connection with the mother country, she 
would be free to do so, — a statement which is doubt- 
less still true, but with this important difference, that 
no one now expects that that time will come, while 
then it was quite definitely anticipated. There soon 
arose an agitation headed by influential Canadians, 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 91 

for separation from Britain and union with the United 
States, an agitation which might perhaps have been 
successful if It had been earnestly and tactfully sec- 
onded by the United States. In this connection, how- 
ever, our traditional imperialism has always been 
strangely lacking, a phenomenon which will later call 
for explanation. We have steadily refused to be 
anxious about Canada or territorially covetous toward 
her, and have viewed with indifference if not with sym- 
pathy, the confirmation of Canada's unnatural de- 
pendence upon Europe and unnatural separation from 
ourselves. 

But while Seward's larger scheme has not been 
realized, the exclusion of Russia from the Western 
Hemisphere is so important as a measure of national 
security, that it amply justifies the annexation. In 
this connection, the importance of which later events 
have done so much to emphasize, the great secretary 
was undoubtedly far in advance of his time. Earlier 
American imperialism had been economic, and with 
most Americans it remained so, as the jibes at 
" Seward's icebergs " sufliciently proved. Seward's 
policy was essentially strategic. That we have since 
found wealth there is pure luck. 

The nature of Seward's policy is clearly manifest 
in his next move, the attempted purchase of the Dan- 
ish West Indies. Their economic value is insignifi- 
cant, but their strategic importance is enormous, as 
Seward and a few of the leaders who had learned the 
lessons of the war clearly perceived. But he was 
ahead of his times, and the earlier easy going In- 
dulgence of Congress now failed him. The plain 



92 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

fact is that he was tackling a twentieth century prob- 
lem in the intellectual environment of the nineteenth. 
The political imagination of the American people was 
still in its infancy, and Congress seldom fails to rep- 
resent faithfully at least the limitations of the people. 
There was as yet no appreciation of impending pres- 
sure from Europe and no conception of annexation 
which was not to eventuate in statehood. Proposals 
which transcended these limits in both respects stood 
little chance of acceptance. 

The whole matter was complicated by the fact that 
the government was now convulsed by the fiercest fac- 
tional light known in all our history, a struggle be- 
tween the President and Congress. Matters came to 
such a pass that the President's recommendation was 
sufficient to insure the opposition of Congress. As 
Seward supported the President, he naturally shared 
the bitter hostility of Congress. The very advan- 
tageous treaty negotiated by Seward would hardly 
have commended itself to the men of his generation 
in any case. As it was, the Senate contemptuously 
refused even to consider it, and continued in that re- 
fusal, even though Denmark twice obligingly extended 
the time for its consideration. 

A like fate overtook the effort to establish a pro- 
tectorate over Santo Domingo under the next adminis- 
tration. Here again factional spirit was rife, so 
much so as to elicit from President Cirant a digni- 
fied protest in his hist communication to Congress on 
this subject. But while personal rancour may have 
turned the scale, the objections to the new imperial- 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 93 

Ism already cited were now more definitely formulated 
and strongly urged. The uncertainty as to the atti- 
tude of the Dominican people and above all the unfor- 
tunate — yet natural — recommendation that Santo 
Domingo be admitted as a state, were made the 
ground of earnest and sincere objection. A protec- 
torate was too " un-American " to be considered, and 
no other way out of the difficulty suggested itself. 
The strategic argument, on the other hand, was 
naturally much less felt by Congress than by Grant. 
So the proposal was decisively negatived. 

It seemed, therefore, that in 1870 we knew where 
we stood. We had been consistent not only in what 
we had done, but in what we had refused to do. Ad- 
jacent territory which could be filled with our kind of 
people and made into states we wanted, and that with- 
out assignable limit. But we did not want territory 
that could not be made Into states, nor did we want 
states made of such material as Santo Domingo had 
to offer. Our apathy toward Canada remained a 
somewhat puzzling exception to the first proposi- 
tion and our acquisition of Alaska a nominal exception 
to the second, but no reasonable person could doubt 
our attitude on either. American Imperialism had 
reached its limit, physical and psychological. 

But though we may halt at the river's brink and 
turn aside, if we come to a place where there are step- 
ping stones and half-way points, we turn again and 
cross to the other side. Traditional American policy 
was separated by a seemingly Impassable gulf from 
Santo Domingo as a perpetual dependency, and still 



94 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

more from Santo Domingo as a state. To cross this 
gulf we needed a midway station or stepping stone. 
Hawaii furnished the midway station. 

Ihe Hawaiian Ishinds, situated a third of the way 
across the Pacific and peopled by an alien race, were 
not eligible for annexation under the conditions of the 
early conservative program we have been consider- 
ing. But commercial relations had been long estab- 
lished and had become very extensive, while a remark- 
able missionary movement, perhaps the wisest, broad- 
est, and most successful yet to be recorded, had estab- 
lished a close bond of union with this country. Up 
until the middle of the century we had had no thought 
of anything but the independence of the islands, but 
there were unmistakable signs that independence could 
be maintained only artificially by Anierican interven- 
tion. Britain and France did not share our scruples 
about annexing distant islands, and they were just then 
engaged in making a clean-up of the Pacific. Once 
the British flag had been hoisted there and witlnh-aw n 
only at the strenuous request of our government, and 
at another time 1-Vance had taken practical possession. 
Intervention and constant championship of Hawaiian 
rights became a settled policy of the L'nlted States. 

Finally, in 1853, following a definite request of the 
Hawaiian government, a treaty of annexation was ne- 
gotiated, but this was not submitted to the Senate be- 
cause it conferred statehood on the Islands, a policy 
to which our Secretary of State was wisely opposed. 
Fifteen years later the indefatigable Seward again 
urged annexation, but finally confessed that other is- 
sues for the time being made impossible the considera- 



THE BREAK WITH TRADITION 95 

tion of " the higher but more remote questions of na- 
tional existence and aggrandizement." These two 
terms, " national existence and aggrandizement," givx 
the key to Seward's policy and to the imperialism to- 
ward which we were inexorably moving. 

Whether the national mind moved fast or slow, it 
could move in but one direction. To occupy Hawaii 
would carry us dangerously far, but to let a rival oc- 
cupy it would be to bring him still more dangerously 
near. We were beginning to hear about naval de- 
fence and were learning the value of naval bases. If 
the islands of the sea were to be drawn into the great 
scheme of things and to find their allegiance, Hawaii 
must become American. 

Meanwhile American commerce and American in- 
fluence became ever more preponderant. The gov- 
ernment was avowedly pro-American and dependent 
on our good offices for its maintenance. Factions 
deepened into permanent feuds, and sought backing 
with foreign powers. Disorder finally culminated in 
revolution and in a request from the Provisional Gov- 
ernment thus established for annexation to the United 
States. A treaty was negotiated and signed in the 
last days of President Harrison's administration, but 
was not ratified till Cleveland became President, 
March fourth, 1893. 

Cleveland was absolutely opposed to the new im- 
perialism. What he would have done with Oregon 
and California if he had been in Polk's place fifty years 
earlier it is interesting to speculate. But if he was 
reconciled to the earlier program, he was uncom- 
promisingly opposed to the new. He not only with- 



96 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

drew the treaty from the Senate but even attempted 
to overturn the Provisional Government and restore 
the effete monarchy on the ground that the revolu- 
tion had been effected by American aid. He failed, 
however, in the one purpose as in the other. The 
Provisional Government maintained itself and con- 
tinued to champion the cause of annexation which was 
accomplished, not without a bitter struggle, in 1S97, 
early in the administration of McKinley. Even then 
the annexation would probably have been defeated 
had it not been for the outbreak of the war with 
Spain and the sudden realization of the necessity of 
preventing Spain from using the Islands as a base of 
operations against our western coast. 

But the die was cast. 7 he tradition of continuous 
territory was broken and the doctrine of ultimate 
statehood challenged. Would Hawaii ever become a 
state? Perhaps, if Americans kept going there and 
multiplied and replenished the land. It was a mid- 
way station from which champions of old and new 
might look hopefully to the nearer or the farther 
shore. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE GREAT INADVERTENCE 

In the middle of the nineteenth century, as has 
been noted, the United States seems to have been 
pretty^ definitely committed to the policy of limiting 
its expansion to contiguous territory on the North 
American continent. We had annexed no detached 
territory, and despite the inclination of our earlier 
statesmen toward the West Indies, it may be safely 
asserted that no such annexation was contemplated. 
The annexation of Alaska broke the tradition of con- 
tiguous territory, but it was not intended to do so. 
It simply represents an abortive scheme to complete 
our expansion northward. Whatever precedent it 
established, counted for little in view of its peculiar 
situation and character. 

The annexation of Hawaii makes a definite break 
in our tradition, but one which can be plausibly con- 
strued as a broader application of the accepted prin- 
ciple. Islands for the most part belong to one conti- 
nent or another, and in carefully considered schemes 
of development and defence, must be so included. In 
the age of naval supremacy in particular, outlying 
islands become matters of critical importance, and a 
controlling position on the continent implies their con- 
trol. To include these island outposts is merely to 

97 



98 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

define more accurately the continent itself. No sane 
American strategist can consent to the exclusion of 
the Hawaiian Islands, any more than a European 
strategist could yield the Azores or the Canaries. 

But clear as is this reasoning, it was far reaching in 
its implications. If Hawaii was necessary, by the 
same token Cuba and all the West Indies were re- 
quired to safeguard our position. There were not 
wanting those who perceiv^ed the logic of this annexa- 
tion, and thus began the argument which culminated 
in the Treaty of Paris. 

The American people, however, did not at once 
feel it necessary to be logical. Logic is at best usually 
an afterthought in such cases. It is concrete situ- 
ations that count. A concrete situation had arisen in 
Hawaii, and something had to be done about it. 
Other islands might be the same logically, but they 
did not present the same concrete situation. Perhaps 
they never would do so. It was enough to deal with 
such situations when they presented themselves. The 
American people do not cross bridges until they come 
to them. 

But once the barrier of our continental tradition 
was broken down, our farther expansion went with 
a rush. In principle, every vestige of conservatism 
was thrown to the winds in an almost unnoticed 
transaction of this period, the annexation of Tutuila, 
one of the Samoan Islands. It would be difficult to 
find in the whole history of Iniperlalism, American or 
any other, a more unpremeditated result or a more 
flagrant disregard of accepted principles or even of 
the considerations of ordinary prudence. I hrough- 



THE GREAT IVAD\'ERTE>XE 99 



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100 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

vision of the islands gave the remaining and larger 
portion to Germany and thus made her our next door 
neighbour in a remote part of the world where both 
countries are necessarily represented by personal 
agents exercising large discretionary powers. What 
that may mean in the way of embroiling the two coun- 
tries the earlier history of Samoa should teach us. 

This is narrative, not criticism. It is probable that 
the acquisition in this remote region of one of the 
most splendid naval stations in the world was a piece 
of great good fortune. If we were to have the far- 
flung battle line, it was certainly desirable that our 
outposts should be the best possible — as Tutuila 
certainly is, — and tlft far-flung battle line was 
already a foregone conclusion. 

The Samoan annexation was indeed but a minor 
episode in a vast imperialist movement which sud- 
denly changed the whole current of our history. In 
that movement our war with Spain naturally held the 
centre of the stage and exercised the controlling in- 
fluence over our policy. That policy now developed 
with startling rapidity. July 7, 1898, we consented, 
not without sore misgivings, to annex Hawaii. Five 
months later the Treaty of Paris with its epoch-mak- 
ing changes of policy was signed. With Ciuam and 
the Philippines in our possession, we need hardly 
wonder that the annexation of Samoa a year later, 
scarce attracted notice. The die had been cast. 

We are now sufficiently removed from the Spanish 
war to survey it more broadly and see it in truer per- 
spective. Thus viewed, the spectacle is not entirely 
edifying. Nominally. Spain was at war with a re- 



9 

THE GREAT INADVERTENCE loi 

bellious colony, and we were a neutral state. As a 
people, however, we were not neutral but aggressively 
partisan, both in our discussion of the issue and in 
the action of multitudes of our citizens. Spain was 
powerless to conquer Cuba and equally powerless to 
bring her own people to a realizing sense of their im- 
potence. There was endless accusation, recrimina- 
tion, and evasion on both sides. In her charges of un- 
neutrality and failure to restrain our citizens, Spain 
had a clear case. In our lame defence we urged argu- 
ments which we had repudiated when Britain used 
them a generation earlier. On the other hand, when 
we demanded reforms, Spain was no less evasive and 
disingenuous. It was in fact' the old conflict between 
legitimacy and efficiency, a conflict as old as history, 
but one which curiously enough is always fought under 
disguises. Possession is normally the product and 
the record of past efficiency, and present efficiency is 
always challenging that record. But men are not 
philosophers enough to plead their cause In terms of 
ultimate principles. Hence the sophistries and pre- 
texts that fill the air with dust while the great uncon- 
scious Instincts whose bidding we are wont to do, 
marshal their forces for the fray. It is useless to 
talk of neutrality In such cases. Sympathy owns a 
higher law. Judged from the standpoint of diplo- 
matic " correctness," America had no sort of a case. 
Yet her mandate was one that she could neither mis- 
take nor resist. Being compelled to state the case of 
ultimate principles In terms of diplomatic convention, 
her apologia sounds specious and sophistical. Fortu- 
nately, there is now no such necessity. We can put 



102 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

It bluntly. Spain had made a sorry mess of it, and 
we had lost patience and were determined to make an 
end of her rule. That is a dangerous philosophy for 
nations to talk out loud. It works havoc with the 
instincts of courtesy and the conventions of deference 
whose restraints are vital to the comities of men. 
But as a mute intuition working in the twilight of half 
consciousness, it is the instrument of the great re- 
newer. Our war with Spain was one of the best justi- 
fied of all wars. 

All interest centred in Cuba, the great struggling, 
suffering, half human thing. Sympathy was hers, 
and we called for her release. Beyond that we 
neither thought nor willed. In perfect accord with 
the national attitude President McKinley, after an 
exhausting exercise of patience, recommended inter- 
vention in behalf of Cuba and of humanity, and the 
more than ready Congress declared war upon Spain, 
taking pains to stipulate " that the United States 
hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to ex- 
ercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said 
island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts 
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave 
the government and control of the island to its peo- 
ple." Despite the cynicism of foreign critics, there 
can not be a reasonable doubt that this declaration was 
sincere and that perfectly sincere efforts ha\e been 
made from beginning to end to redeem the pledge. 
Strikingly similar was the action and the intention of 
Britain when I'gypt was occupied a few years earlier. 
It remains to be seen whether Cuba will become an- 
other Egypt. 



THE GREAT INADVERTENCE 103 

But though, in beginning the war, our thought and 
purpose were hmited to Cuba, It was quite impossi- 
ble thus to limit our action. We were at war with 
Spain, and war knows but one law. The enemy must 
be attacked and crippled wherever possible. Spain 
had other possessions in the Western Hemisphere, 
notably Porto Rico, and to leave this nearby island 
in the enemy's hands as a base of operations and 
source of supplies was not to be thought of. Hence 
the prompt occupation of Porto Rico, and following 
the occupation, the inevitable appeal to the imagina- 
tion and enlargement of the imperial horizon. We 
had not thought about Porto Rico before, but now that 
we did think about it, what should be done with it. 
The inefficiency and mismanagement which were the 
grounds of our war with Spain, were quite as manifest 
in Porto Rico as in Cuba, and there was as little hope 
of amendment In the one case as In the other. The 
smaller Island had not revolted, but permanent con- 
tent, the only guaranty of genuine peace, was not to 
be thought of. If disorder had forced us to inter- 
vene in Cuba, It would force us to intervene In Porto 
Rico. To expel Spain from one island and leave her 
In the other was simply to do the thing In Instalments, 
a method recommended by neither economy nor hu- 
manity. The logic of the situation was Inexorable. 

But if Spain was to leave, what was to become of 
Porto Rico? Cuba was to be Independent. We had 
promised that In the days of our liberty enthusiasm. 
But to Porto Rico we had made no promises and were 
therefore free to follow our bent. Somehow the 
analogy of Cuba did not commend itself. The island 



104 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

was smaller; there had been no revolt, no blow for 
freedom; our occupation had been welcomed; we 
needed a naval station and became suddenly aware 
that Porto Rico was a strategic site, and — but what 
need to enumerate? The inclination to annex Porto 
Rico was overwhelming, and much less satisfactory 
reasons would have sufficed. Undoubtedly it was 
the wise thing to do, the only thing to do, the thing 
that any nation that has ever commanded the respect 
of posterity would have done. But it was not the 
less an innovation and an inadvertence. We did not 
enter upon the war for the sake of colonies and em- 
pire, but the war brought us colonics and empire just 
the same. That is the way that empires grow, our 
empire and other empires. Premeditated empires 
are seldom realized. Nowhere does intention count 
for so little. 

If we seek a more striking illustration of this over- 
mastering power of the logic of events, this same war 
can furnish it. It was quickly realized that Spain's 
chief power to injure us was in raiding our commerce. 
In the Far East where our commerce was considerable, 
she had both ships and a naval base. It was indis- 
pensable that our Pacific squadron should if possible 
destroy the Spanish ships at Manila before the raid- 
ing began. This, to be sure, had not entered into 
the plans of those who had summoned us to put an 
end to misgovernment in Cuba, but in willing the end, 
they could hardly be expected to take up the ques- 
tion of the ways and means. It was easy to see, how- 
ever, that this had to be done. We had not thought 
about the Philippines, scarcely knew, indeed, that 



THE GREAT INADVERTENCE 105 

there were such things, but when a study of the map 
disclosed the fact that there were Spanish possessions 
in this part of the world, and that there were cruisers 
there ready to raid our commerce, we of course saw 
that we must destroy those cruisers. 

So the cruisers were destroyed and then we were 
again faced with a situation that we had not fore- 
seen. Spanish rule in the Philippines was not es- 
sentially different from what it was in Cuba and not 
much more popular. The fleet that we had de- 
stroyed had been its support. Without the fleet there 
could be no Spanish government, and under the cir- 
cumstances, no government of any kind. Anarchy 
meant massacre and all the horrors that come when 
savagery, long held in leash, again has its chance at 
those it hates. We had not thought about that when 
we destroyed those cruisers to protect our commerce. 
Some of us, far from the scene, were loath to think 
about it afterward. But those who were there had 
to think about it, and could do only one thing. They 
must maintain the order whose support they had de- 
stroyed. 

For this reason Dewey remained. For this reason, 
perhaps, he " interrupted " the cable lest unconscious 
Washington should veto his decision or call him 
home. For this reason he raised our flag in Manila. 
For this reason, — and for other reasons, — we are in 
the Philippines today. 

It was only a question of giving time enough for the 
imagination to picture that battle in the shimmering 
light of that tropical sea, and Old Glory waving from 
the venerable ramparts of sleepy Manila, and retreat 



io6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

became impossible. We ne\er had thought about it, 
surely, but now that we did think about it, how im- 
portant to have a naval station in the Ear East where 
our cruisers could protect our commerce and be on 
hand for other possible emergencies such as this. 
How plain our duty to redeem these islands from 
Spanish misrule as well as those near our shores. 
How providential the opportunity which brought eight 
million Asiatics to the missionary and the teacher in- 
stead of forcing their ministry to wait for a grudging 
hearing. What possibilities for commerce, for ex- 
ploitation, for organization, for philanthropy, for — 
In short, we were in the mood to stay, and we drafted 
soldier, ruler, merchant, and priest into the service 
of justifying our choice. 

The task w^as not easy. The Philippines do not, 
like Porto Rico, stand guard at the gateway of our 
homeland. They guard the entrance to a remote and 
different world. To us here at home they are hardly 
a defence. They are rather a thing to be defended, 
and that at a distance and against possible claimants 
near at hand. Their value depends all upon our 
farther policy. If we are minded to push our battle 
line out to this front of the far eastern world, to plant 
our naval stations in every sea and police the planet 
with our sentinels, then the Philippines are a brave 
beginning. But we had not planned to do that. 
We had not thought we wished to do it. Nay, up to 
the very time when it all happened, we had not wishcil 
it. Wc had resolved to free Cuba and to abate a 
standing nuisance in our neighbourhood. And lo, 
here we find ourschcs in Malay land, deep enmeshed 



THE GREAT INADVERTENCE 107 

in the tangled web of the East. It may all be fortu- 
nate, but it certainly was not intended. If in advance, 
any one had proposed to annex the Philippines we 
should have questioned his sanity. 

The decision once reached to annex the Philippines, 
the treaty was framed with intelligent regard to the 
true situation. Manila could not fail to be a naval 
station of importance, and all precautions were taken 
against its isolation. The commercial route to the 
Philippines is usually a roundabout one, for ships find 
it advisable to touch at Japanese and Chinese ports 
as well as at Manila. But for naval and military pur- 
poses a direct route is preferable. Hawaii lies on 
this direct route about three thousand miles from our 
shores. In the six or seven thousand miles from 
Hawaii to Manila an intermediate station was de- 
sired. This was supplied by the island of Guam 
which Spain was also compelled to yield. With the 
annexation of Tutuila a year later, the United States 
completed its system of stepping stones across the 
Pacific, Hawaii for Japan, Hawaii and Guam for 
Manila, and Hawaii and Tutuila for New Zealand 
and Austraha. Britain herself could not have chosen 
them better. She had been our teacher, and we had 
not sat at her feet in vain. 

It Is all so natural, yet all so unexpected, so mo- 
mentous. Two years before, ours was a republic, 
home staying and with no thought but to continue 
so. And now an empire had arisen, an empire of 
which we had been the builders, but not the architect. 



CHAPTER VIII 

AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 

The nineteenth century, which had witnessed the 
expansion of the American Repubhc from the At- 
lantic to the Pacific, might seemingly have been con- 
tent to leave it within those safe limits. Neverthe- 
less at the very close the irrepressible American tem- 
per slipped the leash, and the conservative policy of 
the century was abandoned. Hawaii was annexed 
July 6, 1898. Seven months later the treaty of Paris 
gave us Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and 
suzeraint)^ over Cuba. On January 16, 1900, we 
were formally installed in Samoa. Thus in the short 
space of eighteen months we had pushed our frontier 
out many thousands of miles, enmeshing it with the 
frontiers of the great powers of Europe, and neces- 
sarily revolutionizing our relation with other powers 
and modifying the strategy- of our national defence. 

But changes far more serious than those of bound- 
ary or strategy were involved in these annexations. 
Our whole political philosophy underwent a radical 
change. We had believed in a compact territory, 
and had thought to stay within the limits, or at least 
within the lee, of our continent, but we had annexed 
Samoa. We had learned to prize race homogeneity, 
but Porto Rico seemed certain to remain Spanish. 
Wc averred that " governments derive their just 

108 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 109 

powers from the consent of the governed," but we 
had coerced the Fihplnos, We had pinned our faith 
to democracy, the government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people, but we refused to admit 
even Hawaii to the privileges of statehood. We 
could annex Constantinople or Finland on the strength 
of such analogies as these. 

These things are not said in criticism. Philoso- 
phies have no prescriptive rights over life. They are 
for the most part little more than the shadows which 
events cast in passing. Our earlier philosophy had 
been simple and idyllic, blissfully unconscious of ne- 
cessities which we had not yet experienced. It served 
us till our broadening life brought necessities that It 
could not meet, and then with but moderate protest It 
released us from our allegiance, 

" New occasions teach new duties, 

Time makes ancient good uncouth. 
Thej^ must upward still and onward 
Who would keep abreast of truth." 

There is no saving grace In an Inherited rule of thumb. 
As a matter of fact, the disintegration of this early 
philosophy had begun long before. We had never 
asked the consent of the peoples whom we had an- 
nexed, and In the only case where such consent was 
clearly expressed, — that of the Danish West Indies 
In 1868, — we had refused annexation. Even then, 
Seward had positively refused to make annexation de- 
pendent on consent of the islands. Possibly he 
realized that after our reconstruction of the South 
following the Civil War, the less said about consent 



no AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

of the governed the better. Consent is the reward 
of just government, not its preliminary. 

Nor had we shown much concern about race homo- 
geneity when we annexed Spanish Florida and north- 
ern Mexico. It was doubtless realized that American 
immigration would assimilate these Spanish popula- 
tions, but there is little evidence that this was felt to 
be necessary. Similarly, in annexing Alaska, we did 
violence to our tacit doctrine of continuous territory', 
but trusted to a future annexation of Canada to re- 
establish it. 

In short, we had always taken long chances with 
our political principles, and trusted to the future to 
restore temporary breaches. Our only Hxed rule of 
action had been to meet each situation on its own 
merits. This we kept right on doing, careless of out- 
ward consistency. There were very good reasons 
for our action, special and particular reasons in 
each particular case, reasons which appealed to sane 
and practical men. So we did the needful each time 
as we saw it, letting our philosophy adjust itself to the 
new situation as it had previously done to the old. 
That is, we gave to the great instincts of race asser- 
tion and human sympathy, precedence over traditions 
born of accidental situation and local experience. 
These traditions of course made a respectable but a 
rapidly diminishing protest. It took years of bitter 
struggle to annex Hawaii, months to ratify tlic treaty 
of Paris, while Samoa, most doubtful of them all. was 
a matter only of days, time enough for the bare neces- 
sities of Senatorial routine. We had crossed our 
Rubicon and America was an empire. 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE iii 

These things accomplished, there is little occasion 
to comment on subsequent annexations. The Canal 
Zone was acquired by " perpetual lease " from the 
Republic of Panama by treaty signed in 1903 and 
ratified February 23, 1904. This insignificant area 
probably surpasses in value, and in its influence upon 
our national policy, all other acquisitions since 1848, 
as we shall soon have occasion to note. It bears 
somewhat the same relation to the American empire 
that Gibraltar bears to the British, a trifling territory 
vital to our very existence, the object of intense de- 
sire to our rivals and of all our possessions the one 
where our right is most likely to be challenged. No- 
where else in our entire domain are the necessities and 
the responsibilities of empire, and the inadequacy 
of our earlier philosophy so manifest as In Panama. 

Finally, at the moment of writing, we have to note 
the acquisition of the Danish West Indies. The 
price is large, — far larger than Seward asked us 
to pay half a century ago, — but no one doubts the 
wisdom of the purchase. We have at last become 
conscious of the dangers and the strategic necessities 
of our position. There Is a beginning of that im- 
perial mind without which an imperial domain is an 
anomaly and a peril. It is possible that we shall make 
little use of the magnificent harbour and potential 
naval station which the Islands offer, but we must at 
least make sure that no enemy uses them against us. 
The Canal is the magnet which attracts the steel of 
Europe to our shores. At all costs it must be pro- 
tected from those whose ambitions menace our exist- 
ence. So reasons our newly awakened consciousness. 



112 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Once more, expansion seems to have reached its 
limit. It may truthfully be said that no further an- 
nexations are contemplated. Nor is it probable that 
circumstances will again force our hand. All thought 
of union with Canada, the one really attractive pros- 
pect, has been abandoned. Acquisitions of territory 
in the old world are almost unthinkable, despite the 
possibilities which the world war suggests. Eatin 
America still troubles us, but if the present war fore- 
stalls European Intervention there, we shall have as 
little occasion, as we now have inclination, to extend 
our rule in this quarter. It is occasionally proposed 
that we acquire the British West Indies in exchange 
for the Philippines, but in this matter of dependent 
peoples, Britain has outlived the age of barter if we 
have not. It is altogether possible that the age of 
annexation is at an end. 

The age of annexation but not the age of imperial- 
ism. Imperialism is a permanent process, annexation 
a passing phase. Annexation is suitable for a harsh 
and primitive age, or for empty territories, or for 
territories favourably disposed, but in this age of the 
world the empire builder who knows no method but 
annexation, would not get \cry far. It we are done 
with annexation, that only means that we ha\c learned 
a subtler art. 

As the nineteenth century exerted itself to com- 
plete the task of the primitive imperialist era, so the 
twentieth century hastened to inaugurate the new era. 
The century was but two months old when Congress 
on March i, 1901, enacted the famous " Piatt Amend- 
ment," defining our relations with Cuba. The act, 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 113 

passed under this unobtrusive name, was destined to 
become, next to the Federal Constitution, perhaps the 
most important document in the history of the United 
States. 

It has been noted that the Cuban struggle for in- 
dependence was the occasion of our war with Spain, 
and that in entering the conflict we pledged ourselves 
to establish that independence and to hand over 
Cuba to the control of her own people as soon as con- 
ditions would permit. We promised this readily and 
sincerely, and quite as much to remove our own appre- 
hension as that of the Cubans. We had as yet no 
overseas possessions, and had just rejected with em- 
phasis the petition of the Hawaiians for annexation, 
listening the while to words of scathing denunciation 
from President Cleveland on this and all similar proj- 
ects. We probably thought we agreed with him. 
We have always stoutly maintained such principles 
except when circumstances called for their temporary 
abandonment. We distinctly disapprove of crossing 
bridges as an abstract proposition. It is only when 
we come to them that we make an exception. We 
came to the Hawaiian bridge very soon after, when 
war was really upon us, and we crossed it without 
hesitation, but for the present we disapproved. So 
much the more the Cuban bridge which was not yet 
in sight. So we cheerfully promised never to cross 
it. We fully meant it. We sympathized with the 
sore-stricken people, and we still had something of 
our former easy faith in independence as a panacea. 
Besides, we instinctiv^ely felt the advantage, before 
the world and before ourselves, of a disinterested pro- 



114 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

gram. Has not even Germany sought the role of 
champion of the independence of little nations? 

There can be little question that the acquisitions 
which speedily followed effected a considerable change 
in American sentiment on this point. There was 
more to be said for the annexation of Cuba than for 
that of Porto Rico, and vastly more than for that of 
the Philippines or Samoa. Yet all these were an- 
nexed, while Cuba was " freed."' The promise stood 
in the way of annexation. There were not wanting 
those who saw the anomaly and favoured the repudi- 
ation of the pledge on the plausible ground of the 
welfare of Cuba herself, and such sentiments were 
more manifest in Havana than here. European ob- 
servers accepted annexation as a foregone conclusion, 
remembering Eg)pt, Finland, and the like. Further 
protestations of our purpose were the subject of 
cynical levity. Had we had the cynicism so frankly 
manitested by our critics, we should doubtless have 
done as they predicted. We have done things quite 
as bad as this, — perhaps should have done this under 
different leadership, — but under Roosevelt we kept 
our promise and withdrew from Cuba. 

But it was impossible to be unconscious, as we had 
formerly been, of our own interest in Cuba. The war 
had taught us that Cuba, feeble as she was, might be 
our undoing. Moreover, our two or three years of 
military occupation had been years of busy effort and 
of almost magical transformation. The dark little 
land of a few years before was now illuminated by the 
play of our national Imagination, and we decided to 
make our withdrawal conditioned upon the protection 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 115 

of our interests and the perpetuation of our beneficent 
work. This was putting a liberal construction on our 
promise, but not an unplausible one. We had prom- 
ised to leave Cuba to her own people when her " paci- 
fication was accomplished," an elastic condition which 
it necessarily rested with us to define. It could be in- 
terpreted narrowly, as the mere suppression of dis- 
order in the island, or broadly, as the establishment 
of conditions which would insure permanent peace in 
Cuba and the adjacent territories under her influence. 
There was the usual difference of opinion between the 
literalist and the rationalist, a difference that has al- 
ways been with us and which, in ever\^ crisis of our 
histor\', has been decided in favour of the latter. The 
decision in this case was comparatively easy. To 
withdraw as soon as Cuba was quiet but while condi- 
tions were such as to inspire a speedy recurrence of 
disorder, w^ould be crying peace! peace I when there 
was no peace. Pacification must be more than tem- 
porary quiet, if it was to have any significance as a 
condition of self-government. It is the product of 
slow development, economic, social, and political, as 
Britain has found in Egypt, and we might legitimately 
have stayed indefinitely as she has done, waiting for 
the elusive condition. We chose a unique alternative. 
The Amendment provides, (i) that Cuba shall 
enter into no compromising arrangements with foreign 
powers, (2) that she shall contract no debt which can 
not be paid out of current revenues, (3) that the 
United States may Intervene to preserve Cuban inde- 
pendence, enforce treat}- obligations, and ensure a 
government able to protect property and hfe, (4) that 



ii6 AMERICA AxMOXG THE xNATlONS 

all acts of the American government be validated, 
(5) that American sanitary regulations be enforced, 
and (6) that Cuba sell or lease to the United States 
sites for two naval stations. The requirements were 
in effect somewhat more exacting than this brief sum- 
mary would indicate, paragraphs i and 3 being par- 
ticularly comprehensive. The United States retains 
virtually complete control of foreign relations, and 
may intervene to correct almost any condition which 
she judges to be seriously unsatisfactory, her naval 
bases on opposite sides of the island serving practi- 
cally as garrison posts for the exercise of her control. 
That these provisions were seriously meant is indi- 
cated by the fact that the right of intervention has 
been exercised repeatedly, once to the extent of super- 
seding the regular government for a considerable 
period. 

Cuban politicians were quick to see the purport of 
the Amendment and to protest that it destroyed the 
independence which the United States had promised 
and which we purported to be giving. With great 
reluctance they accepted the unwelcome conditions, 
appending certain " interpretations " thereto which 
were calculated somewhat to lessen their rigour. It 
was all in vain. They were informed that the ac- 
ceptance must be unqualified, and they finally yielded 
with bad grace. 

There were not wanting objectors at home who de- 
clared that under the Amendment Cuba would not be 
independent, but would be a protectorate. I'hls the 
author of the Amendment stoutly denied. Both were 
right, but the objector had the better case. Techni- 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 117 

cally Cuba is not a protectorate, for protectorates do 
not ordinarily define and limit the powers of suzerain 
and dependent as is done in this case. Nor are the re- 
lations as here defined altogether such as are tradi- 
tional in cases of that kind. A protectorate governed 
by a written constitution is in a sense unique and per- 
haps marks a significant advance in the art of imperial 
organization. 

But all this is beside the mark, however important. 
In his main contention the objector was right. Cuba 
may not be technically a protectorate, but Cuba is not 
independent. She can not negotiate with foreign 
powers, she can not borrow money, she can not even 
manage her home affairs or conduct her housekeeping, 
except under the supervision of her suzerain and 
within the narrow Hmits prescribed by the agreement. 
Her territory is virtually garrisoned by the suzerain's 
forces who reserves the right to intervene practically 
at discretion. We may not join in the objector's pro- 
test, but we must concede the essential correctness of 
his analysis. Cuba inaugurates a new era in Ameri- 
can imperialism. 

Before considering the consequences that have fol- 
lowed from this epoch making arrangement, it is well 
to consider its adaptation to the conditions with which 
we had to deal. The interests of the United States 
were vital, and the Piatt Amendment shows both a 
clear appreciation of them and a rare wisdom in 
adapting means to ends. 

It was first of all necessary that Cuba should not 
be occupied or in any way controlled by a foreign 
power with whom America might be at war. It is 



ii8 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

beyond question the best base in existence for an at- 
tack upon the United States with the exception of 
Canada. There are many ways in which a foreign 
power might get a foothold in such a country, ways 
against which Cuba unaided would be quite unable to 
protect herself. There was indeed much reason to 
fear that an independent Cuba with its inevitable mis- 
government, would be in more or less constant trouble 
with the United States, and that a short sighted re- 
sentment would lead it to throw itself into the arms 
of a power hostile to the United States. This possi- 
bility, so painfully suggested by recent conditions in 
Mexico, was foreseen and forestalled, not merely by 
pledging Cuba to a policy of aloofness, but by a series 
of provisions calculated to secure the fultilment of that 
pledge. The naval stations at Guantanamo and 
Bahia Honda undoubtedly serve general naval pur- 
poses, but it can not be doubted that their chief pur- 
pose is to protect Cuba against foreign occupation. 
Similarly, the provision that Cuba should contract no 
debts which she could not pay out of current revenues, 
was designed to avoid occasions for foreign inter- 
vention. Finally, the somewhat extraordinary pro- 
vision for intervention to suppress disorder, though 
designed in j^art to protect American property and 
prevent friction between the two countries, had also 
as its chief purpose the forestalling of foreign inter- 
vention. 

All this will be clear if we note the way things 
work in countries similar to Cuba where no such sale- 
guards exist. Let us suppose such a country or- 
ganized after the fashion of a republic and influenced 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 119 

by its example. The temptation to showy public ex- 
penditure and unremunerative public works is strong. 
Even if honest, — a somewhat rare condition in 
Caribbean lands, — the government soon contracts 
debts which it cannot pay. With impaired credit, it 
now begins to mortgage its revenues. A new loan is 
contracted for the payment of which the customs re- 
ceipts are pledged. Then local discontent results in 
a revolution. As a military or political movement 
this is farcical, but its financial aspect is often serious. 
The revolutionists, always impecunious, desire to fill 
their war chest and empty that of their enemies. 
The favourite move is to seize the customs house 
where, of all places, ready money is most likely to 
be found. But this money is pledged to foreign 
creditors whose interests the government Is under ob- 
ligation to protect. If in addition to this seizure of 
funds, citizens of the same country have had their 
buildings burned and have perhaps lost their lives in 
the disorders, even the most reluctant government 
can hardly evade the obligation to intervene. When, 
instead of being reluctant, the government in ques- 
tion is looking eagerly for a pretext for occupation, 
it will readily be understood that these disorders may 
have the gravest political consequences. 

Things like these had happened time and again in 
the pseudo-republics in the neighbourhood of Cuba, 
save only the fatal intervention, and this had been 
prevented only by the protest of the United States 
backed up by favouring conditions in Europe of which 
Americans have been singularly unconscious. In a 
word, we had again and again been threatened, — and 



I20 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

were still threatened, — with unwelcome neighbours In 
the Caribbean, when the problem of Cuban inde- 
pendence came before us. We had impulsively de- 
cided to free Cuba, and had pledged ourselves to 
grant her independence. And then, with the reflec- 
tion that follows impulse, It became clear that inde- 
pendence was not a thing to be granted or withheld, 
but a thing dependent upon deep underlying condi- 
tions. Judged by this deeper test, Cuba was not and 
could not be independent. No country as small as 
Cuba and situated as Cuba Is, could be Independent, 
even if its people were wholly wise, a condition which 
the Cubans hardly fulfilled. This necessary depend- 
ence of Cuba once perceived, it was merely a ques- 
tion upon whom Cuba should depend. There was but 
one sane answer to such a question. Cuba must be de- 
pendent upon the United States and independent of 
other powers. To this end, there must be no Impru- 
dent debts, no alliances or treacherous understandings, 
no disorders or pretexts for intervention. And for 
the attainment of these ends we must rely, not on 
promises and good intentions, but upon garrisoned 
posts and authorized Intervention. The Piatt 
Amendment was merely the formal recognition of 
facts which none had created and which none had 
power to alter. Our only choice lay between frank 
recognition and the ostrich policy of voluntary uncon- 
sciousness, a policy which would have left the great 
necessities unaltered, but would have resulted In end- 
less bickering, heart burning, and perhaps In Irre- 
trievable disaster. 

One provision of the Amendment stands quite apart 



AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE 121 

from all the foregoing, and is In fact hardly relevant 
to our Inquiry, Our temporary occupation, coincid- 
ing as It did with epoch-making discoveries concern- 
ing the origin and nature of tropical diseases, had 
enabled us virtually to eliminate yellow fever, one of 
the most terrible scourges that ever devastated our 
territories. This result could be maintained only by 
the vigilant enforcement of regulations then in force. 
With any people competent to manage their own af- 
fairs and Inherently capable of independence, such 
enforcement would have been a matter of course. 
Our Congress, however, deemed it necessary to stipu- 
late that these regulations should continue in force. 
It is significant that this was one of the demands to 
which the Cubans took exception. Of course the ob- 
jection was based, not on the end sought, but on the 
method adopted. They wished to reserve the right 
to adopt some other system of sanitation. Stripped 
of its dissembling, this meant that they were willing 
to will the end but not the means. Sanitary regula- 
tions are notoriously Irksome to a people of low de- 
velopment. There is nothing from which denizens 
of the tropics suffer so much as from filth, but there is 
nothing with which they are so loath to part. Clean- 
liness implies thoughtfulness, restraint, and sacrifice 
of immediate comfort. Filth is the concomitant of 
careless ease. But the filth of the tropics means the 
blight of the world, and in this, as in so much else, 
the men of the tropics must forego the privileges that 
are congenial to their nature. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE AFTER\L^TII OF PANAMA 

The clear perception and definition of our relation 
to Cuba was made possible by our military occupa- 
tion of that country and the obligation thus imposed 
upon us for a considerable time of administering the 
country and studying its needs. But for this war, 
while the problem would have been the same, there 
would have been nothing to overcome the inertia 
which always retards action in such cases. We should 
have allowed Cuba to blunder on, compromising her- 
self and us to any extent, until finally the presence of 
imminent peril would have roused us to a tardy recog- 
nition and a painful assertion of our inevitable inter- 
ests. As it was. the relation was defined and estab- 
lished under singularly favourable conditions. 

It was inevitable, however, that this arrangement 
should suggest the problem of other states similarly 
situated. For instance, if it was all important that 
Cuba should not become a base for German hostility, 
or a breeding ground of pestilence, was it not equally 
necessary that precautions be taken regarding Hayti 
or the Central American states? A yellow fever vic- 
tim would derive little consolation from the assurance 
that his germs were not of Cuban, but of Havtian 
origin. Conceivably, too, a German expeditionary 

122 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 123 

force might reconcile itself to temporary exclusion 
from Cuba, if a convenient base were available in 
Santo Domingo or Honduras. 

In a word, the policy adopted with regard to Cuba, 
though perfectly sound and necessary to the protec- 
tion of our most vital national interests, was of little 
value unless it was generally applied. The perception 
of this fact was speedily manifest in an effort to ex- 
tend some form of American protectorate over the 
Caribbean region. 

This effort was immensely stimulated and its scope 
extended by the decision of the United States to build 
the Panama Canal. The Canal was in any case an 
inherent necessity, commercial and military, of our 
geographical situation. It is certain, too, that in its 
vast influence upon our national and commercial de- 
velopment, shifting the centre of population and busi- 
ness enterprise, as all such things do, it will make itself 
evermore necessary, an indispensable condition of the 
life that It will create. And just as it becomes a 
necessity to us, it becomes the inevitable objective of 
any attack upon us, for the essence of attack is always 
to strike the vital necessities of the enemy. More- 
over the international character of the canal traiHc 
makes its control by an enemy or a rival a matter of 
immense positive advantage. Imagine the possibili- 
ties, merely from a business standpoint, of German 
occupation of the Canal with power to levy discrimi- 
nating tolls at discretion. 

The Canal is at a distance from our borders, and 
It can be attacked and defended only by sea. It can 
not be too often insisted that all effective naval opera- 



124 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

tions are short range operations. It is possible for a 
European navy to steam to the Panama Canal, but 
unless it had the rare good fortune to meet and de- 
stroy its antagonist at once, it would quickly exhaust 
its coal and other supplies and be reduced to im- 
potence. Against an enemy that played the waiting 
game, its chances would be small unless it had near 
by a vast accumulation of coal, food, munitions, and 
reserves of men, with opportunities for repair and 
refitting, ail accessible and under protection. This 
is the meaning of the oft mentioned hut popularly ig- 
nored naval base. 

It is therefore the obvious policy of the United 
States, if it wishes effectually to defend the Canal, to 
prevent the establishment in its vicinity, of hostile 
na\al bases. This can mean nothing less than the 
control of the entire Caribbean Sea on the east, — for 
any one of its myriad islands and of its adjacent coasts 
is near enough to ser\e as a hostile base, — and on 
the west to control the few neighbouring islands and 
the adjacent coasts tor a considerable distance to the 
nortli and to the south ot the Canal. This control, 
of course, does not necessarily imply (Kcupation. It 
may take anv form which we can be sure will guar- 
antee the result. Occupation by a powcrtul and 
friendly power may concei\ably be satisfactory. It 
is in anv case our necessary reliance in the case of 
Jamaica anti a large number ot other islands under 
British rule. But where we doubt the power of a 
nation, however friendly, as in the case of Denmark, 
or where we doubt both powci" and good will, as in 
the case of some ot these local independent states, we 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 125 

are constrained to seek other guaranties or incur the 
obvious risk. 

It was quickly perceived that the Piatt Amendment 
was the ideal thing for the safeguarding of our inter- 
ests in this region. To prohibit foreign alliances, 
debts, and revolutions, and insure their elimination by 
a limited occupation, was at once the adequate pro- 
vision for our needs and the irreducible minimum of 
our requirement. This involved no interference in 
legitimate internal affairs, and at the same time it 
offered the priceless advantage of our protection. 

But the application of the new principle to coun- 
tries recognized as completely independent presented 
serious difficulties. Outside control is not a thing that 
is welcomed by even the weakest and most incompetent 
of peoples. Much more serious, however, was the 
reluctance of our own people to assume the responsi- 
bilities involved, and above all, deliberately to impair 
the seeming independence of peoples long recognized 
as free. It was the conflict between the early ideals 
of our people and the new born consciousness of their 
vital needs. Unfortunately this conflict of ideas and 
of temperaments, difficult to manage at the best, was 
complicated by its coincidence with other issues on 
which parties had divided with extreme bitterness. 
As in Johnson's and Grant's administrations, feeling 
had become so bitter that men were willing to defeat 
measures which they approved, merely to checkmate 
the administration. The vote on the Caribbean 
treaties, in some cases at least, did not reflect the feel- 
ing of either Congress or the country. 

But the objections of the one side and of the other 



126 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

to the establishment of formal relations of dependence 
with certain of these countries were soon overborne 
by the development of perilous conditions arising 
from their helplessness and demoralization. Santo 
Domingo, whose request for annexation as a state 
had been refused in Grant's time, proceeded rapidly 
to force our hand. The republic became hopelessly 
bankrupt, while petty revolutions continually robbed 
industry of its fruits. An acquaintance of the writer 
who lived long in Santo Domingo, thus relates his 
experiences. " I have lived through hve of these 
revolutions and have never heard a shot fired. I 
knew the leader of one of them. He confided in me 
that he had gotten three thousand dollars and was 
going to start a revolution. Later he and his army 
made me a call. There were thirty-one of them, five 
of them being generals. I treated them all to coffee, 
and after that, when they robbed the mails, they al- 
ways sent me my letters.'' It would be difficult for 
burlesque to go much farther, but in a country whose 
military defences were on much the same scale, and 
where the soldiers of the realm were likely to join the 
revolution if It promised excitement, such disturbances 
were a fatal obstacle to Industrial and political de- 
velopment. 

In 1904 an American company in Santo Domingo 
was awarded large claims against the government by 
an arbitration commission and a lien on the customs 
receipts. This at once brought up other claims, until 
in 1905 the L'nited States was compelled to intervene 
or permit other nations to do so. The affairs of the 
country were taken In hand exactly like those of a 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 127 

defunct railway company, a receiver being appointed 
who collected the revenues, gave the government a 
stipulated allowance, and devoted the balance to pay- 
ing the nation's debts. Its authority was at first noth- 
ing more than the moral backing of the United States. 
It was immensely successful, the natural resources of 
the country being rapidly developed under these whole- 
some conditions. 

On its face, this arrangement was altogether unlike 
that with Cuba. It said nothing about relations with 
foreign powers, asked for no naval station, did not 
mention intervention, and required nothing with re- 
gard to sanitation. It was purely financial and tem- 
porary. Our Senate would not have sanctioned any- 
thing more at this time. It would not have sanc- 
tioned even this if it had not been rather drawn into 
it in an effort to redress the extensive grievances of 
an American company. But It seems to be a law of 
international relations that these things never stop 
where you Intend them to stop. The financial ar- 
rangement worked beautifully. The revenues in- 
creased, legitimate requirements were met, and rapid 
progress was made toward payment of the debt. 
But with the elimination of revolutions and plunder, 
life seemed to have lost Its zest for Dominicans of a 
certain type. Smouldering discontent broke forth 
into revolution In 19 12, the custom-house being as 
usual the storm centre, and the difficulties were ad- 
justed only with great difficulty and with the aid of a 
special commission. The storm broke again In 19 14 
and more seriously. This time a German cruiser was 
hurried to the scene to " protect German interests," 



128 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

a purpose which it was already suspected was suscepti- 
ble of broad interpretation. In alarm, our govern- 
ment hurried a considerable fleet of warships to 
Dominican waters, and order was restored by a sub- 
stantial intervention with bombardment of rebel bat- 
teries. 

It was clear that something more than a peaceful 
receivership was needed, but it was with extreme and 
perilous reluctance that we at last faced the situation. 
It had long been our policy to soothe Latin-American 
sensibilities. And besides, we had our prepossession 
in favour of independent republics. In 191 1 Presi- 
dent Taft had negotiated treaties similar to the then 
flourishing Santo Domingo arrangement, with Hon- 
duras and Nicaragua, countries utterly bankrupt and 
threatened with foreign intervention, but the Senate 
refused to ratify them. The rejection of an even more 
advantageous treaty with Nicaragua in 19 13 was 
followed by a disastrous revolution. While the re- 
jection of these treaties was largely a matter of that 
factional spite which has so often complicated our 
foreign policy, there can be no question that it im- 
plied an unreadiness on our part to embark deliber- 
ately upon a protectorate policy. We had made a 
start in Cuba and In Santo Domingo, both rather un- 
wittingly, and we consented to see the thing through, 
but to adopt the general policy of managing the aflfairs 
of all neighbour peoples who did not know how to 
manage their own was something for which we 
were emphatically unprepared. There remained, of 
course, the embarrassing question. "If thev can't 
manage them and we don't manage them, what 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 129 

then? " It Is our way not to answer such questions 
until we have to. When the German cruiser came, 
we had to answer. 

But the cruiser was not all. An announcement was 
made at this time In a joint note from Germany and 
France which, though almost unnoticed by our care- 
free people, must have given our government food 
for thought. Haytl, like all her sister pseudo-repub- 
lics, was bankrupt, and a receivership was plainly Im- 
pending. This announcement was to the effect that 
if Intervention In the affairs of Hayti should become 
necessary, the intervention of a single power would 
not be satisfactory. This was the most direct chal- 
lenge that the Monroe Doctrine had received In the 
ninety-one years since Its proclamation. The Ameri- 
can receivership in Santo Domingo had been a con- 
spicuous success, and save for our reluctance to Inter- 
vene by force of arms, it would be difficult to allege 
a reason why It should not be extended, If need be, to 
the Haytian end of the Island. The only possible con- 
clusion is that the protesting powers regarded the re- 
ceivership as likely to lead to something more, and 
they were right. But the clear intimation that they 
claimed a share In these perquisites of West Indian 
reconstruction, had far reaching implications. The 
incident was speedily lost sight of in the infinite calam- 
ity of the world war, and we have scarcely realized 
how narrow was our escape from complications that 
now appal the Imagination. 

The danger has passed for the moment. Germany 
and France are not sending joint notes just now, and 
they have other cares than the Monroe Doctrine. 



130 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But the incident has effected a change in our attitude 
which nothing else could have brought about. This 
is reflected in our latest Caribbean treaties, treaties 
that are the result, not of military occupation like 
that with Cuba, nor of a financial arbitration like that 
with Santo Domingo, but of a clear recognition of 
standing peril such as confronted us in liayti at the 
time of the joint note. 

Appropriately enough, the chief of these treaties is 
with Hayti. This treaty, combining the essential fea- 
tures of the Dominican receivership and of the per- 
manent relation with Cuba, adds certain important 
features which mark a great advance and greatly en- 
hance our control. The treaty is furthermore a 
masterpiece of diplomacy in its handling of Haytian 
susceptibilities. It contains the now familiar pro- 
visions regarding alienation of territory to foreign 
powers, the contracting of debts, and the maintenance 
of sanitary conditions. It also establishes a receiver- 
ship but this is a somewhat more elaborate affair than 
that of Santo Domingo, and plainly recalls British 
example. There is to be a " receiver " and also a 
" financial adviser " to the administration. The 
function of the one would seem to be to collect and 
disburse revenue, that of the other to " advise " the 
government as to all investments, taxes, expenditures, 
and so forth, it being stipulated that the expenses of 
the receivership are to be paid first, and debts next, 
the native government being provided for out of the 
remainder. 

The most important innovation, however, is the 
establishment of a natiN'e constabularv, urban and 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 131 

rural, under American officers for the maintenance of 
order. Experience has abundantly proved that such 
a constabulary in the hands of British or American 
officers, can be made absolutely loyal to the dominant 
race. It rapidly acquires a prestige and caste char- 
acter of which it is immensely proud, and which makes 
any collusion with its own race for purposes subver- 
sive of the established order, altogether unlikely. 
This, therefore, is tantamount to full American police 
control. All the officials thus provided for are to re- 
port to " the presidents of both republics." Finally, 
both countries, separately and specifically, pledge their 
" aid " to any extent that may be required, to the 
authorities thus established. 

A most important feature of this treaty, and one 
which shows both the progress made since Cuban 
days and the unconscious acceptance of our larger re- 
sponsibility, is the diplomatic form of its phraseology. 
The Piatt Amendment is brutally frank. Cuba must 
and shall, or we will " intervene." No wonder the 
Cubans saw in this the negation of their independence. 
But in Hayti the two governments " co-operate " to 
establish the necessary institutions. All functionaries 
are " appointed " by the Haytian government on 
" recommendation " of the President of the United 
States. The United States will not " intervene," but 
will " aid," — both governments will aid, — the newly 
established authorities. The American government 
will assert no authority, but its representatives will 
" advise " the Haytian government. It is easy to see 
in the American officered Haytian constabulary some- 
thing very like the native troops of India and Egypt, 



132 AMI-KICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

while the " financial adviser " is obviously the " resi- 
dent," so familiar in the native principalities of India 
or in the Federated Malay States. But these British 
terms, though originally chosen for their innocuous- 
ness, are avoided. The sceret is out that these terms 
connote real authority. That might alarm the llay- 
tians. It would alarm Americans still more. 

This latest development of American imperialism is 
therefore in many ways sharply contrasted with our 
earlier timid ventures. It is the first frank recogni- 
tion of the inability of such countries as Hayti to gov- 
ern themselves, of the necessity of preserving order 
and security in territories so situated under existing 
world conditions, and the inadmissibility of allow- 
ing any nation but ourselves to undertake the task, 
propositions hardly to be questioned save by those 
who reject all the principles upon which the present 
world order is based. The treaty not only recog- 
nizes the essential principles of the Piatt Amendment, 
now become the constitution of the American empire, 
but it establishes American control, not potential as 
in the case of Cuba, but actual and comprehensive, not 
only over the finances and general policy of the gov- 
ernment, but even over its local police. Cuba is al- 
lowed to appoint her own officials, to collect and dis- 
burse her own re\-cnues, and to police her own terri- 
tories, with only the warning that we shall " inter- 
vene " if she does not do these things satisfactorily. 
And since Intervention is a very cumbersome and costly 
expedient, and one which is highly distasteful to both 
parties, Cuba is in fact free to indulge to a consider- 
able extent in tropical politics without feeling our 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 133 

heavy hand. She has neither the annoyance nor yet 
the assistance of an " adviser," though we may per- 
haps assume that the position of American repre- 
sentative in Cuba is one of dehcate responsibility. 
Our relation with Cuba thus insures only an emergency 
control, a disadvantage, beyond doubt, as regards the 
immediate ends of government, but possibly an ad- 
vantage in the end. In any case the freer relation 
was appropriate to the conditions under which it was 
established. Cuba did not come to us bankrupt, 
mortgaged to foreign creditors, and demoralized by 
a century of independence. No doubt these condi- 
tions would have appeared promptly if Cuba had been 
free to do as she chose. But as they were not pres- 
ent, and as our obvious concern was to protect our- 
selves and avoid foreign complications for our neces- 
sary protege, we have wisely limited ourselves to the 
attainment of these objects. We could undoubtedly 
manage Cuban affairs better than the Cubans do, but 
the world has learned that local administration is 
not the function of empire. 

We had a different problem in bankrupt Santo Do- 
mingo and Hayti. We tried to meet the situation in 
Santo Domingo by the simple business device of a re- 
ceivership, only to find the financial situation compli- 
cated by revolution and the dreaded foreign interven- 
tion. With the distinct warning of the two greatest 
military powers of the world that in case of further 
disturbances, we must share with them the privilege of 
intervention, we wisely decided that there must be no 
further disturbances. Foreign entanglements, bank- 
ruptcy, revolution and pestilence must cease In these 



134 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

neighbour lands. How could we have willed less 
than this? And since who wills the end must will the 
means, we embodied our decision in this treaty with 
Hayti. What else could have provided the means? 
Lingering hopes that Hayti may sometime be self- 
sufficient, or perhaps just another concession to Hay- 
tian susceptibilities, limited the duration of the treaty 
to ten years with privilege of renewal if necessary. 
Renewal may be taken for granted. Hayti will be 
independent as Egypt will be independent, when the 
empire that now exercises control as a condition of its 
own existence, shall have ceased to exist. 

In the treaty with Hayti the great principles of 
Caribbean protection are definitely recognized and 
formulated. Further application, however, though 
plainly inevitable, must await favourable opportunity. 
One case of peculiar urgency required immediate at- 
tention and was settled almost simultaneously with 
that of Hayti. Nicaragua was the most troubled 
state in Central America. In ten years there were 
sixteen revolutions. Finances, it is needless to say, 
were in a most tleplorable state. All parties had 
come to realize the desperate condition of aftairs and 
wore praying for intcr\ cntion. Nevertheless, treaties 
after the Santo Domingo pattern pro\iding for a re- 
ceivership under American control had been twice 
ignored by the L nited States Senate. I'he inertia of 
our continental tradition still continued, even in the 
face of the most imminent peril. Once more, too, the 
spirit of factit)n, — a quarrel between the President 
and a section of his own party, — complicated the 
issue. But for the war who knows what German 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 135 

cruisers might have appeared upon the scene, and 
what compHcations might have arisen from our re- 
fusal to look this perilous situation in the face? 

But as the terrible reality of this struggle of the 
nations became apparent and we slowly perceived our 
closer relation to it, the thoughts of the nation inevit- 
ably turned toward the problem of national defence, 
and in particular toward the Canal, that most vital 
yet most exposed part of our defensive system. It 
was remembered that Nicaragua offered an alterna- 
tive route which we had long considered. The pos- 
sibility that some other power might secure this route 
and construct a competing canal, meanwhile getting 
firm lodgment on the territory of helpless Nicaragua, 
like so many possibihties hitherto ignored, now be- 
came a disturbing reality. For such a transaction the 
avowed bankruptcy of Nicaragua and our own refusal 
to come to her relief furnished ample excuse, while 
our hesitation In fulfilling our pledge about the canal 
tolls furnished the sufficient pretext. Such a canal 
would be fortified like our own and would thus be- 
come automatically a double naval base. 

Prompted by such considerations as these we nego- 
tiated and ratified in 19 16, a treaty conveying to the 
United States In perpetuity each and every canal 
route across Nicaragua and leasing for ninety-nine 
years with option of ninety-nine more, two Islands on 
the east coast and a naval base to be chosen at will In 
the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific side. In return the 
United States was to pay to Nicaragua the sum of $3,- 
000,000, but it was prudently stipulated that the 
money was to be deposited in an American bank 



136 AMERICA AMONG THE NAl lOXS 

chosen by our Secretary of State and devoted to the 
payment of Nicaraguan debts under his supervision. 

The strange thing about this treaty is its silence on 
the famihar principles of the Piatt Amendment, — 
foreign entanglements, contracting debts, sanitation, 
and intervention. The explanation is to be found in 
the fact that Xicaraguan affairs were already In our 
hands. American troops had occupied Nicaragua for 
several years, while an American bank, formed for 
the purpose with the consent of our government, had 
gotten complete control of the finances and the pro- 
ductiv^e assets of the hopelessly disordered state. 
The $3,000,000 paid by this government had mostly 
been advanced by this bank, and the arrangement men- 
tioned above was merely one of reimbursement. It 
would seem in effect that the administration, balked by 
a factious Senate, yet compelled to act to avert na- 
tional disaster, had resorted to the device of creating 
a private receivership to do, under governmental coun- 
tenance and guaranty, the work which the government 
was not permitted to do itself, and which it was yet 
impossible to neglect. Be this as it may, the work 
was done, and America was in control, unofficially if 
not officially. The treaty and its stipulated payment 
redeemed tlu' dbligation of the goxcnimcnt to those 
who had done its work. 

But the (]uestion naturally arises why the govern- 
ment ditl not at the same time assume its further 
functions anti provide, as in Ilnvti, for the inevitable 
and nccessarv protectorate. I he conditions prevail- 
ing in Central America apparentlv tiirnished the an- 
swer. Nicaragua is not an isohited island, but one ot 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 137 

a group of little states habitually jealous and often at 
war with one another. The necessity, both local and 
international, of bringing order out of this chaos, is 
apparent to all, but American opinions — - the reflec- 
tion for the most part, of individual temperament, — 
naturally differ as to the remedy. The one party sees 
hope only in a foreign protectorate, — necessarily that 
of the United States, — and vast and manifold are the 
influences constantly at work for that end. Property 
in particular, whether in citizen or alien hands, re- 
fuses to believe in the capacity of peoples so small, so 
crude, and so unfavourably situated, to provide the 
protection which it requires. Those also who are 
chiefly concerned with the fate of greater nations and 
who see the strategic position of these unconscious little 
states, naturally incline to an American protectorate 
as the only adequate safeguard of its vast interests. 
But there is another temperament, — one possibly 
less impressed with actualities and more liberally en- 
dowed with imagination, — which seeks a remedy in 
political rehabilitation and real independence. If 
these people are ignorant, they must be educated; if 
they are thriftless, they must learn thrift in the hard 
school of experience; if they are small, they must gain 
consequence by union. A federated Central America 
with possible inclusion of other Latin peoples, is the 
logical program of this party. The practicability of 
this program and its relation to the problem of our 
national interest we have to consider in connection 
with the larger subject of Pan- Americanism. For the 
moment we are concerned only with its bearing on the 
treaty with Nicaragua. 



138 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

An important step was taken in the direction of 
federation when in 1907, on the initiative of Mexico 
and the United States, a Central American court of 
justice with one representative from each Central 
American state, was established to decide the ques- 
tions which had kept these little states in turmoil. It 
was fondly hoped that the existence of such a tribunal 
would make these incessant wars unnecessary, and 
by establishing peace, lead to ultimate union. These 
hopes were far from realized, but something was ac- 
complished. 

It will be plain that if these states were to arbitrate 
their quarrels among themselves, they must be free 
to do so. If one of them were made a protectorate, 
it would lose all freedom of action in foreign relations, 
and the others would have to deal with the big suzerain 
state rather than with an equal. Moreover it would 
put an end to all possibility of federation so far as the 
protected state was concerned. Since this experiment, 
begun at the instance of our government and under its 
patronage, was still in progress with some prospect of 
successful results, the protectorate must be held in 
abeyance. More exactly, since bankruptcy had made 
a receivership inevitable, the protectorate must re- 
main unofficial. 

But the great question of the canal with its pre- 
destined defences of island and bay, could not be 
thus risked. To these our government must have a 
title which no rival among the great powers could 
question. Hence these were conveyed by treat}', while 
the more general interests of foreign occupation, debt, 



THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA 139 

sanitation, and intervention were not " nominated in 
the bond " but were quietly assured in fact. 

With all this deference, however, the treaty at once 
dealt a staggering blow to this system of incipient 
federation. It excited the jealousy of neighbouring 
states who vaguely saw in it advantages to Nicaragua 
which they did not share. Two of them, Salvador 
and Honduras, shared with Nicaragua the coast of the 
Gulf of Fonseca, and consequently had joint rights to 
its waters, while a third, Costa Rica, had for one of 
its boundaries the river which was to be utilized in 
part for the proposed canal. These states protested 
that Nicaragua had sold what she did not possess, and 
that the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of 
Fonseca gave control of their adjacent coasts. Sal- 
vador and Costa Rica brought suit against Nicaragua 
for damages before the Central American court al- 
ready mentioned and won by the predestined majority 
of four to one. Nicaragua promptly ignored the de- 
cision. The authority of the court was plainly at an 
end as regards matters to which the United States 
was a party. 

These protests seem to have been technically justi- 
fied. Our Senate took no notice of them beyond as- 
serting that it had no intention of violating the neutral- 
ity of the protesting states. The procedure was 
rather summary and our action possibly precipitate. 
It may be questioned, too, whether a joint treaty with 
the four powers concerned would not have given us 
a technically better title. But it may also be ques- 
tioned whether such a treaty would have been prac- 



I40 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ticable and whether the attempt to secure it would not 
have resulted in a series of hold-ups eventuating in 
extortion or in the failure of the treaty. Meanwhile 
Nicaragua was the all important party. If her con- 
sent was not enough to build a canal, it was at least 
enough to prevent any one else from doing so. And 
Nicaragua was necessitous and in our power. It was 
a very human transaction, but then, who expects our 
Senate to be superhuman? 

Whatever the merits of this discussion, it only ob- 
scures the larger question at issue. The conflict is 
between opposed principles and temperaments. The 
one takes seriously the nominal independence of such 
countries and esteems as of primary importance their 
regulation of their own affairs. The other recog- 
nizes them as dependent, not by choice of ourselves or 
others, but necessarily and inherently dependent, he- 
cause of their smallness, their location, their climate, 
and the resulting race characteristics. To the inde- 
pendence part}', Central America is its own little 
world. To the imperialist partv, it is but a pawn on 
the mighty chess board of world empire. We may 
sympathize with the one or the other, but we must not 
judge the one by the standards of the other. The 
United States plays the vaster game, must play it and 
play it well, for the stake is its existence. 



CHAPTER X 

THE UNFINISHED TASK 

It Is difficult to follow the expansion of America in 
the Caribbean without feeling that it will go farther. 
Whether it should go farther is not the question. 
This is neither an indictment nor a propaganda, but a 
study. No more is assumed than that national char- 
acter shows a certain continuity, and that incentives 
which have been potent in the past are likely to be 
potent in the future. If so much be conceded, then 
the further development of Caribbean domination 
seems assured. If the considerations which have im- 
pelled us to restrict the liberty- of Cuba, to take over 
the financial problems of Santo Domingo and to as- 
sume the management of Hayti, are legitimate, then 
there is more work of this kind for us to do. Condi- 
tions were no worse in Hayti than in other Caribbean 
countries. Utter recklessness and incompetency have 
characterized the management of every one of these 
pseudo-states which the preoccupations of the real na- 
tions have temporarily abandoned to independence. 
It was a matter of chance which one of the dancers 
should first pay the piper, but all have danced and 
all must pay. As each faces in turn the inevitable 
crisis, the same problem presents itself. What reason 
is there to believe that we shall not meet it in the 
same way? 

141 



142 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Indeed, the chief reasons rather gain in force as 
the process is continued. As regards its own pros- 
perity, to be sure, and its economic serviceableness to 
mankind, each territory redeemed from chaos to order 
is so much clear gain. But in the matter of protect- 
ing our health against tropical diseases, or preventing 
the lodgment of hostile powers near our coasts, our 
work in rehabilitating these countries is largely thrown 
away unless we complete it. It is like the building of 
a wall which is useless until the last breach is closed. 
The nearer we come, therefore, to completing the 
wall, the more compelling the motive to close any 
breaches that remain. There is strong reason to be- 
lieve, therefore, that the impulse to dominate the 
Caribbean and the Pacific coast within the same lati- 
tudes, will be not only continuous but cumulative as a 
factor in future American policy. Doubtless this 
domination will assert Itself in various ways, some 
overt and complete as in the case of Porto Rico, others 
indirect, unofficial, perhaps merely moral. The only 
requisite will be real control. This control it can 
hardly be doubted that America will insist upon ac- 
quiring. 

Before considering the question of form and 
method, it may be well to inquire what the limits of 
American control are seemingly destined to be. We 
will confine ourselves first to the problem of defence. 

It hardly need be said that we have little to fear 
from these countries themselves. Military operations 
which may be necessarv to restore order in these 
regions may prove troublesome and expensive, and 
certain of these countries in the hands of a foreign 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 143 

enemy might be a serious danger, but left to them- 
selves they will hardly endanger the United States by 
military aggression. Mexico might conceivably have 
the rashness to attack us and the brief good fortune 
to achieve temporary successes, but the certainty of 
the ultimate outcome Is likely to deter her from ag- 
gression, unless backed by foreign powers. Unfortu- 
nately there Is much reason to believe that In the 
event of a strong combination of European powers 
against us, the sympathies of Mexico, with her old 
grievances, and perhaps of all the Caribbean states, 
would be with our enemies. This would not neces- 
sarily be due to any Injustice on our part, though our 
record Is doubtless far from perfect In this respect, 
but to the simple fact that they are smaller and weaker 
than ourselves and to their consciousness that no mat- 
ter what our deference to their pride, their fate Is In 
our hands. 

It is Europe, therefore, that we have to fear, 
Europe that surpasses us In need and In power to take, 
Europe that alone has the power to make these help- 
less neighbours formidable, Europe and Japan, for 
outside of America there Is only Europe and Japan. 
They hold Asia and Africa, — and they are not satis- 
fied. Our problem Is therefore to hold them at a 
distance. Even at a distance they are terrible. 
Planted near our shores they would be Irresistible. 
These powers of whose friendship we have no suffi- 
cient guaranties, must have no colonies or naval sta- 
tions In the Caribbean. They must have with these 
irresponsible states, no relations of intimacy or obli- 
gation which In an emergency might be transmuted into 



144 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

the thing we fear. That is the irreducible minimum 
of our demand, and whatever the means chosen to se- 
cure this end, there is no indication that the American 
people will relax its effort or lessen its demand. 

One exception must be made to this veto upon 
Europe. We have nothing to gain by vetoing Brit- 
ish expansion in the Caribbean, at least as regards our 
national defence, for the simple reason that she is 
there already in positions as strategic as any that she 
is likely to acquire. Beginning within a hundred 
miles of the Florida coast, her islands stretch in an 
almost unbroken outer chain to Trinidad in the ex- 
treme southeastern corner where the chain links 
solidly with the mainland, while the bulwark of British 
Guiana is only a few miles away. In the middle of 
the area and absolutely commanding the chief en- 
trance, Britain holds Jamaica with the Caymans far- 
ther west. Finally, on the Central American main- 
land at the western boundary of the Caribbean, is 
British Honduras. I here may be reasons why 
Britain should not acquire farther possessions here 
and should have no part in the necessary work of 
redeeming these forfeit states, but these reasons can 
hardly have to do with our national defence. It Is 
to be hoped that we have other guaranties against 
harm at the hands of Britain, but If not, we shall 
hardly find safety in limiting hor acquisitions In the 
Caribbean. Her present possessuins are sufficient to 
meet all mllltarv and na\"al requirements. 

The proposal that the L'nltcd States acquire these 
possessions in exchange for the Philippines has al- 
ready been mentioned. The reasons urged concern 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 145 

the Philippines rather than the West Indies. Those 
who make the proposal are apparently anxious to get 
rid of the former rather than to acquire the latter. 
They believe the possession of the Philippines exposes 
us to grave dangers, yet do not feel that we are at 
liberty to dispose of them without regard to the wel- 
fare of the inhabitants. The problem of the Philip- 
pines will be discussed In its place. For the present 
we have only to note that such an exchange would 
contribute nothing to our safety in the Caribbean. It 
would give us more naval bases, but we have enough 
already. Meanwhile, if there are those whose Imagi- 
nation suggests a possible attack from Britain, It may 
suffice to reflect that Canada would furnish the neces- 
sary base. 

The case of France Is slightly similar. By her 
possession of Guadeloupe and Martinique together 
with several smaller islands in the eastern Caribbean, 
with French Guiana farther east on the South Amer- 
ican mainland, France occupies a strong strategic situ- 
ation which an aggressive power might use effec- 
tively as a base for a farther advance. The question 
naturally arises, is France such a power? Have we 
anything to fear from her presence In the Caribbean? 
We may safely assume that all powers that are real 
powers and have some degree of liberty of action 
are aggressive powers. On this point France has left 
us In no doubt. No people has cherished the dream 
of empire more fondly than France or made greater 
sacrifices to realize it. It would be a mistake to as- 
sume that as a republic her temper has seriously 
changed. Never has French Imperialism been more 



146 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

zealous and seldom has it been more successful than 
In these recent years of the Republic. 

It would also be hazardous to count on the senti- 
ment of the present moment as offering permanent 
guaranties for the United States. That sentiment is 
certainly one to be carefully conserved, an asset of 
possible inestimable value. But sentiment undergoes 
surprising changes with changing circumstances, and 
nowhere more so than in France. The French are 
today the allies of the people whom they have hated 
longest of any In Europe. We share at present and 
are likely to share Increasingly their cordial good will, 
but changed conditions and new conflicts of interest 
may quite destroy this safeguard. 

There is reason to believe, however, that the ad- 
vance of France will not be In this direction. Her 
vast designs In both America and Asia have proved 
abortive and have seemingly been abandoned. On 
the other hand France now has possessions In Africa 
which are of enormous extent and value, and the de- 
velopment of which makes heavy demands on both her 
enthusiasm and her resources. It Is probable that as 
the result of the present war these possessions will 
be still farther Increased. With every step of her 
advance challenged by jealous and powerful rivals, 
France seems little likely to hazard her African em- 
pire in an Imprudent American venture. 

In another respect the problem of the French 
colonies is less reassuring. France will not use them 
to our hurt, but can France hold them? Had France 
and Britain been beaten In the present war. It Is wholly 
conceivable that such colonics might have been part 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 147 

of the price that France would have to pay for peace. 
That opens another hne of thought. It is conceivable, 
too, that with but slight commercial interests in this 
part of the world and a limited merchant marine more 
profitably employed elsewhere, France might consent 
to sell the islands. There can be little question who 
the most eager customer would be. For these and 
similar reasons it may well be the policy of the United 
States to acquire the French possessions if possible as 
we have recently acquired the Danish Islands, not 
because we need them or because of their intrinsic 
value, but because their possession by Germany or 
some power similarly disposed might be fatal to our 
security. Still another power presents a similar prob- 
lem. Between French Guiana and British Guiana lies 
Dutch Guiana, and the same power possesses Cur- 
acao, a group of islands off the coast of Venezuela. 
Holland as a neighbour we may view with perfect tran- 
quillity. But Holland is one of the little countries of 
Europe whose existence depends on the maintenance 
of the present balance of power between Britain and 
Germany. Were Britain to be crippled ever so 
briefly, Holland would become a part of Germany, 
and her vast island empire would automatically pass 
under German control. This union might be overt 
in the form of annexation, or concealed under the 
form of an entente or an alliance. It would make 
little difference. Holland would be compelled, no 
matter how unwillingly, to place her possessions at 
Germany's disposal. It is precisely this which we 
have feared in the case of Denmark. The danger 
in this case was perhaps a little greater, for it is pos- 



148 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

sible that Britain would stake less to maintain the 
independence of Denmark than that of Holland, but 
the cases are not greatly different. In both cases 
these West Indian possessions are remote from the 
chief centre of national interests and are unprofitable. 
To Germany they would have a value not measured 
by their balance of trade. Holland is less likely to 
sell, and her posessions are perhaps less available for 
the purchaser's purpose, but the reasons for the one 
purchase hold in a degree for the other, and make it 
a seeming necessity of ultimate American policy. 

But our chief danger lies, not in the possessions of 
other powers, but in the so called independent states. 
These offer in abundance not only the naval stations 
required, but valuable resources in tropical products 
and in some cases populations capable of efficient use 
under foreign training. They are one and all in- 
capable of protecting themselves against foreign ag- 
gression, while their recklessness and incapacity in- 
volves them in obligations to foreign powers which at 
times compel intervention and always furnish its 
plausible pretext. All are of the lowest political 
morality and susceptible to bribes as well as to flat- 
tery. Finally, the disparity between them and the 
United States and the frequent necessity of unwel- 
come action on the part of the latter naturally results 
in jealousy and ill-will on their part. No doubt all 
these regrettable conditions can be modified and possi- 
bly eliminated in time by patience and wisdom on our 
part. No doubt every reasonable effort should be 
made to that end. But that is not the question. The 
fact to be noted here is that the character and temper 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 149 

of these states makes them subservient to the purposes 
of a hostile power. Germany (for the moment neces- 
sarily the type of such a power) can find in any one of 
these states the site that she wishes and In their dis- 
honourable policy the excuse for seizing it. Against 
such action these states could oppose no force what- 
ever, and in the face of so plausible an excuse it would 
be most embarrassing for a foreign power to protest. 
That this is not mere imagination recent events 
have clearly shown. German intervention In Vene- 
zuela was prevented in 1908 only by a direct threat 
of war, coupled with the greatest tact on the part of 
President Roosevelt. A German cruiser at Santo 
Domingo forced us to violent and precipitate Inter- 
vention. During the period of the war and probably 
before It, German Intrigue has been busy In Cuba and 
Mexico with results not yet wholly manifest. And 
within the year have come reports of German nego- 
tiations for a submarine base In Venezuela, a country 
whose policy seems to have become definitely pro- 
German, and of German Intrigues In Yucatan to pre- 
vent the customary sale to the United States of the 
sisal, a monopoly product Indispensable to the har- 
vesting of our grain crop In this year of need. These 
interferences, ranging from petty annoyance to deadly 
peril, are but suggestions of an ever present possi- 
bility of unlimited scope against which these states 
have neither the power nor the moral character neces- 
sary to protect us. It Is easy to minimize the signifi- 
cance of German Intervention In Santo Domingo and 
Venezuela. Perhaps Germany would have with- 
drawn when her grievances were redressed. But 



150 AMERICA AxMONG THE NATIONS 

such incidents tend to recur, and repeated Intervention 
usually ends in occupation. Nor is Germany the only 
danger. It is certain that Japan has sought a naval 
base in the vicinity of the Canal and has made over- 
tures to disatiected powers regarding it. 

Whatever the actual danger Involved In these condi- 
tions, there can be no question that the government of 
the United States judges It to be serious and that the 
acquisition of the Danish West Indies, the protector- 
ate over Haytl, and the various arrangements with 
Cuba, Santo Domingo, Panama, and Nicaragua have 
had as their chief purpose the defence of the nation 
against this danger. 

How far will the United States go? It is impos- 
sible to say, but It Is possible to say how far this policy 
may go. The object is to protect the southern ap- 
proaches to the United States and above all the ap- 
proaches to the canal and the traffic routes between 
the Americas. Through the Caribbean passes all the 
traffic between our eastern coast and the eastern coast 
of South America, between our eastern coast and 
western South America, between our eastern coast and 
our own western coast, between the entire Atlantic 
basin and the vast Pacific world. The Caribbean Is 
In the Western Hemisphere what the Mediterranean 
is in the Eastern, the jugular vein through which passes 
the life blood twixt heart and head. Imagine the re- 
sult of submarines sheltered by careless or jealous peo- 
ples along a route like this. 

What did those nations who were vitally interested 
In the safety of the Mediterranean think necessary to 
its defence? Nothlnc: less than the direct control of 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 151 

its entire irresponsible coast. The northern coast 
was held by responsible powers, powers If not wholly 
trustworthy, at least to be dealt with as independents 
rather than as dependencies. The southern coast 
was helpless and irresponsible. The power that all 
dreaded might buy or seize at will. France, long 
established In Algeria, seized Tunis, Britain seized 
Egypt, a world war was risked to save Morocco, and 
last of all Tripoli was seized with Incontinent haste, 
lest a lodgment of Germany at Benghazi bring all 
their work to naught. Even outside the sea the same 
anxieties were felt. Within a year after England 
captured Gibraltar, she brought Portugal under her 
control lest danger should lurk around the corner, and 
the attempt of Germany to establish herself at Agadir, 
some five hundred miles down the outside African 
coast was resisted at the risk of war. 

It will be easy here for our minds to go off on a 
tangent and lose themselves In the query whether 
Britain and France had a right to assert control of the 
Mediterranean against Germany. That is not the 
question. We are Interested solely in seeing what 
they regarded as necessary to that end. There can 
be very little doubt that we have decided to keep 
Germany and all similar powers from getting a foot- 
hold in the Caribbean. What is necessary to accom- 
plish our purpose? Britain and France have told us. 
There must be no Barbary Coast left for Germany 
and her like to appropriate. But the Caribbean 
coast is all Barbary Coast. Then there must be no 
Caribbean coast left open to appropriation. This 
means some form of effective control over all the 



152 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

islands not in responsible hands (a control already 
assured) , over all of Central America (a control more 
nearly assured than official reports would suggest), 
and over at least Venezuela and Colombia. This 
need not mean annexation or even a protectorate. 
There are many ways, and any way is good which 
will insure that these people shall not dare, if possible 
that they shall not wish, and above all that they shall 
not be able to serve the purposes of the enemies of the 
United States. 

It must be remembered that since the Canal is the 
vital organ, the paralysis of which might be ruin to 
the United States, the adjacent Pacific Coast is hardly 
less important than the Caribbean. Here again Co- 
lombia has the power, as she at present has the in- 
clination, to do us harm. It is desirable to remove 
the inclination, though whether apology and penance 
for a much provoked and justified offence would effect 
the desired propitiation may be doubtt^d. A pur- 
chased good will resting upon a foundation of jealous 
weakness and low political morality, is a feeble guar- 
anty against the bribes of our rivals. We shall 
hardly be safe while Colombia retains her power to 
harm us, with Germany on the one side and Japan on 
the other to put her friendship antl her probity to the 
test. 

One state remains which presents a different and 
a more difficult problem. In her situation Mexico 
is to be grouped with the powers just considered. 
Her proximity to the Canal, though not so immediate 
as that of Colombia or Central America, is sufficient to 
give us everv concern, while her extension to the north- 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 153 

west and her monopoly of the Gulf of California 
gives to every indentation in her long Pacific Coast 
a strategic value of which we are becoming increas- 
ingly, not to say anxiously, conscious. Meanwhile 
Mexico is too large, too populous, too rich, and too 
advanced, to permit of the summary treatment meted 
out to Hayti and Nicaragua. She is able to harm us, 
able to resist our control. Is she able to protect us 
against the dangers which her very existence in this 
quarter involves? In some other part of the world 
she might reasonably aspire to independence and self- 
direction. It is the emphatic determination of the 
American people that that shall be her privilege. 
Rarely has such a provocation to intervention been 
resisted as that which Mexico has given to the United 
States during the last five years. While official for- 
bearance has at times belied the impatience of the 
people, there can be no doubt that it represents their 
settled determination to assume no responsibility for 
the internal affairs of Mexico. So far as these af- 
fairs can be isolated from the tangle of world affairs 
in which our own destiny is inextricably involved, 
Mexican independence rests upon the foundation, not 
only of American conviction, but of the deepest 
American sentiment. If interference were necessary, 
Americans would detest the job. 

But this fact remains, a fact which no man can 
alter and which must become greater and plainer with 
the passing years. Mexico lies between us and our 
most vital possession. In no way, direct or indirect, 
can she be allowed to jeopardize its safety or to 
weaken control of those seas and those coasts upon 



154 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

which Its safety depends. And in no way could this 
so easily happen as by indiscreet relations with nations 
capable of challenging our control. Xor are these 
relations to be feared merely in the form of hostile 
alliances such as that insanely proposed by Germany 
between Mexico and Japan. It Is not even voluntary 
relations that menace us most, but relations forced 
upon Mexico by her own recklessness, incompetency 
and Injustice. If Mexico were differently situated, a 
wronged nation might be slow to punish her, and other 
nations slow to intervene, but when powerful nations 
are looking for pretexts to Intervene, and their rivals 
see In their moves a menace to their own safety, Mex- 
ico must walk straight. If Mexico is to escape a pro- 
tectorate, It must be by voluntarily assuming its es- 
sential limitations. She is not free, — no nation so 
situated can ever be free, — to live unto herself. It 
is to be feared that the Mexican people have not the 
capacit}' permanently to maintain real independence of 
action in a situation exposed to the full Impact of the 
mightiest forces of world Imperialism. To steer an 
even course twixt such a Scylla and Charybdis would 
imply a skill to which no people, Anglo-Saxon or any 
other, can yet lay claim. Failing this absolute cor- 
rectness of procedure, Mexico seemingly must pass 
under the effectual control of the greater power that 
is doomed to depend upon her loyalty and trustworthi- 
ness. 

It remains to be considered what change If any, is 
likely to take place in the form ot our Caribbean con- 
trol. Present forms show a wide range. There Is 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 155 

the broad autonomy of Cuba, tempered only by inter- 
vention in rare emergencies. There is the private re- 
ceivership of Nicaragua with its official connivance, 
then the official receivership of Santo Domingo, and 
finally the full protectorate of Hayti. Which will be 
the preferred form and ultimate model? 

It is unlikely that any one type will prevail through- 
out our " sphere of influence." Practical empire 
builders are not misled by any love for the logical or 
the symmetrical, into strained efforts for uniformit}^ 
They care nothing for symmetries and everything for 
adaptations. The countries in question differ widely 
in character, and very different circumstances are re- 
sponsible for our intervention. The working ar- 
rangements decided upon will differ accordingly, and 
that perhaps increasingly with the varying character 
of their development. 

Yet there is a tendency toward the more complete 
control, a tendency which may go farther. The 
earlier Interventions were the more timid, the later 
the more resolute and complete. Cuba comes first, 
Hayti last. The difference is not an accident. Half 
measures have been disappointing. The Cuban ex- 
periment did not save us from the necessity of a costly 
military reoccupation. The well managed receiver- 
ship of Santo Domingo did not avert revolution, or 
save the island from German cruisers and American 
occupation. If we are compelled to occupy Cuba 
again, we shall probably stay. If our work In Santo 
Domingo continues, we shall doubtless have a con- 
stabulary. The half measure is easier to Introduce. 



156 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

It is less repugnant to the natives and to ourselves. 
But it has thus far failed to accomplish its purpose 
without the supplement of violent and costly military 
intervention. It is probable, therefore, that the more 
partial forms of control will evolve into more com- 
plete forms if control is continued, and that subse- 
quent occasions for the exercise of control will be in- 
fluenced by these experiences. 

In particular it may be doubted whether the system 
of private control so successfully introduced in Nica- 
ragua and doubtless extensivclv dc\elc)ped in other 
Central American countries, can persist. The su- 
perior efficiency of such a svstcm mav be conceded, 
and the informality with which it mav be introduced is 
a great advantage. The resort to such an expedient 
when government ignores a situation which will not 
suffer neglect, may be a patriotic duty. But such a 
system, involving as it needs must do, the backing of 
government, has all the disadvantages to the nation of 
direct gcnernmental intervention without the advan- 
tage of publicity and effective responsibility. Above 
all, it is impossible to imagine such a control unin- 
fluenced by considerations of private profit which ex- 
perience warns us to keep away from the administra- 
tion of dependencies. If American control is neces- 
sary in the Caribbean, it should be the control of the 
American government, and not the control of private 
interests for whose sins we must answer and whose 
acts we can not determine. I his is written in no un- 
sympathetic spirit toward those interests. They are 
needed and should be encouragetl. But they furnish 



THE UNFINISHED TASK 157 

additional occasion for national control, not a substi- 
tute for it. 

It may be expected that American control in the 
Caribbean will become more avowed, more compre- 
hensive, and more extensive as time goes on. 



CHAPTER XI 

PAX-AMERICANISM 

The progress of our inquiry has brought us at last 
to the continent of South America and to the much 
advocated pohcy of Pan-Americanism. Indeed, from 
the moment that we crossed the Rio Grande we have 
been upon the domain of this attractive doctrine. 
The discussion of its proposals has been purposely de- 
ferred. It has seemed necessary first to trace the de- 
velopment of American imperialism from its begin- 
nings on our far eastern frontier westward across the 
continent and out to its farthest battle line, to take 
account of its conquests, to note its habitual attitude, 
and to project into the immediate future the resultant 
of its temper and its opportunity. That temper has 
been and still is one of instinctive assertion. Though 
occasionally balked by domestic faction, the Imperial- 
ist impulse has never long been held in check. Coun- 
sels of prudence have been occasionally heard, but 
to those who recall our acquisition of Samoa and the 
Philippines it would be absurd to claim that these coun- 
sels had prevailed. The American empire has grown 
with prodigious and incontinent rapiditv. The Ro- 
man Empire did not grow so fast. The British Em- 
pire did not grow so fast. Neither of them took 
such long chances or so often did the unintended and 
unconsidered thing. 

158 



PAN-AMERICANISM 159 

There Is no evidence that this temper has changed. 
If we have committed follies, as the prudent assert, we 
have not yet been punished. We have learned 
subtler ways of winning, more varied ways of ruling. 
We have found new reasons for old Impulses, and old 
Impulses have renewed their youth. 

Finally, we are still confronted with opportunity. 
More than any other people, we have prizes within 
our grasp. And we are grasping them. Never was 
our frontier more alive than It Is today. Acquisition 
of new territory has become a commonplace and passes 
unnoticed. Not one American in a hundred realizes 
that we have a protectorate over Hayti and that our 
control Is creeping out through all these southern seas. 
If he knew, his only reaction would probably be a 
slightly Increased complacency. The door Is thus 
opened wide for a government, embarrassed by the 
mischievous irresponsibility of these petty make-be- 
lieve states, to take refuge in an ever broadening im- 
perialism. Unless the leopard changes his spots, this 
must carry our frontier to the limits we have men- 
tioned. 

Will It carry us farther? There is plausibility in 
the suggestion. In the full sense of the word nature 
furnishes no absolute boundaries. If we could cross 
the Pacific, we may cross anything. Incentives to 
the control of the American tropics are likely to be 
found in the world's growing need of their products, 
the necessity of more Intensive exploitation, the inef- 
ficiency of their peoples, and the Incompetency of their 
governments to encourage and protect foreign enter- 
prise. It would be rash to predict that this Inherent 



i6o AMERICA AMONG THE NAriONS 

conflict between northern energ)' and tropical letharg)' 
will not result in farther extensions of northern control 
over the American tropics. 

But equally, it would be a mistake to assume that 
such an appeal will come from the American tropics 
alone. Geographical propinquity will count for very 
little beyond the limits of the Caribbean. Indeed 
South America offers no such propinquit}'. If it is 
a question merely of exploiting the tropics and not of 
vital defensive strategy^ the pathway of the sea may 
lead us to Asia as easily as to South America, and the 
Philippines may as easily be the base for a farther 
advance as Hayti or Panama. 

Nor is the call of the tropics the only one. The 
war upon which we have now embarked has incalcula- 
ble possibilities. We are committed not merely to the 
redressing of our grievances to date, but to the vastly 
larger program of settling such difficulties as the war 
itself may create. Without taking too seriously the 
fascinating program of " making the world safe for 
democracy," it is well to remember that the war is to 
be fought on European soil and in conjunction with 
nations having possessions in every part of the world. 
When the peace conference meets we shall hear very 
little of the sonorous slogans which heralded the 
war's beginning and much of the concrete problems 
for which these phrases suggest no vcrv tangible solu- 
tion. Taken in the aggregate, it will be the problem 
of policing a troublesome world and maintaining and 
improving its productive activities. Who knows 
M-herc these police duties mav call us? Present in- 
clination and intention in the matter will have very 



PAN-AMERICANISM i6i 

little influence on the result. There will be new in- 
terests to consider, world interests and local interests, 
interests of our allies, interests of humanity's help- 
less wards, and new and unforeseen interests of our 
own. And along with all this there will be new pas- 
sions and new visions which will have tremendous 
power over us to determine our decisions. Who 
knows what these decisions will be? Is it certain that 
we can get out of the old world when once we have 
gotten in? 

Of course we do not intend any such enlargement 
of our program. We can not conceive of circum- 
stances which should induce us to make the Philippines 
a base for further advance. But then, we did not in- 
tend to take the Philippines and could not have con- 
ceived beforehand of circumstances which would in- 
duce us to do so. Our study of American imperialism 
has been in vain if we have not learned that it is not 
premeditated but essentially inadvertent. Perhaps 
this Is the normal character of imperialism. The 
plea of Demosthenes to the Athenians that they should 
cease to be led by circumstances and should learn to 
lead circumstances, was unavailing. It may be ques- 
tioned whether any people can learn the difficult art 
of leading circumstances. There are vital processes 
in national as In individual life that seem able to func- 
tion only when unconscious. One nation in our day 
has adopted the program of deliberate and conscious 
imperialism, with results not encouraging to the pol- 
icy of leading circumstances. 

It seems quite impossible, therefore, to forecast 
with any certainty the future of American expansion 



1 62 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

beyond the limits of the Caribbean. Not that the 
American advance can go no farther, or that it will 
go no farther, but that there is no telling at present 
where that farther going will be. If the Monroe 
Doctrine seems to imply for us predominantly Ameri- 
can interests, it must be remembered that the mainte- 
nance of that doctrine is as likely to lead us into war 
in the old world as In the new, and that war tends to 
create local attachments and interests, wherever it 
goes. We were fighting for purely American inter- 
ests when we sent Dewey to the Philippines, and forth- 
with our interests ceased to be purely American. 
Moreover, doctrines do not determine destiny, but 
destiny determines doctrines. 

In considering a program which Is to be conscious 
and deliberate rather than instinctive. It is Important 
to remember what manner of men we are. The adop- 
tion of a policy at variance w'ith our temperament will 
not change our temperament, or at best it will change 
It but very slowly. The imperialist Instinct Is strong 
in us by nature, and It has been strengthened by three 
centuries of Intrepid assertion unrebuked by a single 
serious mischance. We have profound faith in our 
capacity and In the universal adaptation of our institu- 
tions to human wants. Our capacity for forbearance 
Is therefore slight. 

But Important as It is to see ourselves as we are, 
It Is even more Important to see ourselves as others 
see us. It Is a peculiarity of this unintentional im- 
perialism that we are largely unconscious of our own 
attitude. As we are never aggressive until circum- 
stances suddenlv coerce us, we li\e in constant mood of 



PAN-AMERICANISM 163 

fancied deference which overshadows all else In our 
experience. Outsiders are quite uninfluenced by our 
consciousness of Innocence of which they have no ex- 
perience. They see only our acts which have been 
consistently aggressive, and from which they not un- 
naturally infer a consistent purpose of aggression. 
Their attitude seems to us one of unworthy suspicion, 
and ours to them one of designing hypocrisy. The 
relation is natural and Is not to be conjured away. 
It must be with consciousness of our character and 
our reputation that we confront the proposed policy. 

The term, Pan-Americanism, though seemingly self- 
explanatory. Is but vaguely defined. It suggests the 
analogy of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, but a 
comparison reveals only contrasts. They seek the 
union of all members of a single race under a single 
government. But Pan-Americanism implies neither a 
single race nor a single government. A single govern- 
ment for all the Americas could only be our own. 
Such an extension of our rule Is certainly not to be 
predicted In the light of our present knowledge. 

So far from advocating this policy of ultra-impe- 
rlahsm, the advocate of Pan-Americanism Is usually a 
pronounced anti-imperialist. He deprecates above 
all things the extension of anything Hke sovereignty 
over the lesser American states. He would have us 
not only scrupulously respect their Independence, but 
defend it against all comers. He would recognize 
not only the independence of these nations, small and 
great, but their equality with each other and with our- 
selves. No paramountcy and no patronage would 
find a place in such a program. Studied deference, 



1 64 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

frequent intercourse, and arbitration of difficulties are 
of course urged. 

Turning from these generalities, emphasis is usually 
laid upon the importance of South American com- 
merce, and Americans are urged to exploit this market 
more wisely. We are reminded of the great wealth 
of the more progressive of the Latin-American coun- 
tries, their culture, their tastes and their peculiar re- 
quirements, and are mildly chided for our apathy and 
our ignorance regarding these our American neigh- 
bours. The facts cited in some of these earnest ap- 
peals are startling and quite justify the reproach which 
they occasionally imply. 

Every appeal for international amity, for mutual 
acquaintance and friendly intercourse is deserving of 
sympathy and support. There seems to be no doubt, 
too, that American enterprise has been less awake to 
its opportunities in this part of the world than in al- 
most any other. For a nation so familiar with the 
world as we are, it is difficult to account for our mis- 
conceptions regarding South America, while our slip- 
shod business methods there arc hard to reconcile with 
our efficiency elsewhere. These conditions are hardly 
creditable to us, and the effort to correct them deserves 
un(]ualified support. 

Ihere is a possibilltv, to be sure, that our advo- 
cates have overlooked certain facts and that the most 
sanguine expectations may not be realized. The more 
developed parts of South America are climatically 
much like our own country, and the most of their ex- 
ports are commodities which we produce in sufficiency. 
We are therefore less able to be useful to each other 



PAN-AMERICANISM i Gs 

than are countries of a more complementary character. 
Tropical South America is different, since the tropics 
and the temperate zone are permanently necessary 
to each other. But tropical America is as near to 
Europe as it is to us, while Africa, its great com- 
petitor, is not much farther away. There is little 
natural basis for mutual monopoly in the trade of the 
Americas. 

Ethnically, too, the bond of kinship, a bond which 
affects all customs and the whole fabric of economic 
and political life, is not between the Americas, 
but between Latin America and Latin Europe on the 
one hand, and Anglo-Saxon America and Anglo-Saxon 
Europe on the other. It must be remembered, too, 
that this nearness of kin is also nearness in space. 
The great Latin countries are all nearer to Latin 
Europe than they are to New York, and New York 
is nearer to Liverpool than Latin America is to either. 

Too much importance should not be attached to 
these facts. They perhaps explain present trade re- 
lations, but they do not explain, much less justify, our 
Ignorance and apathy regarding this vast field of op- 
portunity. The advocacy of closer trade relations 
with Latin America is amply justified and deserving 
of success. 

But there Is nothing in all this to justify the name, 
Pan-Americanism. There is nothing that is exclu- 
sively or even pre-eminently applicable to the Western 
Hemisphere. Does not every argument that is urged 
in favour of closer commercial relations with South 
America apply equally to Australia, to China, to every 
country? The gospel of Pan-Americanism Is thus 



i66 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

far but the gospel of world intercourse and amity 
given a specious particularity in this somewhat neg- 
lected field by the use of a pretentious and misleading 
name. Pan-Americanism stands for no natural unity 
that is relevant to our discussion. If historic accident 
had not applied a single name to two rather excep- 
tionally separated grand divisions of the globe, the 
concept like the name would never have come into 
existence. 

Beyond this doctrine of commercial intimacy and 
international amenity, there have been no very sig- 
nificant developments of the Pan-American idea. 
Suggestions have been made, however, that something 
of political co-operation might result as commercial 
and other bonds were developed, and the Latin coun- 
tries came into their own through the exploitation of 
their great natural resources. The idea is an attrac- 
tive one, and there are not wanting those who see in a 
Pan-American league the one hope of effectively en- 
forcing the Monroe Doctrine. Such a league seems 
to some to be foreshadowed in the ABC conference 
summoned by Mr. Bryan for the settlement of Mexi- 
can difliculties. This won for its author numerous 
plaudits, not because of its achievements which were 
disappointing, but because of the principle involved 
which seemed to be the harbinger of a happier time. 
It is important to consider the possibilities of a Pan- 
American league since in spite of its vagueness, — or 
possibly because of its ^'agucncss, — it appeals to cer- 
tain minds. Is such a league possible, and if possible, 
would it be efficient? 

The Latin Americans arc not of our race and do 



PAN-AMERICANISM 167 

not speak our language. That is not an Insuperable 
obstacle to co-operation, but it has invariably pre- 
vented co-operation in the past except in cases of con- 
quest or the menace of extreme danger. But the 
greater difficulty lies in the fact that these countries are 
small and weak as compared with our own. They 
perceive perfectly that a league of nominal equals 
would be in fact a league dominated by a single power 
and that alliance could only mean subordination. It 
is here that our imperialist temper and record, so per- 
fectly visible to others and so blandly ignored by our- 
selves, come in to complicate the situation. Fear of 
American aggression is the outstanding fact in Latin 
America, a fear varying in inverse ratio to their near- 
ness to ourselves. We protest with all sincerity that 
we have no hostile designs. If they concede our sin- 
cerity, they see in it no protection. We had no de- 
signs against Porto Rico or the Philippines or Cuba or 
Hayti, yet they have one after another fallen under 
our control. Our intentions interest them little in the 
face of our remorseless advance. That we have had 
compelling reasons for each forward step is poor con- 
solation. There are more such reasons waiting to jus- 
tify the steps they fear. Each step is a trifle to us, too 
small an item in the day's work to disturb the com- 
placency of our conscious good intentions. To them 
it is momentous, the shaping of a people's destiny. 

The important thing to note is that neither party 
can help it. It inheres in the situation. They have 
had to give ground before us, and they will have to 
give ground again, no matter what forbearance we 
manifest. They see it, — or rather they feel it, which 



1 68 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

means much more. We should feel It if we were the 
under dog. Tact and forbearance on our part, and 
wisdom on theirs will lessen the difficulty, but nothing 
can remove the fundamental relation between the two 
Americas. 

Why not? 

There are three reasons, all of them inherent and 
measurably permanent. These deserve our careful 
consideration. 

Anglo-Saxon America Is united and Latin America 
Is divided and must stay so. Mexico, though phys- 
ically joined to Central America, and through it and 
the Isthmus with South America, Is permanently sepa- 
rated from her Latin kin. If union Is in store for her, 
it can hardly be other than union with the great neigh- 
bour to the north, with all that such union portends to 
a Latin state. Even union with Central America 
would modify her situation but little and that Is 
seemingly blocked by the rapidly developing system of 
protectorates and Is almost certain to be opposed In 
the Interest of the protection of the Canal. Central 
America may conceivably become a single state, but 
even so only an Insignificant one and one Inevitably 
under our protection. L^nlon across the barrier of 
the Canal is unthinkable, unless in the form of loose 
confederation under our auspices. 

South America is divided from end to end by one of 
the mightiest mountain barriers In the world, one 
which separates adjacent countries more effectively 
than the widest ocean could do. The western slope 
is narrow, too aritl to develop more than a scanty 
population, and tot) long to be administered from a 



PAN-AMERICANISM 169 

single centre. The broader eastern slope is divided 
in its turn into distinct political units differentiated by 
climate and race, factors of the greatest importance 
which we shall soon be called upon to consider. 

Those who are hopeful of a political union in 
South America will of course urge that railroads and 
commercial intercourse tend to lower these barriers 
and so make union possible. They will perhaps cite 
the example of the United States whose population 
is not divided by the Rocky Mountains, as an argu- 
ment that the union of South American states is not 
impossible. Such an analogy is wholly misleading. 
Under a single government our eastern population 
expanded into the western territory which had been 
acquired by conquest. There was no federation be- 
tween separately developed states. In other words 
there was union before there was any barrier. That 
makes all the difference in the world. So obvious 
are the obstacles to union in the present instance that 
its most sanguine advocates hardly hope for a consoli- 
dation of Latin America into less than seven distinct 
nations. So partial a unification would hardly affect 
the problem with which we are concerned. 

In considering the possibilities of such a union, we 
can not safely ignore the teachings of experience. 
There can be no question as to what the teachings of 
history are in this connection. Peoples thus sepa- 
rated never unite unless compelled to do so. This 
compulsion may come in various ways. For instance, 
one of these countries, let us say Argentina, might 
conceivably conquer the rest, advancing step by step 
as we have done in the north. But her task would be 



lyo AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Immensely more difficult than ours has been, and these 
difficulties are increasing. No one thinks that such a 
conquest is contemplated, still less that it will be ef- 
fected. 

Or an outside power might conquer South America 
and unite it, or what amounts to the same thing, force 
it to unite in self defence as the American colonies 
were united by war with England. Such a unification 
is more probable, but it is the avowed policy of the 
United States to prevent an attack on Latin America, 
and it is probable that with the aid of European 
jealousies, we shall succeed. South America will thus 
be spared the pressure necessary to unite her. To 
that type of mind to whom history is irrelevant, such 
reasoning will no doubt seem inconclusive. Such 
persons can see no reason why the obvious advantages 
of federation should not lead intelligent men to adopt 
it. To all of which it may be pertinent to reply that 
men are neither wholly intelligent nor wholly disin- 
terested, and that to such, the advantages of federa- 
tion are not entirely obvious, while the sacrifices and 
painful adjustments which it requires are usually very 
much so. The enthusiast is confident that growing 
intelligence will reveal these advantages which short- 
sightedness now overlooks. It is possible that 
intelligence would reveal to the enthusiast ob- 
stacles which enthusiasm has overlooked. There is 
much reason to fear that if wc wait for intelligence 
to make this nice calculus of advantage which is to 
overcome our narrowness and reconcile us to irksome 
readjustments, we shall wait long for union among 
men. Such union as we have thus far achieved has 



PAN-AMERICANISM 171 

been the result of compulsion which has enforced the 
necessary sacrifice pending the realization of ultimate 
advantages. This historic method will not be ap- 
plied in South America, — certainly not if we can help 
it, — and as a consequence South America will seem- 
ingly remain divided. 

The second reason for disparity between the two 
Americas is the character of their populations. That 
of Anglo-Saxon America is European and efficient; 
that of Latin America largely Indian. This is un- 
equally true in different parts. The population of 
Argentina is largely European, a fact to which the 
remarkable prosperity of that progressive country 
may be largely attributed. In other parts of the 
temperate zone something the same Is true. But 
through the broad tropical belt of South America and 
in the Caribbean countries and Mexico, Indian blood 
predominates, the European population being in some 
cases not over one eighth of the whole. An extensive 
admixture of negro blood, sometimes completely dis- 
placing the Indian, still further complicates the situa- 
tion. Serious as is the negro problem with us, it bears 
no resemblance to the race problem in some of these 
states, and the different solution reached in the two 
Americas is not the least of the permanent barriers 
between them. 

With all deference to the claims of these races, we 
must recognize that Anglo-Saxon America has an im- 
mense advantage over Latin America in the character 
of its population, and that this advantage can not but 
be disturbingly apparent to the latter. It is a source 
of weakness to Latin America and an additional oc- 



172 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

casion of division among its peoples. For the Euro- 
pean population of progressive Argentina is as little 
inclined to merge with the negroid population of trop- 
ical Brazil as we would be in like case. 

This brings us to the third reason for the political 
weakness of Latin America, namely Its tropical cli- 
mate. For purposes of racial-political inquiry it is 
customary to broaden the zone of the tropics to thirty 
degrees on either side the equator. The assertive na- 
tions of the world have been located outside these 
limits during all the historic period. The peoples 
within this zone have almost invariably been ruled by 
peoples outside it. The reason for this, though fam- 
iliar in a partial way, is of so much importance and 
has so direct a bearing upon questions of modern 
statecraft that it must receive careful consideration 
later. For the present we have only to note the rela- 
tion of the two Americas to this zone. 

Anglo-Saxon America lies almost wholly In the 
temperate belt. Only peninsular Florida and part of 
Texas drop below the parallel of thirty. Latin 
America lies almost wholly In the tropical belt. Only 
Uruguay and the main parts of .Argentina and Chile 
lie outside of latitude thirty south. It Is in these 
countries and in the adjacent highlands of southern 
Brazil that are found the wealth and enterprise of 
Latin America. Possiblv something of the same 
energy and wealth may appear In the higher table- 
lands of the trojiics, but these regions In South Amer- 
ica are largely arid and therefore unsulted to the 
maintenance of a considerable population. The great 
bulk of Latin America Is tropical and must perma- 



PAN-AMERICANISM 173 

nently accept the limitations of a tropical climate. 
The climate of the tropics is not only a limitation 
In itself, but it accentuates the other limitations al- 
ready noted. A mountain chain is much more of a 
barrier in the tropics than in a temperate clime, for 
tropical peoples do not build railroads and bore tun- 
nels. Political union is also more difficult to tropical 
peoples on account of their feebler Initiative. Nor 
is it in the tropics that energetic peoples displace 
feebler folk by their greater power of multiplication 
and survival. 

The limitations of Latin America are Inherent. 
These Hmitations are susceptible of slow modification, 
and Latin America will undoubtedly progress. But 
Anglo-Saxon America must also progress, and cer- 
tainly under more favourable conditions. Concede 
such rate of progress as we will, the disparity re- 
mains, must remain, so long as the one is predomi- 
nantly tropical and the other temperate, the one di- 
vided and the other united, the one fundamentally 
Indian and the other Anglo-Saxon. 

In considering the prospective relation between the 
two Americas It Is further to be remembered that It 
is the tropical end of Latin America with which we 
are in contact. The prospect would be entirely dif- 
ferent if Argentina were our next door neighbour and 
therefore the natural sponsor to us for the Latin peo- 
ples. But It is the most Irresponsible of the Latins 
whom nature has made custodians of Panama and who 
have the guardianship of our citadel. Unconscious 
of the Interests with which they trifle, provocative and 
venal in their relations with nations whom we can not 



174 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

permit to have pretexts for aggression, and tempting 
with their unguarded wealth the cupidity of a grasping 
world, how can we consort with Eatin America as a 
trusted equal, or show to her irresponsible peoples 
that forbearance and disinterested recognition which 
Pan-Americanism enjoins? Failing this studied re- 
straint, there can be no genuine mutuality between the 
Americas. The relation is inherently that of a pro- 
tectorate, and the Monroe Doctrine is the recognition 
of that relation. This the Latin nations perfectly 
understand and deeply resent. Eike most of the raw 
material of nations yet to be which makes up so large 
a part of our half baked world, Latin America has 
yet to learn that relations of dependence are writ in 
the constitution of the planet. It is perhaps well 
that susceptibilities should be soothed by diplomatic 
disavowals, but such efforts should be limited to the 
amenities of life. All attempts to remove the un- 
acceptableness of this relation by the fiction of a 
league of equals will but advertise the disparity which 
is the ground of the offence. Pan-Americanism as a 
policy of commercial enterprise and international 
good will is commendable and important. But as a 
project of political co-operation in an age when such 
co-operation has become essential to national exist- 
ence, Pan-Americanism is a delusion. In the stern 
race rivalry of our time Latin America is one of the 
least eligible of all the candidates for our alliance. 
She comes to us not as an additional protection, but as 
an added and difficult interest to protect. In the great 
problem of national defence Latin America stands, 
not as an asset, but as a liability in our account. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 

Allusion has been made In the preceding chapter 
to the conditions of tropical Hfe as a handicap to na- 
tional development. This assumption is not likely 
to be challenged in view of the facts of common 
knowledge in the world about us, and the uniform 
testimony of history. It may be questioned, however, 
whether there is any general appreciation of the rea- 
son for this fact and of its significance to our present 
inquiry. No government of tropical origin com- 
mands the respect and confidence of mankind, nor has 
the modern world any faith that the people of the 
tropics are capable of organizing a stable and equit- 
able government. We accept submissively enough 
the dictum of the historian that no satisfactory gov- 
ernment in the modern sense was ever yet organized 
by a tropical people and tacitly admit the Inference 
that none ever will be or can be. Yet these passive 
admissions find no recognition In our political philoso- 
phy where we still love to attribute universality to our 
favourite propositions. We believe that the neces- 
sity of order and justice Is universal and that govern- 
ment is everywhere needed to secure them. We as- 
sert that democracy or self government Is a universal 
right and that " governments derive their just powers 

175 



176 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

from the consent of the governed." And along with 
our unhesitating assertion of these universal principles 
we tacitly recognize the permanent inability of two 
thirds of the human race to provide for themselves 
that order and justice which we have declared to be 
indispensable and yet to be unobtainable in any other 
way. We have thus one more example of that men- 
tal hospitality which welcomes impartially the most 
antagonistic propositions. 

With such a conflict in our philosophy, it is not sur- 
prising that our practical policy betrays something of 
inconsistency and hesitation, and that whichever way 
we decide, the reproach of inconsistency is ready for 
us. This conflict of principles is especially marked 
in a nation's earlier experiences. After a time we get 
used to being inconsistent and accept it as a normal 
condition, as indeed it is. It is none the less im- 
portant that we should attain, if not to consistency, 
at least to a judicious inconsistency in our attitude to- 
ward tropical peoples. To this end it may be well to 
inquire somewhat more carefully into the grounds of 
their peculiarities. 

The prominent characteristic of the tropics is heat. 
To this is added, in a large part of the tropics, a com- 
paratively high degree of humidity. It is this com- 
bination of excessive heat with excessive humiditv that 
is especially trying. Heat alone, if not aided by hu- 
midity, is not incompatible with human efficiency, as 
witness Arabia whose population has been one of the 
most aggressive and efl^cient in the world. But un- 
fortunately a dry climate is usually an arid climate and 
the result is a subsistence too scanty to support the 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 177 

numerous and concentrated population required for 
political organization. So the Arab has become a 
marauder, spending his energies on the richer fields 
outside his habitat. Egypt, with its dry climate and 
its valley watered by the silent river, forms a unique 
and wonderful exception. 

But in the humid tropics, where heat and moisture 
push nature into overpowering exuberance, man with 
his commission to subdue the earth, is reduced to help- 
less impotence. For all men, Hottentot and Esqui- 
mau alike, are compelled to keep their blood at about 
ninety-eight. A couple of degrees more or less, If 
continued long enough, would kill them. To main- 
tain this uniform temperature under wide variations 
of outside heat, nature has installed a heating plant 
and a refrigerating plant based on exactly the same 
principles as the artificial constructions that bear these 
names. We keep warm by burning fuel and insulat- 
ing the exposed surfaces. We keep cool by evaporat- 
ing fluid and thus absorbing superfluous heat. If the 
air is dry and thirsty, the fluid evaporates readily and 
the refrigerating plant works well. If the air is 
humid, the fluid refuses to evaporate and the plant 
refuses to refrigerate. 

But we are supplied with a power plant as well, and 
this burns fuel and generates heat. If we work, we 
" get hot." The locomotive has to have a fire in the 
firebox even on the hottest days. In cold weather this 
comes in handy, and \Ye kill two birds with one stone. 
We even exercise to keep warm. But in hot weather 
when we are trying to keep cool, this extra heat is 
an extra burden for the refrigerating plant, and if it 



178 AMERICA AxMONG THE NATIONS 

is hampered by humidity, it is quickly taxed beyond 
its capacity. The man must cease exertion or die. 
The capacity for exertion is therefore the capacity of 
the refrigerating plant, and this in turn is directly de- 
termined by the heat and moisture of the air. 

We must be careful to avoid the assumption that 
this limitation of tropical character is a moral defect. 
We say the man is " lazy." But he has to he lazy, 
which means that " lazy " is not the right ^Yord. The 
inactive man in a cool climate is a misfit; in a hot cli- 
mate he is the only fit. Equally erroneous is the no- 
tion that the defect is intellectual, that education and 
intelligence will make him efficient and give him the 
mastery over nature which is the condition of a self- 
supporting civilization. But intelligence and thought 
come under the same great taboo. They require 
energy. Not to mention the dependence of intelli- 
gence upon the vast outfit of physical appliances, — 
books, schoolhouscs, apparatus, and the like, the pro- 
duction of which implies highly organized physical 
activities, it must be remembered that even psychic 
activity requires energ)^ When it is too hot it is irk- 
some to think. 

But the all important fact is that intellectual ac- 
tivities are in themselves a by-product of phvsical ex- 
ertion. The dependence may not be immediate in the 
life of each individual, but in the aggregate the de- 
pendence is absolute. A man who never works may 
possibly do a good deal of thinking, but a race never. 
It is the struggle with physical environment that is the 
source of all the primary problems of the mind. If 
that struggle is casual and spiritless, these problems 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 179 

make no effectual appeal. The seeming exceptions to 
this principle are only seeming. There is intellectual 
life, sometimes of great subtlety, in the tropics, but it 
usually proves on investigation to be an exotic, and in- 
variably shows a tendency to detach itself from the 
concrete realities which are its natural counterpart. 
The tropics may produce a mystic, but hardly a scien- 
tist. 

It is therefore in this broader sense, physical and 
psychic, that we are to conceive the great ban of the 
tropics. Condemned to inactivity, man lacks the 
stimuli which elsewhere develop the powers of his 
mind. Physical and mental torpor broken by spurts 
of feebly co-ordinated action and short-range, shallow 
cunning, are his usual, perhaps his inevitable charac- 
teristics. 

From these basic defects derive others which still 
further limit his efficiency. He is the victim of mal- 
nutrition because too Ignorant to choose and too 
thoughtless to conserve the proper food. Parasites 
and micro-organisms with which the tropics abound, 
find him an easy mark. It Is said on the highest au- 
thority that ninety-five per cent, of the inhabitants of 
the Philippines are infested with intestinal parasites 
which enormously deplete their limited energy. Con- 
tagious diseases rage unchecked with little exercise of 
the simplest precautions. And all this apparently 
without hope of cure from within, for nature has here 
denied to man the energy needed to control the com- 
peting forms of life. 

It is important here to notice certain propositions 
which hover vaguely In the western mind. One is that 



i8o AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

the tropical peoples are young peoples and that these 
limitations will disappear as development proceeds. 
But they are not young. The evidence is convincing 
that some of these races are among the oldest that we 
know, and that their present condition is the result of 
a development far longer and more unhindered than 
our own. Xay more, the extremely imperfect devel- 
opment of the tropical man, as judged by our stand- 
ards, is in effect an adaptation. He Is a fit, not a mis- 
fit. Nature's criterion of fitness is not the abilit)'^ to 
enjoy Browning or Beethoven. She shows no prefer- 
ence for what we call higher types and is perhaps as 
much concerned for her parasites as for her humans. 
We may therefore picture her as viewing her tropical 
t>'pes with as much complacency as any other. If we 
do not like them, it is we who must change them, not 
nature. 

But why should we change them if they fit the con- 
ditions of their environment? Why disturb nature's 
adaptations? 

The answer is simply that the tropics are necessary 
to our own civilization. The most remarkable phe- 
nomenon in modern economic development is the util- 
ization of tropical products and the discovery of their 
serviceableness to non-tropical ci\ilization. Our de- 
pendence upon certain of these products, as tea, coffee, 
and spices, is seemingly arbitrary. We have come to 
care much for these things, almost to require them, 
and are deeply concerned with the development of the 
tropics in consequence, hut it is not clear that they 
meet a vital need of our civilization. Others like 
sugar are products of both temperate and tropical 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS i8i 

zones, and the value of the tropics is merely as an ex- 
tension of our productive domain. We can raise our 
sugar in the north, but only by displacing something 
else. The more sugar we can get from Cuba, the 
more wheat we can raise at home. 

But there are still other products which only the 
tropics can produce and which are indispensable. 
Chief of these and type of all the rest is rubber, which 
has become a necessity of our civilization. The list 
of these indispensable tropical products is a long one, 
and one that constantly increases, while the number of 
their uses and the amount required for our needs is 
increasing by leaps and bounds. The demands made 
by a single invention like the automobile are revolu- 
tionary in our relation to the tropics. 

These demands, the tropics in the hands of their 
own people and managed in the true tropical way 
are utterly unable to supply. Yet there is almost no 
limit to their productivity if their exuberant nature 
forces can be brought under human control. 

This is the modern problem of the tropics. The in- 
creased yield of tropical products which our present 
civilization demands is something which their own peo- 
ples can not be depended upon to furnish voluntarily 
and unaided. Attempts to extort this increased yield 
by force have produced in the Putumayo and the 
Congo the most ghastly horrors which have ever 
blackened the records of civilization. Yet our civil- 
ization is unrelenting in its demands. Can we im- 
agine that the modern world will limit its use^ of au- 
tomobiles, telephones, ocean cables, and the like out 
of deference to native preferences or nature's adjust- 



1 82 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ments? It has no power to impose upon Itself such 
limitations if it chose to do so. This modern world 
does not act as a unit. If one part refrains, another 
seizes the advantage, and woe to the victim of forbear- 
ance. 

Nor is there anything sacred about nature's adapta- 
tions. All human progress consists in the modifica- 
tion of these adaptations. Our idea of a wheat head 
or a potato or an apple or a pig is not nature's original 
idea at all. Her problem was to adapt them to their 
environment. Our problem is to adapt them to our 
use. If it seem presumptuous for us to take our own 
fellow men in hand to adapt them in turn to our pur- 
pose, we may remember that we are doing the same 
with ourselves, forcing new adaptations, crushing old 
instincts, with no small cost in suffering and loss, all 
in the interest of this pitiless civilization which coerces 
us into its service in order that it may serve us in re- 
turn. 

If we are on safe ground thus far, certain farther 
conclusions will not be difficult. The first requisite 
of this indispensable exploitation of the tropics is the 
establishment of a government such as tropical men 
never establish. It must be capable not only of main- 
taining order and administering justice of quite an 
untropical sort, but also of executing public works and 
developing natural resources in a way which to them 
is unthinkable. Such a government and such an or- 
ganization of forces of control can come only from 
the temperate zone. It is only there that conditions 
have made possible their development. To impose 
them upon the tropics, involves no more necessary 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 183 

hardship than is involved in imposing them upon our- 
selves. 

Nor does this intervention of alien energy involve 
a violation of precedent or an " interruption of evolu- 
tion " as a recent pseudo-scientist has called it. Such 
interruptions are one of evolution's chief agencies. 
They have been going on ever since there were men 
capable of migration, and to them the tropics owe the 
very characteristics in whose behalf modern inter- 
vention is asked to forbear. The tropics have always 
drunk deep draughts of energy from the cool foun- 
tains of the north. 

The dependence between the temperate and tropical 
zones is not new, though it has acquired new and un- 
precedented importance. It is permanent and mu- 
tual. We need their rubber, their spices, their sugar, 
a thousand things which nature has bestowed upon 
them with lavish hand, and we pay for them with the 
energy and brains of our manhood which is their per- 
petual need. The traffic is based on permanent dif- 
ferences of vital condition and can never cease. Nay, 
rather, with the improvement of the means of com- 
munication it must steadily increase, this eternal bar- 
ter of men for things. Progress can consist only in 
facilitating the exchange, assuring its mutuality, elim- 
inating its over-reaching and sharp practice, and con- 
serving the element of human energy on the one hand 
while stimulating that of tropical production on the 
other. 

If the control of the tropics by the temperate zone 
Is to be accepted in principle as it has been adopted in 
practice, a certain revision, or at least re-interpreta- 



1 84 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

tlon, of familiar political principles Is plainly called 
for. Self-government may be a principle of universal 
application, but the only kind that will answer the re- 
quirements of the modern world will have to be im- 
ported for the tropics. It is not native there. It may 
be established there with the consent of the governed, 
but that consent will be neither intelligent nor spon- 
taneous. Civilized government must be with them an 
acquired taste. For that matter it Is so with us. 
The blessings of order and co-ordinated activities are 
nowhere seen and greeted from afar, but are accepted 
at best with sullen acquiescence, and at the worst, only 
under dire compulsion. Imagination can not picture 
-in advance the results of experience. Consent comes 
only as the result of tedious adaptation. If the doc- 
trine of consent of the governed is construed as requir- 
ing consent in advance, then there is scarce a govern- 
ment on earth that can claim legitimacy. 

The case of the tropics is peculiar only in the sense 
that the kind of government which both the necessities 
and the conscience of the great outside world imposes 
upon them, transcends both their intelligence and their 
local requirements far more than is the case in the 
temperate zone. They are not more unwilling than 
we have been, — rather less so. The Hindu has ac- 
cepted British rule far more willingly than the Scotch 
clansman. But if not less willing they are far less 
able to understand. The requirements of sanitation, 
for instance, so necessary for the safety of both them- 
selves and the great outside world, are to them as 
mysterious ns they are irksome. The mysteries of 
sound hnance and of carefully maintained public works 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 185 

are hardly less so. Not only do these requirements 
transcend their present intelligence, but In a sense they 
must always lack the sanction of their own experience, 
for some of these requirements are not their require- 
ments at all, but requirements of the great world which 
has no option but to make the tropics take their place 
in a world scheme of things. The consent of the 
tropics must therefore always imply to a larger degree 
than in the temperate zone, an attitude of docility and 
submission rather than of intelligent appreciation. 
This attitude is readily enough secured, — is indeed 
characteristic of the tropics. It is of course capable 
of frightful abuse and perversion. It induces a sub- 
missive people to submit to the tyranny of the alien or 
of their own leaders. It rallies the docile around a 
Mahdi or an Aguinaldo as readily as around the most 
beneficent of governments. In this it Is like all other 
human characteristics. If condemned because liable 
to abuse, no human virtue and no faculty will stand. 
Whether the tropics having once consented to such 
government as the conscience and the necessities of the 
larger world demand, can be depended on to be loyal 
to it thereafter Is a question still at issue. Not a few 
fondly hope that once enlightened by experience of the 
benefits of civilized government and Instructed In Its 
management, the tropics will gladly maintain its neces- 
sary institutions. It Is easy to believe that they will 
gladly will to do so. But the matter Is not merely one 
of volition. Whether they w^ill perceive the means 
necessary to that end and will to adopt irksome meas- 
ures whose necessity Is not very obvious, Is not so clear. 
We are too apt to forget that we have experience on 



1 86 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

this point to enlighten us. Santo Domingo, Hayti, the 
Central American states, Liberia, are all cases in point, 
— if not ideal cases, just the kind of real cases which 
constitute our problem. To say that they have met 
or are learning to meet the conditions which the neces- 
sities and the conscience of the civilized world impose 
would be grotesque. Not one has succeeded; scarcely 
one is even approaching success; most have practically 
ceased to function and have accepted foreign control. 
These experiences are perhaps not conclusive, but they 
establish a presumption which is not doubtful. The 
possibility of civilized government becoming acclim- 
ated in the tropics is not yet demonstrated. 

It is perhaps appropriate to notice here that the 
principle of self government, whether in the tropics 
or elsew^here, is necessarily modified in certain cases 
by strategic considerations. To take an extreme case, 
who would suggest that Gibraltar should have the 
privilege of self government. Its mongrel popula- 
tion might vote to unite with Spain, or more likely, 
to form an independent republic. Those who are 
hostile to British rule might favour such an arrange- 
ment, but obviously for ulterior reasons. So tremen- 
dous is the strategic importance of " the Rock " and 
so incapable its inhabitants of understanding it or 
maintaining it, that no one has suggested that its gov- 
ernment should be based on other than strategic con- 
siderations. Yet the plea for self-government is 
continually made for Eg>-pt which holds an exactly 
similar and hardly less important place in the great 
artery of Britain's life blood. A recent writer es- 
pouses the cause of the Egyptians with naive uncon- 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 187 

sciousness of this vital fact. " They are like every 
other nation in the world in wanting to run their own 
affairs. They grant that they may run them badly 
for a while. But their argument in unanswerable. 
They ask you to point out a single nation in history 
that has evolved into a self-governing community 
without having gone through a long period of imper- 
fection, mistakes, and errors, even of revolution and 
anarchy." For New Zealand or Argentina that ar- 
gument might be " unanswerable," but not for Egypt. 
There must be no revolution and anarchy in Egypt. 
It would be like a street fight in lower Broadway. If 
they were somewhere else, perhaps we might let 
them fight it out, but not here. It Is safe to say that 
if Britain were willing to grant to the Egyptians the 
privilege of working out their own salvation through 
revolution and anarchy, the rest of the world would 
refuse its consent. It simply must not be. 

The bearing of this principle upon our own prob- 
lems in the Caribbean is obvious. Cuba, Panama, 
and Nicaragua can not be allowed the privilege of 
anarchy which in another situation they might claim. 
Situated as they are, they must walk straight. Theirs 
is the irksome honour of children born to the purple. 
Less obviously but not less really, the same is true of 
Mexico. It simply is not true that it is no concern 
of ours how long Mexico takes to secure her free- 
dom or what means she uses in securing it. We are 
very much concerned with the means, nor can we wait 
for ever. The futility of mere waiting Is further em- 
phasized, by the fact, if it be a fact, as we have seen 
reason to beheve, that tropical peoples are not merely 



1 88 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

immature, but that there are Inherent limitations to 
their capacity for unaided development. It is some- 
times impossible to wait till they have reached this 
limit. It is folly to wait beyond it. 

Recognizing, then, the inevitable dependence of the 
tropics upon the energy of the temperate zone for 
their guidance and constructive development, certain 
dangers and certain requisites call for consideration. 

The tropics must be developed. That is what our 
trusteeship is for. If we were not compelled to 
seek their products, we might leave them in contented 
lethargy. They would never disturb us. But we 
need their full service if we are to build up the world 
civilization to which we have now set our hand. 
The native unaided can not assure us this service. 
The trustee must do so if he is to justify his trustee- 
ship. Mere occupation, without constructive organ- 
ization and development, forfeits all claims to pos- 
session. That was our indictment of Spain. It is 
still more the indictment of Portugal in her rich but 
neglected African dominions. 

On the other hand, experience has demonstrated 
the futility of brute coercion. The trouble with the 
native is not perversity but helplessness. He lacks 
not only force, but intelligence, imagination, and fore- 
sight. Mere pressure brings but meagre returns and 
at ghastly cost. The Belgian Congo, the Putumayo 
in Brazil, and some of the French colonies are morally 
forfeit on this ground. 

7 he world is not quite clear, it would seem, as to 
the perquisites of trusteeship in the tropics. The 
tendency at first was to regard tropical dependencies 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 189 

as private estates or preserves to be monopolized by 
the owner. Exclusive privileges of trade or ex- 
ploitation were reserved to the controlling nation, or 
conferred upon a trading company or other beneficiary 
at its discretion. This traffic was then worked for all 
it was worth, the price being forced up by all the de- 
vices known to the modern trust, even including de- 
struction of part of the product. With the disap- 
pearance of the trading company and the admission of 
the general trader, the same result was sought by 
differential duties favouring the citizens of the pos- 
sessing country, and by export duties, a favourite in- 
stitution of the tropics. The earlier, direct monopo- 
lies are now obsolete, but discriminating duties and 
like devices implying rights of private exploitation 
are still common. 

There is plainly a tendency, however, toward the 
view that the tropics are world property and not 
open to commercial appropriation by a single people. 
In not a few cases, some product which all require, 
is to be obtained from only a single district. To 
hold up the world by demanding an exorbitant price 
for such a monopoly product, is a risky game for any 
single nation to play. It accentuates in the extreme 
the anxiety of the dispossessed to challenge the right 
of possession of the more fortunate, and is one of the 
most serious causes of modern wars. To permit 
trade on equal terms and levy only such duties as are 
required to defray expenses of administration, is 
the probable policy of all tropical dependencies in 
the not distant future. In the home country, the 
economic argument for free trade is less conclusive. 



I90 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

We must consider the needs of varied culture and 
national self-sufficiency in wartime isolation. But 
neither of these arguments apply with any such force 
to tropical dependencies. Such an open door policy 
may seem to remove all incentive to bear the white 
man's burden in this onerous trusteeship, but this is 
far from the case. Men like to see their flag wave 
over distant lands and their civilization extended to 
alien peoples. For this they are willing to incur large 
costs and forego all material remuneration. There 
is in this unreasoned ambition, a desire to make pre- 
vail that order that we have learned to value and 
love, a desire which is as nearly altruistic as any that 
men ever know. It is only the self styled idealist who 
assumes that men seek dominion for pay. 

There still remains, however, a tangible profit in 
the trusteeship of the open door. If we can not 
shut others out, they at least can not shut us out. And 
the exploitation of our tropics, if it does not inure 
solely to our benefit, at least includes us in its bene- 
fits by broadening the market for tropical products 
and giving added assurance that the needful shall 
not fail. 

It should hardly be necessary to add that tropical 
dependencies require a degree of disinterestedness 
on the part of their administration which puts the 
nation to its severest test. At home the self-seeking 
and corrupt arc restrained by the watchfulness of 
their peers and the scourge of social ostracism. The 
tropics have no such defence. They are unable to 
locate the evils of maladministration from which 
they suffer. Their opinion counts for nothing with 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 191 

the corrupt administrator, and those who alone can 
hold him responsible are unconscious and far away. 
Any tendency to make such a dependency a perquisite 
of " deserving " candidates for official favour is repre- 
hensible in the highest degree. If there is any place 
where the office should seek the man and not the 
man the office, it is here. So obvious is this danger 
that it has been urged as a sufficient reason for con- 
demning the whole policy of dependencies. But it is 
a danger which the world must risk, and a danger 
which can be successfully met. In nothing has the 
political evolution of the world shown more progress 
in the last three hundred years than in the govern- 
ment of dependencies. Doubtless much remains to 
be accomplished, but a comparison of the Spanish 
government of Peru with the British government of 
the Federated Malay States or the American govern- 
ment of the Philippines should reassure even the most 
confirmed pessimist. Nor is the difference one of 
race alone. Conceding, as we are perhaps too will- 
ing to do, the superior aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon 
for the government of dependencies, it must be recog- 
nized that he has had much to learn and that he has 
been much indebted to favouring conditions. His 
early ventures were not so different from those of 
Spain, and would perhaps have turned out no better if 
he had begun his colonizing with the treasure trove 
of Mexico and Peru instead of making terms with 
grudging nature in austere New England. He has 
learned, — the world has learned, — much, and can 
learn the more that is needful. 

It may be noted in closing this chapter that the 



192 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

policy of permanent trusteeship of the tropics is a 
comparatively recent reaction against a view once 
widely prevalent that all dependencies were but ap- 
prentices in the art of self-government, and that 
graduation, even an early graduation, into independ- 
ent self-government was in store for them. So gen- 
eral was this expectation that government policy was 
shaped by it at times to a degree that it is difficult for 
us to realize. It is stated on reliable authority that 
Britain at one time had reached the decision to with- 
draw from Jamaica and her other West Indian pos- 
sessions, leaving them to manage their own affairs as 
they seemed able to do after their long tuition. Even 
the date had been set and the orders issued. Some 
change in the personnel of the British government was 
doubtless responsible for averting this disaster, for 
a disaster it would certainly ha\e been. Since then 
the steady decline of Hayti, Santo Domingo, and 
other independent states whose case seemed fairly 
analogous, has applied the necessary correction to a 
hasty and sanguine generalization. 

A similar precipitate decision of the United States 
regarding the Philippines has likewise been recon- 
sidered, at least for the present. In this case, how- 
ever, the problem has been complicated by considera- 
tions of national security, the coiniction being widely 
held that the Philippines were not defensible and 
therefore a source of danger. I Iiis is an important 
question which will demand our later consideration, 
but for the present it is sufficient to note that this 
conviction greatly strengthened the argument of those 
who were predisposed by their political philosophy to 



THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS 193 

recognize the capacity of the Filipinos for self-gov- 
ernment. That capacity is now being put to a re- 
markable test. The result of that test will be of un- 
usual interest. Present workings are too much the 
result of recent American management to be con- 
clusive. It is a nice task to distinguish between mo- 
mentum and active energy, and only long experience 
can show how far present Fihpino achievements are 
due to the dying and how far to the hving force. 



PART TWO 
AMERICA AMONG THE WORLD POWERS 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE GREATER POWERS 

Our inquiry has led us from the early and forma- 
tive period of American imperialism to its inevitable 
sequel in the problems which now confront us on the 
American continent. This continent is obviously our 
chief field and possibly our only field of legitimate 
political activity. But as we have considered our 
relation to the various American countries, we have 
been conscious at every step of the existence of other 
and greater countries whose interests and ambitions 
in this part of the world are the chief factor in our 
problem. It is to these countries, therefore, that we 
now turn, inquiring more definitely as to their inter- 
ests and ambitions, and also as to other relations 
which we may sustain to them and which must needs 
further complicate our problem. 

Our problem now becomes a very different one. In 
our own hemisphere we are plainly the paramount 
power. The Latin American countries are all in- 
ferior to us in size, population, wealth, and organ- 
ization. This fact, taken in connection with their 
situation and our mutual necessities, makes them 
more or less dependent upon us. The dependence 
varies greatly, from a case like Argentina where it is 
a remote contingency, to that of Hayti or Panama, 

^97 



198 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

where it amounts to permanent control, but in one 
important respect all are alike. If they need help, 
they must come to us. Other nations are not likely 
to help them, and those that might be disposed to do 
so are precisely the ones whose assistance we can not 
permit. This is the meaning of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, and if there were no Monroe Doctrine, it is 
the meaning of the situation. If we keep our leader- 
ship in American affairs, we keep our independence. 
If we lose that leadership to a stronger power, we 
necessarily become subservient in turn to that power. 
That power might be very forbearing, — as we are 
trying to be in our own exercise of leadership, — but 
that power would be paramount. There is reason 
to fear that certain powers in that position might not 
be forbearing. 

The problem of American relations is therefore the 
problem of maintaining this paramount position, the 
problem of calculating the amount of control required 
in a given case and considering the form which that 
control should take. Hence the Piatt Amendment, 
the Nicaraguan and Dominican receiverships, and 
the Haytian protectorate, with more in the making. 
Hence, too, the policy of conciliation, with its watch- 
ful waiting and its ABC conference. The problem 
is that of a vast protectorate with infinite complexities 
of physical and psychological condition which, amid 
constant change, must be kept in constant equilibrium. 

Turning to the old world the problem is changed, 
— almost reversed. A number of the nations of 
Europe are more powerful than we are. While 
great changes are probably in store for some of these 



THE GREATER POWERS 199 

powers, and our own growth In population, wealth, 
and organization tends constantly to give us the ad- 
vantage, it seems likely that some of these powers 
will always surpass us. If there is to be a paramount 
world power, it must be in the old world, not in the 
new. That was settled when the shrinking planet 
sent up the wrinkled outlines of the continents. 
Americans are fond of contrasting complacently their 
own vast domain with the little countries of western 
Europe, but they forget that one European country 
which has not yet reached its probable limits, already 
has a population nearly twice as large as our own in 
a territory three times as large as our own and on 
the average more productive. Add Canada and 
Mexico and the West Indies to our present terri- 
tory and we should still be inferior in population, 
in area, and in hfe sustaining power. Moreover this 
country is far more likely than we are to extend its 
territory, and its population is increasing at a more 
rapid rate. Nor is this the largest, the most popu- 
lous, or the most powerful of old world powers. 

But this is not all. America may conceivably hold 
her own against any old world power, either now or 
later, but she can never do so against a combination 
of European powers. It is occasionally argued that 
these great powers will break up and so their menace 
will disappear. The tendencies are all the other way. 
For many centuries political aggregation has gone 
steadily on, and even where it seems to have reached 
Its limits as In the countries of western Europe, it is 
still going on in the form of ententes, alliances, etc., 
which tend more and more to harden into permanency. 



200 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

For the moment our safet)' lies in the division of the 
the old world, but that protection is diminishing. An 
active combination of old world powers to extend 
their influence in America is no longer a mere possi- 
bility; it is a certainty, and we are protected from it 
only by a counter combination among these same 
powers. 

As we look beyond the American continent, there- 
fore, our relation is one of inferiority, present and 
presumably permanent. No doubt we are very pow- 
erful, quite the superior of many European countries, 
and further favoured to some extent by our posi- 
tion. But even in dealing with the lesser countries 
of Europe, we are seldom privileged to use our 
strength. These countries are quite as dependent as 
those of Latin America, but their dependence is not 
upon us. Any effort to assert our will against them 
tends to line up Europe in their defence, a combina- 
tion against which we are powerless. Our only re- 
course is to line up Europe or part of it on our side. 
Europe is the arbiter. We control America, but 
Europe controls the world, — controls it and must 
continue to control it unless present indications de- 
ceive us. It is of course the larger Europe that we 
have in mind, not merely the little area arbitrarily 
set off by the L'rals and the Caucasus, but the Europe 
which, originating here, has spread resistlessly across 
the white man's land of Asia and the island continents 
of the southern seas, while reducing tropical Asia and 
Africa to unquestioned vassalage. It would be blind- 
ness not to see that the centre of gravity of things 
human lies in this vast aggregate. 



THE GREATER POWERS 201 

This then is our problem. How shall we make 
terms with those that are stronger than we, 
stronger for the moment in their local intensive de- 
velopment, stronger for the morrow in their resources 
and their power of growth, and always and for ever 
stronger in combination? Obviously the problem of 
todav is different from that of tomorrow or the ulti- 
mate future. Europe is now divided and incapable 
of united action. Even so her several parts are re- 
doubtable and partial combination is becoming ha- 
bitual if not permanent. We must therefore con- 
sider our relation to these parts in succession, both 
individually and in their possible combinations. 
Only upon a study of actual national relations can we 
base such slight forecast of a remoter future as pres- 
ent knowledge warrants. 

It may be prefaced that the United States is rather 
a novice in these matters. We have had intercourse 
with the powers of Europe from the first, but for 
the most part of a very minor and incidental sort. 
The relation has been like that of casual acquaintances 
rather than of working partners or active and close 
competitors. The early life of our nation was in 
fact one of isolation, and when our severance from 
Europe was once thoroughly effected, we fell into a 
way of assuming that nothing that happened there 
really concerned us. Meanwhile, as has been seen, 
we carried things over here with a high hand. The 
result was that we learned to be a little high-handed. 
Our attitude in such matters as the Behring Sea con- 
troversy, the Nicaragua boundary dispute, and the 
Manchurian Railway scheme, was curiously out of 



202 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

proportion to the force at our disposal. It reflected 
in the sphere of diplomacy something of the popular 
conviction that we can " lick creation," which was only 
a way of saying that we thought creation safely dis- 
tant and barked at it like a puppy from behind a high 
fence. The fence is gone now, at least in places, 
but we have not yet come to realize that any one may 
come over. It is a truism that our national isolation 
has vanished, that it is now possible to cross the ocean 
in force, and that the real frontier of every nation is 
now the ocean's farther shore. We have a new situ- 
ation and new knowledge, but not yet the new in- 
stincts to serve our new needs. So we have been 
incredulous and even impatient with those who have 
warned us of possible trouble with Japan or other 
powers. We admit that they might attack us, but 
we do not believe they will. As our chief representa- 
tive put it a couple of years ago, there was " no ob- 
jection to the discussion of preparedness as a purely 
academic question." Even now that war has come, 
we hardly realize that it is a case in point or that it 
has any real bearing on the general question. It is 
one of the small compensations for the world's calam- 
ity that it seems likely to awaken us to a realizing 
sense of our place among the nations. We shall 
never realize that position or be alive to our real 
danger until we can believe that a nation, — almost 
any nation, — when tempted by a great opportunity 
or driven by a great need, zvill despoil its nciqJihour. 
Perhaps it should not be so, perhaps it will not al- 
ways be so, but it is so now, and if we would play 
safe, we must assume that it will continue to be so. 



THE GREATER POWERS 203 

The incorrigible optimism of our race which is at 
once the hope of the future and the danger of the 
present, lures us again with the promise of a false 
security. There are fond dreamers who believe that 
this will be the last war. There have been such after 
every war for the last three hundred years. Let us 
hope if we can, but let us not stake our all on so un- 
certain a prospect. There are no adequate moral 
safeguards against war. It is vain to invoke the 
analogy of individual relations. Seemingly the anal- 
ogy does not fit; certainly it does not appeal. Nor is 
the spell to be wrought by paper formulas or verbal 
incantations. Even aversion to war is no safeguard, 
as our own case proves, nor is our case peculiar among 
present belligerents. 

And there are new straws to grasp at. It is labori- 
ously demonstrated that war does not pay, that no 
resulting economic advantage, even in the event of 
victory, can compensate for its costs, the hope being 
that such a demonstration will dissuade men from it. 
There is not a belligerent in the present war that did 
not know this in advance. Again free trade is urged 
as the panacea, the opening of all doors to the com- 
merce of all nations, that the temptation to force 
these doors may be removed. How strange, in the 
light of such a proposal, that the one free trade coun- 
try in the world should have been for decades the 
chief object of hostility! 

But dearest of all these illusions to the American 
heart is the belief that democracy is the one safeguard 
against war, and that our task in the present strug- 
gle is to destroy the autocracy of the Central Powers 



204 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

and so banish war for ever. No better illustration 
could be given of the vice of unhistoric thinking. 
During the last hundred years the two most imperial- 
istic nations of the world, those that have expanded 
most incontinently, encroached most often upon their 
neighbours, and oftenest grasped the sword for this 
purpose, have been the world's two great democra- 
cies, Britain and the United States. Their nearest 
rival has been France, a country intermittently demo- 
cratic throughout the period, and never more ag- 
gressive than under the present republic. 

There is a momentary plausibility' in this assump- 
tion that democracies are pacific. In every democ- 
racy of the world today there is in progress a violent 
class struggle, a struggle as bitter, as destructive and 
as painful as any war we have known until the pres- 
ent. The aggressive party in this struggle grudge 
their powder for any other cause. They hate the 
opposing class far more than they hate any opposing 
nationality. In the autocratic countries this struggle 
is more or less repressed and the nation is thus able 
to exert its force as a unit in pursuance of its designs. 
Germany was able to attack her neighbours; France 
and Britain were not. This in itself is a sufficient 
refutation of Germany's claim that she is fighting only 
to defend herself against aggression. The radical 
democracy of France and Britain was too intent upon 
its home struggle to consent to a war of foreign ag- 
gression, as the last election in France preceding the 
war abundantly proved. 

But it would be a mistake to assume that democra- 
cies are peaceful. They are ultra belligerent. If 



THE GREATER POWERS 205 

we assume that democracy means perpetual war at 
home, it is conceivable that it may mean perpetual 
peace abroad. That would be a huge assumption for 
a slender hope, an assumption as unplausible as it 
is unpalatable. No, if democracy ever settles its 
quarrel at home, it will show the old masterful tem- 
per in the field from which it has been temporarily 
diverted. The world may become pacific, but not 
through democracy. The slogan, " down with autoc- 
racy," serves the present purpose, and ultimate pur- 
poses can wait, — must wait. 

The causes of war are more vague and more com- 
prehensive than any of these remedies imply. Na- 
tions do not fight to make money, nor to force open 
the doors of trade. Nor do they rally as slaves to 
serve the ambitions of an autocrat. They are moved 
by great common impulses, which individually 
they do not understand, to do things which in- 
dividually they do not enjoy, and to seek ends from 
which individually they do not profit. If this seems 
irrational, it is because our reasoning has taken ac- 
count only of the individual life, — its detachable fea- 
tures, so to speak. No matter what our sympathies, 
it is the beginning of wisdom in these matters to recog- 
nize the existence of something more than this, some- 
thing for which men have always been willing to sacri- 
fice this. All attempts to translate this " oversoul " 
of the nation into terms of the individual life have 
been in v-ain and must always be in vain. To give it 
tangibility and substance is to degrade and falsify It. 
It envelopes us as an intangible atmosphere of emo- 
tion which expresses itself only In symbols. Its vast 



2o6 AxMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

expanse and length of days, however finite, mean 
more to our finite minds than universahty and eter- 
nity. In comparison, our lives of the moment forget 
to assert their little claims. The materialistic paci- 
fist may jeer and argue, but men will worship still. 
The cult may be folly, but it is folly to forget that it 
is a cult. 

And this thing that we reverence may suffer harm. 
Through the violence of war or the insidious en- 
croachments of peace its votaries may be scattered, 
its symbols dishonoured, and its temples profaned. 
There may be strange accents, uncongenial customs 
and unwelcome ideals instead of those we have 
learned to love. The prospect is repugnant to our 
inmost souls. It was this instinctive revulsion of 
feeling rather than any reasoned estimate that 
prompted a recent distinguished utterance that " if 
Germany wins the war, the world will not be fit to 
hve m. 

And conversely, all may be exalted, enlarged, and 
glorified. \'otaries may be more numerous, reverence 
more profound, homage more heartfelt, and symbols 
more sacred, if we will pay the price, perhaps the 
uttermost price. Do not say, I shall not see it. 
Foolish words! Do I not foresee it? Object not, 
my good is no better than another. Who knows 
but me? Or that my good is unsubstantial, no good 
at all, that it does not pay. Think, man, how many 
good things in our world would perish if such argu- 
ments were held conclusive. 

In some such way the men about us might reason, 
were it a thing to reason out. They guard as a 



THE GREATER POWERS 207 

sacred trust the nationality in which their lot is cast, 
and count no price too dear to pay for its defence, 
its aggrandizement, and its exaltation. It is vain to 
tell them that it Is worthless. The argument strikes 
equally at all intangible good. 

But why can not each nationality keep its place, 
recognizing its limits and respecting the boundaries of 
its neighbours? There are two reasons. 

The first reason is that the present limits of na- 
tional territory are arbitrary and unsatisfactory. 
Whether we regard them from the standpoint of 
commercial convenience, or national defence, or eth- 
nic unity, or all three together, the same conclusion is 
inevitable. No rational finality has been reached. 
Perhaps none can be reached, but improvement seems 
possible. There is not a nation that does not see 
some particular excrescence that it would like to have 
removed. The result might be merely to make new 
ones, but it is the present ones that irritate. The 
result is that present national arrangements suit no- 
body. The situation is one of unstable equilibrium. 

The second reason Is that a particular equilibrium, 
if ever so satisfactory for the moment, Is continually 
disturbed by the silent forces of growth. Nations 
change In their Inner substance as the result of the 
situation. The progressive nations, having dis- 
tanced their competitors, become unprogresslve and 
are distanced in turn. Whole nations lose their 
Imagination and become automatic and unadapt- 
able. It Is Impossible that this should not react 
upon the tenure of territory, and especially upon 
that penumbra of tropical and island dependencies 



2o8 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

which surrounds every great empire and which, we 
have seen reason to beheve, has its basis in permanent 
condition. Nothing could have been more natural 
or just than that Portugal under Henr}' the Navigator 
should bring the islands and helpless lands which he 
discovered under the sway of his organizing genius. 
Nothing could be more unfortunate than to have that 
sway continue today. It was precisely such consider- 
ations as this that justified the expulsion of Spain 
from Cuba, of Mexico from California, and of 
Turkey from the Balkans. Yet there were some of 
these Balkan States that three centuries before had 
thrown themselves into the arms of Turkey as an en- 
lightened power to escape the miseries of Christian 
misrule. 

Industrial changes are potent in effecting this 
change in the national temper, and these again are 
affected by discoveries and inventions. The discov- 
ery of the route round the Cape of Good Hope ruined 
Venice and destroyed the reason for the allegiance of 
her manifold dependencies. The discoveries con- 
nected with the utilization of coal made modern in- 
dustrial England and reduced artisan Italy and Flan- 
ders to hopeless inferiority. And now again the de- 
velopment of electrical transmission harnesses the 
rushing streams of Italy and makes her aspire to a 
larger " place in the sun." 

The impatient objector will ask: " But whv fight 

about it? " We would gently remind him once more 

of the purpose of our study, uot propaganda hut in- 

' quiry. Perhaps men should not fight about it, but 

they do. The growing and virile peoples get restive 



THE GREATER POWERS 209 

at seeing their seedy neighbours in the enjoyment of 
imperial sinecures. Yet these latter think it pre- 
posterous that they be asked to give up that which 
is theirs just because upstarts covet it. There is no 
arbitrating this conflict between prescriptive right and 
presumptuous innovation. 

The point of it all is that our world is in flux. 
Nothing is fixed, no arrangement is guaranteed. The 
subtle forces of change are always at work, not less 
in the quiet than in the stormy days. Just as the 
forces of nature, working silently through the years, 
loosen the stones in the structure that our hands have 
reared until at last it falls with a crash, so the forces 
of growth and decay, the ebb and flow of virile power, 
the wax and wane of imagination, slowly disturb the 
balance of forces in our human scheme of things, until 
with a crash the old order collapses and a new order 
begins. 

Into this troubled world we must venture with wary 
feet. It is ours, not to expostulate and inveigh, but 
to acquaint ourselves with these powers that may 
make us or be our undoing, to learn which of the 
nations has become cautious through great posses- 
sions, and which is aggrieved by reason of disinher- 
itance, to see which is menaced with a great danger 
or confronted with a great need from which aggres- 
sion seems to promise escape, and above all, which 
are impelled by the pressure of rivals or of environ- 
ment to cross our pathway and to seek safety or ad- 
vantage at our expense. We need spend little time in 
discussing promises, obligations, or sensibilities. No 
nation will ever attack us because we have been ill- 



2IO AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

mannered or refrain because we have been polite. 
Remembrance of past favours or resentment for past 
injuries will count and should count for little. As 
the generations succeed one another, there always 
arises a Pharaoh that knew not Joseph. These con- 
siderations of affront or Injury or gratitude for past 
favours will loom large In the manifestos of hos- 
tility or alliance, but it will be the necessities of our 
rivals that decide their action. It should be, — must 
be, — the necessities of America that decide our own. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 

Among the great powers with which we have to 
deal, one, and only one, is not European. Japan is 
oriental. In a sense even Japan is European, for her 
political and military organization, her science, and 
all the enginery of her national life are borrowed 
from Europe. Both her imperial constitution and 
her military organization are modelled on those of 
Germany and work much the same in practice. The 
government is essentially autocratic as in Germany, 
but the autocracy is of the European rather than of 
the oriental type, and it has learned, as in Germany, 
how to make parliamentary institutions both subser- 
vient and useful. The spirit and ideals of the two 
countries are similar in many ways. 

But the Japanese people are not European, and 
their thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor their ways 
as our ways. Their history nowhere touches our own 
until the middle of the nineteenth century. Their 
religion is markedly different from ours, and while 
they are as little inclined as we are to make crusades 
on behalf of religion, neither they nor we can help 
taking the shape that the religious mould has given 
us. Finally, their social and domestic life has been 
developed along lines so different from our own as 
to be almost incomprehensible to us, as ours to them. 

211 



212 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

These things do not make peoples enemies, but they 
make it easy for other things to make them so. Peo- 
ples thus separated are curiosities to each other rather 
than kindred, and if occasions of conflict arise, the 
restraining scruples are few. 

This segregation of the Japanese people from 
those of European stock (and with them, of course, 
the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples) is most im- 
portant to our inquiry. There can be no question 
that our relations with European nations have been 
much influenced by the fact that we are related to 
them. We have been most reluctant to restrict our 
hospitality to their peoples, even after that hospitality 
had become embarrassing to us, and we have married 
and given in marriage with them freely and without 
reproach. Not so with the Oriental. We slammed 
the door in the face of the Chinese long years ago, 
and would have done the same with Japan had she 
not hastened to save us the trouble by closing the door 
herself. Intermarriage with the Oriental is re- 
garded with extreme aversion. The instinct of race 
integrity here asserts itself with great posltlveness, 
refusing to reason, as is the way with instincts. 

All this is familiar, much of It a fact of our own 
conscious experience, but perhaps we have not fully 
realized that the Oriental feels the same way toward 
us. He is curious, interested, and not unfriendly, 
but he knows that between our race and his own there 
Is a great gulf fixed which neither will ever cross. 
He bears us no ill-will, for the most part, but If his 
interests conflict with ours he will not hesitate as to 
which to sacrifice. No more would we. Indeed he 



THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 213 

is conscious that we have not hesitated, that with the 
first brush of conflicting interest we have uncere- 
moniously thrust him aside. We need fear no worse 
from him, — and expect no better. The Japanese is 
not worse than other men. We may dismiss at once 
the charges of trickiness and untrustworthiness which 
we have unconsciously trumped up against him in 
defence of our race exclusiveness. Such charges have 
the usual, and no more than the usual, justification. 
The salient facts are that the Japanese are in the 
ascending phase of race assertion, that they are led 
with singular sagacity, that they have certainly no 
more and possibly somewhat less scruple about race 
encroachment than other civilized races of our day, 
and finally that there is between us no cushion of 
kinship or common culture to lessen the shock of race 
collision. 

What reason have we to fear such a collision? 

Japan has a population nearly double that of the 
whole United States west of the Mississippi, all in 
an area somewhat less than the state of California. 
Although she has a vast urban population, she man- 
ages by her intensive agriculture to raise nearly all 
her own food, while England, similarly situated im- 
ports half to three fourths of her own. Yet only 
one sixth of the surface of Japan is, or ever can be, 
cultivated. Despite the amazing frugality and ad- 
mirable simplicity of Japanese life, Japan suffers 
acutely from congestion of population. Yet that 
population is on the increase, and the efforts of a so- 
licitous government have thus far not availed to 
check the increase. Here is the first and most 



2 14 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

fundamental problem of the Japanese people. 
There are too many for their little land, and place 
and food must be found for the growing surplus. 

Overpopulation is one of the most serious dangers 
that ever confronts a nation. People do not know 
what is the matter. They are conscious of a vague 
malaise which expresses itself in many different forms 
and lends itself to the most diverse interpretations. 
Lack of employment, low wages, high cost of living, 
and burdensome taxes, necessary concomitants of 
overpopulation are charged to the iniquities of the 
industrial order, the rapacity of dealers, and the 
corruption of government. No social order is per- 
fect enough w'holly to refute such charges, or strong 
enough to ignore them. All disturbing and dis- 
ruptive forces are accentuated by this most funda- 
mental of maladies. Relief in some form is a con- 
dition of national tranquillity if not of national exist- 
ence. 

In an early stage of social development, relief is 
found In chronic warfare whose conscious purpose is 
feud or conquest, but whose function is to relieve con- 
gestion by a crude blood letting, always reckless and 
often disastrous, but perhaps preferable to its fa- 
miliar alternatives, pestilence and famine. But civ- 
ilized society seeks milder means of maintaining the 
equilibrium between population and sustenance, and 
no nation is seeking these means more earnestly or 
more intelligently than Japan. More efficient meth- 
ods of economic production and more effective re- 
straining instincts arc of the very essence of civiliza- 
tion, but these develop slowly and do not afford im- 



THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 215 

mediate relief. This can be found for the moment 
only In emigration, the means by which Europe has 
for three centuries preserved the equilibrium which 
has made the development of civlhzatlon possible, 
eliminating famine altogether and restricting war to 
other functions. 

Strangely enough, this recourse Is denied to Japan. 
There are still many parts of the world where popula- 
tion Is not congested, many even where It Is Insuffi- 
cient, but for one reason or another none are fully 
available for Japanese colonization. 

There Is first of all the adjoining Asiatic main- 
land, the only part of the world that Is peopled by 
kinsmen of the Japanese. This field has the great 
advantage that no fundamental race antagonism sep- 
arates the two peoples. Not only are the peoples 
more or less akin, the Japanese having been recruited 
from time Immemorial by Chinese, Mongol, and 
Korean Immigrants, but the Japanese civilization Is 
founded on the Chinese, and the Chinese sages are 
quoted In Japanese literature almost as freely as the 
prophets of Judea In our own. 

But much of this area Is densely peopled and suffers 
from overpopulation even more acutely than Japan. 
To emigrate to such districts would be to jump from 
the frying pan into the fire. There are other parts, 
It Is true, like Korea and Manchuria, which are not 
overpeopled, as the Oriental counts such things, and 
which are under Japanese control, and therefore 
doubly open to Japanese colonization. But here a 
new barrier exists, the nature of which it is most im- 
portant to understand. 



2i6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Colonization in the true sense of the word, the only 
sense which affords sensible relief to a congested 
population and promises to propagate a people's life 
and culture, must be the migration of all classes and in 
particular of the humbler and more numerous classes, 
the classes that most feel the pressure and most require 
relief. These classes must go as workers, to earn 
their living. They know how to live only in their 
own way. Going, not to an empty land, but to a land 
where fields are owned and industries are organized, 
they must compete as wage earners or as tillers of 
the soil with those on the ground. If these live more 
wretchedly than they ha\e been accustomed to do, 
no matter how needless their poverty may be and how 
due to sloth and waste, the new comers must for a 
time accept their condition of life. Of course if 
they would do this and stick it out, they would ulti- 
mately find their native thrift and skill better re- 
warded in this less congested land, but people who 
leave their own land to better their own condition, 
will not ordinarily accept a worse condition for their 
whole individual lifetime, in the interest of these ulti- 
mate results. 

On the contrary, such countries soon develop a 
different tendency which often acts as a bar to coloni- 
zation. Instead of the settler goes the exploiter, the 
man of larger means and superior abilities. He buys 
estates, develops specialized plantations, builds mills, 
factories, and the like, employing cheap native labour 
under improved methods and with the more perfect 
implements of his own civilization, a combination 
which is often very profitable and which the foreign 



THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 217 

organizer has no inclination to disturb. The Inev- 
itable result of this system is the development of a 
race caste. The countrymen of the exploiter soon 
find themselves socially barred from native occupa- 
tions. This is not gratuitous snobbishness, but a vir- 
tual necessity for the maintenance of the prestige upon 
which the success of the new and mutually beneficial 
relation depends. 

India furnishes a perfect illustration of this system. 
British exploitation has transformed the country in 
a manner incalculably valuable to its inhabitants as 
well as profitable to its organizers. No form of 
human co-operation is more legitimate or less open to 
criticism. There is none whose benefits are so mutual 
or whose services to humanity in general are so cer- 
tain. But certain results are inevitable. There is 
no caste in India like the caste of British blood, and 
none so likely to persist. And the British are not 
colonizing India. The race that in this sense ex- 
ploits a country can never colonize it. 

The Japanese are exploiting Korea, Manchuria, 
and China. In the first they have a free hand, for It 
is theirs, and the Immigration of Japanese is every 
way encouraged. But the traveller landing In Fusan, 
a city which has been a Japanese headquarters for 
many centuries, finds all the humbler occupations in the 
hands of Koreans. The Japanese, more numerous 
here than elsewhere In the province, already form 
a caste in which the Japanese coolie can find no place. 
In Manchuria the same Is true in a more pronounced 
degree. In China, the Japanese compete with many 
other nations for the privilege of organizing its vast 



2i8 AiMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

human energies and developing its illimitable re- 
sources. The purpose of the recent unprecedented 
demands of Japan was to secure a paramount posi- 
tion in China in this important work. 

But Japan is not colonizing China or Manchuria or 
even Korea to any appreciable extent. Her position 
as exploiter is one of immense significance to her, to 
China, to the world at large, and to ourselves, as we 
shall have occasion to note, a position comparable to 
that of Britain in India, and perhaps destined to be 
as influential, but it does not solve the problem of 
Japan's redundant population. The Japanese or- 
ganizer and the Japanese capitalist find their oppor- 
tunity, but the coolie must look, elsewhere. 

And that great elsewhere is mostly, — almost 
wholly, — in control of one powerful and jealous race, 
the Anglo-Saxon. He has room and opportunity in 
plenty, but he reserves them for himself. Against 
the thrifty Japanese every door is closed. The 
American has spoken unmistakably. The Japanese 
may not come here as a labourer, or own land, or 
settle among us. Not less plainly has spoken the 
Australian or will speak the others as occasion arises. 

The reasons alleged are partly true, partly specious 
and disingenuous. The assertion is that he is an 
" unfair '* competitor. Unfair is a euphemism the 
world over for dangerous. When tacit agreement 
has established a level of prices or wages, it is 
" unfair " to disturb it. Possibly unlovely traits of 
Japanese character lend countenance to the charge, 
but they are hardly more than pretexts. The real 
objection to the Japanese is that he is willing to ac- 



THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 219 

cept life and labour on less favourable terms than 
we are. If he stays, he gets our job, our farm, our 
place in the sun, by the working of an inexorable 
economic law, and the instinct of self-preservation 
compels us to resist. The more of a case we can 
make out against him, the easier it is to rouse the 
necessary spirit of opposition. So he is " dishonest," 
" tricky," " un-American," " immoral," objections too 
often urged by those not qualified to cast the first 
stone, and not more true of him than of other men. 
But the one thing that is true, and that is enough, if 
not to justify our opposition, at least to create it 
among any virile people on earth, is the fact that he 
can underbid us and so displace us and take our birth- 
right. Perhaps this does not justify us in excluding 
him, but the point is not worth discussing. We shall 
exclude him, — if we can. 

The one remaining possibility for Japanese emi- 
gration is in Latin America, and this opening has not 
been overlooked. Nevertheless the opportunity is 
more restricted than it might seem. Most of Latin 
America is tropical and therefore little suited to 
Japanese colonization. Very much of it is peopled 
by an inferior race, and is therefore a field for ex- 
ploitation rather than for colonization, for the same 
reasons that hold in China and Korea. The most at- 
tractive part of it, on the other hand, is in the pos- 
session of Europeans who will almost inevitably have 
the Anglo-Saxon's reasons for excluding the Oriental. 
Possibly Mexico offers the most favourable oppor- 
tunity, and possibly here or elsewhere in Latin Amer- 
ica Japanese settlement may be attempted. 



220 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Curiously enough, even here the Anglo-Saxon in- 
terposes his veto. There can be no question that 
the American people would look with extreme dis- 
fa\our upon the establishment of Japanese colonies 
anywhere in the Western Hemisphere and especially 
in any proximity to our own boundaries. Nothing 
could at lirst sight seem more churlish than this atti- 
tude of universal opposition to the Oriental. Not 
content with keeping him out of our own territory, 
we threaten to pursue him far beyond it. We segre- 
gate him as we do the pestilence, drawing our cordon 
around his narrow domain. Yet there is a reason 
which is perhaps quite as imperative as that already 
noted. This reason is to be found in the connection 
which exists between emigration and political expan- 
sion. We object to the Japanese in California on 
economic and social grounds. In Mexico that objec- 
tion does not hold. If the Mexicans do not object 
to Japanese competition, that is quite their affair. 
We do not object to the Japanese in Mexico. 

But we do object to Japan in Mexico. If we knew 
that the Japanese settler in Latin America did not in 
any sense bring his country with him. that he would 
never claim its aid and it would never claim his al- 
legiance, any objection on our part to his settling 
there would be an unpardonable impertinence. But 
there is an increasing tendency on the part of modern 
nations to retain the allegiance of those born under 
their flag, who take up their abode in other lands. 
The doctrine that the fatherland has a perpetual claim 
upon the allegiance of its sons, even when permanently 
domiciled under a foreign flag, has been asserted 



THE MONGOLIAN MENACE 221 

of late with growing emphasis, and has given to emi- 
gration a sinister political significance. A settlement 
of aliens therefore becomes a foreign outpost and po- 
tentially a foreign fortress. All this is perfectly in 
keeping with the instinct of nationality which we have 
already considered. There is something that is 
dearer than the welfare of the individual, — dearer 
to those who stay, and dearer to those who go, — and 
that is the welfare of the nation and of the culture and 
life of the race. It is a degenerate and unworthy peo- 
ple that can expatriate itself without a pang, — with- 
out serious reservations. As the culture and spiritual 
hfe of the race find more and more perfect expres- 
sion in the developing organ of the nation, we must 
expect the nation to make an ever stronger appeal to 
the individual whose spiritual heritage it holds in its 
keeping. We must expect, too, that the nation, ever 
more delicately equipped, will grapple to itself with 
hooks of steel all those who can serve Its purpose In 
the strenuous competition of civilization with civiliza- 
tion. Each culture will claim Its own and seek its own 
over land and sea. With the new facilities, none can 
elude Its search, none can be deaf to Its daily and 
hourly appeal. Increasingly, therefore, emigration 
loses Its individual character and takes on the char- 
acter of the national life. Every community In whose 
population a single alien element predominates, be- 
comes a pawn on the political chessboard not to be 
overlooked by the master player. It Is therefore with 
perfect reasonableness that we regard with Interest, 
not to say with alarm, the establishment of Japanese 
communities In our neighbourhood. 



222 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But meanwhile the world is closed to the Japanese 
and to their neighbours and kin. It is a startling fact 
that they alone among civilized races are not wel- 
comed in any part of the civilized world or its un- 
civilized dependencies. Every other expanding race 
is free to expand in any part of the world on condi- 
tion of accepting foreign allegiance. The German, 
the Syrian, the Russian, the Jew, may settle and la- 
bour among us, may buy and sell and get gain, but 
not the Mongolian. This race alone, expanding in 
response to that universal pressure which so few races 
have been able to resist, and which they resist seem- 
ingly at their peril, must contain itself. Will it do 
so? Can it do so? Dull indeed must be the man 
who can not see in this repression of the irrepressible 
a mine laid for the explosion. 

In the face of this world-wide ostracism of the most 
numerous and the most prolific of the races of men, 
how trivial seem the remedies so confidently urged. 
We should soothe and conciliate the Japanese. We 
should send visitors back and forth and exchange pro- 
fessors and promote an " understanding." Yes, of 
course. But this is no question of Japanese sensibili- 
ties. The trouble is due to no misunderstanding. 
The cause lies deeper and deeper must go the cure. 



CHAPTER XV 

GREATER JAPAN 

In considering the possibility of collision between 
America and the Mongolian East, we have thus far 
confined our attention to the physical or biological 
problem. This Is primarily a problem of numbers, 
room, and sustenance. An excessive birthrate, for 
which satisfactory restraints are not yet available, 
produces a surplus which, unlike that of other over- 
populated countries. Is debarred by a world-wide op- 
position, from seeking relief in migration and assimi- 
lation into other races. 

But Japan would not be satisfied with such a solu- 
tion of her problem even If the world would allow It. 
Even Europe is beginning to realize that It is not sat- 
isfactory, and the present war is primarily a protest 
on the part of Germany against this method of main- 
taining the equilibrium. This surplus population is 
after all the growth of the people. To dispose of It 
by emigration to other countries Is simply to give 
away and waste what ought to make the home country 
great. It costs a great deal to raise a man from in- 
fancy to manhood, and when he Is grown and able to 
work, he ought to be worth something to his own 
people. It Is quite a wrong view, so these reasoners 
tell us, to regard such a man as a burden, and his de- 
parture to another country as a good riddance. The 

223 



224 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

power of a race to maintain itself against the mani- 
fold forces that threaten its integrity and its existence, 
is not alone its power to multiply, or to conquer ter- 
ritory, or to acquire wealth. It depends quite as 
much on its ability to hold on to its offspring, to stamp 
them indelibly with its own character, and to retain 
their persistent allegiance. The race that consents 
easily to expatriation and assimilation may multiply 
and replenish the earth, but as a race and as the expo- 
nent of a distinctive culture, it will perish. Tenacity 
of race character and allegiance is therefore quite as 
important as numbers or extent of territory. As the 
nations become more conscious of this fact, they show 
increasing solicitude for those who go out from them, 
striving to discover some way by which their strength 
may still inure to the benefit of their race. 

All this rests back upon the truth with which we are 
already familiar, a truth which we ought constantly to 
recall and emphasize, but which we are prone to over- 
look, that our human problem is very much more than 
a problem of the individual. There is for every peo- 
ple something much greater and more precious than 
the individual. There is the great structure of race 
custom, slowly built through the patient ages. There 
are sentiments and ideals which fill life with music 
and bathe with sunset glories the threshold of the in- 
e\itable night. 1 here are symbols of faith and fam- 
ily and race, the cross, the flag, the marriage ring, by 
which the heart declares its allegiance and in which it 
recognizes its own. There are the laws, those curb- 
stones which line the traffic routes of life and keep 
men safe in their goings. All this and more, that un- 



GREATER JAPAN 225 

counted wealth of the race which we call its culture, 
each race builds, enlarges, and protects as the heritage 
of the individual. He is nothing without it. He 
may perish and others will take his place, but if it per- 
ishes, all that is of value to him and to others perishes 
with it. Like a child born of a naked savage upon a 
barren heath he enters upon a life without content or 
rational justification. 

Hence it comes that the object of supreme concern 
to every people is not its individuals but its civiliza- 
tion. If that is menaced, any number of individuals 
will be sacrificed unhesitatingly for its preservation. 
This is merely their emergency contribution to that 
which is their all. And for precisely similar reasons 
the normal contribution of the individual, — of every 
individual, — is service, service to the limit of his 
powers and under the widest possible range of condi- 
tions. What more natural than that any surplus of 
individuals above what can be accommodated in its 
present establishment and employed for its mainte- 
nance, should be utilized for its enlargement and ex- 
altation ! 

Along some such line as this the half unconscious in- 
stincts of a people grope toward their goal, a goal 
which can never be mere provision for the individual, 
but must always have for its paramount aim the main- 
tenance and aggrandizement of the culture of the race. 
And since race culture uses as its chief and most tangi- 
ble agency the organization of the state, the race will 
always be jealous among other things for the power 
and extension of the state. 

There can be no question that this conception of 



226 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

race interest has grown rapidly in recent years. Half 
a century ago the older peoples viewed with little ap- 
parent concern the wastage of their human surplus, 
and even encouraged it by fostering emigration. To- 
day scarce one of them is doing so. A few decades 
since Englishmen discussed with unconcern the prob- 
able graduation of the British colonies into inde- 
pendence. Today such opinions would seem almost 
treasonable. The race consciousness of all peoples 
now has the wider horizon of the imperial state. The 
old wasteful days, when nations looked on with indif- 
ference at the loss of the most enterprising of their 
citizens, are past and an era of culture thrift has be- 
gun. The emigrant goes out with a string to him. 
The nations are looking, not for the place where their 
colonist will be best off, but for the place where he 
will be worth most to them, a place where he can be- 
come a paramount influence, a country which he can 
make subservient, if possible a country which he may 
sometime bring under the control of his nation. 

And for precisely this reason, the nations are 
watching immigration with a new solicitude. They 
see unpleasant possibilities in the presence in particu- 
lar localities of aliens of a single nation so numerous 
as to keep one another in countenance and preserve 
their alien culture intact. Above all they watch with 
anxiety the formation of such alien communities in 
neighbouring and weakly governed states where the 
power to assimilate is small and pretexts for interven- 
tion are frequent. Our objection to the Japanese as 
individuals is thus reinforced by our objection to Japan 
as a colonizing and expanding state. 



GREATER JAPAN 227 

Any nation which is really alive and enterprising is 
in this sense a potential menace to other nations, but 
this menace is immensely increased if the nation in 
question is hard pressed. The Spartans were a harm- 
less folk until driven from their earlier home and 
threatened with destruction. A nation menaced with 
political extinction or with serious curtailment of in- 
fluence, will take risks in order to strengthen its posi- 
tion, which under other circumstances would be the 
height of imprudence. A nation so menaced thus 
becomes in its turn a menace to other nations. 

Japan, like England, is situated close to the main- 
land in a position of wonderful strength. But even 
more than in the case of England, the disparity in size 
between the little island state and the mainland Is 
enormous and is not offset by the divisions In the lat- 
ter which have so long been England's protection. 
Japan faces on the continent only a single modern 
power whose area is nearly sixty times her own. 
Her relation to Russia well Illustrates the complexity 
of modern international relations. There is little 
race antipathy between them, and Russia suffers from 
dearth rather than from congestion of population. 
Yet the conflict of interests between them is as marked 
and as irreconcilable as any in the world. So long as 
the control of necessary gateways Is a part of the pol- 
icy of enterprising nations, Russia will be impelled by 
the strongest considerations of commercial conven- 
ience and national defence to force her way through to 
the eastern sea. At present she has no satisfactory 
outlet. There is indeed but one really available out- 
let, alike serviceable to commerce and capable of de- 



228 AiMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

fence, the Gulf of Pechili with its great harbour at 
Dairen, its Gibraltar at Port Arthur, and its impreg- 
nable outposts in Korea and Shantung. Toward 
these Russia was pressing with all the force of her 
mighty energy when the nineteenth century closed. 

Japan viewed this advance of Russia with the ut- 
most solicitude. It is most important that we should 
understand the reasons for her anxiet}'. These are 
essentially two, political and cultural, though as we 
have seen, they are but different aspects of a single 
interest. 

If Russia should advance a solid front clear out to 
the Japan Sea and intrench herself in Korea and Port 
Arthur, while ample communications were established 
with the populous districts of Western Russia and the 
regions of eastern Siberia were filled with Russian set- 
tlers, there could be no question but that Russia would 
dominate the entire East. China, for an indefinite 
period, would be unable to oppose any effectual oppo- 
sition, and against a power so vast as Russia Japan 
could not protect herself. It is of course possible 
that Russia would never have attacked Japan, but the 
mischief would nevertheless be done. Between two 
countries so situated there are sure to be numerous 
questions on which interests and opinions would differ, 
questions of their commerce with China and with each 
other, questions of naval and maritime privilege, ques- 
tions of every conceivable sort, the decision of which 
would make a great deal of difference to both citizens 
and state. Against this greater Russia little Japan 
could never make her will prevail. If she accepted 
in every case Russia's view of the situation, she would 



GREATER JAPAN 229 

be unmolested but would dwindle Into Insignificance. 
If she resisted she would be coerced and probably 
annexed and assimilated. Her fate would be that 
of docile Denmark or devastated Serbia. This was 
the political danger. 

But something far worse menaced little Japan. 
The Japanese culture Is one of the daintiest and most 
exquisite In the world. There is a porcelain-like 
delicacy and fragility to the wondrously beautiful civ- 
ilization which the Japanese have inherited from old 
Japan and to which they are attached with passionate 
devotion. What would happen to this civilization if it 
were lined up In helpless subserviency to the huge raw- 
boned might of Russia? We will suppose the most 
favourable conditions, that Japan remains unmolested, 
that Russia is friendly and sympathetic, and even that 
Japanese culture becomes the object of patronizing 
recognition on the part of Russian aesthetes who 
should worship at the shrine of Kyoto as Cicero did 
at the shrine of Athens. What would come of It? 
Undoubtedly Japanese culture would enjoy a certain 
dilettante distinction and attain a wide vogue abroad, 
but it would die at home. It would still have par- 
tisans who would extol its merits and speak with 
fine scorn of its parvenu patrons, but the eyes of the 
people would turn with admiration to the culture of 
the race that had the power to do the thing that It 
willed. Nothing discredits a culture like impotence. 
Indeed the first marked effect of the opening of Japan 
and the revelation to her people of the power of the 
western nations, was an almost tragic disparagement 
of their own civUIzation accompanied by a domestic 



230 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

vandalism and a tasteless foreign craze the results of 
which a generation of restored sanity has not been able 
to obliterate. No, it needed no invasion or conquest 
to destroy Japan as her wise leaders knew and loved 
her. Only let Russia build out in fulness of strength 
on the nearby mainland and the mischief was wrought. 
Little Japan could never exist alongside of Greater 
Russia. 

What was the way of escape? There was but one 
possible answer. There must be no Greater Russia, 
and there must be a Greater Japan. This is the 
program of Japan. 

The first part of the program was simple if not 
easy. Russia must be checked in her advance, kept 
out of the mountain fastnesses of Korea, expelled 
from her naval base at Port Arthur and driven back 
from the sea. That has been momentarily accom- 
plished. Beginning by brushing out of her path the 
complacent Chinese suzerainty, Japan fell upon over- 
confident Russia with blows so sudden and so stinging 
that the colossus reeled back from Korea and Port 
Arthur, and the coveted Manchurian outlet was lost. 
1 he victory was indubitable but It was not decisive. 
It was a victory of Japan's uttermost against a frac- 
tion of Russia's strength. It was plain that Russia 
could and would and must come back, for the Man- 
churian outlet was as near a necessity to Russia as such 
things can ever be. Japan had taken successfully 
the first step toward Greater Japan, but now more 
than ever she needed to be, — must be, — Greater 
Japan. 

The stars in their courses have fought for her, and 



GREATER JAPAN 231 

her momentary gain has been prolonged beyond her 
hope. Other and mightier enemies have smitten Rus- 
sia and called all her forces into the supreme struggle 
for existence. The truce with Japan has been pro- 
longed indefinitely and even masked with an alliance. 
And now revolution, with its orgy of destruction and 
fantastic reorganization completes the paralysis and 
prolongs the truce from which Japan profits so much. 
It may be long before Russia renews the challenge, but 
her need remains. In her moment of carnival she 
may forget it, but not for long. Japan does not for- 
get it, does not forget that when that challenge comes 
she will need to be Greater Japan. 

To be Greater Japan she must have more territory, 
more population, and more wealth. Where are these 
to be obtained? 

There is first of all the Asiatic mainland. Of this 
she now holds Korea, is in virtual control of Man- 
churia through her ownership of the railroad and her 
possession of its terminals and defences, and last but 
not least, is in a position of paramount influence in 
China. Unless Japan suffers a great military reverse 
or fails In her far-sighted vision, her hold upon all 
these territories is likely to increase. She has re- 
cently protested in no uncertain terms against our 
sending a note to China without first consulting her, 
claiming thus a " paramount position " in China as 
a " necessity of her national defence." Having 
forced back Russia and expelled Germany, she openly 
asserts a protectorate over the entire East. She has 
thus taken a very tangible and considerable step to- 
ward Greater Japan, albeit a step which like the pre- 



232 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ceding, is immensely .hazardous, and requires more 
than ever that she become Greater Japan. 

What adxantage can Japan hope to derive from 
her paramount position in the East if she can main- 
tain it? 

The first and most tangible advantage is that of 
defence, Japan has the same advantage from keep- 
ing Germany out of Shantung that we have in keeping 
her out of Cuba. She now holds Korea and Man- 
churia against Russia, and Kiaochow in the Shantung 
Peninsula against Germany, while her great island of 
Formosa further south (taken from China in 1895) 
now guards the coast of Southern China where she 
has put the Chinese government under bonds never to 
allow a foreign establichment. Finally, in these last 
days, she has acquired the famous Portuguese settle- 
ment of Macao, an island near Flong Kong. She 
thus has stations along the whole eastern coast which 
is brought under her effective control to the exclusion 
of all European rivals except her ally, Britain. The 
possession of defence stations does not insure de- 
fence, but it gives an advantage so enormous that it 
may be questioned whether any power is now able 
to challenge her control save only the single power 
with which she at present shares it. 

As a refuge for her surplus population, we have 
seen that this great territory is poorly available. It 
has a vast population of its own which can not be 
displaced and which is yet but little likely to become 
Japanese. There are two requirements in this con- 
nection which must be separately considered. In the 
first place room is needed for Japanese who have 



GREATER JAPAN 233 

no place and whose coming Japan can not hinder. 
In the second place, Japan needs more Japanese to 
fill her armies, industrial and military, if she is to 
become Greater Japan. Neither of these are here 
satisfactorily secured. There is little room for the 
Japanese who are unprovided for. It may be 
doubted, too, whether the time will come in any near 
future when Koreans and Chinese can be trusted to 
fight the battles of Japan. So long as this is true, 
Japan can not be satisfied with a position, no matter 
how paramount, on the mainland of Asia. 

One object, however, and that of great importance, 
Japan seems likely to realize In Manchuria and 
China. If she can not colonize them she can ex- 
ploit them, and the yield should be enormous. 
Poor as they now are through ignorance and mis- 
management, their mineral resources are among the 
richest in the world, while they teem with an in- 
dustrious population capable of indefinite production 
under proper leadership, a population which furnishes 
from the outset one of the richest markets in the 
world for the varied industries of new Japan. These 
advantages, of course, Japan can not monopolize, 
but her nearness and the low cost of her labour give 
her advantages which come dangerously near to mo- 
nopoly. These advantages she perfectly appreciates 
and seizes with disquieting alacrity. 

But all this necessarily depends for its guaranty 
of final success, upon securing a broader basis for 
her own population whose patriotism must be the 
support of the imperial structure of Greater Japan. 
We may rest assured that Japan will not willingly 



234 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

abandon the hope of finding a place where her peo- 
ple can multiply, and where they can still be her peo- 
ple. It is difficult to see where she can tind that ter- 
ritory in the Eastern Hemisphere. 

One more opening remains for Greater Japan, and 
this perhaps the greatest of all. As she becomes 
more and more conscious of the similarity of her posi- 
tion to that of Britain, she naturally inquires where the 
British live who back this tremendous power and on 
what fields they reap their harvests. The answer is 
the sea. The British red upon the map tinges the 
ocean's blue from pole to pole and drowns all other 
tints. Upon the sea many millions of Britons win 
their livelihood, and here are invested thousands of 
millions of British capital whose dividends put the 
w^orld under tribute to Britain. Why may not Japan 
share this opportunity? This is in fact her most 
hopeful outlook and her most immediate ambition. 
It is one, too, which we have unintentionally done 
all we could to help her to realize. Driven by the 
clamour of a bullying minority of labour, we have en- 
acted legislation which has handed our Pacific com- 
merce to Japan on a silver platter. The commerce 
of Japan has gone forward by leaps and bounds, 
profiting enormously by her shrewd rather than dis- 
interested attitude in the present struggle. Her vast 
fleet, supplemented by recent acquisitions from our 
own, is kept in safe and lucrative employment which 
it will doubtless continue, to enormous advantage in 
the early years of peace. There seems to be no 
reason why Japan should not dominate, not to say 
monopolize, the trans-Pacific coninicrce. 



GREATER JAPAN 235 

It seems a legitimate ambition, and if Japan can 
be bound over to keep the peace on such terms as 
this, America and the rest of the world may have 
reason to think the bargain a good one. But does 
it bind her to keep the peace? And if she breaks the 
peace, what of her ships in such an event? 

We need not emphasize the obvious fact that as 
land empires are subject to attack by their land 
neighbours, so maritime empires are subject to attack 
by their maritime neighbours. If France has to be 
on her guard against the German army, so Japan 
has to be on her guard against the German navy. 
Thus the maritime state naturally becomes a naval 
state, developing her navy pari passu with her mer- 
chant marine and using it for defence or for offence 
as inclination or necessity may prompt. If any one 
doubts the necessity of this parallel development, it 
is sufficient for our purpose to note that Japan does 
not doubt it, and that her policy in these matters is 
not at all a matter of question. There are farther 
factors which tend in the same direction. A great 
maritime power implies great shipbuilding plants, and 
these can be turned to the building of ships of war 
when occasion demands. It implies the existence of 
large numbers of sailors, navigators, engineers and 
so forth who can be drawn upon in an emergency 
for naval warfare. It implies a vast transport serv- 
ice, for a merchant ship is at the call of its flag in 
case of war. When the present war broke out, the 
Allies are said to have commandeered thirty-two 
hundred ships of their several flags for the trans- 
portation of troops and munitions. What would 



236 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

have happened if they had sold all their ships to 
Germany a few years before? 

Most important of all, a naval and maritime state 
must have its stations scattered through the seven 
seas. Enough has been said to make clear the need 
of such station? for the nav"y in time of war. For 
reasons not so obvious but which are said to be quite 
as decisive, maritime commerce seems to require 
them in time of peace. A nation trading all over 
the world may theoretically have the facilities of all 
foreign ports at its disposal, but practically its ships 
are at a certain disadvantage in ports which are un- 
der the control of a rival trading power. The flag of 
the port will have precedence in numberless ways 
which in the end are apt to tip the scale against the 
stranger, not to mention the ever present possibility of 
national rupture when exclusion means capture and 
ruin. A chain of naval stations is therefore the 
necessary concomitant of maritime development. 
And once more, if we do not believe it, Japan does. 
She views with admiration and envy the wonderful 
chain of posts which like a string of jewels, Britain has 
flung around the neck of the world. She is duplicat- 
ing it as fast as she can. Already her island empire 
stretches in unbroken chain from the tip of Kam- 
chatka down to the southern tip of Formosa, and now 
by her latest acquisition, on to Hong Kong. It will 
go farther if Japan is able to carry it farther. There 
will be counterparts for Singapore and Colombo and 
more, if Japan can find them while England has her 
busy day. The highway of Suez from Yokohama to 
London will be dotted with her caravanseries. 



GREATER JAPAN 237 

But there is another route hardly less important, 
perhaps destined to be more important, a route that 
leads from Yokohama straight as the arrow flies to 
Honolulu and on, glancing along the Mexican coast, 
to Panama and past the Virgin Isles to our busy East 
and the great centres of European Industry and trade. 
Oh, for stations along this route! And nature has 
been so thoughtful in the matter of Hawaii. Yes, 
and so has Japan, for she has peopled it with her chil- 
dren. And Mexico ! Think of it. Colony, naval 
station, all she needs. And Colombia, sullen and 
venal, with harbours of refuge at the very gates of 
the Canal. Japan has thought of all this and has 
acted on the thought. She has no naval station In 
Mexico or Colombia as yet? Who knows? She 
has certainly negotiated for such, and if she has not 
yet succeeded. It Is not from lack of desire, nor from 
fear of us or regard for us, nor from any love that 
our sister republics bear us. 

This one fact must be borne in mind in discussing 
our relation to Japan. Japan is neither more hostile 
nor more unscrupulous than other nations, but she is 
a hungry nation, hungry beyond the measure of most. 
With a people banned by a world ostracism which the 
world has no power to lift, crowded into an inade- 
quate territory which greater neighbours are forced 
to covet, and charged with the defence of a fragile 
and exquisite civilization which has no kindred among 
the civilizations of men, her course is dictated by an 
imperious necessity which laughs at our puny expedi- 
ents and bids us look to our goings. We have not 
comprehended the problem before us unless we have 



238 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

perceived that even a friendly Japan is still a men- 
ace. 

Does this mean war with Japan? Not if we do 
our part like men. The push of life is eternal, but 
its power is finite. The greater power of growth 
will grow the lesser to a standstill. If we perceive 
the impact of Japanese growth and the direction of 
Japanese need, and stand stiffly over against them, 
opposing growth with growth, and claiming our rea- 
sonable heritage upon the sea, out to where we have 
placed our outposts in the Philippines and Samoa, 
Japan will not challenge our position alone. 

Alone! Ay, there's the rub. When the pain- 
ful pressure of her manifold need forces her to 
knock with importunity at our gates, will she knock 
alone? 

Note. As these pages go to press come several significant utter- 
ances from the head of the Japanese Mission to the I'nited States, 
utterances the most authoritative possible, since the head of this 
Mission is both the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire and 
Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The most noted of 
these utterances is a categorical announcement that Japan will tol- 
erate no aggression of the western powers upon China. This 
statement to which certain organs of public opinion here have had 
the bad taste to take exception, is a commonplace of the existing 
situation, and the only startling thing about it is its admirable candour. 
With it was coupled the pledge that Japan would adhere to the policy 
of the open door. This we may assume to be sincere. Japan is 
not generous but prudent. She could not close the door without 
immense difficulty and danger. Moreover, she is perfectly safe in 
leaving it open. 

A far more significant statement, however, seems to have attracted 
little attention. This was to the effect that Japan had cast in her 
lot with the English speaking nations of the world. Tliis statement, 
if true, is perhaps the most important that a Japanese statesman 
could utter. It is probably true. The supreme political fact of the 
twentieth centurv is the struggle between the Teuton and Anglo- 
Saxon for world leadership. That is the meaning of the present 
war, the meaning of the scheming and manoeuvring of the last half 



GREATER JAPAN 239 

century. Many things incline Japan to take the Teuton's side, — 
similarity of organization and political faith, similarity of need, etc 
If Japan has cast in her lot with us, it is not because she loves us 
or hates our enemies, but because she judges, — and none judge more 
shrewdly than she, — that we are to be the winners in the contest. 

These statements were apparently intended to prepare the public 
for the announcement which followed a few days later, that the twp 
governments had reached a definite understanding and embodied it 
in an exchange of notes. In this understanding we recognized for 
the first time the paramount position of Japan in the Far East apd 
entered into a virtual undertaking to cooperate with her in main- 
taining the integrity of China and guaranteeing the open door, an 
undertaking in which China not unnaturally sees more of menace 
than protection. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE UNFEARED POWERS 

It has been the declared poHcy of the United States 
from the first to minimize political relations with 
Europe. Washington's farewell advice to avoid en- 
tangling alliances with European nations, though 
aimed at a particular danger which quickly passed 
away, has received the broadest interpretation and 
the sincerest recognition as the foundation of our 
national policy. This policy was really reflected in 
the Monroe Doctrine which was in essence a declara- 
tion of the policy of America for the Americans, the 
negative implications being hardly less definite than 
the positive assertion. 

This conservative political policy was paralleled 
and In some sense reinforced by our commercial pol- 
icy of protection, a policy largely fortuitous in its 
origin, but speedily confirmed by the industrial condi- 
tions which it created. It can not be said that this 
policy has smoothed the pathway of our international 
intercourse, but it has had two Important results 
which have coincided with our separatist policy in 
politics. 

In the first place it has been In general non-dis- 
criminatory. Whatever tax was levied, was levied 
upon all producers alike. We did not charge more 
duty upon French woollens than upon British wool- 

240 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 241 

lens of like quality. To be sure, if we chose to levy a 
heavy duty on silk and a light duty on chemicals we 
could hit France and favour Germany, and such con- 
siderations were by no means always absent in fram- 
ing our tariff laws, especially when we found it neces- 
sary to coerce a refractory nation into admitting our 
goods on more favourable terms. But the possibili- 
ties of discrimination in such ways were always limited 
by the exigencies of home industries. They have been 
as nothing to the discrimination practised under the 
system of commercial treaties where a country dick- 
ers with each country separately, granting better 
rates to one than to another, in return for like con- 
cessions. Such treaties come perilously near being 
national alliances and easily provoke military re- 
prisals, as they are in turn the frequent result of mili- 
tary operations. The much talked of Economic Con- 
ference of the Allies and its alleged policy of " War 
after the War " illustrates this intimate connection. 
The United States has pretty uniformly held aloof 
from this policy of commercial alliance and in so 
doing has undoubtedly confirmed its policy of politi- 
cal aloofness. 

A second result of our policy of protection has been 
to lessen trade relations with other countries, to force 
the development of industries temporarily and even 
permanently unprofitable at home, and so to foster 
the economic independence of the country. The 
economic advantage of this independence may well 
be doubted. Economic efficiency is attained by spe- 
cialization, not by all-roundness, and there is no rea- 
son to believe that this law holds less of the nation 



242 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIOxNS 

than of the individual. But economic efficiency is 
very dift'erent from human efficiency, and the advan- 
tage to the latter of this policy of national self-suffi- 
ciency is more plausible. In any case there can be 
little doubt that it has contributed to the policy of 
political aloofness which Washington enjoined, both 
by equipping us for a self-sufficient life and still more 
by creating a mental attitude favourable to it. 

It is suggestive of the nature of the relations with 
which we have to deal, that despite the exceptionally 
favourable conditions, geographical, economic, and 
historic, under which this experiment of national 
aloofness has been tried, we are today active partici- 
pants in the most stupendous European struggle ever 
known and in full alliance with nations whose im- 
mediate objectives have to do wholly with the East- 
ern Hemisphere. By almost universal consent, too, 
this participation was unavoidable. It is true that 
in deference to our tradition we have avoided the 
formalities of alliance, but we have not avoided its 
substance. We have refused to commit ourselves 
to the concrete objects of the various allies, — the 
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the independence of 
Belgium and Serbia, the reconstitution of the Balkan 
States and Poland and the like, and have substituted 
glittering generalities instead. We are fighting " to 
make the world safe for democracy." " We are 
fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the 
undictated development of all peoples." How dif- 
ferent from those peoples who are fighting for prov- 
inces and strategic frontiers! Yet it must be ap- 
parent to the thoughtful that this program of gencr- 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 243 

alities must resolve Itself into a program of con- 
crete arrangements. The undlctated development of 
all peoples will in the end depend on frontiers and 
other concrete arrangements of the sort that the 
Allies, — our allies, — are fighting for. And since 
they are our allies and the parties most immediately 
concerned in all these concrete matters. It Is obviously 
Impossible that our ultimate concrete program should 
be other than theirs. Equally, too, though we have 
not signed a treaty pledging us to make peace in com- 
mon with the Allies (no entangling alliances for us) 
It is demonstrably impossible for us to do otherwise. 
We can not secure anything approximating to our de- 
clared aims until Germany submits to the Allies. 
We therefore cannot quit the war a day sooner than 
the Allies and we manifestly cannot continue it a day 
longer. 

Then away with all illusions. We are back In 
Europe, back despite our stern resolve, our long tra- 
dition, our commercial aloofness, and our proud self- 
sufficiency. This Is no excursion. We are back with 
bag and baggage, and back to stay. If we win what 
we are fighting for, we shall have to guard what we 
win. If Europe needs us now, she will always need 
us, and If we can not resist her appeal as an alien, 
how much more prompt our response when the graves 
of our soldiers have made her soil our shrine ! 
What then of the new hfe in the old homestead of 
our race? 

We may safely assume at the outset that with all 
their jealousies and grudges, the nations of Europe 
are, one and all, minded to be our friends. A single 



244 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

prominent exception seems to exist at present, but 
it may be doubted whether even in this case the hos- 
tility is representative and ineradicable. Most of 
the European nations are conscious of certain un- 
lovely traits in American character which they make 
the occasional object of criticism and ridicule, over- 
looking meanwhile, as is men's wont, some of our 
better characteristics, but these doubtful amenities do 
not mean hostility, and both the desire for our lucra- 
tive commercial patronage and a wholesome respect 
for our power incline them to friendship. In most 
cases, and especially in the case of the nations we are 
about to consider, hostility is a remote contingency. 
But that contingency, never quite excluded, is the sub- 
ject of our present inquiry. 

Of the score or more of countries which make up 
modern Europe, the majority are popularly regarded 
as negligible in any consideration of our national de- 
fence. They are too small, too poor in resources, 
or too handicapped by situation or other circum- 
stance to give us any concern. Such are the Scandi- 
navian countries, the Balkan States, Portugal, Bel- 
gium, Holland, and perhaps Italy and Spain. Our 
peaceable relations with these countries are impor- 
tant and mutually profitable. But if these relations 
should be strained to the breaking point, the ad- 
vantage would seem to be overwhelmingly with us. 
No doubt this is the prevailing opinion in America. 
Our relation to the minor powers of Europe, as re- 
gards problems of national defence, gives us no con- 
cern. 

It may be doubted, however, whether this com- 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 245 

placency is justified. It is based on the mistaken as- 
sumption that these nations are separate units and to 
be dealt with singly in any emergency which may 
arise. They are, on the contrary, nearly all of spe- 
cial strategic importance in the European scheme of 
things. We have to deal, not with them alone, but 
with their backers. As regards the problem of our 
national defence, our interest in these powers lies 
in their relation to these backers, into whose plans 
they enter and whose bidding they are likely to do. 
Such states as Belgium, Portugal, Albania, and 
Turkey, are not natural states at all, but artificial 
creations or unnatural survivals maintained by the 
great powers in the interest of their national defence. 
The same is true, if in less degree, of nearly all the 
lesser powers of Europe. We are stronger than 
they, but we have not to deal with them alone. By 
themselves they are negligible, but as auxiliaries of 
the greater powers, willing or unwilling, they may 
turn the scale. Was not Belgium Germany's un- 
doing? Did not Greece thwart the plans of the 
AlHes? 

There is more than one way in which a little na- 
tion may play the decisive role in great events. It 
may be the protege of a great power, voluntarily 
making common cause with it. Such is Portugal in 
relation to Britain, such Germany asserts Belgium to 
be in regard to Britain and France. Again, it may 
be an inevitable victim in the line of imperialist ag- 
gression, and may yield, be it ever so unwillingly, a 
strategic site which is vital to the great schemes to 
which it itself is sacrificed. Such is the relation of 



246 AMERICA AIVIONG THE NATIONS 

Belgium and Holland to Germany, of Serbia to 
Austria, and of Turkey to Russia. And finally, to 
vary slightly the case last mentioned, it may possess 
dependencies which it can not defend and which, 
when seized by a greater power, quite change the re- 
lation of the latter to other powers. Thus Den- 
mark, though completely helpless as against Russia 
or Britain, was none the less their deadly menace by 
virtue of her possession of Schleswig-Holstein, so 
vital to Germany's schemes. Similarly, moribund 
Turkey held Egypt, and China held Korea, each in- 
dispensable to the supremacy of the powers into 
whose hands they have since fallen. 

Are there more possibilities of this kind? Are 
any of these little countries that we do not fear, 
proteges of big countries whose purposes they are 
likely to serve? Are there any that are likely to be 
forcibly annexed and to furnish thus new avenues of 
aggression to the great? Above all, are there pow- 
ers that hold in feeble hands weapons which may be 
taken from them and used in stronger hands to our 
undoing? In one or another of these ways, every 
minor power in Europe is for us a potential menace. 

The problem here suggested is illustrated by our 
recent acquisition of the \ irgin Isles, or the Danish 
West Indies. They are of insignificant extent and 
of no direct value. They give us nothing that we 
did not already possess in sufficiency. In the hands 
of Denmark they were innocuous. But it was all 
but certain that the islands, if left in possession of 
Denmark, would ultimately come under the control 
of Germany. This might happen by means of an 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 247 

alliance based on some form of mutual interest, an 
alliance for which Germany could afford to offer 
Denmark large inducements. Or the islands might 
be ceded to Germany, either under compulsion, or 
for the large inducements which might be offered. 
Finally, and most likely of all, Denmark herself 
might be annexed, either abruptly, as in the case of 
Silesia or Alsace-Lorraine, or gradually, by the se- 
ductive method of a slowly tightening alliance. The 
method would matter little. The result would mat- 
ter much, and we have wisely decided to forestall its 
possibilities. We are on the best of terms with Den- 
mark, but Denmark can not be trusted with the cus- 
tody of anything which Germany can not be per- 
mitted to acquire. The example of Schleswig-Hol- 
stein has not been forgotten. 

It may be useful at a time like this to recall this 
famous case. In 1852 the five great powers, Eng- 
land, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, at the 
Conference of London pledged themselves to re- 
spect the integrity of Denmark and to defend it 
against attack. Later, Prussia, till then without a 
navy, conceived the idea of becoming a naval power, 
and at once perceived that a canal across the neck of 
Denmark was necessary to enable her to use her 
navy as a whole against either a Baltic power like 
Russia or a western power like England or France, 
for the Danish straits would inevitably be blocked in 
case of war, and their navy would thus be divided and 
comparatively helpless in either direction. Schles- 
wlg-Holsteln, the neck of land which joins Denmark 
to the mainland, must be secured. When, on a 



248 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

trumped up charge, Denmark was attacked by Prussia 
and Austria, France, much occupied elsewhere, de- 
clined to interfere in a matter that interested her but 
Httle, England, much more concerned, threatened 
but at the last moment (as Bismarck had predicted) 
refused to go to war without France, and Russia, 
vitally affected by this project which transferred the 
control of the Baltic to Prussia, was helpless.^ 

The menace of the Danish islands has been re- 
moved, but other possibilities remain. A similar but 
far more important case is that of Holland, the in- 
corporation of which is a well known part of German 
policy. It is true that the Dutch do not share this 
ambition, and they have powerful backers, but it is 
by no means sure that Germanv can be prevented 
from acquiring control of some sort over the little 
neighbour. It must be remembered that avowed an- 
nexation is not the only nor the most feasible method. 
Commercial dependence making it impossible for 
Holland altogether to oppose German designs, may 
be all that is necessary. It is perfectly possible, too, 
that a difference between the United States and Hol- 
land might find the latter the willing ally of Germany. 
In such a combination the weight of Holland would 
be tremendous. It is true that the menace would be 
much less to us than to a country like Britain which 
would he at the mercy of Germany, attacking through 
Holland, while the Dutch Fast Imlies would present 
a like menace to almost the whole British Empire. 
But while we should face no such menace, a Dutch- 

1 This case is commended to the attention of the League to En- 
force Peace. 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 249 

German combination has its possibilities for us also. 
Dutch Guiana is not the equal of Danish St. Thomas, 
but it is not a place where we could see German power 
established without serious misgivings. 

More general but not less real are the dangers in- 
volved in all those minor countries which are factors 
in the problem of the balance of power in Europe. 
Belgium does not threaten us, nor would her union 
with Germany give to the latter power any point of 
immediate vantage in a struggle with America. But 
the possession of Belgium would give Germany so 
great an advantage over France and England as to 
make her the paramount power in Europe and make 
it impossible for other powers effectually to oppose 
her designs. Such being the situation in Europe, it 
would be still more impossible for America to oppose 
her. What country could be more remote from 
American interests than Bulgaria? Yet the control 
of Bulgaria by Germany is an important link in the 
continuous chain which she expects to extend through 
the Balkans and across Asia Minor and Mesopo- 
tamia to the Persian Gulf. Once again, the realiza- 
tion of such a scheme would leave Europe helpless 
and ourselves still more helpless to resist schemes 
the extent of which has never yet been fully realized. 
Bulgaria may be our undoing. Equally and more, 
Turkey has sites in her possession which are the key 
to the entire balance of the modern world. Our in- 
terests in Turkey are more than mission schools. 

Broadly stated, the minor powers of Europe hold 
the balance of power in the world. Powerless for 
independent action, they are capable of tipping the 



250 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

scale into which their weight is thrown either by 
choice or compulsion. In but few cases is it possi- 
ble to anticipate their action, the more so as their 
freedom of choice is so limited. They remain as 
residual unorganized material among the growing 
aggregations of Europe. For the moment they are 
the object of the knight-errantry of Europe, guided, 
as humanity loves to be, by the instinct of self-pres- 
ervation and the sincere pretext of generous chivalry. 
Their independence, tenaciously maintained and chiv- 
alrously upheld, has its place, but it can hardly con- 
tinue. Slowly, Involuntarily, imperceptibly, half un- 
consciously, it may be, these little peoples, scarce one 
of whom represents an ethnic unity or a seriously dis- 
tinctive culture, will range themselves under the 
larger banners. The result is likely to be momen- 
tous. It is one to which we can not be indifferent. 

Hardly to be classed among minor powers, yet far 
from attaining to the first rank, is Spain, a power 
with whose decadence we have had much to do. 
With her final expulsion from the Western Hemi- 
sphere our political relations with Spain are popularly 
supposed to have terminated. There can be no 
doubt that Spain has accepted her defeat in good part 
and that she meditates no reprisals, either alone or 
in alliance with others. If she finallv decides to en- 
ter the present war, there can be little doubt that 
it will be as our allv. 

But concurrently with her humiliation as a military 
and colonial power, Spain began to feel the stirrings 
of a new life which her humiliation did much to ac- 
centuate. It is the first condition of efficiency in the 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 251 

nation as in the individual that it should be forced 
to earn its own living. For nearly four hundred 
years Spain had lived a parasitic existence. She had 
known the whole range from stifling affluence to ab- 
ject squalor, but still clung to her choice to be minis- 
tered unto rather than to minister. With the final 
loss of her colonies came the final emancipation from 
her parasitic ideal. Forces already in operation now 
became the nation's chief reliance, and she joined the 
ranks of the renewed and progressive lands. There 
can be no doubt that her progess has since been steady 
and that it will continue. 

If so, Spain can hardly fail to come again into re- 
lation with the many states to which she has given 
birth, a relation more vital than any she has hitherto 
known. As an absentee landlord rack-renting the 
country, Spain was odious, but as an intelligent indus- 
trial state she would be welcome in a way that we 
can never be. Community of civilization would be 
an immense advantage in commerce, for after all 
commerce and industry are only purveyors to civiliza- 
tion, and the stranger is much at a disadvantage as 
compared with one to the manor born. No doubt 
this tendency of the Spanish world, — or shall we say 
the Latin world? — to draw together again is incipi- 
ent as yet, and other influences may neutralize it, but 
it is a factor not to be ignored. It must be remem- 
bered too that geography favours it. Spain is nearer 
to South America than New York. If ambitious 
projects lately attributed to the king and his advisers 
to tunnel the Strait of Gibraltar and carry a railway 
through Morocco to Dakar (all in Latin territory) 



252 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

are completed, Latin Europe will be but three days 
by fast steamer from Latin America. It would be 
strange if so great an advantage were without sub- 
stantial results. 

I here is in such a development nothing necessarily 
inimical to American interests. In her own way the 
United States would doubtless profit by so great an 
improvement in communication. Yet it can not es- 
cape the thoughtful mind that such a development 
would tend to make Latin Europe the ally of Latin 
America in more than a sentimental and cultural 
sense. It is much to be hoped and not unreasonable 
to expect that relations between the United States and 
the Latin world will remain friendly. But if our 
necessary domination of the Caribbean and the jeal- 
ousy which the divided condition of Latin America 
tends to produce, should result in serious friction be- 
tween these countries and ourselves, the backing of 
Latin Europe with its renewed energv and its closer 
communications w^ould quite change the problem for 
us. The concept of a Latin Europe again making 
common cause with Latin America and working out 
a Latin destiny in common is an imposing one and one 
not to be dismissed as of no concern to ourselves. 

The position of Italy in such a combination is less 
easy to forecast. That position would naturally be 
less central and significant. Italy is not in the direct 
line of communication, and her ambitions have of late 
turned in an opposite direction. I Icr first ambition 
is to dominate the Adriatic bv controlling its head 
and its mouth, and to this end she is now bending all 
her energies. She has verv declared ambitions how- 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 253 

ever, in the JEgean, while her seizure of TripoH, and 
earher, of Eritrea and Somaliland indicate an east- 
ward trend of her development. The French seiz- 
ure of Tunis in 1881 perhaps determined this trend. 
Tunis is the natural point of contact for Italy with 
Africa, but a point from which the natural hne of 
least resistance is toward the west as the history of 
Rome illustrates. Perhaps the fear of such an ad- 
vance of Italy, impelled France, already in Algeria, 
to forestall Italy whose aspirations toward Tunis 
were well known. The forestalling was complete, 
for an advance westward from Tripoli is seemingly 
impossible. All later developments have accentu- 
ated this trend of Italy toward the east, a direction 
farthest from our own interests. 

But the possibility of political complications with 
Italy, though slight, is not excluded. The Italians 
have become one of the great migratory peoples of 
the world. Immense numbers flock to our shores 
where their presence has already caused grave com- 
plications. Other streams go to South America 
where they are rapidly becoming a prominent ele- 
ment in the scantily Europeanized population. Re- 
calling what has been said about the increasingly 
political character of immigration, it will be seen 
that here too is a potential protector of Latin 
America, 

All such suggestions seem fanciful, and taken by 
themselves they are so. No country which is other- 
wise well disposed, will go to war or risk war on be- 
half of emigrant subjects. Nor yet will Italy, if 
ever so inclined to war, make war on us alone for any 



254 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

pretext or any reason, even the most urgent. But 
there are other possibilities outside these. Excess 
population, dynastic embarrassments, entangling al- 
liances, any number of things, may predispose Italy 
to action in conjunction with other nations, action of a 
kind for which the interests of her immigrant sub- 
jects would furnish the occasion. Suppose, for in- 
stance, that we had incurred the wrath of Germany at 
a time when the mob killed Italian subjects in New 
Orleans and Louisiana refused redress. What 
would Italy, at that time the ally of Germany, have 
done? It will certainly be a clumsy statesmanship 
which makes Italy our enemy, but then, — we might 
have clumsy statesmanship. 

The case of France, while suggesting little save 
the association with Latin America already Indicated, 
brings us into the class of the great Imperial powers. 
No nation In any age has had vaster ambitions or 
seemed so often near to their realization. When 
we remember that her " sphere of Influence " has at 
one time or another, included not only the great ter- 
ritories she now holds, — territories twenty times the 
area of France — but Eg^'pt, Palestine, India, numer- 
ous islands in the East and West Indies and nearly all 
of North America, while under Napoleon nearly all 
Europe except England owned her suzerainty. It is 
hardly too much to say that France Is historically the 
world power. 

But equally, no nation has known such fluctuations 
of fortune. Her Napoleonic empire dissolved as 
quickly as it was formed. In the wars of the eight- 
eenth century she lost her entire colonial empire, and 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 255 

was obliged to build another in the nineteenth out of 
the left-overs, spacious but mostly inferior territories. 
There was a momentary vista of supreme opportun- 
ity when she recovered Louisiana, but she did not hold 
it long enough to raise her flag there. Not till the 
audacious Napoleonic attempt to dominate Europe 
was over did the work of patient imperial construc- 
tion begin. 

In the course of this arduous task several vast proj- 
ects have been undertaken with varying degrees of 
failure and success. The most ambitious of these 
and the one which most concerns ourselves was the 
attempt to re-establish French rule in America by 
the occupation of Mexico. This was based on the 
belief, for a time general In Europe, that our own 
state was to be dismembered and so rendered power- 
less to protest. The occasion of our civil war there- 
fore seemed opportune. It proved most inoppor- 
tune. Had the attempt been made before the war 
our proverbial unpreparedness might have given a 
chance of success. But the war did not dismember 
us and it did prepare us. So when it was finished 
France recognized the hopelessness of the attempt 
and withdrew her army, leaving her chivalrous pup- 
pet emperor to his fate. There seems little likeli- 
hood that the attempt will be repeated. France has 
since become a republic, and while, this, as we have 
seen, offers no guaranty of a peaceable disposition, it 
perhaps does insure a more serious estimate of our- 
selves. Furthermore the development of every part 
of America steadily lessens the likelihood of success 
in such an undertaking. Finally, as we shall see. 



256 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

France has found other opportunity and has been 
obliged to concentrate her energies elsewhere. 

The second great attempt was in southeastern 
Asia, After losing India, France looked around for 
another like opportunity. China was the only pos- 
sible chance. The prospect was good that China 
would go the way of India. France determined to 
post herself in a position of vantage. In co-opera- 
tion with Britain she humbled China, meanwhile 
establishing herself in Tongking and Cambodia. 
This was very strategic ground, adjoining the most 
populous part of China on the north and the rich 
Siamese-Burmese peninsula on the west. The " for- 
ward " policy was quite frankly inaugurated. Ag- 
gression on the west prompted Britain to precipitate 
annexation of Burma to her Indian empire. On the 
north it provoked bitter opposition from China at 
whose hands France suffered unexpected humiliation. 
Progress was stayed, and slowly it developed that 
China was not to fall an easy victim to Europe, but 
that, taking advantage of European jealousies, she 
was going to be modernized and possibly maintain 
her independence. With this decision of destinv, 
the great French scheme of an Asiatic empire mis- 
carried. Tongking, splendid domain as it is, is but 
the wreck of an abandoned enterprise. Testimony 
from all sides is to the effect that the Frenchman no 
longer sees visions and dreams dreams of Tongking. 

Throughout the century as in all preceding im- 
perial periods, Africa has attracted the attention of 
the French. Napoleon's dream of an empire in the 
nearer East is well known. From an earlv date the 



THE UNFEARED POWERS 257 

claim of France to Egypt was generally recognized, 
a claim forfeited to Britain in 1882 by the almost in- 
credible caprice of France. Aside from this, how- 
ever, and Britain's resolute exclusion of France from 
the upper Nile valley, her progress in Africa has 
been steady and substantial from her seizure of Al- 
geria in 1827 to her final acquisition of Morocco in 
191 1. Broadly speaking, she has acquired in that 
period the great island of Madagascar and the great 
hump of western Africa with the seacoast nearly all 
the way from Tunis round to the Congo. As we 
round into the Gulf of Guinea, it is true, French occu- 
pation becomes intermittent. Her frontage upon the 
coast alternates with that of Britain, as formerly with 
that of Germany, thus making incomplete her occu- 
pation of this vast West African domain which she 
would fain call her own and in which she is plainly 
the dominant power. But if other nations hold por- 
tions of her Africa, she holds portions of theirs, while 
the reversion of the huge Belgian Congo is promised 
to France if Belgium parts with it. 

This African domain is the living part of the 
French colonial empire, the part where France has 
her visions, and spends her enthusiasm and her 
money. It is well that it is so. It is the colonial 
possibility that is nearest to her shores. The coast 
from Tunis to Morocco gives her absolute control 
of the great western basin of the Mediterranean, — 
her Mediterranean, — and the resources of her trop- 
ical territories are illimitable. 

And what of us? We had well-nigh forgotten 
America in this development. So has France, 



258 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

There is but one country from which we have less 
to fear than France. As one already largely en- 
dowed, she has much to lose and little to gain from 
territorial readjustments. It Is the dispossessed who 
make trouble. The possessors have given bonds to 
keep the peace. France, too, has demonstrated that 
she has but little aptitude for general commerce and 
maritime power. She helped Britain force open the 
ports of China to western trade, but the steamers she 
built to ply on the busy Yangtse now fly the British 
flag. An empire scattered across the seven seas would 
require a temperament and a navy which she does not 
possess. The vast domain bulked near her doors, 
furnishing alike the indispensable tropical products 
and the indispensable national defence, is the appro- 
priate outcome of her four centuries of effort. 

France still owns French Guiana and a few islets in 
the Caribbean. \Yhat is our interest in them? 
Will she use them against us? It is difficult to see 
her advantage in so doing under present or prospec- 
tive conditions. Will she dispose of them to some 
one who will? Probably not, but it is a possibility. 
They can have neither economic nor political value 
to her, considering her other interests. The likeli- 
hood that she will transfer tlicm to an unwelcome 
party despite our protests seems slight at present. 
But circumstances might change. She might have in- 
ducements to make the transfer. She might con- 
ceivablv be compelled to make it. It behooves us to 
avoid the transfer, to avoid the compulsion, possibly 
to forestall it by their acquisition or by their trans- 
fer to our unavoidable partner in these parts. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 

There are two countries which we seldom think 
of when considering the problem of our relation to 
Europe, Austria and Russia. They are geographi- 
cally remote from us, and though both are credited 
with unscrupulous ambitions, the policy of each is so 
directed that it seems little likely to conflict with our 
own interests. Yet the nations are today so closely 
related that it can hardly be said that any move, even 
the most remote and unrelated, is a matter of indif- 
ference to us. Interests that do not concern us di- 
rectly, often affect us vitally through some inter- 
mediary whom they touch. This is peculiarly the 
case with both the countries in question. 

AUSTRIA 

Austria (by which is here meant the Austro-Hun- 
garian Empire) is not one country but two, each as 
distinct as it is possible for clever political device to 
make it, though the two confer their crowns upon a 
single person. In these days when even in auto- 
cratic states, monarchs are a very small part of the 
machinery of government, two states that refuse to 
combine In anything except the monarch, are very 
much apart, the more so, when, as In the present case, 
they cordially dislike each other. 

259 



26o AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But the anomaly does not end here. Each of the 
two countries is composed of several smaller coun- 
tries, united, to be sure, as regards government, but 
divided in everything else. All told, there are ten 
fairly distinct units, — we can not do better than to 
call them countries, — in this partnership empire. 
There is a distressing diversity in this heterogeneous 
group. Thus, the Bohemians and the Galicians are 
racially close kin and they are all Catholics, but they 
are geographically very poorly united, and they have 
a separate history which they stubbornly refuse to for- 
get. They both make fairly good connections terri- 
torially with Austria to whose empire they belong, 
and together with Hungary, they round out the Dual 
Empire nicely, but they could not make any sort of a 
working team themselves, even if they were so in- 
clined, which they are not. They are equally disin- 
clined toward the union with Austria to which they 
consent for the simple reason that they can not help 
it. 

Or again, take Slavonia, Croatia, and Bosnia. 
These are all Serbian in race and language, and it 
is on this fact that Serbia bases her hope of a greater 
Serbia. But Slavonia and Croatia are Catholic, 
Serbia is Orthodox, i.e. adherent of the Greek or 
Russian faith, while Bosnia, or at least its aristocratic 
and influential element, is Mohammedan and very 
reactionary at that. So the Slavonians and Croa- 
tians are ruled by the Hungarians who make the most 
of their privilege, while the Bosnians, whom neither 
of the great partners dared to take lest they have 
more aliens than they could handle, are managed by 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 261 

a Bosnian Bureau connected with the joint army ad- 
ministration of the Dual Empire, and the Serbians 
maintain a precarious independence. Still other 
alien elements, like the Roumanians and Italians, 
present like problems of incompatibihty and subjec- 
tion. 

Finally, it is to be noted that the two dominant 
races, the Austrians (who are Germans) and the 
Hungarians or Magyars, who glare at each other and 
yet co-operate with each other in order to hold down 
the others, are both in a minority In their respective 
countries. The Austrians number only about a third 
of the inhabitants of Austria, and the Hungarians 
are in much the same plight. And since neither of 
these races has the slightest intention of relinquishing 
control, various devices are adopted to maintain it. 
The other races are partially disfranchised and 
played off one against another with a skill which natu- 
rally develops under these conditions. 

The empire thus created is in a sense an anomaly. 
We usually think of a nation as the political organiza- 
tion of people who are drawn together by some con- 
scious bond of race, religion or common purpose. 
That is what a nation should be, and that is what 
the nations of the world for the most part now are. 
Nobody imagines for a moment that any part of the 
United States or of France or of Germany would 
withdraw if it could. It is probable that no part 
even of the vast British empire would vote to sever 
its connection with the empire If given the oppor- 
tunity, though a noisy element in a single small part 
vociferates its desire to do so. But it is doubtful 



262 AMERICA AxMOXG THE NATIONS 

whether a single one of the ten race elements in 
Austro-Hungary would vote for real union with any 
other on a basis of fair and equal privilege. 

All this tends to alienate the sympathy of other 
nations, and more particularly of those that recog- 
nize more fully the principle of the rule of the people. 
The feeling is natural that a government based on 
universal constraint rather than on universal consent 
is illegitimate. It is well to recall, however, that 
this anomalous government represents an anomalous 
situation and that a change in the government might 
not help matters if the situation remained unchanged. 
There is much talk of dissolving this unhappy combi- 
nation and giving self-government to each of its dis- 
satisfied elements. But the trouble is that what these 
various peoples want is not to govern themselves but 
to govern one another. Thus, there are no peoples 
in the world that talk more of race integrity than 
the Serbians and Roumanians, since a large part of 
their people are under Austro-Hungarian rule, and 
they would like to add them to their own states. 
But neither of these territories hesitated a moment, 
at the close of the Balkan wars, to annex territory 
peopled almost exclusively by Bulgarians. There is 
every reason to fear, therefore, that if these people 
were given self-government, they would at once be- 
gin to encroach upon one another, for which the 
mixed character of the population, the strategic neces- 
sities of national defence and the convenience of com- 
merce would furnish unlimited pretexts. The best 
thing that can be said of the Austrian government, — 
and tliat is very much, — is that it maintains a degree 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 263 

of order and peace among peoples so divided and so 
circumstanced that they can hardly maintain those 
conditions for themselves. There Is much talk just 
now of a different arrangement for maintaining order 
In this sorely divided region, but no proposal has yet 
been made which to the present writer seems very 
promising. 

The peculiar character of the Austrian state has 
quite naturally prevented the development of a 
colonial empire along French or British lines. If 
foreign dependencies were acquired, the question 
would at once come up whether they should belong 
to Austria or Hungary, and with the jealousy be- 
tween the partners, such a question might not be easy 
to settle. But more Important than this Is the fact 
that Austria has had her hands full at home. Not 
only has there been endless difficulty Inside the jar- 
ring empire, but Austria has been deeply Interested 
in the smaller countries to the south, all of them need- 
ing the same strong handling as her own trouble- 
some family to keep them from flying at one another's 
throats. The relations between Serbia and Bulgaria 
in recent years help to reconcile us to the harsh 
measures by which Austria keeps her Balkan cousins 
in decent shape. Whatever we may think of It, 
that Is the way Austria thinks of it. The Balkan 
States are to her just so much unfinished work. She 
has her hands full now and Isn't looking for more 
trouble, but she undertakes the new task as oppor- 
tunity offers. Serbia was next on her docket and the 
case in many ways was urgent. She set her hand to 
the task, and the world protested; even we protested. 



264 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Why? 

The answer Is to be found in one more peculiarity 
of this most peculiar situation. The Aiistrians are 
Germans. We have seen how the two great part- 
ners in the Dual Empire have each undertaken to 
hold down a lot of lesser peoples, more numerous 
in the aggregate than themselves. And as each has 
built his inverted pyramid about as high as he can 
manage, and still there Is more balancing to be done, 
the two have joined In the farther task which neither 
dares undertake alone. Every precaution has been 
taken throughout to maintain the strict equality of 
the partner states. 

But there Is one fatal Inequality which upsets 
everything. The one partner has powerful family 
connections, so to speak, and the other has none. 
Hungary has no backer, while Austria has a backer 
of overwhelming power. For a time this difference 
did not count, and the two partners managed their 
affairs, each In his own way. But slowly this condi- 
tion changed. The big German family came to have 
need of the partnership to accomplish Its purposes, 
and simultaneously the partners found themselves In 
need of backing. There was much reluctance to 
make the necessary bargain. The Hungarian part- 
ner was not at all happy that the backing should come 
wholly from his partner's family, for he distrusted 
his partner and detested the partner's family. The 
Austrian partner, too, was hardly less reluctant, for 
he was not In good standing with his family of which 
he represented the decaying aristocracy and they the 
parvenu branch, but need deepened into necessity, 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 265 

and the necessity was not otherwise to be met. So 
the Austro-Hungarlan partnership passed under the 
control of the younger but more vigorous branch of 
the German family whose purposes It was hence- 
forth to serve. 

It is this fact that makes Austrian affairs of in- 
terest to us. The maintenance of the Austro-Hun- 
garlan Empire Is Indispensable to the success of the 
German schemes which seem to menace our safety. 
As matters now stand Germany, through the agency 
of some ten million Austrian Germans, controls four 
or five times that number of aliens who are in no 
sympathy with her, and keeps open the road to the 
Balkans and the Dardanelles. If the Dual Empire 
were broken up, its Bohemians freed, and its Poles, 
Roumanians, Serbs and Italians united with the out- 
side representatives of those races to form substan- 
tial independent states, all hope of uniting them in 
the interest of German expansion would be at an 
end. Fighting for Germany is the very last thing 
that Bohemians, Poles, Roumanians, Serbs, or even 
Hungarians would willingly do. But that is what 
they are doing today, thanks to the peculiar organiza- 
tion of the Austrian Empire. And if the issue of the 
present war Is favourable to Germany, this system 
will be carried farther, — no one knows how far. 
Austria is thus, in the hands of Germany, a net that 
gathers fish of every kind, all for the German basket. 
If we are concerned with German plans of world do- 
minion, we are concerned with Austria as the indis- 
pensable instrument of their realization. 



266 AiMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 



RUSSIA 

Even more remote from our national interests may 
seem to be the great Slav nation. It is true that in 
Behring's Sea we face each other across a compara- 
tively narrow body of water, but since the acquisition 
of Alaska, the division is a natural one, and as these 
territories seem destined never to have a considerable 
population, a clash at this point or on grounds re- 
lating thereto seems most unlikely. Although Rus- 
sia has been notoriously aggressive, her program 
seems to have to do exclusively with Europe and Asia, 
and nowhere threatens us. Probably no great power 
has of late given us so little concern. There have 
been strained relations, to be sure, about minor mat- 
ters such as the validity of American passports, the 
Russian limitations upon Jewish citizens being in con- 
flict with treaty guaranties between the two countries. 
As is well known, Russia formerly excluded all Jews 
from her dominions. When Poland was partitioned 
and the major portion assigned to Russia, it proved 
to be impossible to extend this exclusion to the new 
territory, one of the most Jewish in all Europe. 
Jews were therefore tolerated here but were not al- 
lowed outside of certain set limits. This was the 
origin of the famous " pale." The temptation to 
enter Russia and take advantage of its rich oppor- 
tunities for gain constantly appealed to the Jews, and 
the alternate relaxation and enforcement of the rule 
led to those outrages upon the Jews which have 
shocked humanity. 

When we negotiated with Russia the usual treaty 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 267 

of amity and commerce with the standard proviso 
that citizens of each country should have the right 
to reside, travel, and do business in the other, the 
Jew saw his opportunity. He came to America, 
naturalized himself as an American citizen, and then 
returned to Russia armed with an American pass- 
port and demanded the privileges guaranteed by 
treaty. The situation was awkward. Russia re- 
garded the device as a bare-faced evasion of her 
laws, as in many cases it was. If the Jew were al- 
lowed thus to get over the barrier by turning its 
flank, this road was likely to be a much travelled one, 
and the barrier would soon become useless. The 
United States, too, had reason to object to this abuse 
of its citizenship. But on the other hand, the Jew- 
ish citizen had a legal right to demand a passport, 
and our passport and our treaty were not things to be 
lightly flouted. Moreover, American sentiment was 
much aroused against Russia on account of her 
" pogroms " and flagrant injustices against the Jews. 
Last but not least, there was the American Jewish 
vote to consider. Neither side could very well yield 
and neither did yield. The treaty w^as abrogated and 
our relations with the great empire remained with- 
out its valuable guaranties. The revolution which 
seems to have removed the restrictions against the 
Jews, has apparently made possible the renewal of 
treaty relations, but that remains for the future, with 
all its difficult problems, to determine. It is utterly 
fatuous to assume that the destructive triumph of 
democracy has removed the causes of friction be- 
tween Russia and other democratic states. 



268 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But it never entered into the head of any one, 
Russian or American, that a difficulty like this could 
be a cause of war between the two countries. Na- 
tions do not go to war thus lightly. If either were 
vitally menacing the interests of the other, a quarrel 
like this would have furnished an excellent pretext 
for war. Such pretexts as this, tangible and concrete 
things, though often inconsequential, are flaunted at 
the outbreak of every war. The superficial take 
them seriously, often decrying war on grounds so 
trivial, and devising elaborate peace programs de- 
signed to eliminate these baneful pretexts. It is only 
necessary to refer to a situation like this to see that 
the pretext is harmless unless It coincides with a 
deeper predisposition to war based on a fundamental 
menace, perhaps unconscious and instinctively re- 
sisted. When these great intangible issues call forth 
our instinct of self preservation, and yet fail to de- 
fine themselves to our provincial thinking, these small 
grievances do duty in satisfying our minds as to the 
justice of our instincts. 

The American people, as yet unconscious of any 
menace from Russia, has not felt the least disposi- 
tion to resort to the ultimate argument. No num- 
ber of passport quarrels is likely to incline us to do 
so until that menace appears. Is there a likelihood 
of such a menace? 

Of direct conflict between the United States and 
Russia there seems to be no prospect. For a very 
long time to come at least, neither country can plausi- 
bly claim or covet anything that belongs to the other. 
We may reasonably assume that Russia has no de- 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 269 

signs upon the American continent and that we, even 
in our wildest moments of inadvertence, are not likely 
to extend our sway over any part of the Asiatic or 
European mainland. There is no easier line of de- 
marcation in the world than this. The ocean, to be 
sure, is no longer a barrier that armed nations can 
not across, but it is a barrier that they need not cross, 
which is saying much for the possibility and the prob- 
ability of peace. To be sure, as our thought reverts 
to the Philippines, it gives pause to these easy con- 
clusions. The Philippines remain the one conspicu- 
ous anomaly in our present geographical position, an 
anomaly which we must carefully consider in due time. 
But despite this seeming anomaly, the general rela- 
tion is plain and as far as Russia is concerned, ab- 
solute. We belong to the Western Hemisphere, Rus- 
sia to the Eastern, and if we clash it will be when the 
two Hemispheres clash. Will they clash? 

It must not be forgotten that vast as are Russia's 
territories, she is under the imperative need of further 
expansion. She is still an interior country with no 
access to the sea under her control. Of the four nat- 
ural gateways to her territory, the Baltic, the Dar- 
danelles, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Pechili, 
not one is controlled by Russia. Even with these 
fully under her control, Russia would still be at a 
disadvantage in her industrial and commercial devel- 
opment and in her civilizing Intercourse with na- 
tions. The expense of getting to the gateway from 
Interior Russia is necessarily great, owing to the vast- 
ness of the land. To have this handicap increased 
by barriers at the gateway, by arbitrary closings, 



270 AMERICA AiMONG THE NATIONS 

formalities and the like is to increase her disad- 
vantage into a guaranty of permanent backward- 
ness and inferiority. No people has felt more deeply 
than Russia this need of national expansion. It is 
an absurd caricature of the national ambition to char- 
acterize it as " land hunger." Russia has land and 
to spare. What she seeks is certain points of vitally 
necessary control, points even more obviously neces- 
sary than those we seek to dominate in the Carib- 
bean. The necessity of these points is more real and 
more obvious than those required by any other na- 
tion. That revolutionary and mob-ruled Russia that 
has " tasted of liberty and been made drunk," should 
momentarily renounce these national ambitions is not 
strange. The incredible thing is that the sober by- 
standers among the nations should take these drunken 
protestations seriously. Granted that circumstances 
may possibly make this renunciation permanent, we 
can not build our safety on possibilities. It is pos- 
sible, even probable, that my house will not burn, but 
until it is sure, I must in simple prudence, insure 
against that catastrophe. The Russian is not done 
with imperialism, that impulse which in all ages and 
all lands has survived every change of government 
and resisted every appeal of sentiment and philoso- 
phy. Imperialism may learn to accomplish its pur- 
poses without war, but not to relinquish its pur- 
poses. 

Unfortunately Russia can not obtain control of the 
desired gateways without virtually destroying cer- 
tain nations and seriously menacing others. We 
have seen this in the case of Japan. It is even more 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 271 

obvious in the case of Europe. The control of the 
Dardanelles means the annihilation or subjection of 
Turkey and the permanent subordination of a number 
of other nations in or near the Ball<.ans. The control 
of the Baltic means the absorption of the Scandinavian 
countries and of all Germany east of the Elbe. Such 
programs seem utterly preposterous, but it is known 
that they have been long entertained and openly 
avowed. The worst of it is that if they were re- 
nounced and forgotten, the situation would of itself 
revive them. The present geographical situation of 
Russia is one of such very real helplessness that no 
year of national life could pass without suggesting the 
desirability, — the necessity — of escaping from these 
bonds. 

To both Turkey and Germany, therefore, the 
menace of Russian aggression is a spectre, an obses- 
sion. The one is already helpless, the other is sure 
to become so if the forces of peace are allowed un- 
hindered to build out the Russian people to anything 
like the measure of their territory and their re- 
sources. 

Why is the world fighting Germany today? Not 
because she is an autocracy; not because she has sunk 
merchant ships; not because she has done this or done 
that. Germany, faced long ago with the danger of 
being crushed by Russia, realized that she must op- 
pose a united Europe to Russian aggression if, a cen- 
tury hence, that aggression was to be stayed. With 
characteristic maladresse she has sought to organize 
Europe by brute force under her own leadership, with 
the result that she herself stands for the moment as 



272 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

the menace of all other powers. That is why all 
other powers have combined against her. 

But if the western powers will not accept the lead- 
ership and control of Germany, how much less likely 
are they to acquiesce in the leadership of Russia. 
And let us not overlook for a moment the fact that 
the realization of the Russian program, even in its 
minimal form, would give her that supreme position. 
Russia might stop at the Elbe, but there would be 
nothing to stop her. Conceding that the program 
of overt conquest would not be carried to its logical 
limit of world subjection, a greater Russia, peopled 
from the Elbe to the Pacific, as that vast expanse 
soon will be, would sit at the head of the table. Sub- 
serviency would be the sole alternative to subjection. 
And with habitual subserviency would come that loss 
of buoyant initiative, that toadying deference, which 
spells the doom of a civilization and which evokes the 
protest of our instincts almost as completely as does 
physical subjection. The world will be as unwilling 
to be Russianized as to be Germanized, and it will 
ultimately find it even more difl'icult to avoid it. 

And since we have joined in the effort to avert 
German dominion, is it not likely that we shall join 
in an effort to avert a greater and a worse? The 
contingency is remote, perhaps, but not improbable. 
It is true we are far away from Russia and have a 
minimum of occasion to clash. It is true, too, that 
when Russia's day has come, we shall be a very dif- 
ferent people from what we now are. It may seem 
' that our growth in the next hundred years will put us 
quite beyond the need of deference toward any. Un- 



THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE 273 

fortunately we shall not be the only ones to grow. 
This great fact remains which nothing can change, 
which no other fact can outweigh. Russia has more 
power of growth and more room to grow in than we. 
Her territory Is nearly three times as large, and the 
realization even In part of her ambitions would make 
it much larger. Its average productivity is probably 
greater than that of our own country. Her popula- 
tion Is larger and the rate of Increase higher. Her 
culture, though inferior, Is but held in abeyance while 
are laid broad and deep the physical foundations of 
national life. It will match our own when once those 
foundations are laid. It is difficult to see what is to 
prevent Russia from distancing ourselves and others 
In the race. There are endless petty qualifiers of 
these broad relations, but they do not modify their 
essential truth, and Insistence upon them only be- 
fogs the issue. These qualifiers may be all Im- 
portant In deciding the questions of the hour, but in a 
forecast of the remoter future the more completely 
we forget them the better. For that forecast one 
fact is all-important. The power that acquires con- 
trol of the Eastern Hemisphere, acquires control of 
the world. Is It not plain that the policy of America 
must be to prevent the domination of the Eastern 
Hemisphere by any one power? The struggle is 
with Germany today. It will be with Russia tomor- 
row. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 

At the moment of writing these hnes, one country 
engages the attention of Americans. \Ye are at war 
with Germany. The war has been slow in coming, 
and we have been enabled, — compelled, — to scan 
every step of the path which has led us to it. But 
probably there are few of us who do not feel a cer- 
tain mystification about it all. It seems strange and 
unnatural still, a thing so out of our habitual reckon- 
ings, that though there Is no mistaking the path ahead, 
we are puzzled and dazed to make out the path be- 
hind. How did we ever get where we are? Can it 
be possible that the path we have followed in all in- 
noccncy and good will these many years led naturally 
and inevitably here? 

This sense of mystification is the more pronounced 
because of the unexpected form which the war has 
assumed. There have been prophecies, of course, 
these many years, that war must sometime come be- 
tween the United States and Germany. These 
prophecies have attracted little attention save as a 
subject for editorial pleasantry, but such slight im- 
pression as they have made has not at all prepared us 
for such a war as this. It has always been assumed 
that war with Germany, if it came, would come as the 

274 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 275 

result of German aggression in the Western Hemis- 
phere, that it would be essentially a naval war or a 
war on American soil to repel a German invasion. 
That we could under any circumstances be induced to 
participate in a European war and to send an army to 
Europe, while as yet America was untouched and we 
were confronted with only the most hypothetical dan- 
gers, was a suggestion too preposterous for the most 
alarmist of prophets or the most credulous of his fol- 
lowers. Yet that is what we are doing, and doing 
with the almost unanimous approval of the American 
people. 

Is this an accident, or is there something in the 
character and situation of the two peoples that made 
such a result inevitable? If it is an accident, there is 
little likelihood that it will happen again. We have 
but to see it through, or bring it to an end by the neces- 
sary concessions (we can concede much to end so pain- 
ful an inadvertence) and then renew our care-free 
existence. But if there is something in the character 
and situation of the two peoples that made this war 
inevitable, then it may all happen again, — perhaps 
again and again, — unless radical remedies can be 
provided against it. In that case concession may be 
not conciliation, but suicide. No graver question 
than this confronts America among the nations. 

To arrive at an understanding of our relation to 
Germany, we must, for the time being, quite forget 
our part in the problem and consider Germany's situ- 
ation, endeavouring to ascertain the causes which tend 
to disturb the world equilibrium in that quarter. 
Obviously, Germany's immediate concern is not with 



276 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

America but with the neighbouring countries of Eu- 
rope. Our problem grows out of the European 
problem, and we can not understand the one without 
first considering the other. 

The outstanding fact in the present war has been 
the insurgence of Germany. All efforts on the part 
of her apologists to represent her as essentially pacific 
and forced into the war by the aggressions of her 
enemies, have been unavailing. True, she has kept 
the peace for more than forty years, while her neigh- 
bours have engaged in bloody wars, but we cannot es- 
cape the conviction that during this long peace she 
has never been really pacific. Her excessive preoccu- 
pation with military affairs, her avowed discontent 
with her lot, and her constant assertion that her 
safety was threatened by the machinations of her 
enemies have kept the world nervous. Her case has 
seemed to be one of national paranoia, a disorder 
which no other nation has manifested in like degree. 

The reaction of all this has been to put Europe on 
the defensive, and in this Germanv has found fresh 
evidence of her allegations. This in turn has spurred 
her on to new efforts for self-defence, and these ef- 
forts have intensified the apprehensions of her neigh- 
bours and roused them to a farther effort in turn. 
When at last the great rivalry ended In the only way 
In which it could end, the first move again seems to 
have been with Germany. 

In all this series of moves, the question of priority 
Is a difficult one, and discussion leads to no compelling 
conclusion. Each move is motived by a preceding 
move of the rival party, and as always In the great 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 277 

human game, we search in vain for a beginning. 
Nor is the question of much interest save to those who 
have need of exculpation. But to the dispassionate 
onlooker it is not easy at first to see the ground 
of Germany's obsession. Despite the historic antip- 
athies of Europe, no one who has been long in 
touch with the nations of western Europe, can have 
failed to note their growing disinclination to war. 
They were absorbed in schemes of colonial develop- 
ment and industrial and social reorganization, and it 
was only by the most strenuous exertion, sometimes 
in excess of constitutional authority, that their more 
far-seeing leaders prevented a fatal ebb in their mili- 
tary enthusiasm. France, to be sure, had her griev- 
ance against Germany, but this grievance had so com- 
pletely lost its hold upon the popular imagination, 
that nothing but the experience of what they believed 
to be a war of wanton aggression, could have revived 
it. England had no historic grievance and no conceiv- 
able reason for attacking a peaceable Germany. 
The allegation that England brought about this war 
as an occasion for destroying rival German com- 
merce, is too much belied by her mature policy and 
by the inherent probabilities of the situation to im- 
press the unbiased mind. The mere money cost of 
this war would have wiped out the gains of such a dia- 
bolical venture for a century to come, and this was 
perfectly foreseen. 

The relation of Germany to Russia was less reas- 
suring, but even here the danger was certainly not im- 
minent. It is true that Russia chafes under her po- 
sition of dependence as regards access to the sea, and 



278 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

the full realization of her ambitions In this respect 
would ultimately endanger Germany, for Russia un- 
doubtedly desires to have an access to the Baltic un- 
der her control. This can mean nothing less than 
the control of the Danish straits, and presumably the 
extension of Russia westward to the river Elbe, thus 
cutting Germany in twain. Such an extension would 
be a little less preposterous than It might seem, for 
the population Is mixed and patchy, German and 
Slavic settlements alternating pretty much all the way 
between Petrograd and Berlin. There can be no 
doubt that the scheme finds a place In the extreme 
Russian program. But Russia's designs In this quar- 
ter are very remote. Her Interest In the Baltic Is 
as nothing to her Interest In the Dardanelles, and 
the control of the latter would normally present no 
such difficulties as the control of the former. Upon 
this enterprise, therefore, all her effort has been and 
long will be concentrated. When the northern proj- 
ect comes up, a really peaceable Germany ought to be 
able to count on the solid backing of all Western 
Europe to protect her from Russian aggression, 
which, if successful, must In the end menace Ger- 
many's neighbours as well as herself. 

The general assumption, therefore, that a peace- 
able Germany was In no danger of attack would 
seem to be justified by the situation In Europe. Ger- 
many had but to keep her place, and make It plain to 
Europe that she was content to keep her place, to In- 
sure Immunity from attack, or overwhelming support 
in case of such attack. Germany has made no such 
Impression upon Europe for the very good reason 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 279 

that she Is not content with her place and is resolved 
to better it at all costs, and that, before the develop- 
ment and union of neighbouring states shall make the 
task impossible. Germany demands her " place in 
the sun," 

It is this discontent of Germany that endangers the 
peace of Europe. The powers lying farther west 
have reached what all regard as fairly definite terri- 
torial limits, and while minor conflicts of interest still 
exist, it Is not too much to assume that the good sense 
of those Immediately concerned and the pressure of 
other powers jealous for the general peace, are suf- 
ficient to prevent war among them. If Russia is less 
dependable, we may be certain that with the aid of 
Germany, she could be kept from endangering the 
peace of Europe and of the world. The discontent 
of Germany is therefore a matter of supreme concern. 
What is Germany's grievance? What will satisfy 
her and lead her to take her place among the peace- 
ably disposed nations, the true guarantors of the 
world's peace? 

First and foremost, she wants room. The Ger- 
man Empire Is at present about the size of the State 
of Texas. While this area Is larger than that of 
many nations, and quite sufficient, as the result has 
demonstrated, to support a highly significant national 
life, Germany nevertheless deems it Inadequate. 
This demand for more territory can hardly be called 
unreasonable, at least by Germany's present enemies, 
but unfortuntely Germany Is a late comer, and she 
finds that all available lands have been taken or 
blocked by earlier takings. Her demands can be 



28o AxMERICA AxMONG THE NATIONS 

met, therefore, only by despoiling those now in pos- 
session, a proceeding only to be justified by the most 
cogent reasons. Such reasons her destined victims 
declare do not exist. Thus, M. Guyot, a distin- 
guished French authority, argues that despite her 
rapidly expanding population, there is no congestion 
In Germany. Emigration, once heavy, has virtually 
ceased, although nearly a million are added to the 
population every year. This does not look as though 
the population of Germany had reached the satura- 
tion point. M. Guyot believes the present popula- 
tion of sixtv-eight millions could safely be increased 
to ninety millions, since even this number would give 
her a population of but i66 per square kilometre, 
as against 260 per square kilometre for Belgium. 
The conclusion is, of course, that her territory is am- 
ple for her people and that her restiveness is quite un- 
justified. 

M. Guyot's estimate is very moderate. The 
writer has ventured in another connection to suggest 
two hundred millions as a possible maximum for Ger- 
many, But Germany can support two hundred mil- 
lions or ninety millions or even sixty-eight millions, 
only on condition that like England or Belgium, she 
allow herself to become a specialized industrial na- 
tion, making things for others to use, and dependent 
upon other countries for her food and for the 
raw materials of her manufactures. Assuming M. 
Guyot's estimate, when Germany has ninety millions, 
she will be dotted all over with Immense manufac- 
turing cities, with hardly more people upon the land 
than now, and with at least one half her people de- 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 281 

pendent upon foreign food and perhaps three fourths 
of her factories dependent upon foreign materials. 
Something like that is the condition of England to- 
day, while Belgium, whose example is cited as proof 
that Germany can support more than her present 
population, in normal times produces but 22 per cent, 
of her bread. In other words, while Belgium has a 
population of 260 per square kilometre, she raises 
bread for only 57 per square kilometre, less than half 
the number that Germany is already compelled to pro- 
vide for. 

This, of course, is a perfectly possible program. 
The economic dependence involved is common to 
many nations and has been accepted by both Germany 
and England as a condition of wealth and power. 

But there is this immense difference between indus- 
trial England and industrial Germany. England 
possesses territories varied in character and dis- 
tributed all over the globe, which can supply the neces- 
sary food for her people and the materials for her 
industries. Moreover, she has long maintained com- 
plete control of the routes leading to these territories 
and indeed to all other territories with which she can 
maintain profitable economic relations. Her colonies 
and her control of the sea completely emancipate her 
from what would otherwise be an abject economic 
dependence. 

Germany has neither colonies nor control of the 
sea. Her economic development, therefore, tends to 
make her, not another England, but another Belgium. 
It is possible, and even probable, that if Germany 
would peaceably accept the situation, the other coun- 



282 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

tries, always glad of a good customer, would never 
withhold the food and raw materials that she desires. 
We may be perfectly sure that Britain has never 
thought and would never think of doing so. But 
Germany does not feel safe, — honestly and truly does 
not, — and when England tries to reassure her, and 
in all sincerity bids her trust the friendliness of her 
kinsmen, she has an uncomfortable way of saying: 
"' You try it for a while. Give us possession and con- 
trol for a time, and we will see that you are looked out 
for." Of course there are all kinds of reasons why 
such an exchange of roles is impossible, but if it were 
ever so possible, it is to be feared that the Briton 
would feel, — would honestly and truly feel, — that 
it was not safe. Lord Morley and a few sanguine 
Englishmen have seemed willing to accept some such 
situation, but the British people have shown no in- 
clination to adopt their view. If we are disposed to 
criticize this attitude as unworthy and ungenerous, it 
behooves us to remember that men have seldom been 
generous or just to those who were wholly in their 
power. Not that any nation would wantonly and 
without provocation cut off the food supply of an- 
other. But there is certain to be provocation. 
Rivalry and shortsightedness incvitablv produce mis- 
understandings and mutual gric\ances, and the cer- 
tainty that, if worst comes to worst, one partv al- 
ways holds the winning hand, counsels habitual sub- 
mission on the part of the other. This habitual sub- 
mission eventuallv modifies profoundly the national 
temper, stifling the imagination and stunting the facul- 
ties of the people and circumscribing their culture. 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 283 

Our much cherished independence has, therefore, a 
very real and tangible value which it is futile to dis- 
parage. 

This then is Germany's first fear, the fear of dan- 
gerous dependence as a specialized industrial nation. 
She is not big enough, in her present shut-in position, 
to assert a real independence like that of Britain, and 
yet she is too big to accept the abject dependence of 
Belgium, as she must do if she peaceably accepts the 
present situation. She must become bigger, and she 
must be quick about it, for the longer she waits, the 
more fatal becomes the weapon of hunger that her 
rivals in self-protection can turn against her. Even 
as it is, she has probably waited too long. M. 
Guyot's argument amounts to saying that Germany's 
economic dependence, though rapidly increasing, has 
not yet reached its maximum, — not a very conclusive 
argument. 

Bearing in mind this general fact, the German pro- 
gram which at first sight seems so audacious, becomes 
intelligible. In the first place she wants colonies, 
great territories which can grow food and furnish 
rubber and the countless other tropical and local 
products which her industrial development necessi- 
tates. She wants sea power, if not enough to over- 
whelm her rivals, at least enough to deter them from 
trying to overwhelm her or close the sea routes 
against her. And partly because pretty much all the 
available colonies have been appropriated, and partly 
because her situation surrounded by powerful nations 
is so different from that of England, she wants rnore 
room near home, a consideration strongly emphasized 



284 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

by her need of better access to the sea. Her natural 
sea coast on the north and all her best harbours are 
shorn away by two helpless little nations, peopled 
with her own kinsmen and maintained by her rivals 
for no other purpose than to keep her at a safe dis- 
tance. To the south, where she justly foresees a vast 
future development, she has no outlet in her own 
right, and even her ally is but meagrely provided. 
The Adriatic, the ^T-gean, the Black Sea, and the 
Persian Gulf, each giving access to vast commercial 
areas, are the natural outlets of the great industrial 
region of Central Europe, of which in turn Germany 
is the natural dominant element. To extend her con- 
trol, not necessarily by direct annexation, but by alli- 
ance, industrial penetration, and paramount influence 
of one sort or another, until she touches the English 
Channel, reaches down and grasps the mouth of the 
Adriatic, plants herself firmly on the .Egean, the 
Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf, and controls the 
Dardanelles, may seem a preposterous program, but 
Germany is convinced that nothing less than this \\\\\ 
give her real independence. Whatever part of this 
program she omits will be only so much added to the 
program of rivals who may or may not be consider- 
ate, but who in any case will control. The hated de- 
pendence will remain, and the great border strong- 
holds built by nature, being in the hands of her rivals, 
they will tighten the cordon about her and close its 
few remaining gaps whenever she refuses to meet 
their demands. 

This, therefore. Is the central and vital part of 
Germany's vast program; a greater Germany stretch- 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 285 

ing from Antwerp to Avlona, to Salonica, to the 
Persian Gulf, to Odessa and Warsaw. But It is only 
the central part. Around this vast centre is to be 
formed a wide penumbra of tropical and other col- 
onies, producers of food and materials, commensur- 
ate with the great centre which they are to serve. 
This secondary but larger part of the program in 
which we are plainly more immediately Interested, 
and which for that reason we must reserve for special 
consideration, is quite as necessary as the other to 
that economic self-sufficiency which Germany seeks. 
An imperial program, truly, but one about which 
German statesmen seem to differ only as to which 
part it is better to realize first. All unite In the 
belief that Germany, by a prompt and colossal effort 
at expansion, should avert the calamity of economic 
dependence and insignificance. 

But economic dependence is not the only or the 
greatest danger that Germany fears. There is an- 
other which, though remote, is really more serious 
and probably exercises more influence over the minds, 
— or let us say, the Instincts, — of the German peo- 
ple. This Is the danger of being reduced to relative 
impotence, not only politically, but culturally (a far 
more important consideration) by the sheer immen- 
sity of neighbouring races. The obvious menace is 
from Russia, but the more serious menace is from 
the Anglo-Saxon. Not a military menace. It can not 
be too strongly Insisted that Germany has never been, 
and in all probability would never have been, in dan- 
ger of attack from Great Britain. Her claim that 
she was so threatened before the outbreak of the pres- 



286 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

ent war, has been rejected by the entire world. If 
the two powers are now at war, it is because Germany 
willed it so. But it Is equally true that the terms of 
that peace which Britain sought only to maintain, 
were terms which insured the ultimate subordination 
of Germany, and the certainty that her civilization 
would play a lessening part in shaping the destiny 
of mankind. 

There is a well established tendency of culture to 
follow the lead of the majority. Quality may offset 
quantity within certain limits, but quantity counts and 
counts enormously. So also superior power, military, 
political, economic. These Impose upon the minds of 
men and win their suffrages. Big nations take the 
lead of little nations, big cities of little cities, and 
dominant political elements of subordinate political 
elements, not only in diplomacy and war, but In the 
subtler realm of the spirit. Thus parvenu Rome 
overshadowed incomparable Athens, and left the In- 
ferior Roman culture as the chief legacy of the an- 
cient to the modern world. So the finer earlier cul- 
ture of southern France yielded to the political suprem- 
acy of Paris and the cruder north. And so the su- 
perior culture of southern Germany Is yielding to the 
political supremacy of Prussia and Berlin. There 
are many reasons for this, some of them subtle and 
elusive, but others mere questions of practical con- 
venience. The matter of language is an illustration. 
Who takes the trouble to learn Dutch? It is not 
that the language or the literature of Holland are 
inferior (nobody takes the trouble to inquire about 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 287 

that) but that it Is so much easier for a few Dutch- 
men to learn English than for many Englishmen to 
learn Dutch. So the matter adjusts itself quite auto- 
matically. Every educated Dutchman speaks Eng- 
Hsh, but almost never does an Englishman speak 
Dutch. The Dutch language thus slinks more and 
more into the background and tends to disappear, 
taking with it literature, folk lore and much else, 
the very soul of the nation's culture. So the Ger- 
man language, highly developed as it is and en- 
trenched behind a magnificent literature, serves the 
German only for home purposes. There is scarce 
a community outside of little Germany where the Ger- 
man can use his own language, while he can use Eng- 
lish over half the world. The German merchant in 
Shanghai or Yokohama finds English as indispensable 
as in London or New York. 

Conceding, therefore, that Britain will never attack 
Germany, conceding even the far more doubtful prop- 
osition that Russia will never attack her, — a policy 
to which no friendhness of present government or 
present people can pledge Its successors, — Germany 
still has reason to fear. The domain of the Russian 
culture is thirty-five times as large as Germany, that 
of the Anglo-Saxon culture sixty times as large. 
Making all allowances for quality and imperfect as- 
similation, the disparity is enormous. When there 
are ten Russians to one German, as there seemingly 
soon will be, when the Anglo-Saxon race, thoroughly 
united in its culture at least, and with the most strate- 
gic of all situations, also outnumbers the German 



288 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

many fold and imposes Its language and its ways upon 
the commercial world, men will not take their cue 
from Berlin. 

Who cares? 

Germany cares, — cares for this most of all. It 
is what all peoples care for, what only the would-be 
idealist forgets. Mere abstract considerations of 
material well-being appeal to men very little. Prof- 
fer them wealth, comfort, and power, but in un- 
familiar forms, forms which do not bear the hall- 
mark of their race, and you will tempt them but little. 
When old Wulf, the Gothic chieftain, was doffing his 
bearskin preparatory to being baptized into the faith 
that promised so much, he asked the priest where his 
ancestors were. The priest, with the untroubled posi- 
tiveness of the earlier day, replied " In hell," where- 
upon Wulf replaced his bearskin, saying that he would 
" stay with his own folks." There is no hell like not 
being with our own folks. So all men reason, and 
Wulf's German descendants most of all. Doubtless 
few Germans have reasoned the thing out in this way, 
or in any way, but race instinct is busy in them all, 
and race instinct means that, just that. Germany 
must become big. It might do to be little somewhere 
else in the world, but not betv^^een the Saxon and the 
Slav. That is what the Germans are saying. Not 
a few of them see it; all of them feel it. 

This, then, is Germany's program and the world's 
problem. Greater Germany. It is a perfectly natural 
program, the protest of a virile race against the 
stealthy encroachments of races more favourably situ- 
ated and more amply domained. The fact that it 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 289 

menaces our existence and compels us to the most 
strenuous exertion in self defence, should not blind us 
to Its essentially normal character and to the per- 
manence of the instincts and the interests which it rep- 
resents. It rather emphasizes the necessity for their 
full recognition. 

But with all Its essential naturalness, there is an un- 
canny consciousness about this plan of Greater Ger- 
many as It lies In the mind of the German people. 
No great people ever before thought its thoughts out 
loud as the German people have been doing. Other 
empires grow, but the Germans are building theirs. 
The British Empire has been aptly described as " a 
series of inadvertences." Not so the German. 
Everything Is foreseen, calculated and decreed, not 
by an Alexander or a Napoleon, but by the collective 
intellect of a great people. Nor was ever a plan of 
such magnitude discussed so openly or so frankly 
avowed. This has given to German action a deliber- 
ateness and a thoroughness of preparation for which 
history offers no parallel. Whether it increases the 
chance of success remains to be seen, but It certainly 
increases the redoubtableness of the undertaking. 

This redoubtableness Is further Increased by the 
fact that the undertaking does not naturally lend It- 
self to compromises or half measures. If there is 
to be a Greater Germany, there Is no very natural 
stopping place till It stretches from the northern to 
the southern seas, and from the Black Sea on the east 
to the Adriatic on the west. To almost reach these 
limits would not almost accomplish Germany's pur- 
pose, but would spell essential failure. We must 



290 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

expect that these limits will be sought with corre- 
sponding zeal. How many colonies and tropical de- 
pendencies will be required to supply such an indus- 
trial centre, no man can say. We shall not go far 
wrong if we assume that on this point the German 
people are in an attitude of unlimited receptivity. 

The circumstances of the moment perhaps warrant 
a word of caution against an easy misunderstanding. 
We are at war with Germany. It is the time hon- 
oured custom of all peoples to disparage and vilify 
those with whom they are compelled to fight, a pro- 
cedure for which the acts of Germany in the present 
war furnish additional incentive. There is some- 
thing to be said for it. To hate a man helps you to 
hit him. At a time when everything is viewed from 
the standpoint of war necessity, a dispassionate state- 
ment of Germany's case may seem an unpatriotic act, 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Possiblv some 
who thus reason may think the writer " pro-German." 
In the interest of their farther patient attention, he 
begs to disabuse them. None can feel more strongly 
than he the seriousness of the German menace or the 
necessity of resisting it by force. In all this his sym- 
pathies are as pronounced as his convictions. 

But it may be doubted whether the popular patriot- 
ism above referred to will altogether meet the require- 
ments of a struggle so fundamental and so long con- 
tinued as this is likely to prove. There is need of 
much careful observation and cool calculation in deal- 
ing with such an encmv. The present inquirv is in 
the nature of a reconnaissance of the enemv's posi- 
tion. It is courting (.lisaster to attack him with fury 



GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE 291 

without knowing where his strong positions are lo- 
cated. It is just because we are not Germans and can 
not by any possibiHty find our salvation in Germany's 
triumph, that it behooves us to know what Germany 
is planning and what are the permanent instincts and 
interests that are hkely to give persistence to her pur- 
pose. Not until we perceive the reality of German 
need shall we be prepared for the terrible intensity of 
German endeavour. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE STORM AREA 

The central feature of the program of Greater 
Germany, the consolidation of Middle Europe under 
German control and its extension through Asia to 
the Persian Gulf, has been sufficiently outlined. It 
remains for us to consider the program of outlying 
dependencies or colonies which may seem at first 
sight to concern us more intimately, as it is liable to 
bring Germany nearer to our borders. Whether we 
are in fact more concerned with this outlying portion 
of the plan than with its central features remains to 
be seen. Meanwhile we must locate German colonial 
ambitions as definitely as possible. Fortunately we 
are not left to speculation in these matters. The 
fields of practicable colonial enterprise are few, and 
conflicting interests are easily recognized. There is 
no vague unknown left in the world to embarrass us 
in reaching a conclusion. Moreover we are not com- 
pelled to speculate as to Germany's intentions. Rep- 
resentative publications, official utterances, and overt 
acts have clearly revealed the German attitude. Dif- 
ferences of opinion of course exist in Germany as else- 
where, but Germany has left us in no doubt as to 
which opinion is dominant. The war has also 
cleared the situation. Diplomatic denials and dis- 
guises still abound, but they no longer deceive. 

292 



THE STORM AREA 293 

Oceanica early attracted German attention. Most 
of these islands, and in particular, those best suited 
to whites, had been appropriated by other colonizing 
powers, but a certain number remained in which Ger- 
many, at last awakened to the importance of overseas 
possessions, saw possibilities. A number of these 
clusters of coral islands, — the Solomon Islands, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline Islands, and the 
Marshall Islands, and a part of the large island of 
New Guinea, were hastily annexed in 1884-5, while 
the major part of the Samoan Group was acquired in 
1899 by the same treaty which gave the minor island 
and the chief harbour to the United States. All these 
island possessions were seized at the outbreak of the 
present war and assigned to Australia or Japan, thus 
incidentally relieving us of a neighbour In Samoa 
whom recent developments might have made uncon- 
genial. It remains to be seen whether the present 
disposition of the islands is confirmed by the outcome 
of the war. 

But it was lean picking at best which remained In 
this part of the world for a nation that began in 1884. 
Germany's hopes In this quarter are built on some- 
thing very different from the left-overs of that date. 
Next to Britain whose continental possessions In Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand easily give her the first place, 
the great power in Oceanica Is Holland. Her great 
islands of Java and Sumatra are among the most 
valuable tropical possessions In the world, and they 
have the farther great value that they control the 
vitally Important passages to the Far East as com- 
pletely as do Gibraltar or Suez. Germany has no 



294 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

thought of disturbing Holland in her possession of 
these splendid dependencies. On the contrary she 
would be quick to protect Holland against any other 
power that might menace her control. The reason 
is that Germany looks forward to the ultimate inclu- 
sion of Holland in the German Empire, in which case 
Germany would automatically acquire these vast colo- 
nial possessions. This was bluntly urged by Hein- 
rlch von Treitschke, the most influential of all German 
writers on these subjects. " Why all this talk of 
building a colonial empire? Why not take Holland 
and get one all ready built?" Holland, of course, 
looks forward with very different sentiments to this 
possibility, and counts upon the support of Britain, 
who would be doubly micnaced by such a union, to op- 
pose it by every means in her power. On the other 
hand. It is impossible not to recognize a certain rea- 
sonableness In Germany's ambition. The separation 
of the Low Countries from Germany, containing, as 
they do, most of her natural seacoast and all her best 
harbours, and peopled as they are with a race es- 
sentially German, Is one of the most obvious hard- 
ships in the present political arrangement of the 
world, while the great tropical possessions of Hol- 
land are far better suited to the needs of German than 
of Dutch Industry. What a pity that Germany's 
temper is such as to utterly alienate her kinsfolk, and 
that her ambitions are so inordinate that she can not 
be trusted with reasonable access to the world! Ger- 
many should not have Holland and Belgium so long 
as she makes them hate her, and as long as she cher- 
ishes ambitions which deliberately contemplate the 



THE STORM AREA 295 

ruin of the world's greatest peoples the world must 
barricade her own house against her. 

Next in availability and perhaps even greater in 
importance as a field of exploitation is Africa. Here 
in 1884 Germany seized nearly a million square miles 
of territory, possession of which she confirmed dur- 
ing the next six years. These possessions were some- 
what extended in 191 1, especially by access to navi- 
gable waters, as the result of the protracted contro- 
versy over Morocco, and very large projects of link- 
ing up East and West Africa were at one time enter- 
tained. These plans were thwarted by the extension 
of the British possessions in South Africa up through 
the centre of the continent, thus separating German 
East Africa from the German colonies of South West 
Africa and the Kamerun on the West Coast. One of 
the conditions of peace suggested not long since by a 
conservative German of the highest authority, who 
was willing to surrender pretty much everything else 
in the German program, was the transfer to Germany 
of a strip of the Belgian Congo which should link to- 
gether German East and West Africa. There can 
be no question that the project of annexing Belgium, 
so tenaciously urged by the leaders of German im- 
perialism, was motived quite as much by the desire for 
the vast Belgian Congo as by the need of a port at 
Antwerp and a fortress at Liege. 

The division of Africa among the great powers 
has been perhaps the most fruitful source of friction 
in the whole range of recent colonial enterprise. 
The various foreign colonies began as small trading 
posts in some one of the protected landing places or 



296 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

at the mouth of some river which offered access to 
the interior. From these points they were gradu- 
ally extended by exploration and the development of 
trade until they came into touch with one another 
or crossed one another's routes. Friction was the 
almost invariable result. Gradually these disputes 
have been settled and boundaries have become defi- 
nite, but the division is utterly fortuitous and sets at 
defiance all the requirements of administrative and 
economic convenience. The different powers have 
sandwiched their colonies in between one another in 
a way that now blocks railway development and the 
systematic organization of the country. Consolida- 
tion through exchange or some sort of redistribution 
has long been a recognized need, but international 
jealousies and mutually excluding ambitions have 
rendered it impossible. At the time of writing, 
all the German colonies have been seized by Britain 
and France. If this seizure is confirmed, the re- 
sult may be as momentous for Africa as for the 
European states concerned. The exclusion of Ger- 
many from tropical Africa, unless compensated in 
other quarters, would have incalculable consequences 
for Germany, for it is here that she has seen the 
best prospect of realizing her colonial ambitions. 
Holland may come sometime and perhaps colonies 
elsewhere, but for the immediate future, Africa was 
the one hopeful prospect. The first statement of 
possible peace terms to come from a German official 
put in the forefront the necessity of a large and uni- 
fied Germany territory in tropical Africa. 

Quite distinct from the field we have been consid- 



THE STORM AREA 297 

ering is northern Africa, a comparatively narrow 
coastland along the southern littoral of the Mediter- 
ranean which, though in the same continent as the 
region just described, is separated from it by the 
Sahara Desert, a barrier more impassable than any 
ocean, while its climatic and strategic character puts 
it in quite a different category. Northern Africa has 
valuable resources which appeal to German enter- 
prise. It is situated on the great highway of the 
world, strategic alike for commerce and for war. 
Above all it is a land in which white men can live, 
perhaps the only one in the colonial market in which 
there is a reasonable chance that the people of a pos- 
sessing race could establiDh themselves as the domi- 
nant element in the population. Nowhere in the 
world has Germany scanned the possibilities of colo- 
nial establishment more anxiously than here. Un- 
fortunately she came too late. Algeria went to 
France in 1827, long before the German Empire 
existed. France acquired Tunis in 1881 and Britain 
occupied Egypt in 1882. Germany's colonial policy 
had not yet begun. The seizure of Tripoli by Italy 
in 191 1 was undoubtedly motived in part by fear of 
German aggression in this quarter, while the final 
establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco 
closed a prolonged diplomatic controversy in which 
Germany exhausted every resource to secure a foot- 
hold in this most coveted part of northern Africa. 
Her failure in this struggle was beyond doubt the 
precipitating cause of the present war, for it con- 
vinced her that nothing but the crushing of her rivals 
would secure the necessary opportunity. But Mor- 



298 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

occo commanded Gibraltar and so might cut the 
British Empire in two. It must not be in the hands 
of a probable enemy. 

Ever since the British occupied India, thus securing 
for themselves a dominant position not only in the 
Far East but in the world, the ambition of all colonial 
powers has been to find another India. The choice 
has never been difficult, for there is but one other 
country comparable to India in size, density of popu- 
lation, and natural resources. China has about the 
same area as India. Its population is generally sup- 
posed to be greater. Its resources are far superior. 
As the impotence of China became increasingly ap- 
parent during the nineteenth century, she became the 
object of jealous solicitude on the part of the coloniz- 
ing powers of Europe, who encamped around her 
borders as anxious heirs wait round the bedside of a 
departing relative. Britain, as the first comer, nat- 
urally had the best location. Depending as always 
upon her navy, she had her great station at Hong 
Kong, at the convenient southeast corner where the 
population and the trade of China focus in the great 
city of Canton. Hong Kong which is both chief 
arsenal and chief commercial port, a marvel of natu- 
ral defence, was the key to the situation, while the 
great cities of Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtse 
and Tientsin in the Gulf of Pechili, both open to the 
trade of all nations but essentially under the commer- 
cial control of Britain, commanded the trade of cen- 
tral and northern China respectively. 

France, as we have seen, seized Tongking farther 
south than Hong Kong, acquiring — not a fortress 



THE STORM AREA 299 

and commercial harbour as Britain had done, — but 
a vast colony, which however was intended primarily 
as the base for an advance into southern China. She 
too had her " concessions " in Shanghai, Tientsin, 
and elsewhere, though the commercial results have 
been less satisfactory than in the case of the British. 

With the sudden awakening of Germany to the 
Importance of colonies and foreign trade, attention 
turned promptly to the Far East. German pro- 
cedure was characteristically systematic and methodi- 
cal in contrast with the fortuitous policy of Britain 
whose government action has always followed in the 
wake of private enterprise. There was little or no 
German commerce, but It was determined that there 
should be, and to this end a strong station and sub- 
sidized shipping lines were deemed essential. Gov- 
ernment agents were sent out to study the situation. 
One reported favourably on the island of Yezo 
(northern Japan) as well suited to Germany's pur- 
pose and obtainable " by purchase or otherwise." 
It was finally decided, however, that a position in 
northern China near the all Important Gulf of Pechili 
was most desirable, and China was forced In 1897 
to yield a commanding position on the peninsula of 
Shantung with valuable mining and railway conces- 
sions as penalty for the killing of two German mis- 
sionaries belonging to an order that Germany had ex- 
pelled. Too much attention should not be given to 
this circumstance. Germany certainly did little at 
this time to sugar-coat the pill, but the pill was not 
essentially different from that which other nations 
had compelled China to swallow. 



300 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

The choice of northern China as headquarters of 
German Influence, though Inferior In some respects 
to Britain's position in the south, had its advantages. 
It was an advantage to be at the opposite end from 
Britain in the event of a division. It would then be 
possible to claim a large domain in northern China 
with less risk of British opposition, especially if Ger- 
man commercial effort were concentrated on this field 
in the meantime. It is noteworthy that Germany has 
acquired a large concession in Tientsin, the trade 
metropolis of northern China, but that in the treaty 
ports farther south she is less in evidence. The Ger- 
man was everywhere, but official emphasis was laid 
upon German enterprise in the north. 

There was a further reason for this location. 
The capital of China is located in the north, and the 
presence of Germany In the north could not but exert 
a powerful pressure upon the Chinese government. 
This expectation was promptly realized. German 
influence became noticeably paramount in the years 
immediately following the occupation of Kiaochow. 

One disadvantage of the location was not realized, 
or was at least underestimated at the time by Ger- 
many. The establishment in the nearby Shantung 
Peninsula of a strong post by a great military and 
naval power aroused the fear and the hostility of 
Japan, a country until that time in close sympathy 
with Germany. That Japan could be a rival of Ger- 
many hardly seemed likely in 1897, least of all that 
she could ever be a dangerous rival. Yet Germany 
had united with Russia to force Japan out of Port 
Arthur, thus robbing her of the fruits of her recent 



THE STORM AREA 301 

victory over China. In a word, these two mighty 
powers had bidden Japan not to take herself quite 
so seriously, and in particular, not to get in the way of 
her betters. Japan has at least one attribute of true 
greatness. She knows how to take rebuffs and bide 
her time, a subject upon which it behooves us to re- 
flect. 

Once established in Shantung, Germany's policy de- 
veloped rapidly. It suited her purpose for a time to 
enter into an agreement with Britain and France by 
which the three natural divisions of China as deter- 
mined by the great river valleys, were recognized as 
" spheres of influence " of the three powers. The 
south fell to France, the great Yangtse valley, cen- 
tral China, fell to Britain, and northern China to 
Germany. Commerce was of course free to all, but 
railway and mining concessions and in general those 
major enterprises which do not admit of duplication 
and which imply the backing of a whole nation, were 
to be recognized as perquisites of the powers as 
stated. But this policy was abandoned almost as 
soon as started, and Germany embarked upon a policy 
of incontinent commercial conquest of the entire East. 
How far private enterprise was backed by gov- 
ernment subsidy or other aid, and how far it was a 
preliminary to other and more serious designs we 
shall probably never know. Both beliefs were widely 
entertained before the war and subsequent experiences 
have gone far to confirm them. 

At the outbreak of the present war, Germany was 
summarily ejected from Kiaochow by Japan who, for 
the present at least, usurps her place. The total in- 



302 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

terruption of German communications and the pro- 
hibition by the Allies of trade with enemy subjects has 
dealt a staggering blow to German commercial in- 
terests. If the much discussed participation of China 
in the war should become a substantial fact, China 
could seriously injure her great antagonist in at least 
one way, the cancellation of her railway and mining 
concessions and an embargo upon her trade and bank- 
ing. Thus would be effected the complete expulsion 
of Germany from the Far East. 

There remains the American continent. North 
America offers little opportunity, being occupied by 
powers whose subordination is not at present to be 
attempted. Still, North America has not been neg- 
lected. Immense numbers of Germans have come to 
the United States, lost to Germany at first, but for 
the last twenty or thirty years, watched with assiduous 
care by the mother country. Much more than any 
other nation, Germany has adopted the new policy 
of retaining the emigrant by organization and propa- 
ganda. This war has been a revelation of the extent 
to which this policy has been carried and of the re- 
sults attained, results astonishing to us, though dis- 
appointing to Germany. If this war accomplishes 
nothing else, it is much to be hoped that it will brand 
as an unfriendly act the effort of any nation to main- 
tain its own organized nationality within the confines 
of another state. Such an organization, in itself po- 
tential sedition, becomes, when supplemented by the 
incredible espionage of Germany, a permanent in- 
vasion of neighbour states. 

But it is in Latin America thnt Germanv sees her 



THE STORM AREA 303 

opportunity. In this area two or three times the size 
of Europe and twenty to thirty times the size of 
Germany not a single powerful state has developed. 
It contains the largest bulk of tropical land in the 
world except one, territories capable of producing 
everything grown in the tropics in almost limitless 
quantities. The valley of the Amazon alone is said 
to be capable of feeding the entire present population 
of the globe. It contains white man's land enough 
for half a dozen Germanys, not only the temperate 
regions of Argentina and Chile, but the plateaux in a 
large part of Brazil and other tropical regions. 
Finally it controls the second most valuable, — per- 
haps ultimately the most valuable, — trade route 
in the world, Panama. It would indeed be 
strange if Germany had not thought of these possi- 
bilities. 

Americans have been loath to believe in the exist- 
ence of German designs upon this hemisphere, partly 
because of our habitual over-confidence which has led 
us to overlook or misconstrue Germany's inconspicu- 
ous efforts here. We have assumed quite too readily 
that our Monroe Doctrine has deterred Germany 
from making any attempt to acquire a foothold In 
America. There is no warrant for such an assump- 
tion. Germany has not been deterred by any threat 
or fear of our opposition. Bismarck declared the 
Monroe Doctrine a piece of international imper- 
tinence, and German opinion, official and unofficial, 
has been unanimous in its repudiation. Germany has 
held in abeyance her designs affecting the Americas 
because they were of necessity late numbers on her 



304 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

program. A great deal had to be done before the 
final issue was joined in America. It must be Greater 
Germany and not little Germany which should risk 
so vast an undertaking, and hence the consolidation 
of middle Europe must first be accomplished. Nor 
could such a venture be risked until Germany had ac- 
quired control of the sea, for the likelihood that 
Britain would oppose a move so prejudicial to her own 
American Interests was one amounting to certainty. 
The defeat of Britain was therefore a necessary pre- 
liminary. Finally it must be a richer Germany that 
could afford such an undertaking, and hence the de- 
velopment of the industries, not only of Germany, 
but of that whole middle Europe that she counts on 
making into the Greater Germany of the future, must 
first be accomplished if the great penumbra of the 
mighty empire was to be complete. It is with these 
huge preliminaries that Germany is now busy. Her 
industrial development has been pushed with a fever- 
ish energv' that knows no parallel, not merely by the 
stimulus of private emulation but by state pressure 
and state aid, as an indispensable condition of the 
state's aggrandizement. Even this war, so huge as to 
seem the end of all things, was begun and is even now 
regarded by Germany as a preparation for greater 
things. 

But Germany has not been idle in America. It 
was necessary to create here the " interests " that the 
empire in due season would feel called upon to " pro- 
tect." So German commerce with Latin America has 
been stimulated in every possible manner, and Ger- 
man emigration has been skilfully directed to locall- 



THE STORM AREA 305 

ties where it could prosper and retain its German char- 
acter. These locaHties have been chiefly Chile and 
southern Brazil. Argentina, the most promising of 
all, is too large, too populous, and too intensely 
Latin, to be readily influenced by German colonies. 
But Chile and Brazil both have a hybrid population 
with little power of organization or vigorous asser- 
tion. To these, therefore, and especially to the lat- 
ter, German emigration has been directed. Here 
have grown up whole colonies numbering hundreds of 
thousands of Germans and controlling whole prov- 
inces. German is the language spoken and German 
customs are carefully retained. Brazilian citizenship 
has been generally refused. 

What reason have we to believe that Germany con- 
templates anything more than legitimate commerce 
and emigration? This to begin with (not to mention 
published proposals and discussions) that every effort 
is made to keep these settlers from becoming Brazil- 
ian. When Germany encourages her people who set- 
tle in foreign lands to cast in their lot with the people 
of those lands and to give to the new land of their 
adoption allegiance of both lip and heart, learning its 
speech and its ways, and identifying themselves with 
its civilization, then we may assume that Germany 
loyally recognizes the integrity of these countries and 
their right to a permanent place in the family of na- 
tions. Her policy In Latin America has been con- 
spicuously the reverse of this, while unofficial utter- 
ances, at least, have been of a nature to confirm the 
most extreme conclusions. Official disclaimers made 
at a time when Germany was straining every nerve to 



3o6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

prevent our joining the Allies, will deceive none but 
the willing. 

As these words are written, however, more posi- 
tive proof comes to hand. The Brazilian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs announces that the German ambas- 
sador to Argentina has urged his government that the 
time has come to " reorganize " southern Brazil with 
a view to the realization of German purposes, a 
charge substantiated by the publication by our gov- 
ernment of the dispatches of this ambassador. This 
confirms the deepening suspicions of recent years. 

Mention of Latin America in this connection with 
its custody of the Panama Canal, brings us to another 
phase of German expansion, and that not the least 
Important, the annexation of the sea. It Is extremely 
difficult for those who have lived their lives on land 
and are unable to Imagine a habitable earth without 
terra firma under their feet, to think of the sea as a 
territory which millions of human beings can inhabit 
and make yield them a livelihood. But this Is liter- 
ally true, and an expanding population In this age finds 
few better opportunities than to launch out upon the 
sea, put the world under tribute for its carrying serv- 
ice, tap the distance reservoirs of energy to which It 
gives easy access, and bulwark land and empire be- 
hind its redoubtable defences. Like Japan and for 
like reasons, Germany long ago saw her opportunity 
and expressed her decision In the words of the Kaiser : 
" Our future lies on the sea." We are not here con- 
cerned with the Inevitable conflict with Britain which 
this policy of Greater Germany foreshadowed, though 
that conflict Is one which must ultimately decide our 



THE STORM AREA 307 

own fate. But we must remind ourselves of the oft 
repeated truth that such a development of maritime 
interests means a corresponding development of naval 
power, with its inevitable naval stations and its ambi- 
tion to control strategic waterways. The bearing of 
this upon our problem of the Caribbean hardly re- 
quires elaboration. We at present possess the Pan- 
ama Canal and a few miles of adjacent territory, but 
the possession of any defensible site on the borders 
of the Caribbean would jeopardize our possession of 
the Canal and might absolutely paralyse its com- 
merce. With the present status of submarine war- 
fare, it would reach much farther and might destroy 
all commerce on our Atlantic seaboard. When we 
recall Germany's determined attempt to intervene in 
Venezuela, her former opposition to the cession of 
the Danish Islands, her notification that she would not 
acquiesce in our intervention in Hayti, and the recent 
rumour of negotiations for a submarine base in Vene- 
zuela, the danger of German intervention in Carib- 
bean affairs ceases to be speculative. Fortunately, 
the apathy and incredulity of recent years has begun 
to disappear, and it now seems possible that America 
will safeguard her interests before it is too late. 

The danger to America of a German settlement 
south of the equator is less evident, but perhaps not 
less real. A German colony in the rich uplands of 
southern Brazil would inevitably push northward, 
precisely as an English colony in New England 
pushed westward till there was no more land to oc- 
cupy. The indolent Brazilian tropics, despite their 
veneer of western civilization, would oppose no more 



3o8 AMERICA AxMOXG THE NATIONS 

effective opposition to advancing Germany than the 
English encountered from the followers of Massa- 
soit, while the lure of their coveted products would 
tempt eager industrial Germany more than the treas- 
ures of Peru tempted the covetous Spaniard. The 
mastery of South America by the German would be 
as inevitable as was the mastery of North America 
by the Anglo-Saxon. 

The German advance, however, is likely to take a 
more insidious form. The creation of an avowed 
colony may be deemed inexpedient, as likely to invite 
opposition. A possibly wiser policy may be to ac- 
quire influence in Brazil while leaving it nominally 
independent, the policy which Britain has so long suc- 
cessfully maintained toward Portugal. This in any 
case is one phase of German policy. To this end, 
large settlements of Germans, extensive investments 
of German capital, the development of commerce 
with Germany, and the financing of the Brazilian state, 
may all be made to contribute. Few persons are 
aware how far this policy had been advanced toward 
complete control before the outbreak of the present 
war. The decision of Brazil to enter the conflict on 
the side of the Allies is for that country a declaration 
of independence. 

The dispassionate reader can hardly have read the 
foregoing pages without the mental query: "Why 
should Germany not finance Brazil and capture her 
trade? Why should she not possess South America 
as the Anglo-Saxon controls North America? " That 
such control would mean immeasurable improvement, 
no one acquainted with present conditions in South 



THE STORM AREA 309 

America can for a moment doubt. It is the tragedy 
of civilization that the Anglo-Saxon can not bid his 
Teuton cousin godspeed in so beneficent an under- 
taking. Alas, the German Is not content to control 
South America, and such control attained or even 
begun, could not fail to precipitate a struggle be- 
tween these two virile peoples which could end only 
with the destruction of one or the other. The Anglo- 
Saxon is hardly ready, — can hardly be expected, — 
to give the Teuton a place in the sun at the expense 
of himself retiring into the shade. In the interest of 
Teuton and Saxon alike, this internecine struggle 
should be avoided. In due time the writer will ven- 
ture a suggestion as to the possibility of a happier 
outcome. For the moment there can be for the 
Anglo-Saxon but one duty, to resist unsparingly the 
unsparing Teuton advance. 

As we have passed in rapid survey over the dif- 
ferent fields of German imperial enterprise, Oceanica, 
Africa, North Africa, the Far East, America, one 
statement closes every account, — lost in the present 
war. Lost are the coral islands and Samoa. Lost 
are German East Africa and West Africa, Togo and 
Kamerun. Lost, even before the war, were Morocco 
and the coveted Tripolitan port. Lost are Kiaochow 
and the mines of China. Lost, in all probability, are 
the Balkans and Bagdad, the Dardanelles and Con- 
stantinople. Lost, — but no. Here the list ends. 
In one quarter German interests have received no se- 
rious check. Against German aggression In Amer- 
ica, the war has as yet furnished no effectual guar- 
anty. And assuming that present results forecast the 



310 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

final settlement, what is the prospect? Germany, ef- 
fectually checked in every other quarter, can not fail 
to see in America her only opportunity. As yet 
America has been spared because other opportunities 
were more promising or more immediate. What will 
be her fate when she becomes the only opportun- 
ity? Already there have been intimations that Ger- 
many would gladly meet the wishes of her European 
enemies if they would give her a free hand in Amer- 
ica, a proposition to which one power is both shrewd 
enough and generous enough to oppose an unalter- 
able negative. This negative is the only protection 
which America has, outside of its own as yet inade- 
quate forces, against the aggression of the most pow- 
erful and the most unscrupulous nation in the world, 
a nation which war will neither crush nor conciliate, 
and whose energy, — only briefly spent, — will be the 
more effectually directed toward these shores. 

Japan and Germany are the two hungry nations, 
hungry from a vital need. Cramped in their little 
lands, they live in a world that everywhere obevs the 
pitiless law of growth. Only a growth which their 
present territories do not permit can prevent their 
being grown off the face of the earth by peoples like 
unto themselves but blessed with broader lands. 
They will dispossess by any means rather than tamely 
acquiesce in such a fate. Can we resist Japan? Yes, 
if we will. Can we resist Germany? Yes, if we 
put forth our utmost. But neither is the ultimate 
issue. Can we resist them hoiJi should hunger com- 
pel them to make common cause? This is a perpet- 
ual possibility. 



CHAPTER XX 

THE GREATEST EMPIRE 

The British Empire holds a unique place not only 
in Europe but In the world. Unlike other great em- 
pires, past and present, It has its seat In a small Island 
from which centre it asserts an almost Incredible au- 
thority. Japan alone among the great powers Is 
somewhat similarly situated, but the authority of 
Japan extends but little beyond her own Islands, while 
that of Britain covers an area a hundred times that of 
her island, a quarter of the entire globe, while about 
a third of the human race own allegiance to her flag. 

But the nature of this authority is more remark- 
able than its extent. Closely scrutinized It seems to 
fade away and leave nothing tangible, seems in short, 
not to be authority at all. Some one has said that If 
the words " British " and " empire " were stricken 
out of the English language, the British Empire would 
cease to exist, In other words, that the British Empire 
is only a name which is backed by no substantial re- 
ality. Heinrlch von Treitschke declared that the 
British Empire was " a sham," and punctuated his 
anti-British propaganda by the assertion that It was 
not in the nature of things human that a sham should 
endure for ever. Yet despite this absence of anything 
like authority as the world has known it, the fact re- 

311 



312 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

mains that Britain's children come when she calls, — ■ 
that they scarce wait for her calling. They refuse to 
recognize her right to command their services. They 
even refuse to promise voluntary assistance In case 
the mother country should be In straits. Yet that 
service Is rendered and that assistance Is granted with 
a unanimity and a heartiness which no other power 
can surpass. It Is this Inner character of the British 
Empire rather than Its peculiarities, geographic, eth- 
nic, or political, which we need to understand. 

The nucleus of the British Empire consists of the 
islands of Great Britain and Ireland. It Is here that 
the chief dissonance in the empire Is found. Great 
Britain, though peopled by different races, has become 
unified in a very high degree. It is hardly surpassed 
by France, the recognized model of race unity. But 
Ireland has neither entered that unity nor formed a 
unity of her own. Former misrule in Ireland has 
wrought mischief which has not been removed by 
over-representation in the British Parliament and 
other substantial if tardy concessions. Differences of 
religion have sharpened and embittered the conflict. 
But in this and In other respects Ireland is divided 
against herself, A minority of the Irish people, of 
earlier British origin, share the religion, the indus- 
trial character, and the wealth of the larger Island, 
and Insist upon retaining the closest connection with 
It. The less affluent majority, differing in tempera- 
ment, In religion, and in economic status, desire par- 
tial or complete separation, — for here again there is 
no agreement. Local autonomy would seemingly be 
the reasonable and easy solution of this problem 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 313 

were it not for these deepening clefts in Ireland itself. 
The British sympathizing minority not unreasonably 
fear that a majority from whom they have been sepa- 
rated by one of the bitterest feuds that history re- 
cords, will so adjust taxation as to burden those forms 
of industry of which they are the chief owners, or 
otherwise discriminate against them, while the major- 
ity naturally feels that an Irish state can not afford to 
lose its only wealthy constituencies. In turn this ma- 
jority itself is divided into moderates who desire au- 
tonomy and extremists who desire complete separa- 
tion. Probably nowhere in the world can persons of 
alleged intelligence be found who have so little con- 
sciousness of the realities of the world situation as 
these Irish extremists. In our own country espe- 
cially, where irresponsibility is naturally most com- 
plete, their representatives exhaust the possibilities of 
political unpracticality. The effort now being made 
to effect a degree of union among these discordant 
elements, — a union which must naturally precede any 
concession on Britain's part, — would be of absorbing 
interest were it not overshadowed by the tragedy that 
threatens to engulf humanity. 

It may be noted that Ireland as regards area, 
wealth, and population, is a negligible factor in the 
British Empire whose serious interests it continually 
jeopardizes. But the location of Ireland Is such as 
to make it the most strategic of all British possessions. 
Upon its absolute control depends the very existence 
of the Empire. Not the British Parliament but the 
maker of the planet decreed the dependence of Ire- 
land. 



314 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Outside this central nucleus the British Empire con- 
tains a large number of elements differing widely 
from one another in almost every conceivable respect. 
First, there are stations which are essentially fort- 
resses, like Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden. These are 
necessarily under military government (though not 
under martial law), their population, itself little more 
than a camp following, having all necessary safe- 
guards, but no direct voice in matters affecting im- 
perial interests. 

Then there are crown colonies inhabited by popula- 
tions of low development, especially in the tropics. 
These are administered directly by appointees of the 
British Government, a service now governed by tradi- 
tions which are one of the most valuable products of 
human experience. Some of these like Nigeria and 
Guiana are vast territories where native populations 
are and ever must be the chief consideration. Others 
like Singapore and Hong Kong, are mere trading 
posts where a cosmopolitan and exotic population soon 
overshadows the native element. The government 
makes as much or as little use of local citizenship as 
its character permits, a very considerable use in the 
examples last given, although imperial interests are 
still controlled from the imperial centre. 

Rising higher in the scale, we have dependencies 
whose people have developed some capacity for self 
government with the inevitable pride in their own 
forms and outward manifestations which such capac- 
ity implies. With incredible deference, the fruit of 
long experience, Britain preserves these native insti- 
tutions, even their excrescences and defects in which 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 315 

too often a people recognizes its individuality and 
defends Its self-respect. But justice and efficiency be- 
yond anything the native ever knew, are secured by 
the simple device of the " resident " whose unobtru- 
sive admonitions come weighted with the awe of 
Britain. Such are Egypt, the native states of India, 
and the Federated Malay States. 

But Interest chiefly centres in the great self-govern- 
ing " dominions " of Canada, Newfoundland, Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, and South Africa. These in- 
clude nearly two thirds the area of the empire and 
are peopled with men of the British race or men 
capable of easy assimilation. These five dominions 
have acquired entire independence. It is difficult to 
see wherein the Independence of Canada differs in any 
essential respect from that of the United States. It 
has Its own Parliament and passes its own laws on all 
subjects. It Is true that a governor is appointed by 
the British crown, but he holds his office on the strict 
condition that he will do no governing. He has the 
privilege of signing bills passed by Parliament, but 
unlike our president, he has not the privilege of not 
signing them. There can not be the slightest doubt 
that an attempt to veto such a bill would necessitate 
his Instant recall, or falling that, the result would be 
that Canada would withdraw from the empire, as we 
are assured she is free to do at any moment if she 
wishes. No doubt an able governor may be a very 
Influential person, but hardly more so than an able 
British ambassador at Washington, such, for instance, 
as Viscount Bryce. In a sense his Influence Is dis- 
tinctly less than it would be in private station because 



3i6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

of the embargo laid upon all direct political activities 
on his part. 

This obviously gives Canada complete autonomy, 
or freedom to manage her own affairs. But Canada 
has more than autonomy. She has independence. 
She levies her tariffs against Britain quite as against 
other countries. When some years since there was 
an agitation in favour of a lower tariff within the em- 
pire, Canada was careful to remind the British agi- 
tators that that was a matter for her to settle. She 
ultimately made the desired concession, but nothing 
would have extorted it if Britain had questioned her 
right to withhold it. This proud assertion of inde- 
pendence is celebrated in Kipling's poem. Our Lady 
of the Snows. 

" A Nation spoke to a Nation, 

A Queen sent word to a Throne: 
* Daughter am I in my mother's house, 

But mistress in my own. 
The gates are mine to open. 

As the gates are mine to close, 
And I set my house in order,' 

Said our Lady of the Snows." 

In the more vital matter of military co-operation 
Canada has equally asserted her independence. 
When the question was raised in the Canadian Parlia- 
ment whether Canada would pledge her aid to the 
mother country if the latter should be involved in 
war, the subject was debated and the vote was in the 
negative. Canada reserved the right to pass judg- 
ment on the war in question and to help if she felt the 
war to be justified. She none the less was prompt to 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 317 

send troops in the Boer war, and in the present war 
her exertions have surpassed the utmost expectations 
of the empire. 

Finally, Canada reserves independence in the mat- 
ter of treaties with foreign powers. She has repeat- 
edly negotiated treaties with the United States with- 
out British intervention. No doubt this right has 
been exercised with much discretion and with defer- 
ence to British opinion, but hardly more than would 
be shown by any power sustaining close relations of 
commerce and friendship with Great Britain. The 
limit of this freedom has never quite been tested, 
simply because there has been no inclination to test it, 
but British assurance has been publicly given that 
Canada is free to withdraw from the Empire and 
continue as a separate nation or even join the United 
States if she wishes. It would be difficult to imagine 
independence going farther. No doubt if Canada 
should enter a combination hostile to the Empire, 
Britain would take prompt measures in self defence, 
but only as she would do in like case with any state. 

The foregoing applies substantially without change 
to the five " dominions." All are independent na- 
tions held together in a tacit league which does not 
limit in the least their independence or do violence to 
their individuality, but which none the less secures 
the most substantial advantages to all participants. 
It keeps a third of the human race In peace among 
themselves and united in defence against outside ene- 
mies. It provides a court of arbitration for all dif- 
ferences that may arise among the component states, 
a court of immense experience and unrivalled pres- 



3i8 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

tige. And above all it furnishes to a group of grow- 
ing and naturally diverging peoples, a vast unifying 
influence, an imperial oversoul that saves them from 
the pettiness, the provincialism, and the hostilities 
which would otherwise be the inevitable incident of 
their separate development. If Britain finally suc- 
ceeds in lifting such dependencies as India and Egypt 
up to the status of self-governing dominions, the goal 
toward which all effort is at present directed and to- 
ward which clear progress is being made, she will 
crown an achievement which has no parallel. 

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of 
this, the supreme political achievement In the history 
of the world. The problem of the ages has been to 
unite men without crushing them. Union with sub- 
jection of body and spirit and consequent stagnation, 
has been a commonplace of history. Egypt effected 
It four thousand years ago, as China has effected It 
since. Greece escaped It by a strenuous endeavour, 
risking and ultimately losing her all rather than sur- 
render her individuality. But union which should 
secure peace among men, yet leave the varied life of 
every community and every Individual unrepressed In 
all Its infinite suggestiveness, this, though sincerelv at- 
tempted by Rome, has first been measurably accom- 
plished by Britain. 

The system has Its foundation in the great English 
speaking dominions planted In the four corners of 
the earth. Each of these is free to observe and 
criticize the rest, free to experiment, and to copy or 
reject the experiments of others. The reaction of 
these independent dominions, one upon another, gives 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 319 

a dynamic quality to Anglo-Saxon civilization which 
all widely disseminated civilizations have hitherto 
lost. The stagnation which inevitably follows the 
standardizing of human institutions has hitherto been 
the most serious and the most legitimate of all ob- 
jections to the policy of imperialism. At all costs, — 
yes, even at the cost of world wars, — civilization 
must remain dynamic. The instinctive revolt of the 
world against German kultur is due, not to its fright- 
fulness or to any other inherent defect, but to its piti- 
less intolerance. Germany Germanizes whatever she 
acquires. She has sought to Germanize every colony, 
to standardize all her component states. She at one 
time standardized all her universities with the result, 
— as expressed by one of their professors, — of " im- 
mense immediate improvement and no progress 
since." Progress was secured by the sacrifice of 
progressiveness. In a less degree Americans make 
the same mistake. With a fatuous trust in the uni- 
versal applicability of American adaptations, we are 
Americanizing the Filipinos. We have presented 
them with a miniature copy of the American govern- 
ment. Senate, House of Representatives, Cabinet and 
all, which they will wear as a Hottentot wears a top 
hat. We can admire but we can not yet emulate the 
amazing live-and-let-live principle of British organi- 
zation. 

Not less wonderful than the dominions with their 
utter freedom and their elusive spiritual bond, are the 
great dependencies, like India and Egypt, in their em- 
bodiment of the same great principle. They are not 
independent like the dominions simply because they 



320 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

can not be. " Liberty is not a gift; it is an achieve- 
ment," It is not a thing to be granted, but a thing 
to be wrought out in the structure of the body politic. 
If independence were granted, they could not main- 
tain their position in the peaceable family of nations. 
They could not even maintain coherence within their 
borders. Independence with rapine and famine 
within and war without, is not an achievement. Of 
that the world has known no lack. If these desolat- 
ing experiences are to be avoided, these fundamental 
conditions of peace must be imposed where they can 
not be self-developed, as they are imposed upon the 
backward individual by those who are compelled to 
accept his companionship. Bengali and Slahratta 
must not fly at each other's throats nor wreck the land 
and waste the folk with famine. The needful contri- 
bution of the tropics to modern civilization must not 
be interrupted. But these fundamentals once guar- 
anteed, the vast routine of administration is left to the 
native machinery. It is not only permitted to do this 
work, it is encouraged to do it, helped to do it, made 
to do it, saved from the mistakes that would wreck it 
or turn it into an engine of destruction. Britain 
could do the work better, but only with the destruc- 
tion of that vital principle upon which all growth de- 
pends, the people's consciousness that the work is 
theirs, theirs with its privileges, theirs with its re- 
sponsibilities, theirs with its opportunities and its door 
into the limitless future. Said an Indian native 
prince to a Briton: " You British would administer 
this country much better than I do, but my people 
would rather see me ride into town on my elephant 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 321 

than enjoy the best administration on earth." And 
his people made the natural, the inevitable, choice. 

With all its marvels, however, the British Empire 
has long been recognized as an unfinished structure, 
and with the development of its dependencies and the 
growth of its dominions, that incompleteness has be- 
come more apparent. The task of arbitrating the 
differences that arise between members of the im- 
perial family, — differences as serious as those be- 
tween any nations in the world, — and of champion- 
ing their cause against outsiders, necessarily devolved 
at first upon the mother country. In the helplessness 
of Infancy and' childhood, parental arbitration and 
protection are appropriate and Inevitable, but as 
youth strains toward manhood, restiveness betrays 
the consciousness of new powers and new needs. As 
the parental sphere becomes more restricted, Its task 
becomes more delicate. The same great ends must 
still be accomplished, but by Indirection, by counsel 
rather than by authority. Nor is the need one-sided, 
but rather mutual. 

The growing need In Britain has been for some 
organ suitable for the exercise of truly Imperial au- 
thority. The British Parliament, theoretically the 
source of all authority, represents In fact only the 
British Isles. It is suited for the management of 
their affairs and Is more than needed for them alone. 
To add representatives from the dominions would 
unfit it for the management of local affairs, while giv- 
ing It doubtful fitness for imperial functions. The 
spiritual bond of the empire was ideal in its way, but 
there were concrete things of an Imperial sort to do. 



322 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

and there was need of a concrete instrument to do 
them. 

Yet imperial federation, though a recognized need 
in some form, has been dreaded alike by England and 
by the dominions. England has been too long the 
acknowledged ruler of the empire to take very kindly 
to the idea of sitting in council with her colonies as 
equals. There seems to be an element of presump- 
tion in such a proposal. On the other hand, the do- 
minions are too jealous of their independence to will- 
ingly submit to any abridgment of it, even by a coun- 
cil in which they have a share. For instance, India 
insists on the right of her people as British subjects 
to travel and settle anywhere in the British Empire, 
while Australia absolutely refuses to admit Asiatics to 
the dominion. Suppose a council of the Empire 
should decide in favour of India's contention. The 
bare possibility of such a decision is sufficient to as- 
sure Australia's veto. For remember, no dominion 
can be coerced into such a union. 

The impossible seems nevertheless to have been 
accomplished by this war which has dissolved so much 
of the older fabric of civilization. When the British 
Cabinet was reconstituted and five members became 
the real rulers of the British Empire, the astute Lloyd 
George, perceiving that the paternalism of England 
and the provincialism of the dominions had alike dis- 
solved in the fiery ordeal of war, summoned the prime 
ministers of the dominions to Eondon to an " Im- 
perial Conference " to consider plans for the conduct 
of the war and decide upon the terms on which the 
Empire would be willing to make peace. It was an 



THE GREATEST EMPIRE 323 

innocent and natural looking proposal. What more 
reasonable than that these partners in the struggle 
should deliberate regarding their common and vital 
interests. Yet it was an immense innovation. It was 
England that had made plans for other wars and 
decided the terms of peace. But now it is the Em- 
pire. With a great price the dominions had bought 
their citizenship. 

This Council once brought together and the British 
mind wonted to its obviously reasonable task, the 
bold premier quietly announces in a newspaper inter- 
view that the prime ministers of the dominions will 
remain in council after the war; that their countries 
will miss them, but that they must get along without 
them ; that they must stay in London and help govern 
the British Empire. In such unobtrusive fashion 
does this greatest of empires announce the revision 
of its venerable constitution and the inauguration of 
a new era. Later reports are to the effect that the 
Council will meet annually hereafter. Imperial fed- 
eration is an accomplished fact. 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 

The relation of the United States to a power which 
holds a third of humanity in fief could not but be a 
fact of the first importance, even without kinship or 
close historic connection. But when It is remem- 
bered that it is to this empire that we owe our origin, 
that we are one of its seceding members, that its lan- 
guage, its literature, its institutions, its entire civiliza- 
tion are essentially identical with our own, and that 
the relations between the two, commercial, political, 
and cultural, have always been of the closest, the im- 
portance of this relation easily overshadows all other 
facts of a political order in the world. This relation 
is of course a historic product, a thing made possible 
by the events of three hundred years. Equally, any 
future relation which may exist betw^een the two coun- 
tries must be an outgrowth of the present and the 
past. There is talk from time to time of an Anglo- 
Saxon alliance. The reader will perhaps have dis- 
covered ere this that the writer has very little faith in 
our power to institute vital relations of helpfulness 
between nations by formal agreement. For thirty- 
years Italy was in league \\nth Germany and Austria, 
yet when the crisis came, she took the other side. 
Why? Because she was on the other side all the 

324 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 325 

time. Historic conditions had created between her- 
self and Austria a relation of antagonism which no 
formal league could remove. This war has been a 
continuous revelation of the inability of formal agree- 
ments to modify the actualities of historic evolution. 
In the light of these facts, the desirability of an 
Anglo-Saxon alliance is a question of minor interest. 
No matter how desirable co-operation between the 
two great Anglo-Saxon groups might be, a formal 
alliance will not secure it. It Is but a moderate hy- 
perbole to say that if we haven't a union, we can not 
get it, and if we have it, we can not get rid of it. The 
real question Is, therefore, what has been and what 
is the relation between the two countries. We have 
not to do with formal and official relations except 
as they, like straws upon the surface, sometimes be- 
tray the direction of deeper currents. Even overt 
acts, friendly or hostile, are of secondary Importance. 
The Important thing, If we can discover it, is the 
mutual reaction of race instincts, past and present, 
for upon these alone can be based a safe prophecy 
of the future. 

As we glance backward over our mutual history the 
first facts that obtrude themselves are the two wars 
which we have fought with Britain. It is a signifi- 
cant fact that Britain Is the only country with 
which we have been twice at war. A closer Inventory 
discloses numerous points of friction, involving more 
or less prolonged periods of strained relations, the 
Maine boundary, the Oregon controversy, the long 
drawn out Isthmian Canal dispute, the Venezuelan 
boundary case, the Behring Sea controversy, and 



326 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

others. There was decided friction between the two 
powers In Hawaii and Samoa before the final settle- 
ment, with occasional acts far from creditable to 
either side. Finally, and perhaps more unpleasantly 
remembered that anything else, there was unfor- 
tunate hesitation on the part of the British govern- 
ment during our civil war, with much private aid and 
some official encouragement to the Confederacy. 
These facts, hardly to be matched by any like array 
in connection with any other nation, have Impressed 
the popular imagination and given colour to the belief 
that Britain was our traditional enemy. This tradi- 
tion continued with us until our war with Spain, when 
for the first time Incidents of the dramatic sort that 
the popular imagination loves, began to array them- 
selves on the other side. 

Despite these facts and in the face of this long- 
standing tradition, it may safely be asserted that the 
relation between the two countries, — and more par- 
ticularly the attitude of Britain, — has never been one 
of serious hostility, nor has our membership In the 
Anglo-Saxon fellowship (which Is the substance of 
the British Empire) ever been cancelled. We have 
become independent, but so have Canada and Aus- 
tralia. We have declared our Independence, but so 
have they, over and over again. We fought for 
our independence, — and for theirs, — and Britain 
fought for it too, fought with us against a king who 
acted without her warrant and against a theory of 
government that she had repudiated with the sword 
a century before. Britain protects Canada and Aus- 
tralia, but she also protects us. She has stood by us 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 327 

from the first, and in every crisis of our history she 
has tipped the scale in our favour. Canada and Aus- 
traha, uncoerced, proffer their aid to Britain, and so 
do we, in this, the first crisis sufficiently serious to re- 
quire our aid. Granting that the relation Is less close 
than in the case of Canada, that we have more dis- 
tinctive symbols, and that our political and social 
forms are more divergent from the original type, 
these facts qualify but little the general truth of our 
essential oneness as manifested in the history of the 
last hundred and fifty years. The superlative im- 
portance of this fact warrants a brief but careful in- 
quiry. 

The seeming hostility between the two countries Is 
most in evidence In our war of independence. Yet 
It is not too much to say that the loyalty of Britain 
was never more manifest than In that very struggle. 
It Is a truism of history that the British king at that 
time was engaged In a last forlorn attempt to rule 
without the consent of his people. This policy, en- 
joined upon him by a masterful but imprudent 
mother, was resented In England and the colonies 
alike. It was too late In the day for the monarch 
to attempt a coup d'etat and abolish representative 
institutions. What he tried to do was to corrupt 
them. In theory the responsibility of the Cabinet to 
Parliament and through It to the people was re- 
spected, but a parliamentary majority was maintained 
against the will of the people by bribery. It was this 
anti-English government which attempted to govern 
both colonies and England without their consent, and 
was resisted by both and at last overthrown by both. 



328 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Not that the English people had as yet formulated 
the principles of their present imperial policy. The 
empire as a fellowship of uncoerced states had come 
into being unawares, a thing without precedent. Its 
essence was intangible and elusive. There were no 
names for it. The traditions of government did not 
fit it, and inevitably led to misapprehension. The 
seers were few who recognized in the accident of 
frontier independence united with the tradition of 
allegiance, the principle of a new world order, but 
still there were seers. When this principle was put 
to the inevitable test, what more natural than that 
each party should at first construe independence as 
the end of union? But because In advance of this 
assumed separation they had not appreciated the bond 
that bound them, so afterwards they did not appre- 
ciate that it bound them still. 

But the crowning proof of the attitude of Britain 
at this time is to be found in the peace negotiations 
following the surrender of Cornwallis. France and 
the colonies, allies in the war, — which was in fact but 
a frontier episode in a great European struggle, — 
had made the usual agreement not to make peace ex- 
cept in co-operation. When the time for peace came, 
the real race instincts asserted themselves. 

It seems ungracious, at a time when the world 
unites in homage to French heroism and unostenta- 
tious sacrifice, to question the tradition, — never so 
acceptable as now, — of the friendship of France in 
the days of our need. It may lessen our scruples 
somewhat to recall that the France with which we 
had then to deal was not the free France of our day, 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 329 

was indeed hardly France at all, but the government 
of Louis XV and Pompadour which with little war- 
rant assumed to act in her name. That this govern- 
ment gave us help is not to be questioned. That It 
did so from friendship Is much more doubtful. 

France had been at war with England for a century 
over India, America, and other dependencies. She 
had lost everything on the heights of Quebec only a 
few years before. She was not ready to accept that 
verdict as final, and seeing an opportunity by a power- 
ful European alliance to reverse it, she attacked once 
more her redoubtable foe. To detach the American 
colonies was but one of her many objects. It was 
the only one In which she succeeded. Her further 
object was to so detach them that they would be de- 
pendent upon herself, a plan unpleasantly suggestive 
of reconquest. For this she relied upon the peace 
negotiations. When the time came she procrastinated 
and manoeuvred to secure American subserviency be- 
fore entering upon the negotiations. It was even sug- 
gested that the colonies should not ask England to 
recognize their independence, but should allow France 
to guarantee It Instead, a suggestion the purport of 
which hardly requires discussion. 

Meanwhile the English king had failed In his at- 
tempt to rule without consent, and the English people 
had come Into their own. At once the friendship 
which they had manifested toward the colonies 
throughout the war made Itself felt In the councils of 
government. And now comes one of the most as- 
tounding paradoxes of history. England connived 
with her rebellious colonies to rescue them from the 



330 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

clutch of France. The story of that clandestine peace 
forced upon the French minister, despite his undis- 
guised indignation, perhaps reflects little honour upon 
our plighted faith at that time, but it reveals as 
hardly anything else could have done the underlying 
bond between Anglo-Saxon kin. The secret clause 
in this treaty by which it was agreed that the northern 
boundary of Florida was to be latitude thirty-two 
thirty if Florida was finally assigned to Britain, and 
thirty-one if Florida went to Spain, was a further in- 
dication of Britain's willingness to favour the colo- 
nies, though independent, as against any other power. 
After this peace events moved rapidly in Europe. 
The fountains of the great deep were broken up in 
the French Revolution, and from the turmoil emerged 
Napoleon. England was the supreme obstacle to his 
plan of world empire, and against her he hurled all 
his might. Fler supreme reliance was her fleet which 
held the " tight little isle " inviolate. Never since 
its history began has Britain's navy been subjected to 
so rude a test. Not a ship or a sailor could be 
spared, if the great fabric of Britain's empire was to 
escape a destruction that should leave not one stone 
upon another. But these were days of harsh disci- 
pline and imperfect patriotism on both sides the An- 
glo-Saxon sea. American ships became harbours of 
refuge for deserting British seamen, their patriotism 
being matched by that of American soldiers at that 
time, of whom we are told that 400,000 were drafted 
during the ensuing war, while never more than 6,000 
were under arms at one time. In her attempt to sup- 
press desertion, Britain resorted to the high-handed 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 331 

measures that any nation will adopt when its existence 
is at stake. We were too far away to feel our in- 
terests involved in the struggle and too much under 
the influence of recent war traditions to feel the bond 
of kinship. The result was one of the most impru- 
dent as it was one of the most inglorious wars of all 
history. Despite brilliant isolated combats on the 
sea, the result was for us humiliating defeat. Our 
territory was invaded, our army defeated, and — in 
symbol of subjection, — our capitol was burned. 

It is difficult to say to which side this war was the 
more distasteful. All kinds of motives mingled to 
produce the Increasing disgust which led both parties 
to seek a shamefaced peace. Among these motives, 
however, there was not wanting the consciousness 
that the war was fratricidal and an ethnic absurdity. 
There was no weak sentimentality about It, but a mas- 
culine disgust at the nagging family feud which far 
more wholesomely betrayed the sense of essential 
community of Interest. 

It is interesting, however, to note the terms of 
peace. There can be no question that America was 
beaten, no question that we might have been forced 
to acknowledge British suzerainty. Britain was over- 
whelmingly superior, and in December, 18 14, when 
peace was made, the menace of Napoleon seemed at 
an end. Both the navy and the armies employed 
against that supreme antagonist might have been 
turned against us. Yet the first article of the treaty 
stipulates for mutual restoration of territory and 
property taken during the war, while its one con- 
structive article is a pledge of co-operation in sup- 



332 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

pressing the slave trade. The Issues which had 
caused the war were not mentioned. They had 
passed with the emergency that created them. 

The terms of this treaty are astounding. Britain 
had us, and she gave us bacls. to ourselves. And 
forthwith the two resume their co-operation In the 
great work of humanity which stands primarily to the 
credit of the Anglo-Saxon, all as a matter of course. 
Amazing that It should be so; still more amazing that 
It should not amaze us. 

It is appropriate to bear in mind this common ef- 
fort against the slave trade, when we note that in 
the next conspicuous episode of our history Britain 
was unsympathetic. The annexation of Texas which 
resulted in war with Mexico, was opposed by 
Britain and France. It is perhaps of all our Imperi- 
alistic moves the one which commands least sym- 
pathy among ourselves. The reason Is that It was 
avowedly a movement for the extension of slavery. 
Doubtless later events have reconciled the Anglo- 
Saxon family to the action of Its one-time black sheep, 
but we can hardly wonder that at the time It met with 
reproof. Not that British coldness at this time was 
purely ethical or philanthropic. The Oregon feud 
was at Its height. Nations like Individuals, and even 
more than individuals, are always largely influenced 
by considerations of self Interest. But moral sym- 
pathies are always a powerful factor, and often turn 
the scale, as they did In this case when we forfeited 
them, and as they did in the next crisis when the life 
of the nation depended upon them. 

Probably no single situation in our national history 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 333 

Is the subject of more misapprehension than our re- 
lation to European nations during the civil war. The 
legend Is that Britain and France were hostile to the 
Union cause, and that only the Intervention of Russia 
prevented their recognizing the Confederacy and de- 
ciding the war In Its favour. 

The myth of Russian friendship may be readily 
disposed of. There can be no question that the visit 
of the Russian fleet to New York at a critical mo- 
ment In the war was a most fortunate accident, and 
that It exerted much Influence upon nations whose in- 
terference we had reason to dread. But It seems to 
have been proven beyond question that the coinci- 
dence was an accident, and that Russia was unaware 
of the crisis In which she so fatefully Intervened. 
Nor is there anything in her attitude, before or since, 
to warrant the assumption of friendship toward the 
United States. 

We are chiefly concerned, however, with the atti- 
tude of Britain. It is well to remember at the outset 
that this was a civil war, not a war between ourselves 
and a foreign state. Hesitation was therefore 
natural, even to one committed to sympathy with 
America, for both parties were American. The situ- 
ation was further complicated by the fact that the 
southern states were at that time the sole purveyors 
of raw material to one of the greatest of British in- 
dustries, — cotton. Whole districts In England were 
devoted to this Industry, and failure to get cotton 
condemned the operatives to Idleness and almost to 
starvation. Yet our blockade closed southern ports 
and cut off the supply almost absolutely. Men would 



334 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

be superhuman who would acquiesce without protest 
in such a situation, and a government that did not try 
to secure the conditions of existence for its people 
would be guilty of a breach of trust. The British 
government did try by every available means to open 
the southern ports, and considered seriously the ques- 
tion of recognizing the Confederate government. 

It was in the face of this imminent peril that our 
government sent its ambassadors, not to the British 
government, but to the English people. The elo- 
quent Henry Ward Beecher in particular was charged 
with this delicate mission. The story as told to the 
writer by a contemporary, is more than a romance. 
Landing at Liverpool he appealed at once to the cot- 
ton operatives of Lancashire. They were hungry, 
sullen, and boisterous. The great orator was 
greeted with a shower of venerable eggs. Nothing 
daunted, he cracked a joke at the expense of his un- 
gallant opponents, and was rewarded by a laugh. 
That was his opportunity, and building upon this mo- 
ment of fleeting sympathy, he launched out upon his 
defence of the Union cause and his plea for human 
freedom. There was silence, then applause, then an 
ovation. Fame preceded him to the next town, and 
the next, until his journey toward London became a 
triumphal progress. Aud folloiiing him came a peti- 
tion from these operatives of LancasJiire to their gov- 
ernment^ praying that they should not recognize a 
government based on hitman slavery. Much has 
been said of the British statesmen of the time, of Mr. 
Gladstone and his momentary defection from the high 
principles to which his life was devoted, but what 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 335 

shall be said of a nation that pours out its gratitude 
to an autocracy whose navy strays in unwittingly at an 
opportune moment, and withholds it from a free peo- 
ple who will to hunger for its sake ? 

During the years that followed the civil war, there 
was a strange dissonance between the two peoples. 
American cockeyness was much in evidence in the po- 
litical rally, the partisan press, and, — most regret- 
table of all, — in those travesties upon fact, the text- 
books of our public schools. The writer recalls the 
time when certain American statesmen, who for the 
last twenty years have been staunch friends of Britain, 
were making their bid for favour by the ever popular 
method of twisting the lion's tail. In England there 
were few such utterances, — and no such textbooks. 
It is difficult to say whether friendship for America 
was purposely fostered or was a spontaneous mani- 
festation, but fostering is impossible without a meas- 
ure of spontaneity. The important thing is that 
British friendship was a fact. 

The Spanish war was a revelation to the American 
people of its status with European nations. The 
writer had the misfortune to live In Germany during 
that period. To enlarge upon his experiences and 
observations at that time would be unpleasantly in- 
structive. His command of the language saved him 
from the worst of that brutal browbeating which sent 
back most of his fellow American students of the 
time embittered for life against the nation which 
seemed to be leagued to a man in a campaign of mis- 
representation and slander against a nation which 
they had elected to hate. Time and time again he 



2^6 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

has witnessed from his window a squad of newsboys 
go dashing down the street crying: "Extra! Ex- 
tra ! Great Spanish victory," and the diminutive 
sheets were sold for ten pfennigs each, as fast as they 
could be handed out. Never was an American vic- 
tory announced. Never did one of these announce- 
ments contain even a nucleus of truth. All were ut- 
ter inventions. Yet the hoax never failed to work. 
A press venal beyond anything we know, coined thus 
the hate of the people for its nefarious gain. Ameri- 
cans in Paris in those days were not much happier 
than those in Berlin. Not until a boycott was insti- 
tuted against the gowns and millinery of this capital 
of fashion was civility in some measure restored. 

It was all very natural. America was suddenly 
emerging from her isolation and appeared upon the 
scene as a disconcerting factor in the plans of Europe. 
But why this instant brace against us? Why not at 
least an attempt to win our favour, to make us sub- 
servient to their own far-reaching designs? The an- 
swer is simple. They were then enemies of Britain, 
and they knew, when we did not, that the Anglo- 
Saxons were one. 

They knew, and Britain knew. Nothing could be 
more striking than the contrast between her attitude 
and that of the countries noted. Popular manifesta- 
tions of sympathy were innumerable, and there was 
now no reason why government should not follow 
suit. This it did in many ways, and with results that 
we can hardly yet appreciate. We have recently 
learned from Lord Cromer, at that time British ad- 
ministrator of Eg>'pt, how he " stretched " British 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 337 

neutrality in such a way as to prevent the reinforce- 
ment of the Spanish fleet at Manila, Doubtless other 
British authorities did the same as occasion offered. 
Neutrality is an imperfectly defined thing and leaves 
a wide margin of liberty to those who are called 
upon to interpret its obligations. 

Britain's attitude, however, is best revealed by the 
famous incident of Manila Bay which, though elabo- 
rated by the inevitable myth faculty into a pictur- 
esqueness and symmetry somewhat in excess of fact, 
none the less represents, perhaps even more truly than 
mere fact, the actualities of the situation. This in- 
deed is the very function of myth. Actual happen- 
ings usually interpret but partially the logic of the 
situation. Myth gives to fragmentary fact the logi- 
cal completeness necessary for interpretation. Cam- 
bronne is recorded as saying at Waterloo: "The 
Guard dies but never surrenders." He did not die 
but lived to deny that he ever said it. But that is 
what he ought to have said, for the Guard refused 
to surrender and perished, leaving their leader 
wounded in their midst. Myth puts in his mouth the 
appropriate words. This is said to forestall the in- 
evitable criticism that the incident is a " Dewey myth." 
Be this as it may, it is certain that It essentially re- 
cords the facts concerning one of the most critical 
situations in which our country was ever placed. 
The story is here given as it is told in Manila. 

It was foreseen in Europe that America must needs 
destroy the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay as a protec- 
tion to her Pacific commerce. It was also realized, — 
better in Europe than with us, — that this would para- 



338 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

lyse Spanish power in the Philippines and leave the 
islands to be appropriated by any power so minded. 
One power, for reasons already stated, was decidedly 
so minded. A powerful German fleet was dispatched 
to Manila Bay with instructions which may be sur- 
mised from what follows. It is said to have been 
far superior to the fleet of Admiral Dewey. 

The Spanish fleet was destroyed as expected, and 
the expected situation resulted. The Spaniards, in ill 
favour with the natives, would have perished If left 
to their fate. Dewey, perceiving their danger, re- 
mained and sent for assistance. Meanwhile, his fleet 
policed the bay and protected Manila. Anchorages 
were assigned as usual by harbour authorities, and 
movements In the harbour were forbidden after nine 
o'clock at night. Here was a test case for the Ger- 
man commander. To obey these Instructions was to 
recognize, tacitly at least, American authority in the 
Philippines. This authority was precisely what the 
German fleet had come there to challenge. The Ger- 
man fleet ostentatiously shifted its anchorage after 
nine o'clock. The next morning Admiral Dewey, 
who is believed to have conferred in the meantime 
with the captain of a single British cruiser then in 
the harbour, sent peremptory word to the German 
admiral bidding him keep the anchorage assigned and 
adding, — popular report may have modified the 
phraseology, — that " if he wanted fight he could 
have It at the drop of the hat." 

It was now the German's turn to visit the British 
captain of whom he is said to have asked: " What 
would you do in the event of trouble between Ad- 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 339 

miral Dewey and myself? " To which he is said to 
have repHed: "What I would do in that event is 
known only to Admiral Dewey and myself," It was 
further noticed that the British cruiser had taken a 
position exactly between that of the German and the 
American flagships, symbolical of the position so long 
occupied by the navy which it represented. There 
was no trouble between the American and German 
fleets. 

Whatever criticism may take from this expressive 
story, the main facts are certain. The German fleet 
was sent to Manila, and its purpose can have been 
none other than that here indicated. That there was 
friction between the two commanders is also certain, 
as is the fact that the commander of the more power- 
ful fleet backed down before the commander of the 
weaker fleet and the representative of the weaker 
power. That this was done through either fear of or 
regard for the United States, is unthinkable in the 
light of recent events. Whether Germany had a 
right to seek to annex the Philippines, or whether we 
did wisely in annexing them, is not now the question. 
The moral of the story is that to accomplish her own 
ends, Germany was willing to risk war with the 
United States, and that Britain interposed her veto. 
Germany has always been willing to risk war with us 
to accomplish her ends, and Britain has always inter- 
posed her veto. We have ample assurance that Ger- 
many has intimated to Britain her willingness to con- 
cede all demands in the old world on condition that 
she be allowed a free hand in the new, and that the 
offer has been summarily rejected. Britain is pour- 



340 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

Ing out her blood to win what she could hav^e had long 
ago by bartering our safety. That she has had her 
own interest in view in protecting our interests, does 
not lessen the value of that protection. 

It seems clear that in the years immediately preced- 
ing the present war Britain has been far more con- 
scious than we of the essential unity of the Anglo- 
Saxon world. Her dealings with the great domin- 
ions which despite their stoutly asserted independence 
are so indisputably one with herself, have doubtless 
accustomed her to the idea of an underlying unity as 
nothing in our experience has done. Moreover, her 
position in Europe, on the firing line of the great race 
struggle, has taught her, as we have not been taught, 
the necessity of race solidarity, if the Anglo-Saxon 
civilization is to resist the dangers which threaten it. 
Of the whole Anglo-Saxon fellowship, none have felt 
so little, or had so little occasion to feel, the reality of 
that fellowship as ourselves. 

Yet there are plain indications that through all 
the years we have unconsciously recognized it. Said 
an educated German in the first year of the war: 
*' I can not understand you Americans. You are a 
perfect riddle to me. To think that you do not see 
your chanee now to seize Canada! " The writer was 
simply stunned by a remark so stupid. What reply 
was possible to a man who could talk or think like 
that? He tried in imagination to carrv the conversa- 
tion further. " But we do not want Canada. We 
have room enough." Imagine his German scorn. 
" You do not want Canada, you who grasped at New 
Brunswick and wrangled for Oregon, and defied your 



THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP 341 

constitution to get Louisiana and made war to get 
California? You want the earth. You have room 
enough ? Did you need room when you got Louisiana 
or Florida? " " But Canada is distinct in institutions 
and in her unassimilated French population." " But 
haven't you the same population and institutions in 
Louisiana? Are they more alien than the Mexicans 
of New Mexico? And how about the Porto Ricans 
and the Filipinos?" "But strategic considerations 
played a part in some of these annexations." 
" Strategic considerations! Is there a frontier in the 
world so exposed as your northern frontier? An 
arbitrary line which is neither defended nor defens- 
ible, you should annex Canada for that reason alone, 
even though all else forbade. No, your policy re- 
mains a mystery. You have been the most aggressive 
and imperialist nation on earth. No nation has an- 
nexed so often, so indiscriminately, so heedless of race 
or sentiment or defence, as you. And here you have 
your one supreme opportunity, an opportunity fa- 
voured by every consideration, a territory indissolubly 
united with your own and crippled for lack of you as 
you for lack of it, a territory which links up your 
present domains, a territory peopled with your own 
race, largely with your own emigrants, the chance of 
all chances, and you do not take it, do not see it. It 
is strange." 

And slowly the realization came that it is strange. 
Yet it is true. We do not want Canada. Nothing 
is surer than that. It isn't simply that we do not 
want to coerce her. That of course. But we do not 
even wish that she wanted to come. It is a marvel 



342 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

that we feel so, when we remember how we have felt 
toward all other neighbours. Why is it? 

The answer is simple, but one which our keen wit- 
ted German could never understand. Jf'e haze Can- 
ada. The arbitrary line which separates us is at 
once the most indefensible and the safest frontier 
on earth. The historic accidents that separate the 
two countries have given one more precious centre of 
individuality and race initiative, that anti-toxin for 
the stagnation which is too wont to follow the union 
of the families of men, but they have in no way 
jeopardized that fundamental unity which has its 
seat, — not in that consciousness where we coquette 
so often with fickle fancies, but in the deep uncon- 
scious instincts which guard our being. 

For us the supreme phenomenon of the present war 
is the lifting of this unconscious sense of race unity 
up into the light of consciousness. We were united 
before; now we know it. For years we have dwelt 
care-free within the precincts of our race. We have 
put our unthinking trust in Its far-flung battle-line 
and thought only of the prowess of our own right 
arm and Its wooden sword. With a confidence born 
of long Immunity, we have indulged in doubtful 
amenities, our heads given up to little feuds, while 
the heart kept the citadel. And now of a sudden the 
citadel Is assaulted by a host that has sworn not to 
leave one stone upon another. At the call of the 
heart we recognize that It Is our citadel. We have 
found ourselves and the race has saved its soul. 
There was no other salvation. 



CHAPTER XXII 

FORECAST 

It is difficult to see whence we came, but far more 
difficult to see whither we are going. Yet whence 
we came matters little save as it tells us whither we 
are going. History is nothing If it does not end 
in prophecy. With all deference these slight sug- 
gestions are offered in an attempt to complete our 
task by projecting somewhat into the future the 
movement which we have been following. 

We face the future always with two questions, 
what is going to happen, and what can we do to make 
things happen right? To the novice the second 
question seems the more important. The need for 
intelligent intervention and constructive mechanism 
is urgent. There is a temptation to overlook or 
undervalue the unobtrusive building forces of life, 
and to put our trust in contrivance and device, In 
things that men have thought out and determined 
upon, Instead of things wrought unawares by instincts 
that ask no sanction of intellect or will. 

With the new consciousness of this larger race 
unity something of this spirit comes upon us. What 
can we do to hasten a consummation so devoutly to 
be wished? Would It not be well to have an Anglo- 
British alliance duly documented and attested to de- 

343 



344 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

fine our mutual obligations? Is It not highly im- 
portant that we mutually pledge ourselves to arbitrate 
our differences and prescribe in advance the pro- 
cedure to be followed? Would it not be desirable 
that we should have a representative in the Imperial 
Conference, that council of our race? These and 
other well-meant suggestions which are increasingly 
heard, are the natural expression of this new con- 
sciousness that we are one race and that we stand or 
fall together. 

The writer will hardly be suspected of unsympathy 
or indifference if he confesses his doubts as to the 
efficacy or the need of these devices. A little reflec- 
tion on the proposals here suggested will be peculiarly 
enlightening as to the nature of the forces with which 
we have to deal. 

Arbitration is the most obvious possibility, a pos- 
sibility long since recognized. There can be no ques- 
tion that the two countries have now reached a point 
where they can arbitrate their differences, or better 
still, where they can settle them by the simpler pro- 
cess of friendly conference. How much does it help 
under such circumstances to promise that we will so 
settle them? It is a little like asking gentlemen and 
friends to promise to be mutually polite, harmless 
perhaps, but superfluous. Nor is a prescribed pro- 
cedure so likely to fit the case as an improvised one, 
for it must be made by guess before the circumstances 
are known. 

A formal alliance, too, even though aimed at the 
very thing that all desire, would probably hinder 
union rather than promote it. Co-operation in 



FORECAST 345 

minor matters in which the two countries are un- 
equally concerned, is obviously undesirable. An al- 
liance could cover only matters of supreme import- 
ance. How draw the line? The trouble is that the 
line must be drawn in the dark. When we plan be- 
forehand, we have to deal with hypothetical situa- 
tions. But real situations, when they appear, have a 
perverse way of not fitting into prearranged schedules. 
It is always the unexpected that happens. When 
this war broke out, Italy and Roumania were in al- 
liance with the Central Powers, and Greece with 
Serbia, all sincerely enough, no doubt, but the situa- 
tion developed so unexpectedly when the time came, 
that all disposition to keep their promises vanished. 
In such cases, nothing is easier than to find a pretext 
for breaking them, and the only result of the alliance 
is to give to the injured party a new and more tangi- 
ble grievance. This war is in a sense a war of prin- 
ciples as well as of peoples. The Central Powers 
were bound by alliances. They had it all nominated 
in the bond. The others had an entente, an under- 
standing, which specified little and was hardly more 
than a common consciousness of a developing situa- 
tion. The entente has suffered no disillusionment, 
while the alliances have largely broken down. 

Formal representation in an Imperial Council 
which should thus become both the organ and the visi- 
ble symbol of our race unity, is an attractive proposal, 
the more so as it would not necessarily lessen our ef- 
fective independence. There is little question, too, 
that opportunity for such co-operation will present 
itself in the near future and that it can be made per- 



346 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

manent if we so desire. It seems inevitable, too, 
that there will be intermittent occasion for these de- 
liberations of the great family from this time forth. 
The temptation to make of such a council a standing 
board of directors to manage the largest body of 
political interests in the world appeals strongly to 
those who welcome this great unity. 

But it is all but certain that such an arrangement, 
if formal and authoritative, would produce friction 
rather than harmony between the two peoples. Ad- 
justments which are now possible and which should 
become increasingly easy through mutual concession, 
would be resented if imposed by an Imperial Council. 
Independence is still the paramount sentiment, not 
only with us, but with every Anglo-Saxon people. 
The suspicion that it was limited by the new arrange- 
ment would at once operate as a divisive force. 

It can not be denied that there would be some 
ground for such a suspicion. It must not be forgot- 
ten that, with all their unity, the Anglo-Saxon peoples 
bristle with differences, and that it is to these very 
differences, in large part, that they owe their dynamic 
character and power. It is the glory of the Anglo- 
Saxon that he has discovered the secret of unity with- 
out uniformit}% and that secret consists largely in the 
avoidance of mechanism. A mill is always looking 
for grist. Create an organ of imperial unity, and it 
will inevitably be tempted to magnify its function. 
Local eccentricities of healthy growth to which evo- 
lution must look for its " useful variations," would 
be the subject of its unconscious disparagement. The 
tendency would be toward assimilation, toward the 



FORECAST 347 

elimination of annoying dissimilarities, above all, to- 
ward the extension of general jurisdiction over local 
Interests, a tendency toward that mechanization which 
the Teuton calls organization, and which It is the 
glory of the Anglo-Saxon to have avoided. It is to 
be hoped and it Is to be expected that in any emer- 
gency which may arise American interests will be rep- 
resented In the great Anglo-Saxon council, and that 
the influence of this greatest of the Anglo-Saxon na- 
tions will be measurably proportioned to Its import- 
ance. But for the present at least it Is better that 
that representation should be informal and of an 
emergency character, and that Anglo-Saxon unity 
should wear the aspect of a supreme privilege rather 
than that of an Irksome obligation. 

What, then, shall we do, we who are reconciled to 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity, as It emerges from the 
troubled twilight of our earlier history into the full 
light of our larger morning? Simply, recognize it as 
a fact. It will be a shortsighted statesmanship that 
forgets even for a moment that we are but a part of 
a larger people, that Imagines that Britain can be for 
us merely a nation among the nations. Doubtless in 
the great majority of our affairs we shall be, and 
should be, as independent of Britain as New York Is 
independent of California, but in matters that con- 
cern the fate of our race and our common civilization, 
such Independence will be impossible, for It would be 
suicidal. To distinguish between these two classes 
of Interests is one of the nice questions which will 
more and more be the test of American statesman- 
ship. 



348 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

It is in the light of this larger unity that we must 
settle certain vexed questions that from a purely 
American standpoint seem to admit of no satisfactory 
solution. Such is the presence of Britain in the Car- 
ibbean where her possessions completely dominate the 
situation. In view of our anxiety to exclude Ger- 
many and possibly other powers from this region, it 
has not unnaturally occurred to some whose vision is 
bounded by a purely American horizon, that it would 
be well to secure the withdrawal of Britain as well. 
And since an American occupation of the Philippines 
is utterly unstrategic from an American point of view, 
what more natural than to arrange an exchange of 
the latter for Jamaica, British Guiana, and the 
numerous other British possessions in this quarter? 
This would complete our control of the Caribbean 
and would relieve us of dangerous obligations in the 
Far East. The argument is conclusive if we accept 
its initial assumption that we are a separate people, 
destined to work out our salvation in equal aloofness 
from all other peoples. To an isolated America 
the Philippines are a weakness, the British possessions 
in the Caribbean a menace. 

But while these possessions do not fit at all into 
an American scheme of things, they fit perfectly into 
an Anglo-Saxon policy. The divided ownership of 
the West Indies simply insures so much the more per- 
fectly that both peoples will guard this vital point in 
their communications, while the Philippines, standing 
as the natural outpost of British Oceanica as it faces 
the great Mongolian East, again assure joint protec- 
tion of interests vital to the Anglo-Saxon unity. 



FORECAST 349 

But is this solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon race the 
end of the unifying process? Is the rest of mankind 
to be forever gentile, a menace to the unity and to 
the civilization of our race? Or is the process to go 
farther and a larger unity to result, and if so, how; 
along what lines; with what inclusions? Above all, 
what of the Teuton? Is his menace to be perpetual, 
or can he be crushed, or won over, or placated with 
some still unoccupied place in the sun? It is Impos- 
sible to avoid these questions, — equally impossible to 
give them more than the most tentative of answers. 
But even such an answer may have its value. 

The feeling is well nigh universal that the world 
tends toward some form of unity. Constructive 
thought simply balks at any other hypothesis. If it 
could be demonstrated that all unity was transient 
and that men were gravitating apart rather than to- 
gether, it is doubtful if the men of our day would 
take much interest In the outcome. The fact that 
men feel this way does not quite guarantee that It 
will work out this way, but it rather necessitates this 
idea as our working hypothesis, a hypothesis, more- 
over, to which any rational interpretation of history 
lends its support. 

There are two ways In which progress toward unity 
may be conceived and possibly promoted. The one 
is to assume all nations as equal and equally eligible, 
to take them, big and little, young and old. Barbarian, 
Scythian, bond and free, and get them to pool their 
issues, not all issues of course, but a few issues, the 
most vital and obvious, and then slowly to progress 
by getting more issues into the pool and tightening 



350 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

its grip upon them. That is a zvorthy Teutonic con- 
ception of political evolution. It is based on coercion, 
not on cohesion, on legal fiction, not on living fact. 
It makes no allowance for differences of character or 
situation. It covers with its guaranty alike those 
nations that stand as pillars of the firmament and 
those whose very existence is a stumbling block to 
civilization. Men are equal before the law, but does 
that make them equally eligible for membership In 
church or club or in the councils of industry or science ? 
It is equally preposterous to assume that the nations 
can be united for the very practical and perplexing 
purpose of maintaining the world's peace, on an as- 
sumption of equality and universal eligibility. If 
such a " league " is to succeed, some nations must be 
left out. Nations must grow together, not be hand- 
cuffed together, and only a union of those that have 
developed a cohesion of vital tissue can give the 
slightest promise of permanence or usefulness. 
These vital cohesions will be as unequal as the nations 
that they unite. The dream of a universal bond, 
slight at first, but slowly strengthening until it unites 
the weird medley of existing accidents into an all-em- 
bracing human brotherhood is a dream as delusive 
as it is unlovely. It can not be and it should not be. 
It would but perpetuate a vast aggregate inconven- 
ience and misfit, the very existence of which is a suf- 
ficient guaranty that it can never be. 

Progress toward human unity docs not come that 
way. Cohesion develops, here a little and there 
much and here again none at all. Nations will unite 
when they feel like it, and when they do not they will 



FORECAST 351 

stay apart, will even drift apart, for cleavage will be 
an occasional incident of cohesion, with discipline for 
the froward and destruction for the hopelessly per- 
verse. In the great arena of competition nations 
must demonstrate their capacity for nationhood and 
win the right to be. It is by the growth of such ag- 
gregates as the British Empire with admission from 
time to time of new candidates for its fellowship, 
whose vision has broadened to its world horizon and 
who have developed a fellowship of spirit with its 
live-and-let-live principle, that we shall progress to- 
ward human unity, not by such baseless artifices as 
a " league to enforce peace." 

We are then not to regard the Anglo-Saxon unity 
as a finality. That unity is even now not exclusively 
Anglo-Saxon. The Anglo-Saxon is paramount, but 
two thirds of the human material in the great com- 
bine are of other races. There is, — or will be, — 
room for more. Already there are signs of cohesion 
with other elements. Ignoring the present co-opera- 
tion with Latin and Slav, a co-operation which noth- 
ing but long centuries of unforced continuance can 
possibly develop into true cohesion, there are such 
obvious cases as Norway and Holland, countries in- 
timately associated with Britain in the intercourse of 
life and drawn to it by the constant menace of an 
aggression which they can not resist. Doubtless the 
last thing they are thinking of is entering the British 
Empire, but it should be clear by this time that the 
cohesion of which we speak involves no such efface- 
ment of state or institutions as it would to become 
a province of the German Empire. 



352 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

But our thought hurries incontinent to Germany, 
the supreme problem of the hour. Germany sees in 
herself, not in Britain, the nucleus of the new world 
order. She unhesitatingly decides that the British 
combination must be subservient or be dissolv^ed and 
its elements regrouped into a new formation. Never 
was a struggle so vast or so fundamental. Seldom 
have antagonists been so determined. What will be 
the outcome? Can Germany be crushed or democ- 
ratized into peace? Is there room for two such 
powers in the world? Must the struggle be post- 
poned only to be resumed with fuller resources in a 
greater Armageddon? 

Undoubtedly Germany will be democratized, pos- 
sibly is being democratized as these lines are written, 
but will that bring peace? Possibly for the moment, 
for the nations are weary, and internal changes might 
easily be made acceptable pretexts for calling a halt. 
But the hope at which men seem to be grasping that 
democracy will remove the cause of conflict is a de- 
lusion. The nations are not fighting for democracy 
but for existence and for dominion. The most im- 
perialist countries of the world during the past cen- 
tury have been the great democracies. Democracy 
is only a method of expressing the will of a people, 
and unless human nature has utterly broken with its 
past, the things that have looked good to men since 
history began are likely to seem good to them still. 
No passion has been more constant in the human race 
than the desire of peoples to extend the sway of their 
own ideals and their own ways as far as possible in 
the world. To assume that democracy will extinguish 



FORECAST 353 

this passion is to assume that it will extinguish 
human nature. Are not the democracies of the world 
even now fighting to discredit autocracy and, indi- 
rectly at least, to impose democracy, their way of 
governing and doing, upon a people for whom democ- 
racy is not as yet a necessity of self-expression? De- 
mocracy will not remove the Teuton menace. 

Can Germany be crushed? Perhaps so, but to 
what purpose? Germany is used to being crushed. 
Germany was crushed in the Thirty Years' War as no 
nation could now bring itself to crush another. In 
parts of her territory the population was reduced by 
ninety per cent. The whole land was devastated and 
the race began again at the bottom. Yet in the fol- 
lowing century Frederick the Great led this people to 
victories which threatened to shatter Europe. A few 
decades later Germany was ground under the heel of 
Napoleon until every spark of vitality seemed extinct. 
Yet Germans turned the tide at Waterloo and paved 
the way for the uprising of half a century later and 
for the world menace of today. As compared with 
these ordeals, the punishment that Germany is re- 
ceiving today, the utmost that decent enemies can in- 
flict upon her, is little more than a passing smart. 
Her population is essentially intact, the loss being 
hardly more than the normal increase of recent years. 
Her cities are uninjured, her factories are standing, 
and her whole industrial life essentially undisturbed. 
They will remain so, no matter what victory the allies 
may win. Nor is it at all probable that the much 
talked of policy of later economic repression will be 
attempted, or will succeed if attempted. 



354 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

No, there Is nothing to be hoped from crushing 
Germany. Crushing will keep her quiet for a season, 
but not for long. If the crushing that she got in the 
Thirty Years' War did not put a quietus on her effort, 
no subsequent crushing is likely to do so. With each 
rebuff she will only draw back into her shell, study 
the lesson of her defeat, recuperate her forces, or- 
ganize a larger portion of the vast raw humanity be- 
yond in support of her cause, and return to the charge 
with increased momentum and unabated purpose. It 
is not sure that she will ever succeed. It is not sure, 
alas, that she will not succeed. The one sure thing 
is that she will keep trying. Those who dream of a 
quiescent Germany as the result of anything the pres- 
ent war can accomplish, military triumph, political re- 
form, or paper promise, are cherishing a perilous de- 
lusion. 

What can save us from that perpetual and ever in- 
creasing menace from across the Channel? No 
power on earth save Germany herself. She will not 
accept the lot of a dependent power, nor would we in 
her place. She is too big to become a second Bel- 
gium. Her culture is too distinctive and too power- 
ful to be extinguished or surrendered for another. 
It Is useless to tell her that she still has room, that we 
bear her no malice. She must have more, must get 
it seemingly at our expense. And yet she must not, 
must not. Hence these forays that never conquer 
and these crushings that never subdue. 

Suppose a single authority were recognized from 
Inverness to Bagdad, through this danger zone of the 
world. What problems it would solve ! Belgium, 



FORECAST 355 

Holland, the Channel tunnel, the Balkans, the Dar- 
danelles, the Bagdad Railway, Persia, India, Egypt, 
the Suez Canal, — the list is endless. There is scarce 
a problem that vexes the Foreign Offices of Europe 
which it would not eliminate or simplify. 

Fantasy, of course. No such thing seems within 
the range of practical policy. Yet along the road 
that leads that way we must travel toward safety and 
power. Nothing else will save us from suicide; noth- 
ing else from being engulfed by the swarming East. 
No evil designs are imputed to Russia, China, or 
Japan, but designs have very little to do with it. 
Those great peoples, illimitable in numbers and en- 
dowed with resources unmatched in the west, must in- 
evitably pass through stages in their development in 
which war will be not uncongenial, stages in which the 
Zeitgeist will laugh at treaties and coronation oaths, 
and in which no mysticism of temperament or kindli- 
ness of heart will insure against the adolescence of 
their culture. What will these vast masses of hu- 
manity, with their redundant energy and their rudi- 
mentary scruple, do to a Europe engaged in the game 
of the Kilkenny cats? 

If this war is not to be fought utterly in vain, it 
must not preclude, — it must in some degree further, 
— an understanding between Teuton and Saxon. It 
would be, in the phrase of Thucydides, the saddest 
war in history if it jeopardized or postponed that re- 
sult. 

But does it jeopardize or postpone it ? On the con- 
trary, this war is the indispensable preliminary to 
an understanding. We know little of the negotia- 



356 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

tions looking to that end which have passed between 
the two countries in recent years, but it is inconceiv- 
able that any such negotiations should have been suc- 
cessful under the conditions that have hitherto pre- 
vailed. A temper, the most insufferable that history 
records, has obsessed the German nation, and that 
increasingly, for more than a generation. The term, 
Prussian militarism, by which it is popularly known, 
does not adequately express either its extent or its 
character. It is a temper that knows no co-opera- 
tion except vassalage, no leadership except domina- 
tion, no graciousness except patronage. In the his- 
torian and the diplomat, as in the soldier, it is a 
temper of bullying insolence. All round the planet 
during thirty years of travel the writer has watched 
this unspeakable rudeness of the German to those to 
whom deference and protection was due, has seen him 
oust women from their seats, bully the weak, and 
win by his fists what any but a Hottentot would dis- 
dain to accept save as the gift of courtesy. It is one 
of their own publicists who has said that the Germans 
are the best hated nation in Europe because they have 
no manners. 

It is the same in the field of intellect. There is an 
insolent cocksureness about German estimates of men 
and nations which hides under the mask of scholar- 
ship the most abysmal ignorance in the civilized 
world. It has vitiated the most laborious historical 
research on earth by making all the past a prepara- 
tion for the Hohenzollern apotheosis. This is ham- 
mered into the German all the way from the primer 
to the doctor's thesis. As an inevitable corollary, 



FORECAST 357 

the history of other nations Is travestied and their 
portrait drawn In caricature. Writes Professor 
Rudolph Huch In closing a summary of British and 
French civilization: "There are races which are in- 
capable of attaining a high humanity, Incapable of in- 
fluencing the world. Such nations are destined to 
hew wood and draw water for the dominant nations. 
If they can not fill this inferior office they must per- 
ish." This appreciative estimate of Germany's rivals 
may well be offset by Germany's modest estimate of 
herself, as expressed by Professor von Stengel, the 
eminent German authority on International law. 
When asked whether Germany would participate In 
conferences at the Hague after the war for the de- 
velopment of International law, he said " No "; that 
such conferences would be unnecessary under a " Ger- 
man peace." " The one condition of prosperous ex-- 
istence, especially for neutrals," he said, " Is submis- 
sion to our supreme direction. Under our overlord- 
ship all International law would become superfluous, 
for we of ourselves and instinctively give to each one 
his rights'* ^ 

It Is this spirit of arrogant provincialism, organiz- 
ing with perverse ingenuity its laboriously gathered 
facts, which has given Germany a diplomacy without 
finesse, a knowledge without insight, a cleverness with- 
out wisdom, and a might without dominion, Ger- 
many needs seaports and colonies and broad domains, 
but most of all she needs a change of heart. 

From this spirit which Is as hated on the banks of 
the Danube as It Is on the banks of the Thames, 

1 The italics are the writer's. 



358 AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 

nothing can save her except the chastening of over- 
whelming defeat. Lloyd George was right when he 
said that it was not enough to conquer Germany by 
hunger; that she must be beaten on her chosen ground 
and with the weapons in which she trusts. With this 
German temper there can be no compromise. Let us 
hope that its enemies will not falter. Woe to the 
man or nation that calls an untimely halt to this war 
so necessary for the Allies, for us, and for Germany 
herself. 

But when this spirit is exorcised, Germany will re- 
main, — prostrate, it may be, like the demoniac from 
whom the unclean spirit had been cast out, — but still 
there, always there, and holding, despite herself, the 
fate of Europe in her keeping. With such a Ger- 
many we must have an understanding. Political 
union is unthinkable, alliance probably impracticable, 
but somehow the habit of concert, the instinctive 
sense of common rather than of opposed interest, 
must grow up and come to dominate this danger zone 
of the world. Somehow this race which the world 
can not endure, and which yet the world can not spare, 
must learn to " accept equality and not seek domina- 
tion." The task is arduous and the consummation 
remote. The hardest part of the doing is the getting 
willing to have it done. But there is no other zcay. 

It is important to anticipate an objection which, 
despite all that has been said In the foregoing pages, 
is likely to suggest itself, an objection which the Ger- 
man is sure to express with lofty scorn. " What 
then is the superlative merit of your scheme of unify- 
ing the Germanic races as contrasted with ours? 



FORECAST 359 

The difference is merely that you want the English- 
man on top instead of the German." No, what we 
want is the EngHsh principle on top instead of the 
German. That principle is the principle of fellow- 
ship, not of feudalism. It leaves each one free to 
live his own hfe and think his own thoughts and go 
his own ways, and sees the power and the greatness 
of the fellowship in this liberty of its members. It 
is not as hewers of wood and drawers of water to a 
dominant nation that the United States and Australia 
and Canada take their place alongside Britain In the 
great Anglo-Saxon fellowship. It is not " submission 
to our supreme direction " to which Germany must 
consent as a condition of making common cause. 
Only under this freer organization of which Britain 
has given to the world the first working demonstra- 
tion, can we hope to be ourselves, — can Germany 
herself hope to find her place in the sun. 

For there are no more vacant places. Germany 
has said it. A schoolboy can see it. If Germany is 
to play that part in the world which her rich racial 
endowment warrants. It must be In the territories now 
occupied by the Anglo-Saxon race or within Its sphere 
of Influence. They are enough for both. Again 
Germany has said it, for she declares that under her 
leadership and organization all these peoples can find 
there happiness and prosperity. Let us hope as much 
under other leadership and with another and freer or- 
ganization. For though the world must be subdued 
to order, humanity must somehow still be free. 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 

Allusion has been made in the Preface to the article 
by the Earl of Cromer in the Yale Review for Jan- 
uary, 1917. This article is essentially a review of 
my earlier volume, of which this book is a sequel. 
The attitude of my distinguished critic is sufficiently 
indicated by his first reference to my book. Speak- 
ing of the problem of war and peace he says: 
" Nowhere is it discussed with greater thoroughness 
and acumen than in a very able work, entitled ' The 
Things Men Fight For,' written by Professor 
Powers. . . . His book may, therefore, usefully be 
taken as a text upon which to dilate upon some of the 
proposals which have recently been under discus- 
sion." This favourable attitude is amply confirmed 
by the discussion which follows. It is in grateful 
appreciation of this estimate rather than in the spirit 
of controversy that I venture a few words of explana- 
tion. 

He begins with a kindly correction of " some minor 
errors of fact " which he generously adds " in no 
way detract from the value " of the work. I had 
spoken of a plebiscite having been taken in the Ionian 
Islands in 1864 previous to their surrender to Greece 
and he says: " I was at that time on the staff of Sir 
Henry Storks, the last of the British Lord High 
Commissioners. . . . Although I am only speaking 

363 



364 APPENDIX 

from personal recollection of events which occurred 
more than fifty years ago, I think I may state with 
confidence that no plebiscite of the whole population 
was taken." To be set right by such a man, himself 
an actor in those far away events, was an unlocked 
for honour. I accepted his statement at once as 
wholly conclusive, the more willingly perhaps, that 
this supposed plebiscite had seemed to lend colour to 
a modern proposal in which I had no confidence. 

Curiously enough I chanced to be reading at the 
time the " Memories " of Lord Redesdale, which had 
recently appeared, followed almost immediately by 
the author's death. Lord Redesdale was for more 
than half a century in the service of the British gov- 
ernment, most of the time in the Foreign Office. Al- 
most simultaneously with the reading of Lord Crom- 
er's article I came upon the passage (Vol. I, pp. 
324-7) in which Lord Redesdale describes his visit 
to Corfu in November, 1864, the year of the British 
withdrawal. In this brief passage he refers three 
times to the " plebiscite," using that term, and even 
reports at some length the reasons given by a local 
priest for voting as he did. Here we have the testi- 
mony of two contemporary witnesses, both of the 
highest competency, yet in direct disagreement. Such 
is the problem of the historian. 

More significant is Lord Cromer's criticism of my 
suggestion that the Italian expedition against Tripoli 
was undertaken with the connivance of Britain. As 
the point is of some importance, I venture to quote 
the statement to which exception is taken. 

" Tripoli was a nominal dependency of Turkey, 



APPENDIX 365 

and its seizure by Italy involved war with that coun- 
try. Egypt, though under British control, was also 
in name a part of the Turkish Empire, and as such, 
pledged to support the cause of its suzerain. The 
position of Britain in Egypt was peculiarly calculated 
to show her hand. If she wished Tripoli to remain 
Turkish, she had but to permit Egypt to aid Turkish 
arms, or merely to open Egypt to the passage of 
Turkish troops, and Italian conquest would become 
impossible. Britain could have plausibly explained 
that she was merely permitting an unquestioned right, 
and refraining from interference in a matter in which 
she had no concern. On the other hand, her actual 
control of Egypt enabled her to close that country to 
the passage of troops under the equally plausible pre- 
text of insuring its tranquillity, and her own neutral- 
ity, thus assuring Italian success in turn. She chose 
the latter alternative, against strong pressure from 
both Turkey and Egypt itself. Britain did not dis- 
approve the seizure. Indeed, when we recall the fact 
that the masterful Lord Kitchener, whom the 
Egyptians were wont to obey, was sent by an un- 
friendly British cabinet to rule that country, and that 
the Italian expedition was launched immediately after 
his arrival, it is difficult not to see In the move the 
masterly hand of British diplomacy." 

To this last statement Lord Cromer takes excep- 
tion. " Nothing Is more certain," he tells us, " than 
that Italian policy in connection with Tripoli was 
wholly due to Italian Initiative, and that the British 
government, far from encouraging, rather dis- 
couraged the project." To have allowed the passage 



2,66 APPENDIX 

of Turkish troops through Eg)'pt " would have con- 
stituted an unfriendly act to a nation to whom we are 
bound alike by past traditions, political sympathy, 
and present Interests, whilst on the other hand, events 
in Turkey had wholly alienated British sympathies 
from the Ottoman government." 

Yes, beyond a doubt. I should be the last to sug- 
gest that Britain ought to have favoured Turkey. 
She has done that once too often as It Is. My sug- 
gestion that Britain had a hand In the transaction 
was not in the least In the nature of a criticism. No 
British government in its senses could have decided 
differently. But I submit that if Britain's Interests 
and sympathies had inclined her toward Turkey, she 
would have had a perfectly plausible excuse for con- 
struing Egypt as a part of the Turkish Empire as in 
theory she had always consistently done, and using it 
to Italy's undoing. She showed her hand by her deci- 
sion In this matter, a perfectly right decision, but none 
the less one that revealed her policy. If her hand 
was not in the transaction, It should have been there. 

But Lord Cromer says the move was made wholly 
on Italian initiative and that It was rather discouraged 
than encouraged by the British government. Lord 
Cromer certainly knew, and his word Is unimpeacha- 
ble. Does this contradict my assumption? 

It has been settled at least since 1 88 i that Italy had 
a reversionary right to Tripoli. All Europe knew 
the decision. The time and manner of occupation of 
course would depend on circumstances. The habit- 
ual attitude of Italy was that of straining at the leash. 
That of Europe, and particularly of France and Eng- 



APPENDIX 367 

land, was one of caution. They feared trouble with 
their Moslem populations. No doubt the proposal 
to seize Tripoli emanated from Italy, and no doubt 
Britain advised caution. None knew better than 
Britain that whatever the Immediate outcome, the 
policy of excluding Germany from northern Africa 
must ultimately result In war with that country. She 
foresaw and accepted these consequences, but she de- 
ferred the catastrophe by every means in her power. 
Is It unplausible to conclude that Britain both wel- 
comed and dreaded the seizure of Tripoli by Italy, 
that in common with other powers, she had long been 
committed to that arrangement, and yet that when 
the moment came she always saw reasons for caution 
and " far from encouraging, rather discouraged the 
project"? If statesmen are at all like other mor- 
tals, such a contradiction between permanent policy 
and the policy of the moment would be most natural. 
Moreover Lord Cromer's statement Implies but a 
very mild dissuasion on Britain's part, and one which 
undoubtedly yielded to Italian argument and impor- 
tunity long before the blow was struck. When that 
moment came, the coincidence of British and Italian 
action was one not easily explained as the result of 
accident. 

The remaining strictures of the article may be 
summed up In the single statement that I have made 
out too much of a case for Germany. This Lord 
Cromer attributes to my excessive desire to be im- 
partial, since he recognizes that my sympathy for the 
cause of the Allies Is in no doubt. In particular my 
recognition of a certain reasonableness In Germany's 



368 APPENDIX 

claim to Holland and Belgium because their ports 
are the natural outlets for her industrial districts and 
because their population is Germanic, arouses his 
British susceptibilities. He characterizes the ethno- 
logical argument as " miserably weak. " and asserts 
that it does not justify German annexation. He cu- 
riously overlooks the fact that I reach the same con- 
clusion in the passage referred to, where I express 
the opinion that "the two countries (Holland and 
Belgium) offer a base of possible offence against 
Britain which must not on any account be allowed to 
pass into German hands." I have been emphatic 
throughout my book in asserting that the ethnological 
argument is always weak when it is in conflict with 
the more permanent fact of geographical unity, or 
the vital needs of commerce and national defence. 
Significantly enough, when the argument gets away 
from Belgium, my distinguished critic thinks that I 
*' exaggerate " " the difficulties of drawing ethnic 
frontiers," and urges that " if Italians ruled in the 
Trentino, and Austria were no longer to be allowed 
to exercise its Germanizing influence over unwilling 
Slavs, one cause of European disturbance would be 
eliminated." Yes, and another cause of disturbance 
would be introduced, whether less or greater, only 
experience can teach us. That Italy should have the 
Trentino, I have emphatically maintained. The 
ethnological argument here coincides with the great 
interests of commerce and defence. All argument is 
one way. But whether the break-up of the Austrian 
empire and the formation of ethnic states in that 
much troubled region would conduce to the world's 



APPENDIX 369 

peace I very much doubt. A glance at the ethno- 
graphical map of the Balkans Is not reassuring. The 
trouble is that ethnic Interests are here not In har- 
mony with commercial and strategic Interests, but In 
conflict with them. Moreover ethnic frontiers here 
are not definite. Perhaps some one can tell where 
the line comes between Greek and Bulgarian, between \ 
Hungarian and Roumanian, between Slav and Ger- \ 
man, but It Is doubtful If any one could persuade the ^ 
peoples themselves to accept his conclusion. My 
statement that the Austrian government Is " Indispen- 
sable " is criticized as unproved. The proof Is In the 
obvious fact that It normally keeps ten quarrelsome 
nationalities at peace, which would otherwise almost 
certainly be at war. 

My great critic is after all British, and I respect 
him for allowing his patriotism to colour his reason- 
ing. If Britain is to exist, Belgium must be kept from 
German control and the great scheme of Mlttel- 
Europa must be checkmated. This last can be ac- 
complished, so the Allies believe, only by dissolving 
the polyglot state which Germany has made subser- 
vient to her ends. The ethnic argument here favours 
Britain's contention and Lord Cromer looks upon It 
with favour. In the case of Belgium ethnic consid- 
erations favour Germany, and he considers the 
argument " miserably weak." I believe It to be weak 
In both cases. If the temporary playing up of the 
ethnic factor In the Balkans can help to thwart the 
most baneful designs that have ever menaced human- 
ity, I most willingly subscribe to it, but though that 
may save the world. It will not save the Balkans. 



370 APPENDIX 

Their hope lies, not in the maintenance of perfectly 
inconsequential ethnic ditiercnces which are at odds 
with both commercial and strategic interests, but in 
assimilation and union. I wish a single power ruled 
ev^ry inch of territory from Bohemia to Constanti- 
nople, but I do not wish Germany to be that power, 
nor any state that is, or may become, subservient to 
her. The ethnic argument may be good policy here, 
but I believe it to be fundamentally unsound. The 
formation of ethnic states in the Balkans can be at 
best only a temporary expedient, a concession to race 
individuality in a situation where counter claims over- 
whelmingly predominate and where, in the interest of 
civilization, these claims must eventually be recog- 
nized. It is infinite pity that Germany can not be 
permitted to unify, even with a degree of compulsion, 
this divided and yet indivisible outpost of Europe, 
Yet nothing is more certain than that she cannot be 
trusted with this task and with the guardianship of 
our citadel until she can cease " swash-buckling 
through the streets of Europe." Until then we must 
temporize. Perhaps, too, It Is a necessity of our 
nature that we should urge our makeshifts under the 
sanctions of a general philosophy, however fallacious. 
The unqualified endorsement of ethnic claims seems 
to me to be such a procedure. 

One suggestion of Lord Cromer fills me with the 
keenest regret that his thought could not have been 
more fully disclosed. I was on the point of asking 
for this fuller statement when I learned that his voice 
had passed into eternal silence. He speaks of him- 
self as " an Englishman, who would certainly not. In 



APPENDIX 371 

the ordinary colloquial language of the day, be classed 
as a democrat by his own countrymen, but who is, 
nevertheless, a strong supporter of those liberal in- 
stitutions which are the outward and visible signs of 
every democratic form of government." Referring 
to my statement that " modern peoples are more bel- 
ligerent than their governments, for their passions are 
less restrained by knowledge of difficulties," he says: 
" If this view be correct, it, of course, cuts away the 
ground from under the feet of those who look to an 
extension of democratic Institutions as the best safe- 
guard against the occurrence of war. But is It cor- 
rect? It certainly can not be proved to be false, and 
the experience of history rather points to the con- 
clusion that It Is true. Nevertheless, it Is not unduly 
optimistic, to hold that present symptoms appear to 
indicate that the trend of democratic opinion will in 
the near future be peaceful rather than bellicose." 

I know no more fascinating subject for speculation 
than that suggested in this last sentence. Nor do I 
know any man who has lived in my day whose opinion 
is entitled to more respect In such matters than Eng- 
land's greatest administrator whose judgments were 
based on half a century of successful experience in 
the governing of men. What were the " symptoms " 
which led him to hope that democracy was about to 
reverse the teachings of history and become *' peace- 
ful rather than bellicose"? He has given us no 
hint, and I strive in vain to discern them.^ The 
democracies of Athens and Rome, of Britain and 
France and America, have all been aggressively im- 
perialist. Class struggles for the moment absorb the 



372 APPENDIX 

attention of modern democratic peoples, and war is 
decried, not in the interest of peace, but in the inter- 
est of other war. I can not believe that peace so 
motived is really peace, or that the shifting of the 
struggle from race to class is any great gain to con- 
temporary humanity. I believe in democracy, but 
not as a panacea. It gives us freedom, but it does 
not give us peace. It so happens that in the present 
struggle democracy is lined up against autocracy. 
The coincidence is impressive but I believe it to be 
accidental. In a war between the democratic and 
the autocratic powers, democracy is incidentally at 
stake, but democracy is not the issue. With all defer- 
ence to Lord Cromer's opinion, I can not resist the 
conclusion that here as in the " ethnic argument," he 
is unconsciously influenced by considerations of policy. 
Chance has willed that at last the slogan of democracy 
should appeal to all the Allies. But I believe that 
Raemakers, the most scathing critic of German au- 
tocracy that the war has produced, was nearer right 
when he said that if Germany were a republic to- 
morrow with Liebknecht or Scheidemann for presi- 
dent, her relation to the other powers would not be 
essentially modified. A change in the form of gov- 
ernment neither creates nor indicates a change of 
heart in the matter which here concerns us. Democ- 
racy and imperialism are concurrent movements in 
the life of our time, perhaps of every progressive 
time. They compete actively for the interest, the 
sympathy, and the finite energies of their constituen- 
cies, but the two movements are not logically opposed, 



APPENDIX 373 

and it is vain to attempt to stay the one by hastening 
the other. The temper of democracy is neither con- 
cessive nor altruistic. What reason is there to be- 
lieve that it will prove pacific? 



INDEX 



^ 



Africa, 143, 165, 257, 295-8, 367 
Agadir, 151 
Alaska, 61-2, 89-91, 97 
Algeria, 151 
Arbitration, 52, 68, 344 
Argentina, 171-3, 305-6 
Ashburton, 53 
Australia, 315, 326, 359 
Austria, 259-65, 323, 368-70 
Autocracy, 2, 203 

Beecher, Henry Ward, 334 
Bismarck, 36, 303 
Brazil, 172, 188, 305-8 
Britain, British Empire, see 
England 

California, 60, 64, 76, 341 
Canada, 47, 65, 90-1, 93> i"» 

199, 315-7, 326-7, 359 
Canal, see Panama 
Caribbean, 85, 120, 124, 141-52. 

154-7, 160, 162, 258, 348 
Central America, 136-40, 156, 

186 
China, Chinese, 212, 215, 228, 

238, 248, 256, 258, 298-302, 

340-2, 355 
Cleveland (President), 95 
Colombia, 152, 237 
Colonies, 15-26, 32-8 
Congo, 181, 188, 257 
Costa Rica, 139 
Cromer, 53, 336, 363-73 
Cuba, 49-51, 86, 101-6, 108, 112- 

23, 127-33, 141-2, 155, 187 

Danish Islands, 91-2, 109, m, 

150, 246, 248, 307 
Democracy, 2, 3, 4, 203-5, 370-3 
Denmark, 247-8 



Egypt, 28, 102, 114-5, 131, 151, 
186-7, 246, 257, 318, 336, 355, 

365-7 
England, 15-38, 42-4, 46, 59-68, 
99, 144-5, 151, 192, 277, 311- 
44, 357 

Florida, 43-6, 48-51, 56, 58, 70- 

71, 84, no, 172 
France, French, 20-2, 40, 73-4, 

88, 145-6, 151, 254-8, 277, 

297, 332, 336, 357 

Gadsden purchase, 80-2 

Germany, 39, 99, 127, 129, 147- 
55, 223, 247, 264-5, 271-2, 
274, 310, 319, 323, 335-8, 
351-9, 367-70, 372 

Gladstone, 334 

Grant, 92-3 

Guani, 107-8 

Guiana, 144, 147, 348 

Hawaii, 94-9, 107-9 

Hayti, 129-36, 155, 159, 186, 192. 

197 
Holland, 147-8, 244, 248-9, 293- 

94, 351, 355, 368 
Honduras, 128, 139 
Hungary, 260-5 

Imperial Council, 322-3, 344-7 
Imperial federation, 322 
India, 319-20, 322, 355 
Indians, 18-20, 25, 171 
Ireland, 312-13 

Italy, 244, 252-4, 297, 324, 345, 
368 

Japan, 9, 143, 150, 211-39, 299- 

301, 355 
Jefferson, 46, 49, 51, 58, 86, 87 



375 



376 



INDEX 



Kitchener, 365 
Korea, 215-9, 246 

Latin America, 3, 166-74, 197, 

219, 252, 302, 304-6 
Lewis and Clark, 59 
Louisiana, 45, 47, 70, 255, 341 

Maine, 52-3 
Manila, see Philippines 
McKinley, 102 

Mexico, 71-82, 85, 88, no, 152-4, 

168, 187, 199, 219-20, 255, 332 

Mississippi (river), 43, 45, 51, 

56 
Monroe Doctrine, 7, 49, 88, 129, 
162, 166, 198, 240, 303 

Napoleon, 45-6, 254, 331, 353 
New Brunswick, 52-3, 340 
New Orleans, 46 
Nicaragua, 128, 134-40, 150, 198 

Oceanica, 293, 348 
Oregon, 59-68, 72, 340 

Panama, ni, 123, 187, 197, 307 
Pan-Americanism, 158-74 
Parliament, 31-8, 321, 327 
Philippines, 104-7, ^44~S. 158, 

161-2, 191-3, 269, 319, 337-9, 

341. 348 
Piatt Amendment, 112, 115-21, 

131-2, 197 
Polk, 65-6, 78 
Population, 214-5, 279-81 
Porto Rico, 103-4, 106, 108, 341 
Portugal, 151, 208, 244-5, 307 



Puritans, 15-8 
Futuraayo, 181 

Quebec, 22 

Raemakers, 372 
Redesdale, 364 
Representation, 31, 34 
Roman Empire, 29-31, 158 

Salvador, 139 

Samoa, 98-100, 107-8, 158 

Santo Domingo, 92-4, 123, 126- 

30, 133, 141, 155, i86, 192, 198 
Seward, 89-92, 94, 95, 109 
Slavery, 66-7, 72-3, 332 
Spain, 21, 42-50, 54, 59, 61, 96, 

100-7, 244, 250-2, 335 

Taft, 128 

Texas, 48, 71-7, 332 

Treaties of Peace, with England, 

42, 331; with Mexico, 76-9; 

with Spain, 100 
Tripoli, 151, 364-7 
Tropics, 175-93 
Tutuila, see Samoa 

Vancouver, 63 
Venezuela, 149, 152, 307 

Washington (state), 62-3 

Webster, 53, 84-5 

West Indies, 45, 84, 112, 199, 

348 
Whitman, 64 

Yazou Lands, 44 



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